



Taxes and Trust is the first book on taxes to focus on trust and the
first work of social science to concentrate on how tax policy actually
gets implemented on the ground in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. It
highlights the nuances of the transitional Ukraine case and explains
precisely how and why that ‘borderland’ country differs from the
more ideal types of coercive Russia and compliance-oriented Poland.
Through eight bespoke taxpayer surveys, an unprecedented survey
of bureaucrats and more than fifteen years of qualitative research, it
emphasizes the building and accumulation of trust in the transition
from a coercive tax state to a compliant one. The content of the book
will appeal to students and scholars of taxation worldwide and to those
who study Russia and Eastern Europe.
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1 From a Coercive to a Modern Tax State
The image of the state is formed in citizens’ eyes by the tax inspector, the
customs man, the cop. While they’re on the take, people won’t believe the
sincerity of our anti-corruption intentions.
– Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko in his first State of the
Nation Address, 4 June 20151
The Puzzle
Of all the activities that a state takes up, collecting taxes is, perhaps, the
most critical. Without extracting revenue from society, a state cannot
function and cannot do what it sets out to do. Taxation is the sine qua
non of the contemporary state and the social contract. When taxpayers
pay their taxes, they enter into a financial relationship with their state,
a financial reconciliation, if you will, relinquishing private information
about their economic activities while trusting the state to treat them and
that information fairly and confidentially.
Taxation is a prime governance function, but it is also one of the
only activities where the state and society are forced to interact with one
another, and it is one of the few in which citizens have an obligation to
give something up to the state. Tax compliance, therefore, is both about
revenue extraction for the benefit of state coffers and about an opportu-
nity for citizens to enter into a trusting relationship with their state – one
that will be repeated year after year.
At the extremes, there are, perhaps, two ways in which this process can
be done. In the first, those of us who file tax declarations have become
familiar with the yearly ritual of gathering up receipts and filling out tax
forms or filing electronically from the comfort of our own living rooms,
sometimes even seeking assistance from a local tax office, replete with
help desks. We may be a bit worried about being audited, but don’t have
too much concern. In other places, however, groups of men, dressed
1 Bershidsky.
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in black, donning eye masks and sporting automatic rifles, are known
to burst into the offices of major local and international firms, banks,
non-governmental organizations, human rights groups and even private
homes, searching for financial data and records. Today’s twenty-first cen-
tury teched-up mafia? No, it’s just the tax police.
The question that stands before many transitional and developing
states across the globe and the puzzle at the heart of this book is whether
such coercive methods are most effective in getting what the state wants.
And, if not, how does a state transition from a deterrent/coercive state to a
legal/legitimate tax state? A modern tax system is all about a modern econ-
omy, and the legacy of successful tax reform is a modern, legal and legit-
imate state capable of administering tax policy.
This book focuses on three states at three distinctly different stages of
the transition from a coercive governing regime to such a state. Poland
has transitioned successfully to a rule-of-law tax state, implementing
client-oriented tax collection policies to ensure high levels of compli-
ance. Russia employs a largely coercive tax system that enjoys moderate
levels of tax compliance. Ukraine, meanwhile, has failed to build a tax
state that is either effectively coercive or legitimate in the eyes of its citi-
zens, resulting in lower levels of compliance. In essence, Poland has been
more effective because it has a state that is more organized, embodied
with more resources and more citizen-focused and a society that is more
capable of being a compliant partner. Effective governance occurs when
state and society interact through trust in a dualistic process.
The true test for countries taking up a fresh-start approach towards
altering state–society relations lies in whether the state institutions, agen-
cies and bureaucracies – the real heart and guts of the state apparatuses
that sit below the elites and interact with citizens at street level – can be
reformed and made less corrupt. This was critical for Poland in 1989,
and it is vital for Ukraine today. Through a unique series of taxpayer
surveys, this book, like no other, defines in the context of its neighbours
the heart of Ukraine’s governance crisis as lying in the extraordinarily
long-term low levels of trust in their state on the part of Ukrainians.
Reforming the tax administration now as part of a larger vision to over-
haul the state’s relationship with the public would help build a healthier
state, capable of implementing its goals for the long run. Such reforms
would be truly transformational.
Governance across Central and Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union
In many ways, the debate across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union over whether and how to transition to a legal, legitimate tax state
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is part of the larger, intense debate that has erupted over the past two
and a half decades regarding what tasks the state should and should not
take up in economic, social and political life. Overstretching the role of
the state in society ultimately led to the region’s regime crises in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Yet simply shrinking the size and scope of the
state’s activities may not be a magic panacea, either. For if the state fails
to perform well, the dual paths towards a consolidated democracy and
a thriving market economy are at risk of derailment. It is clear that a
state need not be as big as in Soviet times to fulfil essential tasks and
to provide basic public goods. Yet, regardless of how one defines the
appropriate limits of the state sector, one must question whether a state
is, in fact, capable of doing what it sets out to do.
By focusing on the capacity to ensure tax compliance, this book asks
why some transitional states prove more effective in administering policy
than others. Specifically, why has the Polish state possessed a capacity
to function in ways that the Russian and Ukrainian states have been less
capable of? The truly puzzling variation in the capacity of states that
once governed so extensively to ensure tax compliance demands further
inquiry.
State capacity has varied widely across the post-communist region
since the transitions across the two post-socialist regions began with
the 1989 revolutions in the Soviet satellite states of Central and East-
ern Europe (CEE) and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.
In estimating the levels of governance across these regions, it is impor-
tant to see how these states rank with respect to worldwide governance.
The World Bank has created a statistical compilation of some 352 vari-
ables measuring perceptions of a wide range of quality of governance
issues drawn from thirty-two sources and thirty different organizations.2
One indicator, ‘government effectiveness,’ combines responses on the
quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from
political pressures and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to policies.
To capture the variation in post-communist governance and the abil-
ity to implement state policy goals, Figure 1.1 presents the World Bank’s
government effectiveness indicators for Poland, Russia and Ukraine and
the averages for the fifteen EU member states prior to the 2004 expan-
sion eastward, for the Eastern Europe and Baltics region and for the
2 The Governance Indicators are presented in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi. The data
are available at www.govindicators.org. A similar source for data is the Quality of Gov-
ernance Institute’s dataset at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, available at http://
qog.pol.gu.se/data.
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Figure 1.1 World Bank government effectiveness global rankings for
Poland, Russia and Ukraine and averages for Eastern Europe and the
Baltics, the former Soviet Union and the EU-15 countries, country per-
centile rankings (0–100), 1996–2014
former Soviet Union region. Poland ranks just above the average level
of government effectiveness for the Eastern Europe and Baltics region.
Meanwhile, Russia’s level of effective governance ranks higher than the
average of the former Soviet Union states, and is behind, since 1996,
only Armenia and, since 2005, Georgia as well. At the same time, Russia
has ranked lower than all the states in Eastern Europe and the Baltics in
the World Bank survey, with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina. While
it nearly always ranked lower than Russia, Ukraine did score higher than
the former Soviet Union region average up until 2007, when it slipped
below that average.
Other studies find similar results in terms of how Poland, Russia and
Ukraine rank on governance issues. Jessica Fortin constructed a quan-
titative index of state capacity from the first post-communist year to
2006 based on tax capacity (measured by taxes collected as a percent-
age of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)), property rights enforcement,
contract-intensive money (ratio of currency to bank deposits), corrup-
tion and infrastructure reform. While Chapter 4 of this book will ques-
tion whether taxes collected as a percentage of GDP are the best measure
for the extractive capacity of a state, Fortin does come up with a ranking
quite similar to that of the World Bank – namely, one in which Poland is
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in the top five post-communist countries, while Russia ranks both lower
than all CEE states and higher than almost all other FSU states, with
Ukraine leading the bottom third of post-communist states.3
Why Poland? Why Russia? Why Ukraine?
Selecting Poland, Russia and Ukraine as cases provides for a classic John
Stuart Mill comparative design by capturing the region’s variations in the
capacity of the state to implement policy (here, the capacity to ensure
tax compliance) and by providing for a controlled comparison in order
to assess whether the culture and legacies of state–society relations or
internal institutional history and design hold more causal weight.
All three states, two of which were part of the same state, the USSR,
tried to govern very extensively under communism. While Russia has had
the best governance in the former Soviet Union, it has had poorer levels
of governance than other post-communist states and developed states.
Poland, meanwhile, also has been one of the more capable states in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the largest post-communist state in that
region, both in size and in population. Further, while it had less influ-
ence from the European Union in reforming its bureaucracies than other
contemporaneous prospective entrants did, Poland did receive signifi-
cant external financial and technical assistance, like Russia and Ukraine.
Choosing, then, Poland, Russia and Ukraine as cases for close study
allows a comparison to be made with respect to the largest country in
each of the twin post-communist regions and allows a comparison to be
made between the most effective post-Soviet state, an average perform-
ing post-Soviet state, and a successful former Soviet satellite state with
respect to providing for good governance.
Moreover, many of the problems that have plagued Russia and
Ukraine and other post-communist states have been a burden to Poland
as well, posing a real puzzle to explain the variance in governance out-
comes. Specifically, like those in Russia and Ukraine, the transition has
not been free of poverty or corruption in Poland either. First, the tran-
sition to the market economy has meant the loss of jobs for many Poles.
Unemployment in 2003, for example, was as high as about 20 per cent.4
Inequality, while not as great as in Russia and Ukraine, has been grow-
ing in Poland, and a mid-2000s World Bank report suggested that such
growing inequality has contributed to an increase in the number of those
3 Fortin, p. 673.
4 Data obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit <www.economist.com>.
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below the poverty line.5 Second, as in Russia and Ukraine, fortunes were
made in the immediate aftermath of the transition from the command
economy when individuals, often with ties to state officials, took advan-
tage of ambiguity in the law. Third, those who were a part of the com-
munist regime in Poland, even those who worked in pre-1989 security
services, were not purged from participating in current state activity.6
Finally, high levels of corruption did exist within the communist-era
Polish and Soviet states.
Given the variation in state capacity between Poland and Russia, the
Ukraine case becomes necessary. By including Ukraine – a state that is
similarly unitary in structure and more analogous in geographical and
population size to Poland, but one that has a history and a culture more
like those of post-Soviet Russia – in the case selection, aspects that dif-
ferentiate Poland’s state capacity from that of the post-Soviet cases can
be isolated while controlling for the size and federalist structure of Rus-
sia. The unique presence of a sociopolitical cleavage between Ukraine’s
provinces, some of whose histories trace back to Polish or Russian rule
or both, allows a more focused study on how such differences, which
are not as easily discernible in Poland or Russia, can make an impact on
state–society relations.
Hence, choosing Poland as a case for comparison with Russia and
Ukraine provides opportunities to elucidate obstacles to effective post-
communist governance and to define what approaches can realistically
work within the confines of a difficult dual transition to democracy and
a market economy.
The Study of the State, Post-Socialism and
Tax Collection
By its very nature, this study addresses issues raised by those who have
recognized that the ‘state should be brought back in’ to the study of
political science and the pursuit of economic development. Those study-
ing the state, such as Atul Kohli, Joel Migdal and Theda Skocpol, have
underscored the importance of states possessing the capability to imple-
ment official goals.7
In particular, several scholars, such as Michael Mann, Peter Evans and
James Rauch, have emphasized the importance of ‘Weberian bureau-
cracies’, which possess certain personnel characteristics, office struc-
tures and an autonomous relationship to the wider society, as significant
5 World Bank (2005a), cited in Ash, p. 24. 6 Michnik; Ash, p. 24.
7 See, for example, Kohli and Shue; Migdal, 1987; Migdal, 1994; Migdal, 1997; Skocpol,
1979; and Skocpol, 1985.
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criteria in ensuring policy outcomes.8 International aid organizations
such as the World Bank and the US Agency for International Devel-
opment also have begun to recognize that good governance and effec-
tive institutional infrastructures are required in order for countries to
develop. Indeed, in a macro analysis of twenty-five transitional states for
the World Bank, Nauro F. Campos has found that there is a strong cor-
relation between the quality of bureaucracy in a particular country and
its level of development, as measured by life expectancy.9 By comparing
state bureaucracies in three countries, this project contributes to these
literatures by identifying the ingredients for building a capable state.
In particular, this study contributes to the ongoing dialogue regard-
ing the impact of neo-liberal economic reform programs on state insti-
tutions. Since the early 1990s, neo-liberal advisors to former commu-
nist states, such as Jeffrey Sachs and Anders Åslund, have focused on
choosing the ‘right’ reform policies to construct a market economy in
order to pre-empt a drawn-out process to create new institutions.10 The
neo-liberal advisors to the newly democratic states believed that insti-
tutions to protect property rights in the marketplace would be created
through self-interest only after a propertied class was established. On the
other hand, Peter Murrell and Adam Przeworski have argued that shock
therapy advocates assume erroneously that new formal structures and
institutions, necessary for the implementation of any comprehensive eco-
nomic reforms, can be built without the inclusion of society.11 Largely
because the old institutions cannot handle the new way of doing busi-
ness, these shock therapy critics argued for incorporating society – on
both a democratic and an economic level – so that new institutions grad-
ually can be supported by existing informal structures.
Part of the paradox of neo-liberal reforms was that their goal was to
keep the post-communist state small in order to allow market forces to
arise. ‘The debate between shock therapists and gradualists that centred
on the issue of the pace of liberalization overlooked the crucial impor-
tance of institutions for economic growth’, economist Vladimir Popov
has written.12
State administrations and bureaucracies, indeed, are needed to reg-
ulate a market economy. The types and natures of bureaucracies that
develop in post-communist settings are important to market reforms. In
particular, new, complex institutions such as a central bank and com-
mercial bank network, a finance ministry, a system of commercial law, a
8 See, for example, Evans, 1995; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Mann, 1986; and Mann, 1993.
9 Campos. 10 Åslund, 1995; and Sachs, 1994.
11 Murrell; and Przeworski, 1991. 12 Popov, 2000, p. 56.
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court system and a tax collection system must be built prior to or along
with the adoption of neo-liberal reforms so that the market can work.
Even the main pillar of shock therapy, privatization, requires institutions
to ensure that the process goes properly. Further, social welfare institu-
tions need to be effective in easing the burden imposed on the population
throughout the changeover.
Yet, despite the need for strong state institutions to foster the devel-
opment of such market forces, some post-Soviet states have had a rela-
tive weakening of the institutional capacity of the state. This study seeks
to add increased clarity to the larger debate over institution-building
in third-wave democracies undertaking economic consolidation by pro-
viding an analysis that explains why and to what extent state institu-
tions have been less effective in the post-Soviet cases than in Eastern
Europe.
Second, this research project bridges the gap between the East Euro-
pean and former Soviet Union area studies literatures. In this vein, this
work follows the examples of Valerie Bunce, M. Steven Fish, Philip
Roeder, Joshua A. Tucker and others who have been able to make sig-
nificant contributions to the study of regime collapse, democratization,
nationalism and voting behaviour precisely through the study of both
regions.13 Yet, as these scholars have examined different questions, no
one, to my knowledge, has looked comparatively in a book-length work
at the role of the state in the development of these two regions.
Some scholars have studied the role of the state either in Eastern
Europe or in the former Soviet Union. Herbert Kitschelt, for exam-
ple, has devised a theory on the new post-communist party systems in
Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic that relies upon the
assumption that post-communist bureaucracies vary in how they oper-
ate in each state.14 Similarly, Steven Solnick and Kathryn Stoner have
shown that Russia’s federalist system has created a lack of institutional
mechanisms for consolidation of the central state’s power in the 1990s.15
This book builds on the works of these scholars as it compares the roles
of the state in Poland, Russia and Ukraine.
Tax collection is a great policy arena to investigate the role and func-
tion of the state. Taxation is such a wonderful and increasingly pop-
ular topic for study in the social sciences precisely because it lies at
13 See, for example, Bunce, 1999; Fish, 1995; Fish, 1999; Roeder, 1993; Roeder, 1999;
and Tucker, 2006.
14 Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski and Tóka, 1999.
15 See, for example, Solnick, 1996; Solnick, 1997; Stoner-Weiss, 1997; and Stoner-Weiss,
1997.
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the centre of state–society interactions, at the heart of the fiscal state
and at the foundation of a successful market economy. Getting citizens
to pay taxes, in particular, presents a major, if not the central, prob-
lem for states pursuing greater economic development and growth. ‘It
is harder for states that fail to elicit high tax compliance to gain wide
approval, because the quality of public goods in such states dimin-
ishes’, writes Marcelo Bergman. ‘Conversely, higher compliance is self-
sustaining because it enables sound fiscal policies that promote improved
consent.’16
‘[T]axation is not so much a weight or a burden, imposed by one dis-
crete entity on another’, writes Yanni Kotsonis in his study on tax col-
lection in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union up to 1930. ‘[I]t is
equally a nexus where basic categories meet and reshape each other, and
a way to express and negotiate the tensions of a modern regime.’17 In the
Russian Empire of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Kotso-
nis argues that taxes always were about power, not about the purse. ‘In
hindsight, it is clear that arrests, exiles, tortures, beatings, and wholesale
reprisals avoided the point, if the point was the collection of taxes’, he
continues. ‘Either these measures were unrelated to increasing revenue
or they removed the delinquents from production and ensured that the
tax would not be paid at all, or they punished the wrong people. But
taxes were as much a matter of rule and spectacle. They were meant to
instil in the population a fear and respect of power, and they inscribed
legal distinctions in status by dividing the population into taxable and
non-taxable estates.’18 Hence, the collection of taxes, for which different
regimes in different points of time have developed their own systems of
rule and spectacle as they mediate the path towards modernity, merits
an excellent subject for rigorous study.
Within the field of post-communism, the study of tax yields a variety
of differing theoretical approaches that complement each other well. By
focusing on the ability of the states to collect taxes, this study will be
a valuable complement to existing texts on taxes in Russia and East-
ern Europe, including Andrei Schliefer and Daniel Treisman’s With-
out a Map, which focused on fiscal federalism in 1990’s Russia; Scott
Gehlbach’s Representation through Taxation, which takes a large-N polit-
ical economy approach to explain how and why states structure the tax
base, as well as the role that collective goods provision plays in the devel-
opment of certain economic sectors; Hilary Appel’s Tax Politics in Eastern
Europe, which focuses on the international and domestic influences of tax
16 Bergman, p. 2. 17 Kotsonis, p. 5. 18 Ibid., p. 51.
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policy development; and Gerald M. Easter’s Capital, Coercion and Post-
communist States, which takes a broader fiscal sociology approach with
a focus on elites to explain how the distinct ideal-typical tax policies
and regimes emerged in Poland and Russia. Through my focus on the
internal Weberian aspects of the tax administrations and on the unique
application of US tax compliance theory to individual-level survey data,
I take a less stationary approach than some of these authors, emphasiz-
ing agency, trust and iterative action as potential sources for transition
in street-level interactions between bureaucrats and taxpayers. And my
approach is much more focused on the implementation of tax policy
rather than on the development and adoption of tax policy.
Some twenty-five years after the collapse of communism in Europe
and Eurasia, states that once exercised tight control over their popula-
tions so that state goals and policies could more or less be implemented
now find that they differ greatly among themselves in their ability to do
so. For all their shortcomings, communist states were able to govern for
decades – roughly from 1917 to 1991 in Russia and parts of Eurasia and
from 1945 to 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. What has happened
since then has been a dazzling array of variation in these states’ methods
and abilities to govern today. It is now time to explore why that has been
the case.
To do so, this study seeks to achieve the following:
 At the meta-level, to help discern how a state transitions from a coer-
cive state to a legal, legitimate tax state;
 At the macro-level, to determine how the Polish, Russian and
Ukrainian states implement policies to ensure tax compliance; and
 At the micro-level, to establish what exactly is going on inside these
countries that affects tax collection and, more broadly, governance.
This study is the first manuscript on taxation to focus on trust, and it
is the first work of social science to concentrate on how tax policy actu-
ally gets implemented on the ground in Poland, Russia and Ukraine,
highlighting the nuances of the transitional Ukrainian case and explain-
ing precisely why and how that ‘borderland’ country differs from the
more ideal types of coercive Russia and compliance-oriented Poland.
The meta-level question, of course, is the very real present-day dilemma
for Ukraine.
Taxes and Trust presents the culmination of more than fifteen years of
original research – including nine bespoke opinion surveys – into how
states go about the business of reshaping their relationships with their
citizens. Focusing on two states that represent competing models of post-
communist development (Poland and Russia) and on a third state caught
in between (Ukraine), the book uniquely emphasizes the building and
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accumulation of trust as the main vehicle for transitioning from a coercive
tax state to a modern, legal and legitimate one. For a state failing to
gain the public’s trust such, as today’s Ukraine, reforming street-level
bureaucracies like the tax administration would go a long way towards
building a healthier state, capable of implementing its goals for the long
run.
2 Trust and Post-communist Policy
Implementation
To give the transition from communism a viable chance at success, the
new countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union required a state capable of governing on the ground. In order to
explain why Poland, Russia and Ukraine govern the way they do, we need
to explore how capable these three post-communist states are, particu-
larly with respect to their ability to implement tax policy to raise revenue.
The first step in doing so is to examine established theories in political
science for variations in the capacity of states and then to construct a
model of state capacity specific to post-communist states, which we can
then test with respect to the ability of state administrative structures to
raise tax revenue.
Defining State Capacity
State capacity is an elastic term in the literature. Despite its presence
everywhere in political science, the term is not defined in a manner that
entails it being easily measured and operationalized. Nevertheless, most
political science definitions of state capacity include a sense of the state’s
ability to accomplish a task. Mary Hilderbrand and Merilee Grindle, in
their study, define capacity as ‘the ability to perform appropriate tasks
effectively, efficiently and sustainably’.1 Grindle, in her own work, has
identified a capable state as ‘one that exhibits the ability to establish
and maintain effective institutional, technical, administrative and polit-
ical functions’.2 For Michael Bratton, ‘Capacity is the ability to imple-
ment political decisions.’ Bratton refers to Theda Skocpol’s definition
of capacity as the means to implement official goals.3 Therefore, draw-
ing upon these definitions, I define state capacity simply as the ability to
implement state goals or policy.
Political scientists generally have had a sense that state capacity reflects
the ability to achieve state goals.4 Some have described state capacity as
1 Hilderbrand and Grindle, p. 34. 2 Grindle, p. 7.
3 Bratton, p. 235. 4 See, for example, Kohli and Shue, p. 305.
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the ability of state leaders to get people to do something. ‘The main
issues’, Joel Migdal describes as the purpose of his book, Strong Societies
and Weak States, in its introduction, ‘will be state capabilities or their
lack: the ability of state leaders to use the agencies of the state to get peo-
ple in the society to do what they want them to do.’5 Such a definition,
then, denotes being able to identify what it means ‘to define’ a specific
policy agenda, to distinguish who or what defines the state’s goals and to
discern what are the state’s intentions. Moreover, related to these issues
is the ability to set the rules in society (often through bureaus and state
agencies) and the consistency of those rules.
Operationalizing State Capacity
The implementation of an extractive policy such as the collection of taxes
is a good policy area to choose to assess state capacity, as it requires the
penetration of society and utilizes a variety of resources and legitimacy
on the part of the people in order to be successful.
Successful taxation through administrative structures has been viewed
as an essential hallmark of a strong state. For Charles Tilly, in reflecting
on how states were formed in the development of Europe, the essential
ingredients for strong states are institutions (although he doesn’t term
them as such) that control the population. ‘The singling out of the orga-
nization of armed forces, taxation, policing, the control of food supply,
and the formation of technical personnel stresses activities which were
difficult, costly, and often unwanted by large parts of the population’, he
writes. ‘All were essential to the creation of strong states; all were there-
fore likely to tell us something important about the conditions under
which strong or weak, centralized or decentralized, stable or unstable,
states come into being.’6
Similarly, Skocpol has viewed states as ‘actual organizations control-
ling (or attempting to control) territories and people’, which is done
largely through the extraction of resources and the building of adminis-
trative and coercive organizations.7 For Skocpol, the process associated
with rebuilding of state organizations ‘is the place to look for the politi-
cal contradictions that help launch social revolutions’.8 While Skocpol’s
analysis is based on discerning the origins of social revolutions, the pro-
cesses by which state structures are rebuilt and taxes are collected in
the aftermath of a revolution, such as that following the overthrow, or
departure, of communism in 1989 in Poland and in 1991 in Russia and
5 Migdal, 1988, p. xiii. 6 Tilly, p. 6. 7 Skocpol, 1979, p. 31. 8 Ibid., p. 32.
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Ukraine, are critically important for the construction and maintenance
of social order in the post-revolutionary society.
States cannot govern effectively if they cannot collect revenue. The
enormous processes of democratic and economic consolidation require
states to do precisely that. Examining this policy area thus provides a
clearer picture of the foremost fundamental and prior task for states.
In addition, given Eastern Europe’s and the former Soviet Union’s
inheritance of state socialist-designed institutions, focusing on state
capacity through the collection of taxes presents a unique opportunity
to evaluate how country-specific variables work in altering analogous
institutional designs and similar post-communist goals. Why, given the
fact that the centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe imitated
the tax system of the Soviet Union, did Poland’s inheritance of a poorly
functioning tax administration not prevent it from being able to raise
adequate revenues in the 1990s? By holding some aspects of past insti-
tutional design and current state intentions constant, this book can test
for how differing political, economic, geographical and cultural variables
have affected state capacity across these post-socialist states.
Explaining the Variance in Governance and State
Capacity of Post-communist States
As the differing degrees of state capacity to collect taxes in Poland, Rus-
sia and Ukraine are established in this study, the causal forces behind
this variation are explored. Specifically, three basic theories on state
capacity are reviewed to explain patterns of post-socialist state capac-
ity: One school within political science, led by Samuel P. Huntington,
views state capacity as a function of political institutions such as parties
(including the different party systems as they relate to regime type).9 A
second, exemplified by the work of Migdal, sees state capacity as a func-
tion of state–society relations.10 Finally, a third school (Chalmers John-
son, Peter Evans and Max Weber) views state capacity as a function
of the structure of the state itself.11 By examining the variables behind
these theories, I evaluate the relative causal weight of three competing
explanations.
Theory #1: State Capacity as a Function of Political Institutions
Bureaucratic performance may be a function of broader levels of insti-
tutionalization within the polity. In 1968, Huntington wrote in Political
9 Huntington. 10 Migdal, 1988.
11 Evans; Evans and Rauch; Chalmers Johnson; and Gerth and Mills.
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Order and Changing Societies that only where the level of political insti-
tutionalization outstrips the level of political participation could there
emerge stable politics working in the public interest.12 Specifically, this
theory hypothesizes that a focus on political parties – how well they are
developed in relation to the state – would account for variance in state
capacity.
The most important question for Huntington in his 1968 work is how
states can gain the capacity to govern effectively. Huntington begins
by observing that ‘[t]he most important political distinction among
countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of
government’.13 To form capable, effective and legitimate governments,
states need not hold elections, per se, but must succeed in creating orga-
nizations. What is good for the public is ‘whatever strengthens govern-
mental institutions . . . A government with a low level of institutionaliza-
tion is not just a weak government; it is also a bad government. The
function of government is to govern.’14 To develop into modern poli-
ties, authority must be rationalized through specified state structures, the
development of which requires increased participation by social groups
throughout society.
Hence, to involve society in the development of government struc-
tures, political parties are the vehicles for the public to keep tabs
on state institutions so that they can govern effectively. Political par-
ties, states Huntington, ‘broaden participation in the traditional insti-
tutions, thus adapting those institutions to the requirements of the
modern polity. They help make the traditional institutions legitimate
in terms of popular sovereignty . . . ’15 Furthermore, Huntington also
argues that corruption – a sign that government agencies are not working
as they should – ‘is most prevalent in states which lack effective political
parties . . . ’16 Thus, Huntington argues that those political leaders and
‘promoters of modernization’ who ‘reject and denigrate political parties’
in order to modernize their society actually will fail to make their soci-
eties politically stable.17
For Atul Kohli, the absence of effective parties often yields to state
centralization accompanied by state powerlessness. ‘Without parties or
other political institutions’, Kohli has written with respect to the pro-
cesses by which India’s leaders govern, ‘the links between leaders and
their supporters remain weak . . . [I]t becomes very difficult to translate
election mandates into specific policies . . . Policy failure in turn paves
the way for other populist challengers, thus perpetuating the cycle of
12 Huntington, 1968. 13 Ibid., p. 1. 14 Ibid., p. 25, 28.
15 Ibid., p. 91. 16 Ibid., p. 71. 17 Ibid., p. 92.
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centralization and powerlessness.’18 Similarly, in Democracy and Dis-
content, Kohli associates the erosion of established authority in certain
provinces in India as owing to the lack of a cohesive party structure.
Kohli argues for the strengthening of party organizations and for bring-
ing the state’s capacities into line with the state’s commitments.19
The issues raised in Kohli’s work on India are quite similar to those in
Political Order and Changing Societies insofar as ‘the problem of central-
ization and powerlessness is an integral aspect of the imbalance between
institutional development and mobilized demands’.20 Yet, whereas the
focus for Huntington is on socioeconomic change, which causes societal
mobilization that needs to be structured and organized, Kohli views the
spread of democratic politics as encouraging greater political activism in
society, which must be channelled through parties.
Hence, regardless of whether the 1989 and 1991 revolutions were
about economic modernization or democratization, the new post-
communist states, according to this theory, must have developed polit-
ical parties in order to capture the polities’ interest in and oversight of
state institutional activity. How parties are structured in relation to state
structures, how they oversee such administrative institutions, whether
they simply set overall agency goals or provide direction on more precise
bureaucratic functions and how they incorporate society and direct pub-
lic opinion to provide for oversight are deemed to be critical in account-
ing for variations in state performance.
Political Parties and Party Systems in Post-communist
Poland, Russia and Ukraine
Poland. In Post-communist Party Systems, Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka
Mansfeldova, Radosław Markowski and Gábor Tóka assess how polit-
ical party systems – born out of the legacy of the communist regime
type and mediated through current institutions, rules and political
alignment – affect pathways towards the consolidation of Central and
East European democracies. In particular, the alignment of partisan
divide impacts democratic governance. In the post-communist situation,
the nature of a regime divide is the greatest obstacle to effective gover-
nance. ‘The deeper the regime divide’, the authors state, ‘the more likely
even small policy differences among parties undermine their capacity to
collaborate in legislative and executive coalitions.’21 The regime types of
bureaucratic authoritarianism and national-accommodative communism
18 Kohli, 1994, pp. 89–90. 19 Kohli, 1991.
20 Kohli, 1994, p. 90. 21 Kitschelt et al., p. 89.
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have led to democracies that have less sharp regime divides than those
party systems emerging from patrimonial communist societies.22
Kitschelt and his co-authors deem Hungary and Poland to have devel-
oped consensual democracy with competition around key economic
issues, while the Czech Republic has produced a competitive democracy
with significant divisions over economic issues coupled with incentives
for collaboration.23 The development of Poland’s post-communist polit-
ical party system traces its origins to the negotiated transition in the late
1980s during which the communist regime was rather tolerant in allow-
ing opposition activity and the negotiated transfer of power in 1989. ‘In
terms of post-communist party system, Poland shows a rather sharp pro-
grammatic crystallization around both economic and political-cultural
issues resulting in crosscutting divisions, both of which have some con-
sequence for party competition’, Kitschelt et al. remark with respect to
the overall competitive nature of the Polish party system. ‘In Poland,
politicians’ and voters’ formal left–right conceptions of their own and the
competing parties’ positions are informed by both economic and socio-
cultural issues.’24
Poland’s first free post-communist parliamentary elections in 1991,
which followed the first presidential elections in 1990, brought forth a
mushrooming of parties, with more than 100 across the spectrum taking
part. The number of parties participating in national elections thereafter
decreased dramatically. Since those first elections, seven parliamentary
elections and five presidential elections – all free, fair, highly competi-
tive and accompanied by a smooth transfer of power – have taken place.
Not only has the centre-right – led by those associated with the anti-
communist Solidarity movement of the 1980s – and the centre-left – led
by post-communists who have become Social Democrats – each con-
trolled the parliament and the presidency, but there has been significant
alternation between the two sides of the political spectrum. No governing
party since the start of the transition had won re-election to parliament
until Civic Platform (PO) was re-elected in 2011.
Moreover, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a founder of the post-
communist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) who was elected in 1995
and re-elected in 2000, was succeeded by centre-right Law and Justice
(PiS) candidate Lech Kaczynski, who was elected president in Octo-
ber 2005 (and later died in the Smolensk plane crash of April 2010),
after a much contested race with PO candidate Donald Tusk, also of
the centre-right. In May 2015, PO candidate Bronisław Komorowski,
who had been president since his election in 2010, was defeated by PiS
22 Ibid., p. 406. 23 Ibid., p. 403. 24 Ibid., p. 387.
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candidate Andrzej Duda. Meanwhile, after the October 2015 parliamen-
tary elections, the nationalist-conservative PiS party returned to head
the government for the first time since 2005–2007, having defeated the
centre-right PO party, which had been ruling since 2007.
Hence, Poland’s political party system is highly competitive between
the two sides of the political spectrum, albeit especially so between the
centre-right PO and the nationalist right PiS in recent years. The ques-
tion, with respect to this first theory on state capacity, is whether a com-
petitive party system is a primary reason for Poland’s relatively greater
post-communist state capacity and relatively good tax compliance.
Russia. Meanwhile, in states that succeed patrimonial communist soci-
eties such as those of the former Soviet Union, Kitschelt and his co-
authors write that liberal-democratic parties tend to lack the skills, net-
works and resources to replace rent-seeking elites, while other parties
in the system, often communist successor parties, ‘exploit their con-
trol of the policy process to (re)build clientelist networks and to fun-
nel public assets into the hands of rent-seeking groups affiliated with the
party’.25 Deep regime divides, associated most with states that succeeded
patrimonial communist regimes, further complicate effective reform and
institutional oversight as the party system becomes oriented to negotiat-
ing the redistribution of assets to rent-seeking groups.
When applied to Russia, this analysis of a deep regime divide, formed
from a patrimonial communist past, has great saliency in explaining the
first decade of the transition. Parties were, indeed, the political key to
mediating poor economic reform in Russia in the 1990s. Yet, in Russia,
it is not just a bad party system at work; it is also the lack of party politics
that has yielded bad reforms, or rather, a failure to implement govern-
ment policy. In Russia, the underdevelopment of political parties under
both President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s and President Vladimir Putin
since 2000, for different reasons, is also another facet of the underinsti-
tutionalization problem that is viewed as having led to poor governance.
At the beginning of the 1990s, there was great hope that the tran-
sition from one-party rule would give rise to a fully competitive polit-
ical party system. ‘Given Russia’s thousand-year history of autocratic
rule, the emergence of democracy must be recognized as a revolution-
ary achievement of the last decade’, wrote Michael McFaul in 2002.
‘Even so, Russia is not a liberal democracy. The Russian political system
lacks many of the supporting institutions that make democracy robust.
Russia’s party system, civil society, and the rule of law are weak and
underdeveloped.’26 Moreover, in the Yeltsin era, the lack of a structured
25 Ibid., p. 405. 26 McFaul, p. 35.
Trust and Post-communist Policy Implementation 19
political party system at the national level led to a failure of Moscow
politicians to link provincial politics with the national political agenda,
which enabled regional elites to pursue interests in direct opposition to
the centre’s will.27
With respect to filling the seat in the highest office in Russia, Yeltsin’s
re-election, as well as his transfer of power to Putin, was conducted by
processes that were not entirely transparent or competitive. In the 1996
re-election, the media, largely controlled by the oligarchs, gave heav-
ily biased coverage in favour of the president, who began the race with
single-digit popularity ratings, enabling him to pull ahead and beat out
the Communist Party’s candidate, Gennadiy Zyuganov. Near the end of
his second (and constitutionally mandated final) term, Yeltsin handed
power over to Putin in a manner that resembled the passing of a baton to
a protégé. Putin had been appointed prime minister in 1999 by Yeltsin,
who himself resigned dramatically on the last day of 1999, paving the
way for Putin, the new acting president, to win the election in March
2000 handily.
Since 2000, power gradually has become much more concentrated in
the president, and the Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, largely
has been perceived as voting exactly as the Kremlin wants on key deci-
sions, rendering parties less important than they were even in the 1990s.
‘The contrast between the Yeltsin and Putin presidencies is nowhere
more visible than in president-parliament relations’, Thomas Remington
wrote in 2003, indicating that even early on in Putin’s tenure party pol-
itics began to fall in line with the Kremlin. ‘Whereas President Yeltsin
never commanded a majority of votes in the Duma, Putin’s legislative
record is filled with accomplishments. Even on the most controversial
issues – land reform, political parties, ratification of START – the presi-
dent and government have won majorities. By comparison, Yeltsin faced
a hostile Duma that came close to passing a motion of impeachment in
1999.’28
Meanwhile, members of the upper house of parliament, the Feder-
ation Council, are no longer elected but appointed. Similarly, regional
governors were appointed by legislative bodies of the Russian Federa-
tion subjects by recommendation of the president from 2005 to 2012.
Further, while Russian politics does have some aspects of pluralism and
competition, as M. Steven Fish as written, ‘falsification, coercion, and
the arbitrary disqualification of candidates are frequent and pervasive –
not merely occasional and deviant – features of elections in post-Soviet
Russia’.29 All of this has led to the virtual elimination of effective and
27 Stoner-Weiss, 1999b, pp. 17–18. 28 Remington, p. 39. 29 Fish, 2005, p. 81.
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popular opposition political parties. Hence, as candidates for president,
both Yeltsin and Putin did not need a party to be elected – or re-elected.
And a unified, pro-democratic reform party never truly developed in
Russia.
That said, while in office, Putin has been promoting the elevation of
the United Russia party, and, in so doing, has connected himself to a
political party much more than his predecessor. United Russia emerged
first in 1999, according to Henry Hale, as ‘a political party structure
[that] could help take away votes from other parties, but also provide
a significant base of support for the Kremlin in the Duma, and most
importantly, could channel support from governors and corporations
that might have otherwise supported an opposition party’.30 Hence,
United Russia has developed into the state’s party of all sorts, enabling
Russia to be governed nearly like a de facto one-party country and, most
recently, in the September 2016 ballot, saw its majority control of the
legislative branch grow from 238 to 343 of the Duma’s 450 seats. As
Brian Whitmore commented on that election, ‘The Kremlin has appar-
ently given up on even pretending to have a multiparty system.’31
In 2005, due in part to the lack of competitive party politics and in
part to the lack of media independent from Kremlin loyalists, Russia
was moved from being ‘partially free’ to ‘unfree’, according to the Free-
dom House classification. In January 2006, parliament passed a law, ini-
tiated by the president, that places NGOs under tighter scrutiny by the
state. Hence, as Andrew Kuchins related in testimony before the US
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2006, ‘Presi-
dent Putin has consistently and systematically eliminated competition
among independent contending political forces and centralized, at least
on paper, more and more political authority in the office of the Presiden-
tial administration. If Mr Putin does believe in democratic governance
as he contends, he has an odd way of expressing it.’32
In essence, the significant absence of an effective political party system
and effective political parties might account for Russia’s less successful
levels of governance since the fall of communism.
Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, as both emerged from the same country,
Ukraine, like Russia, has a history of patrimonial communist pol-
itics and a post-communist underdevelopment of political parties.
While the political process has been competitive in what is largely a
30 Washington Profile. 31 Whitmore.
32 Kuchins, ‘Russian Democracy and Civil Society: Back to the Future’, Testimony for the
U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 8 February 2006. Available
at <www.carnegieendowment.org>.
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presidential–parliamentary system, with parties generally having to form
coalitions in order to govern once elected to the parliament, the
Verkhovna Rada, parties by and large (with the notable exceptions of
the socialists and the communists) have eschewed ideology based on
economic or social–political concerns, providing for intriguing coalition
governments. At the same time, party membership among the public is
quite low. As Paul D’Anieri has argued, ‘Ukrainian parties . . . are elite-
based rather than mass-based.’33 As such, they were not viewed early on
as a necessary vehicle to political power. In Ukraine’s second presidential
elections in 1994, only one candidate for president was a member of a
political party.
Political parties, like all things related to politics, often are viewed by
the public and experts alike as being vehicles for protecting and enrich-
ing personal business, especially oligarchic, wealth. Elites have used less-
than-transparent political parties and other government connections to
capture the state and derive economic rents. ‘However, these “opaque”
and oligarchic networks were not unified, and relied on various ad hoc
alliances; and their influence on the state did not shut out other inter-
ests altogether’, writes Verena Fritz on the 1990s. ‘Political parties – as a
potentially balancing force – remained weak in Ukraine. To some degree,
there was a self-interest in building the Ukrainian state among political
leaders and the bureaucracy.’34 As D’Anieri has remarked, ‘“centrist par-
ties” remained fronts for interest politics rather than real centralist par-
ties seeking broad electoral appeal’.35 Further, as Steven Levitsky and
Lucan A. Way have observed, both Presidents Leonid Kravchuk and
Leonid Kuchma failed to be utilize parties to solidify support, as both
leaders ‘suffered large-scale defections and lost power to former allies’
during their rule.36
Stephen Kotkin was a bit more direct when interviewed in March 2014
in summing up the entire post-communist political scene of corrupt net-
works, without nuance with respect to different parties or presidents.
‘Ukraine is a wreck’, he stated. ‘Ukraine was destroyed by Ukrainian
elites. Every regime in Ukraine since 1991 has ripped off that coun-
try. They ripped off everything that wasn’t nailed down and then they
ripped off everything that was nailed down. Ukraine gives corruption a
bad name. The economy has shrunk . . . [T]he Ukrainian economy today
is smaller than it was in 1991, by any measure. The economy in Poland is
at least twice as big as it was in 1991. So Ukraine is a basket case because
33 D’Anieri, 2006, p. 189. 34 Fritz, p. 110.
35 D’Anieri, Kravchuk and Kuzio, p. 159, quoted in Fritz, p. 142.
36 Levitsky and Way, p. 214.
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of the Ukrainian political class.’37 Hale stated, prior to the EuroMaidan
Revolution of 2014, that the country has had ‘little real rule of law’ and
can be termed ‘clientelist’ or ‘patrimonial’ because its corrupt politics is
so individualist-based.38
In the 1990s, parliamentary politics was dominated largely by the
communists, who won a surprise victory at the first post-communist par-
liamentary election in 1994. During Kuchma’s presidency (1994–2005),
parties began to be seen as vehicles for oligarchic clans, who have much
greater influence to this day than their peers in Russia.
Broadly speaking, the parties that have developed over the years
in post-communist Ukraine have been either pro-Western and pro-
nationalist (such as President Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc
of the mid-2000s, Vitaly Klitschko’s Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for
Reform (UDAR), Fatherland (formerly the Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko) and
the Petro Poroshenko Bloc), supported largely by voters in western and
central Ukraine, or pro-Russian and EU-sceptical (such as the reconsti-
tuted Communist Party of the 1990s and the Party of Regions from the
early 2000s up until the 2014 departure of Viktor Yanukovych), drawing
upon voters broadly in eastern and southern Ukraine.
There have been two main attempts to break up the patrimonial sys-
tem – both of which were mass-led protest events that brought into
power new pro-Western, pro-nationalist parties. Hale regards the first,
the Orange Revolution of 2004, as ‘dividing’ but not ‘eliminating’ the
clientelist political machine.39 And, in part due to the falling out of
the Orange duo of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, only a year after the
Orange Revolution, the Party of Regions came in first in the 2006 parlia-
mentary elections, after which Yanukovych, whose initial election ‘win’
the Orange camp successfully overturned in 2004, became prime min-
ister. Yanukovych himself was elected to the presidency in 2010. More-
over, as parliament subsequently abolished a law requiring parliamentary
blocs to vote as a whole when forming a coalition, Yanukovych was able
to gain control over a revived patrimonial system by appointing a gov-
ernment without forming a coalition with an opposition party.40
The second attempt, the EuroMaidan Revolution, brought the
removal of Yanukovych in early 2014. The most recent parliamen-
tary elections, which took place later that year, brought forth the most
pro-Western parliament in the Rada’s history, seemingly ready to con-
sider new reform legislation to further democracy and also to get
Ukraine out of its deep economic mire. Midsummer 2016, several of the
37 Kotkin. 38 Hale, p. 85. 39 Ibid. 40 D’Anieri, 2011, p. 40.
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EuroMaidan revolutionary leaders – a group of journalists and civil soci-
ety activists rather than career politicians – launched a new European
liberal political party, Democratic Alliance, seeking to unify the political
centre and centre-right of the country by focusing on the free market,
libertarian choices in private life and fierce anti-corruption endeavours
that would cleave the electorate differently from previous cultural and
populist approaches.41 And, since a new law on parties was adopted,
political parties in Ukraine beginning in 2016 are to be funded exclu-
sively through the state budget in an effort to clamp down on corruption
and financing, but the process, introduced in July 2016, may not be as
beneficial to the reform efforts as originally intended, since the estab-
lished political parties that made it into government with private funding
will be awarded taxpayer money while newcomer competitors, which
lack oligarch backing, will not.42
The question, then, is whether the degree of institutionalization of the
polity through political parties actually matters with respect to the devel-
opment and maintenance of effective state capacity in Poland, Russia
and Ukraine – that is, whether the differences in governance levels in
the three states are due to the presence of competitive parties in Poland
and the lack of them in Russia and Ukraine. If the competition of the
parties in Poland is the critical difference, it must be shown to be due to
the focus and direction that such parties place on the bureaucracies and
administration.
As a way to test this political party hypothesis in order to explain varia-
tion in governance, during my field research stage, I interviewed officials
and bureaucrats in the tax administrative structures on what input they
receive from parties in helping them to implement their policy priorities
or tasks. In addition, I examined what impact parties have on the devel-
opment of bureaucracies and the civil service and on model preferences
in each country.
Theory #2: State Capacity as a Function of State–Society Relations
According to the second theory on state capacity, social explanations
point to the relationships between states and societies. Migdal has argued
that where states lack significant capacity, it is due to the presence of
‘fragmented social controls’ embedded in society that invade administra-
tive structures. In Strong Societies and Weak States, Migdal argues that ‘in
societies with weak states a continuing environment of conflict – the vast,
41 Karatnycky. 42 Yatsenyuk; Kosmehl and Umland.
24 Taxes and Trust
but fragmented social control embedded in the non-state organizations
of society – has dictated a particular, pathological set of relationships
within the state organization itself, between the top state leadership and
its agencies’.43
This enables the state, then, to become ‘the grand arena of accom-
modation’ in the polity. ‘First, local and regional strongmen, politicians,
and implementers accommodate one another in a web of political, eco-
nomic, and social exchanges’, Migdal continues. ‘Second, accommo-
dation also exists on a much grander scale . . . The strongmen end up
with an enhanced bargaining position or with posts in the state itself
that influence important decisions about the allocation of resources and
the application of policy rules.’44 Hence, ‘a society fragmented in social
control affects the character of the state, which, in turn, reinforces the
fragmentation of the society’.45 Indeed, across Eurasia, the rise of new
post-communist forces that have not been incorporated into formal insti-
tutional frameworks might be responsible for state capture.
Joel Hellman’s explanation for stalled economic reform in Eastern
Europe as being the result of the rise of narrow, vested interests that
benefited from rent-seeking opportunities accompanying the transition
to the market also could be useful in explaining the stalled state recre-
ation process.46 The existence of social network ties between private sec-
tor businesses, state enterprise managers and government bureaucrats
might be credited with hampering administrative reform and bureau-
cratic capacity. Therefore, some structural and legal constraints in the
transition to a new economy imposed by the state on society are deemed
to be necessary. Hence, where states lack significant state capacity, this
theory suggests, it is due to the presence of ‘fragmented social controls’
embedded in society that invade state administrative structures.
A fragmented society also has been attributed to the nature of the
political culture that reinforces such unconstructive state–society rela-
tions. John Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss have argued that
the conditions that favour consolidation of the transition in Central and
Eastern Europe are political culture and historical legacy. The authors
conclude ‘that the most significant variable for the success of the trans-
formation is the degree of compatibility of the inherited world views,
patterns of behaviour and basic social and political concepts with the
functional necessities of a modern, partly industrial, partly already post-
industrial society.’47 Hence, the nature of the political culture, formed in
the past, carries the transition forward in different ways.
43 Migdal, 1988, p. 207. 44 Migdal, 1987, p. 427. 45 Ibid., p. 429.
46 Hellman. 47 Elster, Offe and Preuss, pp. 307–308.
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In addition, while the political culture of society is seen to shape
state–society relations, other cultural aspects, such as the nature of the
religious background, also are seen to be important. For example, in
Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam argues that the nature of
Catholicism, with the vertical structure of the church, has adverse effects
on trusting relations between authority and society. Hence, where reli-
gious adherence to Catholicism is less intense, better governance is
argued to be possible.48 Meanwhile, with respect to Eastern Europe,
there is a religious divide corresponding roughly between Catholicism,
which is more ambivalent about the perception of power, in Central
European states such as Poland, on one hand, and Slavic Orthodoxy,
which tends to focus more on obedience, in former Soviet Union states
such as Russia, on the other, and a mix of both within Ukraine. Differ-
ences, then, between the nature of state–society interaction in the two
regions might be related to how the two different churches relate to their
peoples.
State–Society Relations in Post-communist Poland,
Russia and Ukraine
The post-communist transition began with a large disconnect between
state and society. In the aftermath of the 1989 and 1991 revolutions,
societies across the region shared a deep disillusionment with their
bureaucratic states, which were viewed as dishonest and untrustwor-
thy.49 (At its nadir, the Soviet Union may very well have been, in Geof-
frey Hosking’s words, the ‘Land of Maximum Distrust’.50) At a time in
which much was required of both state and society to begin the transfor-
mation to a market economy and a democracy such inherited distrust of
the state on the part of society made the tasks at hand more difficult.
Poland. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have described Poland in the
1980s as a very strong case of ‘civil society against the state’ – a
dichotomy that emerged from centuries of struggle between the Polish
nation and a foreign-imposed state authority, which became ‘a politically
useful concept in the opposition period because it allowed a sharp dif-
ferentiation between “them” (the Moscow-dependent party-state) and
“us” (Polish civil society)’.51 (Similarly, Grzegorz Ekiert titles his book
on the communist-era political crises in Poland, Hungary and the Czech
48 Putnam. 49 Rose-Ackerman, 2004a, p. 2.
50 In his history of trust, Hosking highlights the Soviet Union during its nadir of the 1930s
as the ‘Land of Maximum Distrust’ (Hosking, p. 9).
51 Linz and Stepan, p. 270.
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Republic The State Against Society.52) In particular, the Catholic Church
has been recognized by many as an institutional home for Polish national
identity in opposition to the state throughout Poland’s long history of
foreign occupation – from the 1795–1918 partitioning of Poland by the
Austrians, Prussians and Russians through to the Second World War and
the post-war communist state.
After 1989, the establishment of a new state and the withdrawal of
Soviet forces (and influence) allowed a complete break from this adver-
sarial state–society relationship. However, the appearance of the new
Polish state coincided with the initial shock of a severe economic reces-
sion that made society wary of state activity. Yet 1992 saw the emer-
gence of economic growth that enabled society to begin to view the state
and this new political venture of democracy much more positively. ‘Eco-
nomic factors were thus favourable for democracy to take root, all the
more so because they had a positive influence on public opinion’, Pol-
ish sociologist Lena Kolarska-Bobińska has observed. ‘Over time, social
acceptance of democratic procedures also increased independent of eco-
nomic factors.’53
Nevertheless, the Polish public began to withdraw from public life as
the transition progressed. Bohdan Szklarski has argued that six years
after the beginning of the post-communist transition, Polish political cul-
ture and citizen perceptions appeared to carry over a ‘subject-apathetic’
character from the previous system. ‘However, the causes of apathy,
powerlessness and low efficacy lie more with the feeling of being lost
in the complexity of the new reality and in the disappointment with the
post-communist elites than in formal or ideological prohibitions than it
used to be previously’, he has written.54 For Szklarski, then, the articu-
lation of the general public is constrained by the fact that public policy
in the economic arena ‘is a product of relationship between two most
powerful actors: the state and the unions’.55
Yet Kolarska-Bobińska has discovered that Polish society since 1989
‘can be dissatisfied with elected elites, but not with the system overall,
which allows it to make new choices’.56 Hence, the inability of Polish
society to articulate in a more fulfilling way to political elites regard-
ing public policy issues has not resulted in a poor state–society relation-
ship with respect to general support for the new system or with respect
to public confidence in those more directly responsible for governing.
Kolarska-Bobińska has even found that increased perception among the
public has not resulted automatically in lower approval ratings for those
52 Ekiert. 53 Kolarska-Bobińska, p. 314.
54 Szklarski, p. 199. 55 Ibid., p. 206. 56 Kolarska-Bobińska, p. 317.
Trust and Post-communist Policy Implementation 27
in government.57 In 1999, she observed that while local administration
was listed in an opinion as the third most corrupt sector, it was listed
as the most trusted level of government, aside from the president. Fur-
ther, confidence in local government has remained stable and high since
1992. The perceived efficacy of these local state institutions with respect
to serving local residents well might mitigate any perceptions of corrup-
tion, so that local governments can maintain their legitimacy and can
enjoy the confidence of society.58
Russia. Throughout the 1990s, state interests in Russia were largely co-
opted by societal groups. The nature of the initial economic reforms,
especially the large-scale privatization by which a significant amount of
property ended up in the hands of those with management or commu-
nist party ties, enabled a small minority to maintain privileged relations
with the state. Indeed, the 1995 ‘Loans for Shares’ scheme in Russia pro-
vides a powerful example of how state interests were so co-opted. That
government plan, which called for the auctioning of shares in 29 large
enterprises to banks that offered the largest loans, ended up benefiting
only the interests behind a small group of Russian banks that oversaw
the auctions.59 Similarly, the manner in which Russian banks were able
to funnel money out of the country just before the August 1998 collapse
of the ruble so that bank owners benefited at the expense of small depos-
itors also underscores the danger of government ties with concentrated
private interests.60 The irony of Russia’s situation is that the application
of the neo-liberal agenda with the goal of getting the state out of the mar-
ketplace in order to avoid the rent-seeking behaviour of the state actually
ended up accomplishing the later.
In reaction to the neo-liberal agenda of the 1990s, Putin has initiated
a number of initiatives to curb civil society since his election as president
in March 2000. Several of the oligarchs who came to great wealth and
influence in the Yeltsin era, some of whom even helped his election, were
accused of financial fraud and tax evasion and either were placed in jail
or went into self-imposed exile abroad. (According to Dmitri Trenin,
about twenty-two people owned roughly 40 per cent of the Russian
national economy in 2005.61) The state also took control of the television
networks, including the only independent national station (NTV). And
Putin successfully pushed forward a new law, signed in January 2006,
that places significant regulations on the activity and legal status of non-
profit organizations, especially those that receive foreign funding. The
57 Ibid., p. 320. 58 Ibid., pp. 321–322.
59 Roberts and Sherlock, p. 485. 60 See, for example, Powell et al. 61 Trenin, p. 4.
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creation of a Civic Chamber, tied to the office of the president, also has
largely been viewed by analysts as not being a true forum for expres-
sion of citizen views on state activity.62 On the economic side, in 2015,
approximately 55 per cent of the economy was in state hands – the largest
share in 20 years, with 20 million workers directly employed by the gov-
ernment, equal to 28 per cent of the workforce, up from 22 per cent in
1996.63
Most critically, the manner in which elections are carried out through-
out Putin’s system of ‘managed democracy’ has dramatically curtailed
citizen input into the governing of the state. ‘As for the electoral sys-
tem, it’s not that bad. It’s worse’, Nikolay Petrov argues. ‘The centre
can legally exclude any candidate. A healthier Russian democracy will
not emerge without decentralization and federalism. For now, the lack
of meaningful elections has seriously weakened civil society.’64 In fact,
Georgy Bovt, editor of the Russian newsmagazine Profil’, has observed
that citizens no longer participate in the electoral process at the local
level, adding, ‘and soon they’ll stop voting in federal elections too. Peo-
ple boast about their lack of interest in politics. They don’t read the
papers. Television programs dealing with politics and social issues have
been pulled because of low ratings.’65 Hence, the lack of political choice
and true public debate has led to a lack of interest in politics, evidenced
most recently by the record low voter turnout of less than 48 per cent in
the September 2016 parliamentary elections.66
In his own way, Putin appears to have a different connotation of what
a ‘civil society’ actually is. ‘[W]hat is more important is a mobilization
of the nation before the general threat’, Putin said in his first televised
address following the Beslan elementary school hostage drama, four days
after it began on 1 September 2004. ‘Events in other countries prove that
terrorists meet the most effective rebuff where they confront not only the
power of the state but also an organized and united civil society.’67 Fol-
lowing the Beslan debacle, Putin did not fire the law enforcement
members who were bribed by the terrorists as they passed freely from
Chechnya to North Ossetia, but, according to Anders Åslund, opted
for sacking the editor-in-chief of the independent newspaper Izvestiya
‘who had committed the crime of accurate reporting’.68 In essence, Putin
seems to view a constructive ‘civil society’ solely as an entity to be in step
with and channelled by the Kremlin.
62 For a description of the founding of the Civic Chamber, see McAuley.
63 Djankov, p. 3. 64 Petrov, 2005. 65 Bovt.
66 Phippen. 67 Putin. 68 Åslund, 2005, p. 3.
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With respect to political culture, three main arguments have been
made in reference to the political culture of Russian society to explain its
interactions with the state. First, unquestionably, the greatest applicabil-
ity of this variable in explaining governance problems has been to the real
lack of commitment or desire on the part of the populace to change over
to a new economic system in the 1990s. In fact, Russians did not rebel en
masse against their Soviet state in 1991 (at least outside of Moscow), but
regretted the loss of it, especially in relation to the new one they inher-
ited. Three years after the breakup of the USSR in 1991, 68 per cent
of Russians stated in a poll that the dissolution was the wrong decision,
while 76 per cent stated that the USSR’s demise had affected Russian
living standards for the worse.69 ‘Russians during the Soviet era’, com-
ments James R. Millar, ‘indicated high levels of satisfaction (two-thirds
to three-fourths reported being “very satisfied” or “satisfied”) with their
housing, jobs, access to medical care and higher education, and overall
standard of living.’70 The price liberalization policies initiated in 1992
encountered deep disapproval and scepticism on the part of the popula-
tion towards the economic transition, which has never really gone away.
In contrast, in Poland, the vast majority did not question the collapse of
communism.
Second, many analysts have attributed the origins of Russia’s state–
society unconstructive relations to the fact that Russia is composed, for
the most part, of those whose religion is Slavic Orthodoxy rather than
Catholicism or Protestantism. Shock therapy architect Jeffrey Sachs has
even joined in, recognizing the role that the religious divides among the
different forms of Christianity played in the first decade after commu-
nism in Eastern Europe.71
Linz and Stepan explain that the nature of the three branches of Chris-
tianity can impact the type of support given to democratic opposition
groups, while carefully recognizing that Orthodox Christianity is not
inherently an anti-democratic force. They argue that ‘Roman Catholi-
cism as a transnational, hierarchical organization can potentially provide
material and doctrinal support to a local Catholic church to help it resist
state opposition’.72 As such, the church could be considered as providing
support to ‘a more robust and autonomous civil society’. (Interestingly,
Putnam’s arguments on Catholicism in Making Democracy Work also sug-
gest that the vertical nature of the church leads to a ‘society versus the
state phenomenon’.) Similar arguments could be made with regard to
69 Linz and Stepan, p. 451. 70 Millar, p. 324.
71 Sachs, 1999. 72 Linz and Stepan, p. 453.
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Protestantism, with its emphasis on individual conscience and its inter-
national networks.
‘Concerning civil society and resistance to the state, Orthodox Chris-
tianity is often (not always) organizationally and doctrinally in a rela-
tively weak position because of what Weber called its “caesaropapist”
structure, in which the church is a national as opposed to a transnational
organization’, Linz and Stepan continue. ‘In caesaropapist churches,
the national state normally plays a major role in the national church’s
finances and appointments. Such a national church is not really a rela-
tively autonomous part of civil society because there is a high degree, in
Weber’s words, of ‘subordination of priestly to secular power’.’73 Hence,
according to this argument, whether the Orthodox Church supports civil
society depends upon whether or not the state leaders truly are commit-
ted to democracy.
Further, how frequently individuals within a society attend religious
services might also account for the nature of state–society relations,
regardless of the religion. In 1993, only 16 per cent of Poles stated
that they never or rarely went to church, whereas the correspond-
ing figures for Belorussians and Ukrainians were 71 and 60 per cent,
respectively.74 (Figures were not given for Russia, but can be assumed to
be similar to those for their post-Soviet Slavic Orthodox neighbours.)
Finally, there is the issue of corruption. ‘The real cause [of which] lies
in deeply internalized Soviet cultural practices’, Vladimir Brovkin has
stated. ‘Defrauding the state was an accepted practice under the Soviet
regime.’75 As Thomas Graham, Jr., explained in his September 1999
testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, ‘cor-
ruption has deep roots in the historical conflation of the private and the
public in Russia. For most of Russian history, the state was for all prac-
tical purposes the property of the Tsar. There was no formal distinction
between sovereignty and ownership, between the public sphere and the
private sphere. Almost by definition, public positions were exploited for
private gain.’76 Communist Party rule changed little, other than that
nominal ownership was transferred from the tsars to the Communist
Party, so that state goods were readily available for private gain once
the system began to fall apart.77 Even US Vice President Al Gore, in
defence of the US role in the reform of Russia, has attributed the preva-
lence of corruption in Russia to the ‘legacy of communism’.78 However,
such comments do not explain the dramatic explosion of corruption in
73 Ibid., p. 453. 74 Ibid., p. 246. 75 Brovkin, p. 24.
76 Graham. 77 See Solnick, 1997. 78 See Elsner.
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the 1990s compared with the decade before – or even the greater growth
in corruption that has accelerated under the Putin regime.
The level of corruption also has increased significantly in the Putin
era, beyond that of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. The Putin admin-
istration’s own Interior Ministry’s investigation committee has stated
that they saw an increase of about 13 per cent from 1999 to 2003 in
corruption-related crimes. In 2003 alone, crimes of bribery rose nearly
17 per cent, and they were up again by about 28 per cent in the first half
of 2004.79 In 2004, Transparency International (TI) stated that every
fifth Russian gives bribes to solve problems and that of the $1 trillion
in bribes worldwide, Russia accounts for at least $38 billion.80 In 2014,
Russia ranked 136 out of 175 on TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index,
equal to Nigeria.81
The most recent comprehensive report on corruption from the
INDEM Foundation, released in June 2011, found that
 the average bribe grew nearly twofold in five years from US$90 in 2005
to US$176 in 2010;
 the total volume of petty bribery in Russia grew from US$4.6 billion
in 2005 to US$5.8 billion, albeit alongside inflation growth of 7–8%;
and
 the average amount of a petty bribe (1,817 rubles in 2001; 2,780 rubles
in 2005 and 5,285 rubles in 2010) grew faster than inflation, becoming
93 per cent of an average salary in 2010.82
Moreover, Russia’s own Ministry of Interior relayed in August 2015 that
the average bribe in the country nearly doubled, in ruble terms, from
around 109,000 rubles (US$3050) in 2014 to 208,000 (US$3400) –
startlingly high in any currency.83 Hence, regardless of how high the
numbers go, the general consensus of independent researchers is that
despite Putin’s many public statements and, most presumably, sincere
wishes on curbing corruption, levels of corruption have grown since he
became president.
Ukraine. As mentioned above, Ukraine has had a unique combination
of oligarch-based, or rather oligarch-backed, politics with a very active
civil society, willing to take to the Kyiv’s Maidan (Independence) Square
twice in less than a decade, demanding that their country become less
79 Nemtsov and Pribylovsky. 80 Alyakrinskaya.
81 See, for example, Transparency International at <www.transparency.org/country/#
idx99>, accessed 31 July 2015.
82 Indem Foundation, accessed on 31 July 2015 at <www.indem.ru/en/Projects/
EverydayCorru2010.htm>.
83 Peleschuk.
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corrupt and more Western and stable – in other words, in local parlance,
‘normal’.
Under Kuchma’s presidency, control over society was exercised
through ‘informal means’, or what D’Anieri has labelled ‘machine poli-
tics’ – activities that included the bankrupting of firms owned by oppo-
sition elites, the provision of immunity for firms that support the gov-
ernment, and the use of tax laws and fire codes to close opposition
media.84 Such patronage-based politics was structured more through
‘machine politics’ than ‘party politics’.
Three years after the Orange Revolution, in 2008, Freedom House
labelled Ukraine as ‘free’ – the only Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) country so named. In many ways, the ‘free’ label was
related to the fact that the media in Ukraine had become freer under
Yushchenko. Of course, while less controlled, the media were hardly
‘independent’ in the truest sense, being under the control of various large
(oligarchic) business groups.
Both the Orange and EuroMaidan revolutions have been credited with
enlarging and making more active Ukraine’s civil society due to the
prominent role that NGOs and citizens had in both protest-led move-
ments. ‘[The 2014] election demonstrated’, wrote D’Anieri in describ-
ing the role of civil society in the first revolution, ‘not only that large
numbers of Ukrainians were willing to become politically active, but also
that they had considerable organizational capacity. Organizing, training
and deploying, first, election monitors, and later, protestors, required
considerable logistical capacity . . . Once organized forces got the protests
started, hundreds of thousands of citizens quickly joined in.’85
Moreover, while participants from all around the country took part
in both revolutions, greater participation has been credited to those
from western Ukraine. And, indeed, there is a perception that western
Ukrainians have played a large part in developing Ukraine’s civil society
across the whole country, drawing upon their experience from being part
of the Austrian Empire. ‘Imperfect as they were, the Austrian models
of parliamentary democracy and communal organization’, writes Serhy
Yekelchyk, ‘shaped western Ukrainian social life. [Western Ukraine’s]
experience of political participation in a multinational empire and its
successors also strengthened Ukrainian national identity.’86
Currently, the post-EuroMaidan reform agenda, according to Olena
Tregub, has been pushed from above by three distinct groups – reformers
in the government; a professionalized civil society that has even drafted
legislation as part of push for reforms in particular sectors; and foreign
84 D’Anieri, 2011, p. 39. 85 D’Anieri, 2006, p. 210. 86 Yekelchyk, p. 20.
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donor groups from the West such as the International Monetary Fund,
the US Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. ‘None of
them’, she states, ‘necessarily have the same priorities as Ukrainian soci-
ety as a whole.’87 With respect to the current post-EuroMaidan reforms,
the activity of the formal civil society, largely consisting of NGOs based
in Kyiv that are a product of the now decades of foreign (Western) assis-
tance programs, has been high – evidenced by the formation of a ‘Rean-
imation Package of Reforms’ coalition of NGOs that pushes for par-
liamentary bills, leads protests and monitors reforms, and of a National
Anti-Corruption Bureau to investigate high-level graft – but has not been
matched by a groundswell of criticism and involvement in national affairs
by the general public.88
What has been lacking – even post-EuroMaidan – has been an
enlarged, spirited intellectual and political debate in society over the
future of Ukraine – not just regarding its independence, but as to what
type of state and what type of society should develop there. Admit-
tedly, most of the conversation recently has been about the war in the
East, whether and how the state should be decentralized and the desired
return of Crimea. But, as Tymofei Mylovanov has stated, there has been
little intellectual debate among prominent civil society members with
regard to where Ukraine is going and how the old regime’s void should
be filled.89 Ukraine needs a much more vibrant debate regarding its
future direction, what type and flavour of democracy should develop and
how the society should interact with the state. Further, while there has
been much – and perhaps, surprising – consensus within Ukraine and
the Verkhovna Rada regarding the need to push further with reforms
and lively discussion as to whether the Yanukovych-era elites should be
allowed to work for the state, both within the parliament and in society at
large, there has been less of a discussion as to how the state institutions,
agencies and bureaucracies should be reformed and made less corrupt.
In essence, most of the state–society literature suggests that governance
depends on whether the society can be subordinated to the will of the
state or whether society is strong enough to resist or to co-opt the state.
The nature of the political culture, the historical legacy and the church
in each country can contribute to the degree of independence enjoyed
87 Tregub, p. 90. 88 Economist, 16 April 2016.
89 Tymofei Mylovanov, associate professor of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh,
spoke at the London School of Economics Ideas event ‘Healing Ukraine’ in London on
9 March 2015.
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by the society in opposition to the state. If such a relatively zero-sum
relationship between state and society does account for post-communist
Russia’s and Ukraine’s less successful levels of governance, the question
becomes, then, why were the Polish people with the communist-era
state, the Polish People’s Republic, to a lesser extent than the Russians,
and possibly the Ukrainians, were with their Soviet state while the
opposite appears to have been the case since the transitions began. Pre-
sumably, the natures of the culture, history and church did not change
in these societies after 1989 and 1991. Further, if state–society relations,
as defined in such a zero-sum approach, account for the significant
difference, it must be shown that Polish civil society is somehow more
subordinated to the state than in Russia and Ukraine. And, finally, for
such a theory to hold, the increased state control at the expense of
society in Russia under Putin should make governance even stronger.
On the other hand, healthy state–society relations might well be neces-
sary for good governance, but not in a manner in which an independent
civil society is pitted against the state. As suggested by the levels of trust
in the state (if not in politicians) in Polish society, trust in the state by
society might be the foundation for a constructive (and non-zero-sum)
relationship between state and society. Further, repetitive and concerted
healthy interactions between state and society may well have benefits for
society too, as Samuel Greene has argued. ‘As iterations [between state
and society] continue’, he has written, ‘there should ideally emerge a
stable pattern of interactions, in which civic and state actors may rea-
sonably judge the effectiveness of one or another course of action; this
may be considered the consolidation of civil society.’90
As a way to test whether state capacity is a function of state–society
relations, I conducted interviews with central and local government
bureaucrats, specifically inquiring about which types of social groups,
actors in society, businesses and private entrepreneurs are most useful
in helping them implement their policy priorities and tasks. In addition,
I organized surveys on tax compliance to examine further the nature of
relations between state bureaucrats and citizens on the ground.
Theory #3: State Capacity as a Function of the
Structure of the State
The third school of thought on state capacity finds its origins in John-
son’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle and Evans’ Embedded Autonomy.91
90 Greene, 2014, p. 18. 91 Evans, 1955; Johnson, 1982.
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For Evans, it is the state bureaucracies that are both coherent and embed-
ded in society, through strong ties between the state and the private sector
that can make good investment decisions that will yield growth such that
otherwise atomized elites will invest.
Indeed, the post-communist institutional design of the new state agen-
cies may account for differences in state capacity. A paradox, or fatal
flaw, of the glasnost and perestroika programs initiated by the last Soviet
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, concerned the fact that the problems that
were inherent in the system became more acute once those institutions
attempted to start their own reforms from the top down. The process of
correcting problems complicated those that existed, in turn threatening
the legitimacy of the regime. When a system is based on being hyper-
institutionalized along vertical links, as the Soviet Union once was, that
same system cannot undergo a complete overhaul of planning and man-
agement. Institutions cannot focus on their day-to-day tasks and at the
same time restructure themselves by introducing new incentives for those
at the bottom and reorganizing the command structure at the top. Ulti-
mately, the Soviet system developed an economic fix requiring a clean
break for new institutions to be created.
Phil Roeder, Steven Solnick and Valerie Bunce have offered three
different accounts of the collapse of the Soviet Union, each of which
places the cause in different aspects of the institutional design of the
socialist system.92 Roeder, in his book Red Sunset, has provided a neo-
institutionalist approach to the collapse, stating that its cause lay with
problems in the Bolshevik constitution – the fundamental rules of the
Soviet system. The constitutional order was laid out in such a manner
that policymakers built their power on bureaucratic constituencies, while
bureaucrats in turn needed the continuing confidence of their patrons to
remain in office. The institutionalization of reciprocal accountability and
balanced leadership increased the stability of the polity, but it also had a
perverse effect – it limited the polity’s ability to innovate in policy and to
adapt its institutions to social change. Instead, the Bolshevik constitution
brought policy dysfunction and institutional stagnation.
Similarly, Solnick, in Stealing the State, offers a principal–agent model
of Soviet-type bureaucracies, showing that agents were required to con-
tinue to abide by the agency contract and to manage institutional assets
in the principal’s interests, rather than in those of the agent. If an agent
violated the contract and this went either unnoticed or unpunished (i.e.,
assets were not taken away from the agent by the principal), then the
agent had appropriated the assets. In an analogy to a ‘bank run’, the
92 See Bunce, 1999; Roeder, 1993; and Solnick, 1997.
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state’s institutions began to fall apart, triggered by the perception that
principals could no longer control their resources.
Bunce, in her book Subversive Institutions, also has shown how the
socialist institutions, by design, divided and weakened the powerful while
homogenizing and strengthening the weak interests in society. In the end,
socialism deregulated itself over time – a process that became acceler-
ated when the institutions met the international and domestic events of
the 1980s. Hence, differences found in organizational charts of post-
communist bureaucracies may account for variation in post-communist
state capacities.
With respect to Weber’s characteristics of bureaucracies, Michael
Mann has stated that ‘Bureaucratic offices are organized within depart-
ments, each of which is centralized and embodies a functional divi-
sion of labour; departments are integrated into a single overall admin-
istration, also embodying functional division of labour and centralized
hierarchy.’93 Mann also has explained autonomous state power as relat-
ing to enhanced territorial-centralization, a concept central to state
capacity.94 In short, for Mann and for Weber, being able to implement
certain tasks requires a state structure embodied with a certain amount
of autonomy such that fairly consistent rules can be applied without
undue and incapacitating interference from outside groups.
Hence, according to this third theory, bureaucratic structures that are
designed in a centralized, hierarchical manner to allow an autonomous
relationship to the wider society are necessary in order to provide for
effective policy outcomes.
The Structure of the State in Post-communist Poland,
Russia and Ukraine
The communist political system in East Europe and the Soviet Union
essentially blurred the distinction between state administration and the
Communist Party bureaucracy. ‘The almost complete subordination
of economic and social life to the state’, writes Jacek Kochanowicz,
‘resulted in the growth of a bureaucracy tailored to manage a centrally
planned, command economy through an extensive set of administrative
agencies.’95 Since the collapse of communism, states such as Poland,
Russia and Ukraine have had to reconstruct their bureaucracies so that
the lines between politics and policy implementation are more distinct.
‘Unlike countries that must rebuild classical administrations that have
collapsed or new nations that have to erect government from scratch’,
writes Barbara Nunberg, ‘[Central and East European] countries are in
93 Mann, 1993, p. 444. 94 Mann, 1986, p. 135. 95 Kochanowicz, 1994, p. 213.
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the midst of crafting a set of “unfinished” institutions, which combine
aspects of both pre-communist and communist legacies with elements
borrowed from abroad and with indigenous innovations developed in
response to the exigencies of the transition.’96
Poland. On the face of it, Poland inherited a bureaucratic history
that is comparable to that of the former Soviet Union with respect
to entrenched clientelism and strict hierarchical structure. Throughout
Poland’s complex bureaucratic history, Nunberg writes with respect to
Poland’s bureaucratic legacy, ‘several characteristics typified the state
administration: a rigid and steep bureaucratic hierarchy – that is, many
layers of bureaucracy with decisional autonomy only at the top of the
command structure; power derived from personal ties and seniority
rather than merit; and the prevalence of inflexible rules undermined by
clientelism and circumvented by the use of załatwić (loosely equivalent
to the American slang word “pull.”)’97
Yet there is some question to what extent such ‘inflexible rules’ and
entrenched clientelism have continued to exist in Polish bureaucra-
cies since 1989. On the one hand, Freedom House’s Nations in Tran-
sit 1998 report, for example, stated that corruption is less widespread
in Poland than in other post-communist states.98 On the other hand,
despite Poland’s advances in significant economic policy areas in the
early 1990s, initial reforms such as public administration training and
local government administration changes in 1989 and 1990 were not
followed up with comprehensive bureaucratic reforms. State administra-
tions held over from the communist era were required to implement the
extensive economic programs required in the transition to the new econ-
omy. ‘The source of most corruption’, the Freedom House report does
acknowledge, ‘is the discretionary power of bureaucrats to issue licenses,
conduct inspections, grant waivers, and award contracts.’99 Only in 1996
was Poland’s government able to push through a package of significant
administrative and constitutional changes including a new Civil Service
law.
More recently, as elaborated in Chapter 3, the PiS government threw
out several civil service regulations right after its 2015 electoral win,
furthering the notion that Polish bureaucracies are spoils for election
winners.100
Russia. Despite the changes at the top of the system after the Soviet
collapse, the basic communist employment and administrative practices
96 Nunberg, 1999, p. 3. 97 Ibid., p. 36.
98 Karatnycky, Motyl and Graybow, eds., 1998, p. 452. 99 Ibid., p. 452.
100 Shekhovtsov, 2016, p. 23; and Economist, 30 April 2016.
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were left intact throughout most of the 1990s. ‘While only 10 per cent
of the old-style nomenklatura are still in state or government posts’,
Freedom House reported in 1998, ‘the system suffers from corruption
and an acute shortage of modern managers and civil servants.’101
In 1995, the Russian State Duma passed the presidential version of
a Law on the State Service, which divides public offices into three cat-
egories and bans civil servants from simultaneously holding any other
employment, except teaching or research jobs. ‘Benefiting from expo-
sure to civil service models from abroad and discussions with foreign
experts, the legislation made a good start in establishing the essential
functions and public service ethos of the civil service corps’, writes Nun-
berg. ‘But, the law is not without problems, and serious consideration of
amendment or clarification through subsidiary legislation or regulation
may be needed to ensure that robust civil service institutions are created
and maintained.’102
An additional unique feature of the design of Russia’s institutional sys-
tem is its selection of a federalist structure – a system that does not exist
in any of the Central and East European states. In the 1990s, the adop-
tion of a federalist system of government accelerated further the decen-
tralization process that is normally associated with democratization.
Meanwhile, Putin has sought to reverse that decentralization trend
and strengthen the capacity of the state with alterations in the system
of fiscal federalism; the creation of seven federal districts with viceroys
subordinated to the Kremlin to oversee the provinces; a reform of the
Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, so that it no longer
is composed of regional governors; and the appointment of officials with
strong allegiance directly to the president rather than to other govern-
ment institutions. Following the Beslan terrorist attack in 2004, Putin’s
proposal to nominate regional governors, subject to the approval of
regional legislatures, was successfully passed, so that governors were
no longer elected from 2005 to 2012, when direct popular gubernato-
rial elections resumed. Efforts were also undertaken to ensure that state
agencies and bureaucracies fell in line with the strict hierarchical system
of management. (And, of course, while prime minister in 1999, Putin
began the second Chechen war in an effort to curb any regional seces-
sions.) Hence, due to the ‘power vertical’ function of the Putin system,
Russia is governed much more like a unitary state today than it was in
the 1990s. And, since Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, Putin has
been viewed as strengthening that ‘vertical’ in the executive branch even
further rather than prioritizing economic reform.103
101 Karatnycky et al., 1998, p. 496.
102 Nunberg, 1999, p. 187. 103 Rutland, 2013.
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Ukraine. In many ways, the efforts being undertaken in Ukraine since
2014 are the first major attempts to reform that country’s state and
administrative structures. Most recently, in December 2015, Ukraine’s
parliament passed a new law on civil service reform that is most promis-
ing, calling for administrative and personnel reforms that are more in line
with EU standards in order to root out deeply entrenched corruption.
In 2015, the first full year after the EuroMaidan, the situation with
regard to corruption was viewed through Transparency International
data as quite severe. Compared with the year before, the average bribe
of an official rose from 30,000 to 40,000 Ukrainian hryvnia (albeit
falling in US dollar terms, due to the hryvnia’s depreciation). In 2015,
only 19 per cent of those receiving bribes were in jail, while a tenth
of all convicted of bribery were acquitted. Situations also abounded
in which the fine for bribes was less than the amount of the bribe
itself.104
Meanwhile, throughout nearly all of Ukraine’s twenty-five-year his-
tory up to 2015 as an independent state, the country lacked significant
legislation aimed at truly reforming its bureaucracies. As discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3, the process of administrative reform floun-
dered under Kuchma and Yushchenko. In part, this was because the ini-
tial constitutional division of powers, drafted in the early 1990s between
nationalists and older communists, was consistently up for reconsider-
ation in Ukraine. Part of Ukraine’s uniqueness, of course, lies in its
hybrid presidential–parliamentary system, which has placed executive
power not entirely in the presidency but in the Cabinet of Ministers as
well. And Kuchma’s presidency was viewed as veering towards moderate
authoritarianism, with Yanukovych’s presidency doing so much more. As
such, amidst bureaucratic interference in the economy and amidst a truly
oligarchic system in which oligarchs checked, balanced and stalemated
each other as they intervened in politics, the regional governments also
lacked power on their own to undertake any significant administrative
reforms.
The extent to which the state is well organized and embodied with
human and financial resources may well be an explanation for the state
capacity outcomes in post-communist Poland, Russia and Ukraine. For
this theory to hold, state structure must be shown to be primarily
accountable for governance outcomes. Further, the manner in which the
state is structured – in a hierarchical manner, similar to that of the for-
mer Soviet Union, or in a more Weberian one – must be shown to be of
critical significance.
104 Trebor.
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To test this hypothesis, I conducted interviews with bureaucrats at dif-
ferent levels of the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian states and examined
historical and government documents in order to discern differences in
the lines of authority and hierarchical patterns between the relevant pol-
icy agencies in the three states.
A Model of State Capacity for the Post-communist States
Despite the enormous contributions that each of the three theories on
state capacity described above has made to the field of comparative
politics, each has limitations in explaining post-socialist state capacity
patterns. The first theory, with state capacity being a function of the
development of political institutions such as parties, largely ignores
dynamics of societal interaction with the state other than political parties.
The second theory, with state capacity being a function of state–society
relations, does pick up on such interaction missing in the first theory, but
largely views state and society as engaged only in a zero-sum relationship.
Finally, the third theory, focusing on state capacity as a function of state
structure, is far too exclusively focused on the organization of the state
itself. Furthermore, none of these theories highlight history and previ-
ous state–society interactions extensively. How the state has treated citi-
zens in the past also is critically important in determining current state
activity.
I revise these theories and develop a new model for state capacity.
I construct a theory of state capacity for the post-communist states that
incorporates some aspects of state–society interactions and relies on most
of the state structural arguments. More specifically, my model focuses on
the extent to which the state is organized and provided with resources in
a Weberian sense and on the manner in which society becomes ready
to be a compliant, willing partner in state activity. In focusing on soci-
ety, the second theory on state capacity would predict that if society and
social groups were powerful, one would not see effective implementa-
tion of state goals. My theory predicts, instead, that when trust is built
up between state and society, society will comply. Rather than acting
autonomously, I argue that the state can be effective when it penetrates
civil society to complete a task by building and by drawing on trust on
the part of society in the state itself.
In a broad sense, the term ‘trust’ and the term ‘legitimacy’ can be
used interchangeably in this model, but I rely more on the term ‘trust’,
as ‘legitimacy’ is a bit more government-specific, while ‘trust’ is more
about the state as a whole, irrespective of government and power and
focused more on the state apparatus. ‘Legitimacy’ also conveys notions
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With Qualities Facilitating Co-operative Behaviour
such as Satisfaction with the Transition,
Economic Well-Being, Nationalism 
and Long-Term Trust of the State
Figure 2.1 A model of state capacity for the post-communist states
related to a government being properly elected or powers being specifi-
cally allocated to rulers.
As shown in Figure 2.1, in this new model of state capacity for the
post-communist states, state and society interact with each other through
trust, enabling policy implementation. With respect to the state, if the
question were only about building up resources and improving design, as
the state structural theory would predict, then with a good police, army
and military, citizens should be frightened and coerced into cooperating
with the state. Instead, this new theory predicts that the state can be most
effective when it involves civil society by creating citizens’ trust in itself.
In short, a strong, independent civil society would choose to comply
with the state rather than turn away when it trusts the state. Trust is
essential. When citizens trust their state, they rely on the state to fulfil its
commitments to them.
To be capable of building and drawing upon trust on the part of soci-
ety, the state must be bureaucratically rational in a Weberian sense.
In looking within the bureaucratic rational state itself, as shown in
Figure 2.2, there are four principal aspects highlighted here: the use
of constructive historical references of state–societal interaction (where
available), efficient and well-organized structures, human and technolog-
ical resources and a productive work philosophy.105 All of these need to
105 James Q. Wilson has laid out the concept of ‘Organizational Culture’, similar to my
term ‘work philosophy’ (Wilson, 1989, p. 91).













Figure 2.2 Where to find bureaucratic rationalism within a state
be oriented towards society so that trust can be built up. Hence, where
attitudes of trust in the state prevail, individuals and groups in society
will comply with the state regarding the given policy area, and there will
be more successful policy implementation.106
In general, trust may be defined, as Piotr Sztompka does, as ‘a bet
on the future contingent actions of others’.107 In contrast to certainty,
trust, then, reflects one’s confidence that others – either individuals or
institutions – will act as one would expect they would and prove to be
trustworthy.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that trust in the state is not
synonymous with the other form of trust – trust in others, which has
been referred more popularly to as social capital in the field of politi-
cal science. Simply put, trusting the state to provide goods and to treat
others fairly is not related to citizens’ trust in one another. Moreover,
cross-country survey research has shown that such trust in the insti-
tutions of democratic governance is not correlated with social capital.
‘[T]here is no strong correlation between political trust, defined as trust
in democratic institutions, and social trust’, Bo Rothstein has observed.
‘This has led many researchers to conclude that there is no convincing
106 Russell Hardin has qualified this notion of trust in the state as being necessary for state
legitimacy. ‘If Locke’s understanding of government is that it must be grounded in
trust to be legitimate, then no major government of modern times is likely to be legiti-
mate for more than passing moments’, Hardin writes. ‘Evidently, however, government
need not be legitimate in Locke’s sense to survive and even to manage a nation through
major difficulties and into prosperity. It may suffice that government not be generally
distrusted.’ Hardin, 1998, p. 23.
107 Sztompka, 1998, p. 20, quoted in Rothstein, 2004, p. 18.
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evidence showing that trust in democratic institutions produces social
trust and social capital.’108
In fact, with respect to post-communist Russia, Alena Ledeneva has
observed that there is a lack of trust in newly built institutions, while
at the same time there actually are really strong interpersonal ties within
Russians’ relationships with one another.109 Hence, a citizen can trust or
not trust his or her government, but that type of trust is entirely different
from the type of trust he or she has in others. We simply expect different
things from other individuals than we do from our state. The ability to
trust others on an immediate, close basis is quite different from providing
a trusting relationship with the state writ large.
Citizen trust in government falls into two different aspects. ‘A trust-
worthy government’, Margaret Levi has written, ‘is one that has proce-
dures for making and implementing policy that meet prevailing stan-
dards of fairness, and it is a government that is capable of credible
commitments.’110 Hence, first, citizens must be able to trust their gov-
ernment to be a credible supplier of the goods and services that govern-
ments promise to provide. Second, citizens must be able to trust their
government to respond to them in a manner deemed fair (i.e., consis-
tent with notions of procedural fairness.) Further, trust in the state on
the part of citizens also is determined in large part by previous state–
society interactions. How the state has treated citizens in the past and
how it fulfils its implicit contract with society in the present help deter-
mine the capacity, scope and method of current state activity.
Clearly, the trust society has in the state is shaped by macro-historical
development and macro-level qualities such as satisfaction with the tran-
sition, overall economic wellbeing, nationalism and long-term trust in
the state. And these qualities are not static. The focus here, though, is
on how government behaviour impacts societal trust – that is, how the
state maximizes or minimizes the levels of trust that society has, which
will then impact how well state goals are accomplished. The construction
and maintenance of such trust is iterative.
Such trust is also two-way. Not only must society trust the state, but
the state must also trust society to be responsible and trustworthy in ful-
filling its obligations to the state without excessive coercion to do so.
(Francis Fukuyama’s remark ‘a central lesson of tax policy, which is
that extraction costs are inversely proportional to the perceived legiti-
macy of the authority doing the taxing’ suggests an inverse relationship
between the employment of trust-building, or legitimate, activities and of
108 Rothstein, 2004, pp. 21–22. 109 Ledeneva, 2004, p. 85. 110 Levi, 2003, p. 88.
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coercive ones.111) And when citizens trust the state, they are more likely
to want to earn the state’s trust in them by complying with the state’s
rules and procedures. ‘Reciprocity is the last of the factors that enhance
government trustworthiness’, Levi comments. ‘Citizens are likely to per-
ceive government as reciprocating their trust when they can articulate a
return for their compliance and, when they feel they are being treated
with respect. When government has a good track record of delivering on
its promises, especially those for which its commitments are not credible,
citizens are more likely to trust the government and respond with trust-
worthiness – even in situations where it is extremely difficult to mon-
itor them’.112 Citizens’ trust in their government, therefore, has addi-
tional consequences for the state’s ability to govern. As Levi continues,
such trust of the state ‘affects both the level of citizens’ tolerance of the
regime and their degree of compliance with governmental demands and
regulations’.113 Hence, the erosion of trust in government can lead to
increased citizen noncompliance with the state’s rules and regulations.
Bureaucracies particularly are critical conduits for shaping the levels of
trust between citizens and their government. Agencies entrusted by the
state with implementing policy are involved in all aspects of social life
from the military, law enforcement and the courts; to taxation and regu-
lation of the economy; to environmental protection and on to social wel-
fare services and public education, to name a few. And such institutions
often intervene and interact with citizens as they administer the state’s
business. ‘In most societies, the public also has much more frequent
contact with the administrative institutions of democracy than with rep-
resentative institutions’, Rothstein has written. ‘This is especially true
in the former socialist countries . . . The policy implementation side of
democracy is thus in many ways more central to the welfare of citizens
than the representative side.’114
Levi likewise suggests that when agents of state institutions need the
compliance of citizens to implement their tasks, the government needs
to be trustworthy to its citizens in order for its agents to receive such
cooperation. ‘The hostility of street-level bureaucrats toward clients and
of regulators toward the regulated can be extremely counterproduc-
tive’, Levi writes.115 Hence, how street-level bureaucrats treat citizens –
whether they treat them more like clients, for example – matters with
regard to whether or not the state can build up its trust and legitimacy
so that it can function properly. To strengthen that legitimacy, then,
improving the quality of street-level bureaucracies is critically important.
111 Fukuyama, 2011, p. 343, quoted in Hosking, p. 26. 112 Levi, 2003, p. 93.
113 Levi, 2003, p. 88. 114 Rothstein, 2004, pp. 22–23. 115 Levi, 2003, p. 93.
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To make dramatic increases in the level of citizens’ trust in the state
generally and in street-level bureaucracies in particular, states need to
overhaul their administrative structures so that they are oriented to soci-
ety. To do this, the very unique character of the 1989 and 1991 transi-
tions from communism provided a tremendous opportunity to re-create
radically trust between citizens and state. A transition can allow an over-
haul of state–societal trust. The unique fresh-start approach of a transi-
tion such as those in 1989 or in 1991 – or even in 2014 in Ukraine – can
allow the state to enter into a new relationship with its society in order
to improve trust on the part of the society. And simple items, such as the
new uniforms donned by Kyiv’s new police department in July 2015 (as
opposed to those worn by previous law enforcement forces referred to as
the city’s militia), can symbolize a state’s desire to make a fresh start with
the public.
The equality afforded by communism makes exploiting such an
opportunity to increase citizen trust following the transition much more
possible than in the aftermath of other revolutions that have taken place
across the globe. The populations across the post-communist region,
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Russia and
Ukraine, are highly literate and educated. Nearly all citizens have access
to television. This means that they can be clued into issues regarding the
state and politics quite readily. And, most critically, there was a fairly
equal distribution of income at the start of the transition. This last point
means that the new governments and institutions created in the after-
math of communism did not automatically have large groups in society
that could not be won over. Because there were not significantly different
economic classes, large swaths of society did not have strong economic
ties to the old regime. This is in marked contrast, say, to democratic
revolutions in Latin America, where the outgoing dictatorship may have
had allies among the upper classes, posing difficulties for the new govern-
ment in trying to earn their trust. If the new post-communist state takes
advantage of the revolution’s aftermath by treating essentially economi-
cally equal citizens fairly and providing them with a significantly higher
level of service than the communist regime, it can make giant leaps in
gaining society’s trust.
With respect to the nature of the transition’s aftermath, the 1989
transition in Poland was perceived dramatically differently by the state
and the society than the 1991 transitions in Russia and Ukraine, as
mentioned above. Poles viewed the transition as allowing the creation
of a new state of, by and for Poles, whereas Russians, sitting at the
heart of the Soviet empire, were very uncertain as to what the transition
would bring for them, both as a nation and as individuals. Meanwhile,
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Ukrainians were bewildered as to what independence and statehood
would truly mean.
Further, Bunce has argued that the transition in Poland was a time of
‘extraordinary politics’, whereas in other countries such as Russia, the
transition was merely a time of ‘politics as usual’.116 The transition in
Poland sought to incorporate society – especially as the shock therapy
program of Leszek Balcerowicz was slowed down shortly after its intro-
duction so that those who did not benefit from the reforms could be
incorporated more gradually into the new economic structures of cap-
italism. The abrupt nature of the 1989 transition thus allowed recre-
ation of the state–society relationship in Poland. Meanwhile, the transi-
tion in Russia was regarded as a political opportunity for a few to benefit.
Hence, Poland, which has had great consensus on the meaning of its own
revolution in 1989, shows that the unique fresh-start approach of the
transition itself can allow the state to enter into a new relationship with
society in order to get things done. In contrast, in Russia and Ukraine,
for different reasons, what the exact lessons of its 1991 revolutions actu-
ally are for state–society relations was mired in significant contention for
far too long.
To aid in the recreation of a constructive state–society relationship,
legacies of the past can be very beneficial in the building of trust in
the present. The use of historical legacies in explaining different post-
socialist outcomes has been debated in the literature. As mentioned
above, Elster, Offe and Preuss argue that the conditions that appear to
favour consolidation across the region are, in the end, political culture
and historical legacy. The authors write, ‘what matters most is the social
and cultural capital and its potential for adjusting the legacies of the past
to the requirements of the present’.117 Thus, modernization – and rejec-
tion of the past in contemporary political culture – is the prerequisite to
transforming communist industrialization into post-communist market
capitalism.
Elster, Offe and Preuss view historical legacies in the post-communist
region as bad constraints in the formation of a market economy. ‘These
non-institutional legacies’, they write, ‘have resulted in a number of con-
straints which have severely complicated the transition to capitalism.’118
However, as Hellman has argued in his ‘Winners Take All’ essay, some
societal constraints in the process of transitioning to a new economy
are necessary. A legacy of constructive civil society involvement in pub-
lic affairs can help provide such constraints. In short, all constraints
116 Bunce, 2005.
117 Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998, pp. 307–308. 118 Ibid., p. 158.
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associated with the past need not be viewed as backward and liable to
stall the reform process, or the ability of the state to accomplish its goals
during a time of transition. Past state–society relations can make a posi-
tive difference.
Thus, according to this new model for post-communist state capacity,
it is not simply the degree to which the state is organized in a rational
manner nor how powerful the forces in society are, but the trustworthy
nature of the state in the view of society, which reduces any potential
resistance. Whereas some maintain that successful governance depends
on the extent to which the state has more power over society or on the
extent to which society directs the state, I argue that state and society
mutually reinforce each other’s capacities. The result of their interactions
is benign. The state appears to be only as strong as society.
To become a trustworthy and capable partner of society, each post-
communist state utilizes historical reference points to transform partly
into a version of its former self, modelled on a time when the state is
perceived to have been quite capable and legitimate in the view of soci-
ety. It is the creation of a bureaucratic rational state oriented towards
society, the use of constructive historical legacies when available and a
focus on healthy citizen–state interactions that enables trust to build up
so that state activity will be accomplished more successfully. Trust is at
the centre of policy implementation.119
Evaluating the Model with the Poland–Russia–Ukraine
Tax Comparison
The new model of state capacity for the post-communist states suggests
that successful implementation of government policies is an outcome
of the trust that builds up as a compliant society interacts with state
bureaucracies, which utilize healthy historical references (when possi-
ble), are embodied with rational structures and resources and demon-
strate a constructive work philosophy among personnel. Hence, when
one looks inside a capable state, peeking underneath the ‘hood’ or ‘bon-
net’ of the state (depending on which side of the Atlantic one is on), the
distinct components of rational administrative structures that are all ori-
ented towards citizens should be found. And a compliant society should
119 This model and this book focus on the impact of trust on governance and state capac-
ity. I define and measure trust in the state, but I am not focused especially on explaining
this trust or where it comes from. I am theorizing about the impact of trust or a lack
of trust, not what causes trust, which can be overdetermined by a variety of historical
issues that are too great for proper examination here.
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be shown to possess the attitudes and the ability necessary to partner
with the state.
The rest of this book tests this model in a multi-method approach by
focusing on a critical policy area in post-communist Poland, Russia and
Ukraine – the bureaucracy’s capacity to ensure tax compliance. All three
countries are particularly important, as they had to set up new institu-
tions at roughly the same time once the Communist Party’s central role
in government administration faded away, and today represent distinctly
different democratic, authoritarian and transitional regime types. Poland
is a case of a country that has successfully accomplished the transition
to a market economy and a democratic, legitimate state. Russia, on the
other hand, has remained in (or returned to) an authoritarian form of
governance. Ukraine, central to the story, is a state very much in contin-
uous transition with failed attempts towards building a rule-of-law state
mixed with weak coercion. While some scholars have focused on the for-
mation of tax policies in these countries, no one, to my knowledge, has
looked comparatively in a book-length work at the role of the state pri-
marily in implementing such policies in both an East European and a
former Soviet context.
I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to outline the
implementation of these two policy areas. With respect to the use of qual-
itative process tracing, my evidence is based on careful field research, uti-
lizing primary sources such as government documents and evaluations
on many different aspects of tax and social welfare policy implementa-
tion. I also have undertaken interviews with local and national current
and former tax officials at different levels of the state, as well as with pri-
vate societal actors. While conducting field research in Poland, Russia
and Ukraine, I based myself in the capital cities and visited sub-regions
within each country to get a better sense of how policy flows from centre
to periphery and to gain insight into the extent to which actual goals and
structures vary from agency mandates and normative acts. For example,
over multiple field trips from 2000 to 2015, I interviewed in each country
dozens of officials or former officials who worked in the state tax admin-
istrations (STAs) in at least three provinces in each country. I focused
my research in Poland particularly on the activities of the Ministry of
Finance, the State Tax Revenue Chambers and the provincial tax offices;
in Russia on the activities of the Federal Tax Service (formerly, the Min-
istry of Taxes and Dues), the Russian Academy of State Service and
regional tax offices; and in Ukraine on the STA and regional tax offices.
In Poland, of particular value to my work were the audit reports on the
tax collection agencies going back to the mid-1980s undertaken by the
Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (Supreme Audit Chamber), a state agency inde-
pendent of the other government ministries.
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In addition to interviewing bureaucrats, I also interviewed other soci-
etal actors – such as law firms, accounting firms, NGOs, state statisti-
cal agencies and academics – who directly interacted with or observed
the actions of the tax bureaucracies, in some cases since the start
of the transition, in order to comprehend better the relationship between
the state and society. In many cases, individuals working in law and
accounting firms had worked until fairly recently for their country’s tax
administrations.
With respect to the utilization of quantitative methods, this book also
is based on eight unique Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys of
more than 22,000 Poles, Russians and Ukrainians that I designed and
had carried out by leading polling agencies in 2004, 2005, 2010, 2012
and 2015, as well as a Public Officials’ Survey in Russia in 2011 that
included over 1,000 officials across the country, over 400 of whom
worked in the tax administrative structures.
This book shows that Poland governs more effectively than Russia
and Ukraine and that it has done so due to a better mix of Weberian
bureaucratic rationalism on the part of the state and greater compliance
on the part of society. At the same time, the Russian bureaucracy is
judged to have made some relatively moderate advances in Weberian
terms, while society is judged to remain only partly compliant. Mean-
while, the Ukrainian tax bureaucracy has attempted to follow, albeit to a
lesser extent, some of the coercive attributes of the Russian tax system,
and has encountered less willingness on the part of the public to be tax
compliant.
Regarding the nature of each state and tax collection, I examine specif-
ically how structures and human and technological resources, as well as
a work philosophy geared towards interacting with society, all combine
to produce levels of bureaucratic rationalism. I also show that the nature
of the power employed by the state depends, in part, upon how willing
society is to enter into an agreement with the state and to comply with its
rules. I demonstrate this in two ways: First, my findings emphasize the
role of history – specifically the use by post-communist states and leaders
of certain historical reference points to transform partly into a version of
their former selves, modelled on an era when the state is perceived to
have been quite capable. Second, with respect to more current citizen–
state interactions, the provision of poor ‘customer service’ by bureaucrats
is shown to have a negative impact on society, which may very well refuse
its obligations to obey the state’s laws. Finally, the research also shows,
somewhat surprisingly, that political parties – how well they focus atten-
tion on state agencies and on the post-communist civil service – need
not play a significant role in the building of the capacity of state bureau-
cracies for effective governance.
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In many ways, this study is a response to the call of Joseph Schum-
peter, who argued for the creation of a new field of ‘Fiscal Sociology’
through which, in the words of Isaac William Martin, would be created
various ‘comparative methods to identify causal relationships between
the revenue policies of particular states and the characteristics of their
environing societies’ including ‘the relationship between effective tax
administration and cultural norms that legitimate taxation’.120 By focus-
ing on both the tax administrative and social sides of the tax relation-
ship, this study seeks to provide a full picture of how and why taxes are
collected.
‘In other words’, as Venelin Ganev discerns, how tax states operate
in this study of ‘fiscal sociology’ means recognizing that ‘the capacity
of modern states to tax does not just grow spontaneously as society
responds to the imperatives of economic development, and neither it
is simply “hardwired” into state bureaucracies by smart and dedicated
local politicians or knowledgeable foreign experts. Hence interpretative
accounts of the rise of particular tax states should not be reduced to anal-
yses of tax policies, administrative reforms and fiscal measures, because
such analyses implicitly presuppose that the mechanisms of taxation are
already in place.’121
By focusing on both taxpayers and the state, and on how they engage
with each other, rather than simply exploring new tax laws and admin-
istrative reforms, this study aims to focus on how such a functional
infrastructure of the broader, multifaceted process of tax collection can
be established. As Martin Daunton has remarked, successful taxation
depends on ‘institutional procedures and social norms, which sustain
cooperative solutions to the problems of collective action, and pro-
vide some assurance that fellow taxpayers and the government may be
trusted’.122
The Transformation of the Post-communist Polish,
Russian and Ukrainian State Bureaucracies
In Chapter 3, I undertake a comparative study of the Polish, Russian and
Ukrainian bureaucracies by reviewing how the legacies of each country’s
twentieth-century bureaucratic history were employed after 1989/1991,
as well as each state’s post-communist attempts at administrative reform
to create the state. I also analyze the progress made towards creating a
professional civil service in each state, review the growth and character
120 Martin, 2011, p. 731. 121 Ganev, 2011, p. 246.
122 Daunton, 2001, pp. 10–11, quoted in Hosking, 2014, p. 98.
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of the bureaucracies in the last twenty-five years, and examine general
public perceptions of post-communist bureaucrats.
In particular, Poland’s institutions are shown to have carried with
them legacies from a more distant ‘Weberian’ bureaucratic past from
the interwar years and from a more recent clientelist, hierarchical and
patrimonial bureaucratic past from the post-war socialist state. Since
1989, Polish governing agencies have moderated between these pasts and
the present without the focused attention of political parties to advance
a new civil service. After a Civil Service Act was passed in 1996, its
implementation was held captive by a ‘spoils mentality’ among political
parties. Hence, theories highlighting political party institutionalization
as being critical for the development of state bureaucracies are shown
not to be applicable in the Polish case, as relatively strong state capacity
emerged in the post-communist period without strong party develop-
ment or party impact on bureaucratic reforms.
Whereas the parties have been a stumbling block to civil service reform
in post-communist Poland, Russia has slowly attempted to reform the
state from within. The lack of comprehensive bureaucratic reform under
Yeltsin allowed new, largely economic forces to capture the attention of
bureaucrats at the expense of state interests. Since that time, Putin has
undertaken a series of attempts at administrative reform in order to cre-
ate, or rather ‘recreate’, a tightly centralized Soviet-inspired state with
the bureaucracies under greater control, while older bureaucrats who
mostly entered government in the Soviet era seem to be replaced by for-
mer military and law enforcement personnel rather than by newly trained
younger workers.
In many ways, the lack of trust in the Ukrainian government today,
although it shares the same administrative history as Russia prior to
1991, has its origins in the lack of professionalism on the part of the
Ukrainian state during the 1990s, as it began to undertake a triple tran-
sition to create a market-oriented, democratic and independent country
without policy goals clearly defined by political leaders. After Ukraine
achieved independence in 1991, it appeared as a new state with less
coordination and less control than it had under the Soviet Union, largely
because the main headquarters of all Soviet-era governing institutions
remained in Moscow, and Ukraine thus had to build new ones in Kyiv,
the design of which contributed to citizens’ feeling less vulnerable to the
state’s deterrent efforts.123
123 Author’s interview with Vladimir Dubrovsky, leading research, Centre for Social and
Economic Research, Kyiv, 20 October 2005.
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Thus, each post-communist state employs historical reference points
where available in order to transform partly into a version of its former
self, patterned after a time when the state is perceived to have functioned
well in the eyes of the public.
Creating Post-communist Tax Regimes and Measuring
Tax Compliance
Chapter 4 provides greater understanding, context and measurement
of the object of study, tax compliance. First, the chapter provides an
overview of the history and structure of the tax regimes in Poland, Rus-
sia and Ukraine, including a discussion of the foreign tax advice given to
each country. At the beginning of the 1990s, Poland, Russia and Ukraine
all introduced three new main taxes (the personal income tax, the corpo-
rate income tax and the value-added tax), allowing a comparative study,
as all three states were required to make dramatic institutional changes
in the tax arena at exactly the same time. The type of tax system con-
structed reflects the type of economy envisaged. For Poland, which fol-
lowed Western advice more closely than the others, building a modern
tax system was all about a modern economy.
At the beginning of the transition to the market economy, all post-
socialist states, most of which had copied the Soviet Union’s tax sys-
tem during the communist era, had poorly functioning tax adminis-
trations, falling tax revenues and tax compliance problems.124 Poland,
however, was able to reform its tax system sooner than most of the
other post-communist states and was able to raise adequate revenues
for the state.125 Poland is shown to be consistently able to extract rev-
enue, though it does fall short of its goals at times and has significant
(but not incapacitating) tax arrears. Meanwhile, data from Russia and
Ukraine are more erratic, showing tax collection to be poor throughout
most of the 1990s, with some improvement after 2000.
In recognition of the limitations of available tax data in providing accu-
rate estimates of tax compliance in countries with a history of barter and
high levels of grey sector activity, the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudi-
nal Surveys, conducted by the author, are introduced as a unique mea-
surement of social willingness to comply with paying taxes in the three
states. In these surveys from 2004 to 2015, the Polish polity is consis-
tently shown to be far more willing and compliant in its attitude towards
124 Polomski, 1999, p. 6.
125 See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2000, p. 290.
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paying taxes than are the Russian and Ukrainian polities, the latter of
which had the lowest level of support for obeying the tax laws.
The next three chapters examine more closely how state and society
interact to ensure tax compliance.
Bureaucratic Rationalism in Poland’s, Russia’s and
Ukraine’s Tax Administration
‘Quasi-voluntary compliance by citizens, firms, and bureaucrats is pos-
sible only where there is a rationalized bureaucracy’, Levi and Richard
Sherman have written, ‘In the absence of the conditions that support
such a bureaucracy, the prospects for both development and democracy
are reduced.’126 In addition, human and technological resources and an
esprit de corps, or work philosophy, are crucial for the development of
the requisite ‘rational matter-of-factness’ that enables bureaucracies to
accomplish their tasks.
Chapter 5 examines specifically how Polish efforts at administrative
reform within the tax service have focused on rationalizing the func-
tion and duties of tax officials in a Weberian sense. In contrast, Russia’s
tax bureaucracies lean towards securing their own ‘power’ over society
through their tax collection mechanisms. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian STA
has built over the last decade a tax system based on coercion and bureau-
cratic discretion, leaving Ukrainians to develop less fear and little trust of
their state with respect to tax policy administration. Comparison of the
experiences of these three countries suggests that ‘empowering’ bureau-
crats so that the state will be ‘strengthened’ vis-à-vis society may not
provide as successful an implementation of state policy in the long run
as an approach based upon ‘rationalizing’ the state.
Thus, the chapter partially confirms theories that argue that state
capacity is a function of a well-developed bureaucracy, but also shows
that bureaucracies must be greatly oriented towards society to be
effective.
Social Compliance with Respect to Paying Taxes
Venelin Ganev has remarked, quoting Levi, that one of the lessons
of fiscal sociology ‘is that voluntary compliance is remarkably hard to
cultivate, and even when cultivated, it is “always tenuous,” liable to
126 Levi and Sherman, 1997, p. 318.
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fluctuations and “extremely difficult to reconstitute.”’127 Chapter 6 seeks
to understand how a state can cultivate such compliance.
In 2004–2005, I designed a series of unique Taxpayer Compliance
Attitudinal Surveys of 7,000 Poles, Russians and Ukrainians regarding
their attitudes towards a critical obligation of citizenship. Larger follow-
up surveys took place in 2010 in all three countries, and further surveys
also took place in Ukraine in 2012 and 2015. The 2004–2005 surveys
illustrated that the Polish polity was far more willing and compliant in
its attitude towards paying taxes than the Russian and Ukrainian polities
were. Unlike Poles, whose attitudes towards tax compliance are related
to their trust in the state, and Russians, whose attitudes are related to
their fear of the state, Ukrainians, showing the lowest levels of support
for obeying the law, reacted to state efforts to increase tax compliance
with less fear and little trust. Finally, in the Russian case, comparing
the results of the public opinion surveys with those of my 2011 national
survey of tax and social welfare officials shows that even within the state
itself, attitudes towards Russia’s governance model are akin to those of
the general public.
Furthermore, with respect to examining the impact of ‘customer ser-
vice’ through having had prior bureaucratic interaction in some of the
surveys, for those who have contact with the tax bureaucrats, the nature
of the conduct of the tax officials can make a critical difference to attitu-
dinal support for complying with tax laws.
At the centre of current upheaval, as well as being located in between
the other two cases, Ukraine merits closer attention. Chapter 7 unpacks
the case of the transitional Ukraine by region, by religion, by nationality
and by language. Regional analysis not only reveals, somewhat surpris-
ingly, that the respondents from the four main regions of the country –
East, West, Centre and South (not including Crimea) – do not differ
greatly when it comes to overall support for obeying tax laws, but also
shows that trust explains Ukrainian motivations (or lack of motivations)
for complying across both far eastern and far western parts of the coun-
try, with which part of government is trusted varying according to who
is in office. Meanwhile, differences based on religion, nationality and
language are shown to be relatively minimal.
Taxes and Trust
Focusing on two states that embody competing post-communist models
(Poland and Russia) and on a third state attempting to transition from
127 Levi, 1988, pp. 69–70, in Ganev, 2011, p. 249.
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one model to the other (Ukraine), this study uniquely emphasizes the
building and accumulation of trust as the main vehicle for transitioning
from a coercive tax state to a modern, legal and legitimate one. Despite
the fact that all three countries adopted new tax systems at roughly the
same time (1992–1994), embraced the same main tax types and had to
set up new governing institutions, Poland, Russia and Ukraine are quite
distinct cases. Poland governs more effectively than Russia and Ukraine.
It does so because it has a state that is more organized, is embodied with
higher-quality resources, and is more citizen- and outward-focused, and
has a society that is more capable of being a compliant partner. Polish
state and society interact to create a greater degree of trust between them
enabling state activity to be accomplished.
Meanwhile, with all of its coercive capacity within its structures, Rus-
sia does not govern as much through trust or as effectively as Poland.
Russians respond most strongly to a coercive state, which governs at a
suboptimal level. At the same time, Ukraine’s bureaucracies also seek out
to empower the state ‘as an end in itself’ but do so in a weaker manner
than their Russian counterparts, instilling less fear and less trust of their
state in Ukrainians. For a state failing to gain the public’s trust, reform-
ing street-level bureaucracies such as the tax administration would go a
long way towards building a healthier state, capable of implementing its
goals for the long run. Trust, therefore, is an intrinsic part of revenue
collection.
3 Reinterpreting History to Recreate the State
The Transformation of the Polish, Russian and
Ukrainian State Bureaucracies in the 1990s and Today
In comparison with Russia and Ukraine, Poland’s moderately successful
tax bureaucracies are due in great part to a partial level of bureaucratic
rationalism, in the Weberian sense, that existed within its bureaucratic
administration structures. This chapter will show the impact of the his-
torical development of the bureaucracy in the three states and delineate
the recent history of their administrative reforms. The use of Poland’s,
Russia’s and Ukraine’s historical legacies will be analysed, emphasizing
in particular that the inter-war period served as a pre-existing histori-
cal template for Poland’s later public institutions, whereas the historical
template for Russia’s current leadership appears to be the tight hierar-
chy of the Soviet Union’s military and law enforcement organizations.
Meanwhile, Ukraine’s lack of vision at the top with respect to the nature
and mission of the transition, economic reform model, constitutional
structure and state–society relationship led to a choice by default of a
continued large and directionless bureaucratic welfare state held over,
with little reform, from the Soviet era. Hence, deciding which historical
reference points to employ for the new post-communist regimes matters
greatly for their bureaucracies today, of which, of course, the countries’
tax administrations compose a large part.
The main focus of this chapter, therefore, is not simply on analyzing
history, per se, but on introducing the notion of ‘model transference’,
that is, how post-communist states choose which state capacity legacies
from the past to apply in the present to demonstrate to contemporary cit-
izens that their state is effective once again. For this reason, I employ a
mix of historical sources and post-communist media articles for showing
how past administrative legacies are employed by leaders and agencies
after 1989/1991. The origins and initial staffing of the post-communist
tax administrations are more fully developed and compared with the his-
torical bureaucratic traditions in Chapter 5.
For Poland, since 1989, the choice has been full-fledged democrati-
zation and the creation of a true civil society. To bolster that choice,
references to the inter-war Polish Second Republic, some of which
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actually began to appear in the 1980s, have been utilized in recreating
state structures and state–society relations. Undoubtedly, the option of
joining Europe has provided some incentive. However, Europe became
the choice not primarily due to an intense love of neighbours to the West
or fundamentally due to a desire to join an elite economic club; rather,
the legacy of foreign domination and an authoritarian government led
Poland to want democracy and to seek out support for building demo-
cratic structures. The choice of Europe was not a difficult one for Poland
to make, of course, but it was still a choice.
Moreover, Poland, the largest post-communist country in Central
Europe, has sought a more independent role within the European Union
since it joined in May 2004 – a role strengthened by large segments of
its society that are more conservative, religious and inward-looking at
times, but also more oriented towards including the East and tightening
up ties across the EU’s eastern borders. While Poland today enjoys close
economic and political ties with Germany and is well respected within
the European Union, a decade ago, when the Law and Justice party was
first at the helm, Poland was a bit more inward-looking. Prior to his
election as president in the fall of 2005, Lech Kaczynski, then mayor of
Warsaw, for example, referred to the former German leader as ‘Chancel-
lor Kohl’ and declined nearly all opportunities to visit other European
states.1 He also spoke no foreign languages and was known to be suspi-
cious of Germany, Russia and the European Union.2 In addition, public
opinion polls in late 2005 conducted by the CBOS Public Opinion Cen-
tre saw 40 per cent of respondents agree with the statement ‘a strong man
in power can be better than democratic governments’.3 Hence, with such
currents within Polish society, a choice for democratization and Europe
was not a given. (And, of course, the return of the Law and Justice party
to power in late 2015 has led many in Poland to question the depth of
their country’s commitment to democracy going forward.) In any case,
as we shall see, after 1989, Polish society’s and leaders’ choice for democ-
racy was aided by the use of historical references that positively impacted
the bureaucracy and civil society’s oversight of the state, even when more
comprehensive civil service reform became lost amidst intense politi-
cal party competition and debate. Nevertheless, by 2004, nearly half of
the civil service corps in Poland was composed of fiscal administration
personnel.4
For Russia as well, the choice of how to view the past and what
aspects of the past to utilize in re-building the post-Soviet state lay in the
hands of both the political leadership and society, even while political
1 Economist, 1 October 2005. 2 Ash, p. 24.
3 Ibid. 4 Ministry of Finance, 2004, p. 48.
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parties failed to develop successfully, as both Presidents Boris Yeltsin
and Vladimir Putin have failed to advance the cause of comprehen-
sive civil service reform, which would cover the tax administration as
well. Yeltsin, of course, had a choice in the early 1990s. And he made
some radical, unpopular choices, especially with respect to economic
reform and shock therapy – decisions made after he and his top advi-
sors took the advice of leading Western and, particularly, American
economists. Whether or not to reform the structure of the state and
create a civil service was another choice Yeltsin made, de facto, if not
outright.
Ukraine and its leaders in the 1990s and early 2000s, in contrast,
did not make a specific, concrete choice with respect to which histor-
ical legacy to use, especially as, in many respects, given the varied nature
of the state’s formation, it did not really have a historical reference point
on which to model its state other than the late Soviet period. By not
voicing a choice, Ukraine fostered entrenched political fighting between
its Verkhovna Rada, president and oligarchs and declared by default a
preference for continuing with a Soviet-inspired bureaucratic and patri-
monial welfare state with endemic corruption at all levels.
Selected by a society and its leaders, legacies impact how a state is
transformed, how it is organized and what types of work philosophy
(esprit de corps) will exist within its structures. The question is not how
long legacies from the past last, per se, but which legacies are chosen and
when. Nor do legacies matter exclusively because countries have good or
bad ones. Rather, what matters most is which legacies leaders and soci-
eties choose in constructing the basis of state–society relations.
With respect to Russia, communism is dead, but Soviet-like hierar-
chical government is on the rise. The popularity of the communists has
diminished, but the desire to return to the Soviet era is strong within both
society and its leadership. In 1996, within a matter of a couple of months,
President Yeltsin saw his popularity go from the single digits to being
high enough to carry him into a second term with a landslide defeat
of the Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov, largely out of
widespread fear of returning to the communist past. On the eve of the
vote, Russian state television, the most popular channel, re-broadcast the
popular Oscar-award-winning film ‘Burnt By the Sun’, one of the first
films to depict the horrors of the Stalin purges in the 1930s. A few years
later, in the early 2000s, with Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, Moscow’s
booming and expensive restaurant scene saw an increase in the number
of popular Soviet-themed restaurants, which re-kindled warm nostalgia
for the country that no longer was. Such imagery was repeated in the
propaganda surrounding the 2014 annexation of Crimea.
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Memories and legacies do, of course, change, but they do so as a
reflection of leaders’ and societies’ perceptions of the present. For Rus-
sia, the Soviet era meant one thing for Yeltsin and Russian society in the
early to mid-1990s, but after the turmoil of the Yeltsin era – a decade
that saw a great distortion of wealth amidst an impoverishment that
greatly dwarfed that of America’s Great Depression, a brewing conflict
in Chechnya and the loss of empire and geopolitical status, among other
things – Putin and the Putin-era society began to view the Soviet era
differently.
Poland’s Pre-1989 Administrative Legacies
On the eve of the transition in 1989, Poland’s administrative institutions
carried the dual legacies of a more distant ‘Weberian’ bureaucratic past
from the Second Republic (1918–1939) and a more recent clientelist,
strictly hierarchical and patrimonial bureaucratic past from the Polish
People’s Republic (1946–1989). Some aspects of the Polish inter-war
Weberian bureaucracy were preserved throughout the post-World War
II era, or at least began to reappear in the last decade of communism,
while other aspects of the past were seized upon by Polish society and its
leaders at the start of the transition.
The origins of state-building in Poland did not occur under favourable
conditions and were accompanied by a society that stood in opposi-
tion to the state. Even as the modern state, with a new professional
bureaucracy and modern tax organs, began to be built in nineteenth-
century Poland – partitioned by Austria, Prussia and Russia throughout
the century – a legacy of unhealthy state–society relations, not entirely
unlike those in Russia, was formed. In particular, the state bureaucracy
in the part of Poland controlled by Russia was the most corrupt.5 ‘In
the period of rising national sentiment during the nineteenth century,
the Poles were thus socialized in three different state traditions’, writes
Jacek Kochanowicz. ‘The Polish elite increasingly perceived the state as
a foreign and alien power, because both Russia and Prussia engaged, in
the second half of the nineteenth century, in intensive policies of Russifi-
cation and Germanisation of the Polish population . . . [T]he Poles under
Russian rule developed anti-state ideologies as anti-state conspiracies.’6
While the state, of course, was synonymous with foreign power, the chal-
lenge presented by any state following the partition of Poland lay not
just in unifying the Polish people, but also in making the right choices
5 Kochanowicz, 2004, p. 77. 6 Ibid.
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regarding which bureaucratic aspects to retain from the nineteenth cen-
tury so that an unhealthy state–society legacy could be overcome.
After 120 years of partitions by three neighbouring states, the Polish
government in 1918 based its state administration on the French model.
However, the new administration was constructed by those who lived in
the former Austrian partition, because only in Austria were Poles given
the opportunity to advance in the state service.7 ‘[T]he Galician and
Austro-Hungarian sector of Poland in the South and the Polish interwar
government of 1918–1939 featured a highly rationalized public bureau-
cracy and legal code’, Jarosław Piekalkiewicz and Christopher Hamil-
ton have commented on the period. ‘[T]he interwar years introduced
in Poland some earlier and important changes in law, social legislation,
education, bureaucracy, and economic development, which survived not
only the Second World War but also extended through the period of
Communist-party rule up to the present day.’8 Moreover, in a prelude to
the communist era, the government’s organization was characterized by
centralization and ‘a hierarchical subordination of the lower echelons’,
with civil servants responsible only to their superiors.9
Legislatively, much was done in the interwar period to provide a ratio-
nal, Weberian bureaucracy. In 1922, Poland adopted one of the first
acts in Europe that established a civil service, which was liquidated in
1939.10 That act codified the rights and obligations of bureaucrats as
well as special privileges to attract highly qualified personnel such as
holidays and pensions.11 Moreover, a resolution of the Cabinet of Min-
isters in September 1928 brought the appointment of a Commission for
the Improvement of the Public Administration.12 Such legislation and
directives helped establish a rational, Weberian bureaucracy in the inter-
war period, as was described in 1992 by Zdzisław Chmielewski:
[I]t appears that on the verge of the thirties there came into existence in
Poland . . . the possibility of the processing of programs on the rationalization
of administrative work. From a Weberian, theoretical model of the bureau-
cracy, both the principle of organizational construction, and also the principle
of employment and labour of people in the bureaucratic institution gradually
found application. A functional continuity provided by the behaviour of imper-
sonal forms of orderliness among other things was successfully guaranteed to
the direction of Polish administrative offices. The exact separation of the orga-
nizational and authoritative positions of work was pursued. The cooperation
between the supervisor and the subordinate took place according to a delineated
7 Kamiński, 22 March 1999; and Hamilton and Roszkowski, pp. 136–137.
8 Hamilton and Roszkowski, pp. 138 and 139. 9 Rudzinski, p. 2.
10 Office of Civil Service, 2000, p. 4. 11 Chmielewski, p. 128. 12 Ibid., p. 130.
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agreement from above, which specified unambiguous salary caps and the cri-
teria for professional promotion, as well as heralded systematic meritocratic
control.
The public administration, having strong support from the side of central
political factors, became all the more an efficient and active executor of the will
of the state. The instructional role with respect to the citizen, however, in a way
fell to the bureaucratic organization. [The bureaucracy] was convinced that only
by the adaptation to the institutionalized and normalized forms of behaviour
would it be possible to bring mutual advantages: to make it easier for the citizen
to have contact with the bureaucratic office as well as [to make it easier] for the
office to carry out adroitly their tasks. The bureaucracy tried to remain a positive,
constructive instrument of informing public affairs in Poland.13
Undoubtedly, such efforts at rationalizing the bureaucracy in the inter-
war period provided post-communist Poland with a pre-existing tem-
plate, a historical foundation for re-creating state structures in the 1990s.
For example, the establishment of a Supreme Administrative Tribunal
(Najwyższy Trybunał Administracyjny) in 1932 is mirrored by the 1990s’
Chief Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, or NSA.)
The Supreme Administrative Tribunal, following the Austrian exam-
ple, was an independent court, to which citizen appeals regarding the
infringement of legal rights by an administrative decision could be
made.14
After the war, however, the communist era broke with these tradi-
tions to some extent, beginning with the dissolution of the civil ser-
vice in 1946. While not ineffective or unprofessional, the bureaucracy
under communism in Poland was politicized, with the state largely sub-
ordinate to the party. This politicized structure incapacitated bureau-
crats from making decisions independently. ‘The Communist Party-
state was bureaucratic in nature, but this kind of bureaucracy was very
remote from the Weberian model’, states Kochanowicz. ‘Its apparatus
was not the subject of clear rules, but rather the rules were constantly
redefined according to political expediency. In recruiting its staff, the
party-state paid more attention to political loyalty than to professional
abilities.’15
Despite this, the situation in Poland was not as bad as elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, allowing greater autonomy of the state administration
from the party and the promotion of a number of non-party specialists
to posts of responsibility.16 The formation of a Weberian-style bureau-
cracy prior to World War II had to have an impact to some extent on the
mentality and organizational culture within the post-war administration.
13 Ibid., p. 131. Translation from the Polish by the author. 14 Rudzinski, p. 22.
15 Kochanowicz, 2004, p. 78. 16 Wiatr, pp. 154–155.
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Indeed, as Claudia Torres-Bartyzel and Grazyna Kacprowicz remark,
‘Until 1989 the dominating perception of the public service in general
was based on classical Weberian principles.’17
Within the communist system, the functional equivalent of civil ser-
vants was developed. ‘[Bureaucrats] were specialists with higher educa-
tion and years of professional experience, often very well prepared for
their jobs and motivated in a way not very different from that of their
colleagues in Western democracies’, writes Jerzy Wiatr. ‘Within the con-
straints of the system, they tried their best to make the machinery of the
government work.’18 Studies on the prestige of different professions in
Poland undertaken since the 1970s also confirm the high status given to
mid-level bureaucrats.19
Moreover, Poland differs from the other post-communist countries in
that it was the only state with a defined civil service system under the pre-
vious regime.20 The State Officials Act of 16 September 1982, provided
some stabilization regarding the status of bureaucrats by defining the
basic regulations for bureaucrats’ work and responsibilities and granting
tenure to some.21 While not allowing the development of a fully neu-
tral civil service, the 1982 legislation, designed for a centrally planned
socio-economic system, was an antecedent of the attempts at creating a
true civil service in the post-communist period and is still in force in the
1990s, coexisting with more recent civil service legislation.22 Further,
many bureaucrats who were hired and trained under the State Officials
Act remained in the same jobs at the start of the democratic transition.
Hence, in the communist period, a certain level of bureaucratic develop-
ment was achieved that was sustainable in the post-communist era.
In addition to the civil service reforms, other important administra-
tive changes were made in the communist era that were beneficial to
the start of the post-communist transition. ‘Although the constitutional
bases for reforms were firmly established in the early phases of the tran-
sition’, Barbara Nunberg has observed with respect to Poland, ‘reforms
in the machinery of government were modest and, for the most part,
built on institutional changes already introduced before the fall of the
communist regime.’23 Within the last decade of the socialist regime, a
number of institutional structures were either amended or introduced
in order ‘to increase government accountability without dismantling the
one-party state’.24 Given that the 1980s began in Poland with the arrival
17 Torres-Bartyzel and Kacprowicz, p. 168. 18 Wiatr, p. 154.
19 Torres-Bartyzel and Kacprowicz, p. 172. 20 Ibid., p. 159.
21 Office of Civil Service, 2000, p. 5. 22 Torres-Bartyzel and Kacprowicz, p. 176.
23 Nunberg, p. 47. 24 Rose-Ackerman, 2004b, p. 13.
Reinterpreting History to Recreate the State 63
of the Solidarity movement and the establishment of martial law, as soci-
ety stood ready to oppose the state, no doubt the efforts to amend or
re-introduce new governing institutions were undertaken as a reaction
to the public.
In 1987, for example, the office of ombudsman was established. At
the same time, while audits of public finances in Poland date back to
the Constitution of 1791, the Supreme Audit Chamber (Najwyższa Izba
Kontroli, or NIK) had been established first in 1918 as a separate institu-
tion charged with the task of auditing implementation of the budget and
the finances of the government and its administration. Re-established
in 1949, it was dissolved in 1952 and brought back to be accountable
directly to the government in 1957. Then, in 1980, NIK, which monitors
the government’s activity, was subordinated instead to the parliament,
the Sejm, for greater independence. In 1994, a new statute strengthened
and revived NIK’s organization and tasks.25
Further, whereas interwar Poland had in force the Decree on Admin-
istrative Procedure of the President of the Republic, introduced in 1928,
the communist regime only adopted an administrative code in 1960,
which did not provide for separate administrative courts. In 1980, how-
ever, that code was amended to introduce Poland’s first administrative
court since World War II, the previously mentioned NSA.26 It provided
an avenue for citizens to have their conflicts with the public adminis-
tration resolved. In 1995, a new act further codified the organization’s
structure, scope of jurisdiction and procedures.27 In addition, a Consti-
tutional Tribunal was created in 1989.28 In pursuit of legitimacy before
their society, the Polish communists in the last decade tapped into the
legacies of Poland’s previous experiences with democracy.
Thus, as in Mikhail Gorbachev’s Russia, the leadership in 1980s
Poland actually made several decisions that impacted how the state
would relate to the society in their current decade and in the one fol-
lowing. Much more was happening in the 1980s in both countries than
just a prelude to a revolution and the demise of communism. As we shall
see next, despite all of the changes in the government coalitions and the
lack of constructive administrative reform in the first half of the 1990s, a
capable bureaucracy existed in Poland in part due to structures created
and amended in the 1980s, with the aid of the inter-war legacy, and in
part to the decisions after 1989 to retain those structures and build upon
them, also with the aid of the same legacy.
25 Galligan and Smilov, pp. 221–222. 26 Ibid., p. 212.
27 Ibid., pp. 214–215. 28 Rose-Ackerman, 2004b, p. 13.
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Poland’s Post-communist Administrative History
Polish communist-era dissident Adam Michnik, who founded the
immensely successful Gazeta Wyborcza daily newspaper in the early
1990s and remains its editor-in-chief, argues that there were two pro-
cesses of state-building after 1989. First, Poland sought to figure out
how to adjust the state institutions that existed to democracy, to a state
of law. And, second, Poland looked out to the legal institutions in Europe
because what was practiced in Europe mattered. Once the change came –
a big surprise to all Poles – the desire to get out of the Warsaw Pact and
into the EU and NATO was very clear. Joining the European Union was
‘not a love marriage, but a marriage of convenience’.29
The long legacy of foreign domination obviously impacted the choice
for Polish society. In addition, the legacies from the more distant past,
already utilized to some extent in the last decade of the Polish People’s
Republic, were called upon to help build these new democratic institu-
tions. Yet the process of creating a civil service in the post-communist
period was not as swift as that at the beginning of the Second Republic,
when the need for a new public administration was broadly recognized.
The highly fragmented and ideologically fluid party system of the early
1990s did not allow consensus on administrative reforms.30
Immediately after 1989, the transformation of the Polish economy and
the Balcerowicz plan began without any changes in the Polish public sec-
tor, which was based on a uniform, centralized budget system.31 At the
beginning of the transition, if there was a recognized choice between hir-
ing new bureaucrats and keeping the old laws, on one hand, and passing
new laws to be implemented by old bureaucrats, on the other, Polish
politicians chose the latter.
Despite Poland’s advances in significant economic policy areas in the
early 1990s, initial reforms such as public administration training and
local government administration changes in 1989 and 1990 were not
followed up with comprehensive reforms of the bureaucracies. State
administrations, the Ministry of Finance and its tax organs included,
were held over from the communist era and were required to imple-
ment the extensive economic programs that were part of the transition
to the new economy. The whole process of ‘[d]eparting from the prin-
ciple of centralized administration, complemented with the adoption of
a multi-party system and the development of the local and professional
29 Conversation with Adam Michnik during Professor Jan Gross’ graduate seminar,
‘History 563 – 20th Century European History: Totalitarian Regimes’, Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ, 15 March 2006.
30 Nunberg and Barbone, p. 8. 31 Malinowska et al., p. 34.
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self-governmental structures’, states the Office of the Civil Service, ‘put
employees of the Polish public administration in a new situation, marked
by contradictions and conflicts, which in most cases they were unpre-
pared to handle’.32 In other words, with the exception of the entry of
a number of young professionals into the system,33 changes occurred
all around the main administrative bureaucrats, who themselves saw few
fundamental changes within their own structures.
Poland was slower than other post-communist states, such as Hungary
and the Baltic states, in the adoption of civil service reforms.34 In spite of
this fact, successive Polish governments from the first cabinet in August
1989 onwards did demonstrate some concern and a will to reform the
state administration, even if there was, as Ezra Suleiman describes, ‘a
lack of political consensus on the shape of the reform’. In his first speech
to the Sejm as prime minister, Jan Olszewski – Poland’s third post-1989
prime minister in as many years – said in 1991, ‘Our state is threatened
by paralysis caused by disorder in public administration and its inability
to carry out its basic tasks.’35
From the beginning of the transition, there was a dialogue on making
the administration free from political influence, evening out the politi-
cal factor and making it a merit-based system in terms of function.36 In
order to meet the goals of a merit-based system, the State School of Pub-
lic Administration (Krajowa Szkola Administracji Publicznej) was estab-
lished in the early 1990s to train highly academically qualified students
in a complete civil service program. Additional goals were the improve-
ment of the efficiency of the state administration, the decentralization of
the public administration, modernization of the administration through
tools such as computers and a new system of allocating public funds.37
In October 1992, after three years of preparation, the position of
the Government Plenipotentiary in Charge of Public Administration
Reform finally was created in order to help lay the groundwork for a
Law on Civil Service.38 A first draft of the Civil Service Act was pre-
sented by the first government in 1991, followed by the presentation
of a second draft accompanied by other administrative reform bills in
1993 by the centre-right coalition government of Hanna Suchocka with
encouragement from the European Union.39 (The EU Poland and Hun-
gary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE) pro-
gram, the joint PHARE/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Support for Improvement in Governance and
32 Office of Civil Service, 2000, p. 5. 33 Torres-Bartyzel and Kacprowicz, p. 168.
34 Goetz, p. 1035. 35 Suleiman, p. 298. 36 Kamiński, 22 March 1999.
37 Wiatr, p. 156. 38 Suleiman, p. 298. 39 Mularczyk.
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Management (SIGMA) program and the British Know How Fund pro-
vided financial assistance and advice on civil service reform.40) How-
ever, that cabinet did not last long enough to push the bills through
parliament, and there was never even a vote. By September 1994, the
new team that emerged after parliamentary elections had developed yet
another draft, which was in the parliament’s hands for an additional two
years before being passed as part of a package of administrative and con-
stitutional reforms in 1996. In addition to a flexible Civil Service Law,
‘the adopted package consisted of a reform of the central administration
designed to shift governmental structures and relationships to reinforce
the changes in the role of ministries and central decision-making organs
that had taken place in the transition’.41 Under the new law, the prime
minister appointed 24 politicians, civil servants, and academics to a new
Civil Service Council, which came into being in 1997.
While the 1996 law had established some foundations for the civil ser-
vice, further issues and amendments were raised. In December 1998,
a new Law of the Civil Service was voted in by the Sejm, which came
into force in January 1999 and which was superseded by an even newer
law in August 1999. In January 2000, the Civil Service Council began
to develop a true civil service corps with a new competitive recruit-
ment system, unified training procedures, a modified salary and pro-
motion framework, greater transparency and constructive performance
incentives.42 ‘The public employment system’, Suleiman comments with
respect to Poland and to the Czech Republic and Hungary, ‘is consid-
ered a career system, and officials are rated on the basis of their profes-
sional performance.’43 In particular, vacancy positions must be adver-
tised and new recruits are given a contract for no more than three years
as part of an evaluation phase.44 More senior positions are filled through
a competition and specially appointed competition teams are managed
by the Head of the Civil Service.45 Hence, the establishment of a new
civil service took nearly a decade in Poland, but it was created.
The implementation of the Civil Service Act, however, has been an
example of how competition within a new democracy’s developing polit-
ical party system can become extended to the bureaucracies. There has
been a gap between legislative intent and personnel policy practice.
In the late 1990s, upon assuming power, each governing coalition re-
drafted the Civil Service Act to ensure that bureaucrats loyal to it were
appointed, subjecting the civil service to a sort of ‘spoils’ system. Thus,
40 Torres-Bartyzel and Kacprowicz, p. 175. 41 Nunberg and Barbone, p. 15.
42 Suleiman, pp. 298–299; and Manning and Parison, p. 147. 43 Suleiman, p. 302.
44 Manning and Parison, p. 148. 45 Ibid., p. 148.
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the goal of allowing the new civil service to be truly independent has
never been completely reached. In 1997, for example, the implemen-
tation of the Civil Service Act soon was stopped, as the outgoing left-
wing Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)–Polish Peasant Party (PSL) gov-
ernment of the 1993–1997 period tried to fill civil service posts with
many of its own supporters, terminating the implementation of the 1996
reforms.
Hence, while the public has shown little interest and has not been well
informed about administrative reforms,46 the civil service has been held
captive by a spoils mentality that pervaded parties on both sides of the
political spectrum. The goal has been to build up a loyal corps of civil
servants, judged more on their ideological loyalty than on their profes-
sional qualifications. ‘Although the Civil Service is in principle neutral,
merit-based and permanent, significant hiring and firing happens at the
beginning of the political term’, Helen Sutch, Michał Dybula, Ryszard
Jerzy Petru, Jacek Wojciechowicz and Marcin Przybyla have concluded.
‘Politically motivated appointments for crucial posts usually follow the
nomination of a minister. At the end of the ministerial term, political
figures and senior public servants, whose nominations were mainly polit-
ical, can be seen trying to find soft landings in the management of the
state-controlled enterprises or in the private sector.’47
The ruling coalitions have not cooperated with parliamentary minori-
ties to ensure that the system is not politicized. Upon assuming power in
1997, the right-wing Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS)–Freedom Union
(UW) coalition, for example, criticized its SLD–PSL predecessors for
counting work in the communist party apparatus as valuable experience
for prospective civil servants.48 The 1996 Civil Service Act had required
that top officials have seven years’ experience, including four years in
managerial posts, which led critics to accuse the former communist SLD
of preventing those who were not part of the pre-1989 communist sys-
tem from matriculating to the civil service.49 In 1998, the new govern-
ment amended the civil service law to include stronger requirements and
enabled more graduates from the National School of Public Administra-
tion) to get jobs, rather than public servants from the pre-1989 era.50 At
the end of the AWS–UW government in 2001, the civil service was said
to have been dominated by those appointed on the basis of their political
contacts rather than their qualifications.51
46 Wiatr, p. 160. 47 Manning and Parison, p. 146.
48 Polish News Bulletin, 11 December 1997. 49 Reuters, 17 July 1996.
50 Mularczyk. 51 Polish News Bulletin, 24 October 2002.
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However, in December 2001, with the SLD and PSL parties back in
power, the Sejm passed an amendment enabling state institution heads
to staff top administration posts with people from outside the civil ser-
vice, in effect suspending the Civil Service Act.52 Because open com-
petitions for positions take too long, some governments also switched
to directly appointing people.53 Civic Platform (PO) deputy Jan Rokita
stated at the time that the change would enable the prime minister to
fill some 40,000 positions as he preferred.54 Meanwhile, at the end of
2001, under the new SLD–PSL government, 500 of the 1,400 govern-
ment administrative positions were new political appointees, while 660
of the 1,400 in the highest posts had been changed – a process, noted
Polityka newsmagazine’s Janina Paradowska, that was much faster and
more radical than under the previous government.55 Moreover, gradu-
ates of the National School of Public Administration in recent years have
been unable to find jobs for which they are trained, and the school itself
has become the target of political attacks.56
Hence, progress along the path towards an independent, professional
civil service in Poland has yet to catch up to the initial legislative goals.
And these setbacks have brought the displeasure of the European Com-
mission, which in 2002 regarded the civil service as one of the weakest
aspects of the new Poland.57 While the European Union may provide
some incentives, aid and advice (on a greater scale than elsewhere), how
Poland orients its civil service and which direction it decides to take
appear to be more directly internal matters.
Reaction to these central public administration laws within Poland has
been mixed, as local academics and the public at large have commented
that, while the laws were intended to reduce the number of ministries, in
fact the bureaucracies have pretty much grown everywhere, that employ-
ment has not been reduced and that operations have not changed. A
basic reason for the problems of the bureaucracy is, according to Antoni
Kamiński, precisely the ‘weakness of the political leadership, which man-
ifests itself in the lack of clearly defined priorities and decisive will for
solving key problems of the state’.58
A report released by the state’s separate auditing body NIK in 2005
provided an especially scathing analysis of how government ministers
and provincial (voivod) governors recruited public servants to compose
52 Polish News Bulletin, 19 December 2001. 53 Polish News Bulletin, 24 October 2002.
54 Polish News Bulletin, 19 December 2001. 55 Polish News Bulletin, 24 October 2002.
56 Mularczyk; and Polish News Bulletin, 24 October 2002.
57 Polish News Bulletin, 24 October 2002.
58 Kamiński, 22 March 1999. Translation from the Polish by the author.
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the civil service corps from 2000 to 2004. The report found that more
than 65 per cent of high-ranking public officials were appointed to their
posts without having gone through any competitive procedures and, as
a result, earned even more than ministers as government office heads
froze vacancies in place in order to fund pay raises or bonuses for existing
staff.59 NIK also observed that Civil Service Chief Jan Pastwa was unable
to influence governing politicians to change the situation – a point on
which Pastwa concurred regrettably:
Being myself responsible for the Polish Civil Service, I would prefer it if I could
disagree with the NIK report. Unfortunately, its very first sentence is painfully
true. NIK, basing on data gathered during an extensive audit, states conclusions
that for obvious reasons the chief of the Civil Service cannot have stated . . . I am
particularly regretful about the efforts that have not yielded results as a result
of the inertia, and sometimes blockading, that is purposefully caused within the
administration and the lack of political will and responsibility. Short-sightedness
and particularism in seeking short-term benefits have most frequently gained the
upper hand. For many politicians and the public officials who are subservient to
them, personnel manipulations still represent the simplest instrument for ‘doing’
politics. The NIK report shows, for the first time so well, another shortcoming
of the Polish governmental administration – a system of financing salaries and
training that teeters on the edge of common sense, or indeed the lack of any
system.60
Hence, despite the relatively successful institutionalization of the politi-
cal party structure within Poland, the lack of leadership on the issue of
state administration appears to have been a hindrance, suggesting that
what bureaucratic successes the Polish civil service has achieved may not
be attributable to the top of the governmental structure. And the respect
for NIK is clearly shown in the statement of the civil service head.
Into the 2000s, there still has been a lack of consensus politically on
the civil service. Jolanta Itrich-Drabarek has summarized quite well how
and why Polish politicians have exerted strong influence over the civil
service system since 1989:
[T]he issue of civil service has always remained the subject of political bar-
gaining. Solutions designed for the benefit of specific governments would often
last no more than the government that spawned them. Even when the given
piece of legislation still formally remained in force, it would be modified by way
of frequent amendments by subsequent governments, losing its original shape
and meaning . . . [R]egardless of the particular organizational solutions, state-
ments advocating the abolishment of the tradition of the system of spoils as
well as the practices resulting with public administration becoming increasingly
59 BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 April 2005. 60 Ibid.
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politicized have always continued to appear in the course of the debate concern-
ing the future of the Polish civil service.61
Indeed, as a fourth new Civil Service Act was adopted in November
2008 following the 2007 election win of Civic Platform over the ruling
Law and Justice party, political party competition was rife. ‘Polish civil
service laws appear to have a proprietary nature’, Angelica Ghindar has
written, ‘a particular civil service law is “our” civil service law, or “their”
civil service law, depending on whether one takes the perspective of the
current government or its political opposition.’62 And, as Polish political
parties have had differing views on whether ‘open competitions’ should
be held for high-level positions, the 2008 Civil Service Act reinstated
senior positions in the civil service and weakened the position of a rein-
stated Head of the Civil Service and of an already less than transparent
recruitment system.63
More recently, in its first few days in office following its October 2015
parliamentary electoral win, the Law and Justice government threw out
civil service regulations, such as those that required competitions for
senior jobs and required appointees not to have belonged to a political
party in the previous five years, in order to hire party members for leader-
ship roles, including heads of state companies, which has led, along with
the government’s politicization of public media, to mass demonstrations
across the country.64 The latest wave of replacement and demotion of
professional officials within Warsaw’s ministries has contributed to the
lack of an independent civil service culture and promoted the view that
bureaucracies are to succumb to a system of spoils for election winners,
or even to a sort of ‘politics of revenge’.65
Moreover, since the beginning of the transition, society has viewed
corruption as a greater problem. In 1991, 33 per cent labelled corruption
as a ‘very large’ problem, with 38 per cent calling it a ‘rather large’ prob-
lem; ten years later, in 2001, the corresponding figures were 68 and 25
per cent, respectively.66 Similarly, in 1995, 42 per cent surveyed believed
that many high state bureaucrats derived unjustified benefits from their
public functions, and 43 per cent stated that they believed there are
some, but not many such bureaucrats, whereas in 2001, the correspond-
ing figures were 70 and 22 per cent, indicating a sizeable shift.67
With respect to corruption within the post-communist Polish state,
Timothy Garton Ash has remarked that Prime Minister Kazimierz
Marcinkiewicz ‘has talked darkly of a “Bermuda quadrangle” of corrupt
61 Itrich-Drabarek, pp. 36–37. 62 Ghindar, p. 13.
63 Itrich-Drabarek, pp. 36–37. 64 Shekhovtsov, p. 23; and Economist, 30 April 2016.
65 Dempsey. 66 CBOS, August 2001. 67 Ibid.
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politicians, secret police operators, businesspeople, and criminals.’68 In
the early 2000s, there were several ‘money-for-influence’ scandals, of
which the most famous, perhaps, was ‘Rywingate’, in which a film
producer sought a U.S.$17.5 million bribe from a business group in
exchange for promising changes to be made to a mass media law.
In presenting a progress report on anti-corruption measures to the
Sejm in 2003, Interior Minister Krzystztof Janik said that corruption in
Poland is more the rule than an exception.69 Indeed, in the 2010 Poland
Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey (see Question #59 in Appendix
I), only 27 per cent of Poles stated that their government does a good
job in fighting corruption, while 46 per cent stated that the government
does a poor job and 15 per cent stated that the government does not
fight corruption at all.
Meanwhile, a 2012 report prepared jointly by the Institute of Pub-
lic Affairs and Transparency International claimed that corruption ‘is
no longer a phenomenon of a systemic nature as it used to be in mid
1990s’, due in some great part to the role of Poland’s NIK.70 Poland thus
appears to have experienced systemic levels of corruption, like Russia
and Ukraine, but has been able to move beyond them towards building
a more transparent state. In 2014, the European Commission released
a report on corruption in Poland, which highlighted local business con-
cerns over corruption in obtaining access to public services and in the
public procurement tender process and citizen concerns over corruption
in the civil service (albeit at a lower rate than the EU average).71 Hence,
the perception of corruption is by no means unique to Poland’s
east.
Meanwhile, additional resources have been put into public adminis-
tration, accounting for tremendous growth. The number of those who
worked in the public administration grew from 161,579 in 1989 to
290,225 in 1996.72 For 2013, the Civil Service Department stated that
636,300 work in the public administration (excluding soldiers and offi-
cers), 124,100 of whom were civil service corps members. Approxi-
mately 38.8 per cent of the civil service corps members, or about 47,135
employees, are members of the fiscal (tax) administration.73
Thus, Poland’s legacies have interacted in different ways with the post-
communist transition. The legacy of Poland’s inter-war period acted as
68 Ibid. 69 PAP News Agency (Warsaw), 28 July 2003.
70 Transparency International and Instytut Praw Publicznych, 5 March 2012.
71 Rzeczpospolita, 4 February 2014. 72 Office of the Civil Service (Warsaw), 2001.
73 Office of the Civil Service (Warsaw), ‘Civil Service in Numbers’, accessed at <http://
dsc.kprm.gov.pl/sites/default/files/pliki/civil_service_in_numbers_draft.pdf> on 30 July
2015.
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an ideal reference point for communist leaders in the 1980s as they
decided to bring back that era’s institutions in order to maintain bet-
ter governance and better state–society relations. Those decisions made
a positive difference in the 1990s. Rather than throwing out everything
in the communist governance toolbox, the inter-war legacy was utilized
by the post-communist leaders as well in deciding which institutions to
retain and modify. The irony is that the institutions from the Second
Polish Republic, re-built in part in the 1980s to legitimize the com-
munist state, which was confronting an increasingly contentious soci-
ety, became accepted and re-invigorated with new laws by the post-
communist society in creating the new state. The year 1989, therefore,
provided an opportunity for a fresh look at those existing and recently
transformed state institutions such that they could be updated and re-
framed to accomplish the post-communist agenda in a manner deemed
acceptable by society.
Further, the legacy of foreign domination, most recently under a com-
munist system of governance, led Polish leadership and society to look
elsewhere, in particular to Europe, for models in reformatting their
existing institutions along alternative underpinnings – based, not on
communism, but on democracy and the rule of law. Finally, the com-
petitive party system throughout the post-communist era has been a
real hindrance to better bureaucratic governance, even if well-developed
and well-intentioned civil service laws have been adopted and gradually
implemented.
The Soviet Union’s Legacies Bequeathed to Russia
In Russia, different perceptions on what the real legacies of communism
actually are have been seized upon by the post-communist leadership
and society. As the transition has progressed, Russian consensus on how
things ‘ought’ to be done has been based less on the further pursuit of
the path initiated by Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, towards creating
a true civil society that could monitor the government, and more on
notions of how the pre-Gorbachev system worked to maintain continuity,
stability and order.
The 1980s were used differently in post-communist Russia than in
Poland as the legacy of glasnost and its underpinning values were re-
interpreted by the end of the 1990s, largely because Yeltsin failed to
seize upon them to reform the state further. The Putin era then viewed
the Gorbachev era as a giant, flawed aberration in Russian history rather
than as a basis for creating better governance through greater trans-
parency, a vitalized civil society and a healthier state–society relations.
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Hence, when President Putin told Russians in his annual state of the
nation address in April 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union was
‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’, the remark revealed how
he chooses to utilize the past to shape current views of the present by
invoking a belief shared by tens of millions of Russians.74
Thus, with such prevailing views today in Russia regarding the ben-
efits of the Soviet model of governance (albeit separate from those of
communism), it should not be entirely surprising that, despite some con-
certed post-1991 reform efforts, including the creation of a ‘State Ser-
vice’ and technical assistance programs from the World Bank, the OECD
and other foreign organizations, Russia still lacks a true civil service by
which merit-based employment in the state is protected and by which
political neutrality is guaranteed and safeguarded, de jure or de facto,
in government structures.75 Despite a new Civil Service Law signed by
Putin in 2004, the OECD has remarked that in Russia today, ‘[t]he inter-
face between the political and administrative appointments is blurred, as
state civil servants in executive positions are largely appointed by dis-
cretionary means (although minimum qualifications for such positions
are established by law). The president has influence over the appoint-
ment/dismissal of top and middle management, with the minister and
others in [the] ministry having influence over that of lower grades. All
top management turns over with a change in government, as well as
many middle managers.’76 The bureaucracy, as in Poland, is treated as a
‘spoils system’ of sorts, but unlike Poland, there has been no change in
the direction of government by and large since Putin came to power in
1999.
A poor view of Russian bureaucrats dates back to the Soviet period,
when bribes were in widespread use, just as they had been in Tsarist
Russia. Corruption – and crackdowns on corruption – do have a long
history in Russia. Beginning in the ninth and tenth centuries, Russian
princes would send their representatives to the provinces without pay-
ing them, so that the local population would provide for them, in a
74 This phrase’s exact meaning in English has been discussed greatly in the media. The
Kremlin archived translation of the 2005 speech, accessed at <http://archive.kremlin.ru/
eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml>, states that Putin
called the collapse ‘a major geopolitical disaster of the century’, while the Associated
Press and the BBC, among others, translated the phrase as ‘the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the century’, as found at <www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050426/
news_1n26russia.html> and <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4480745.stm>. All were
accessed on 31 July 2015. Meanwhile, Russian speakers recognise, of course, that the
Russian language does not distinguish between the indefinite article ‘a’ and the definite
article ‘the’.
75 Manning and Parison, p. 45. 76 OECD, 6 December 2012.
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practice known as ‘feeding’. Later, in 1497, Ivan III introduced legis-
lation restricting corruption, while, in 1550, Ivan IV (a.k.a. ‘Ivan the
Terrible’) codified a death sentence for bribery. Peter I (a.k.a. ‘Peter the
Great’) and, a couple of centuries later, the Romanov dynasty waged
unsuccessful battles to curb corruption.77 In spite of these attempts to
halt corruption in Tsarist Russia, service to the state was viewed as a way
to gain material wealth and a position of respect within society. Mean-
while, as Karl Ryavec has observed, ‘Russia lacked both a civil society
and an independent legal system to limit bureaucrats, while the bureau-
crats lacked a “public service” culture that might have formed a system
of self-limitation.’78
After 1917, in terms of bureaucratic habits, little changed. Instead of
monetary compensation, bribes in the Soviet days were often given in
the form of blat, an exchange of favours using government resources.
Being a bureaucrat meant having power over other citizens. A report
prepared by the administrative department of the Communist Party’s
Central Committee as part of an effort in clamp down on bribery in the
five-year period of 1975 to 1980 found that in one year there were more
than 6,000 cases.79
In a study of bureaucrats’ biographies just prior to the Soviet collapse,
David Lane and Cameron Ross discovered, somewhat surprisingly, that
the Communist Party had very little control over the personnel in the
government bureaucracy. They found that ‘the recruitment of personnel
to many of the key sectors of the government bureaucracy appeared to
be determined by the applicants previous experience and tenure in the
bureaucracy . . . [and] . . . that the attempts by party leaders to control the
bureaucracy failed, and that the relative autonomy of the government
apparatus was an important contributing factor in the collapse of the
communist state’.80 Hence, such research indicates that the 1980s actu-
ally yielded some success in de-politicizing the bureaucracy and making
it more independent from the party.
In many ways, the glasnost and perestroika programs were the result of
both a personality-based ‘Gorbachev factor’, the view taken by Archie
Brown, and a society-based ‘Gorbachev phenomenon’, Moshe Lewin’s
perspective.81 In June 1986, a few months after becoming general secre-
tary, Gorbachev stated in a closed meeting with a group of Soviet writers,
‘The society is ripe for change. If we step away, the society will not agree
for a return. The process must be made irreversible. If not us, then who?
If not now, then when?’82 Hence, the impetus for reform, Gorbachev
77 Alyakrinskaya. 78 Ryavec, p. 15. 79 Alyakrinskaya.
80 Lane and Ross, p. 19. 81 Brown; Lewin. 82 Quoted in Tucker, p. 140.
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saw at the time, was emerging from society, which in turn required him
as its leader to act.
For Lewin, the ‘Gorbachev phenomenon’, was the re-politicizing of
the political system as a consequence of the social environment’s effects
upon the political arena. In particular, Lewin believed that urbaniza-
tion, initiated under Stalin but consolidated under Brezhnev, created an
‘emerging civil society’. Yet Lewin did not speak of the same view on
civil society that Robert Putnam and Alexis de Tocqueville had, in the
sense that citizens form autonomous, non-governmental organizations to
resolve problems with the state in an open manner. Rather, he referred
to ‘the aggregate of networks and institutions that either exist and act
independently of the state or are official organizations capable of devel-
oping their own, spontaneous views on national or local issues and then
impressing these view on their members, on small groups and, finally,
on the authorities.’83 Most significantly, urbanization had created inde-
pendent and autonomous modes of thought, which the party through
some of its leaders and cadres understood. The leadership, thus, took
up the challenge and sought to take such an independent, burgeoning
‘civil society’ and place it back in the political arena.
For Archie Brown, however, Gorbachev, the man, was at the cen-
tre of the process of change. The reform program was Gorbachev-led,
rather than society-led. John Dunlap concurs that Gorbachev mattered,
but largely because he ‘unwittingly’ destroyed the Soviet Union. Dun-
lap sees Gorbachev as embarking on a second perestroika period, a cam-
paign of ‘democratization’ in mid-1986 to replace powerful competitors
with allies in the Politburo.84 The goal was not to destroy or transform
the system, but to reject Stalinism and return to the 1920s-era ideals of
Marxism-Leninism through a cleansing and strengthening of the party.
(This was exemplified, among many works and events, by the 1988 play
Onward . . . Onward . . . Onward! by Mikhail Shatrov, which exposed on
the Moscow stage the Stalinist crimes, but called for a return to the
Leninist ideals.)
Furthermore, while Brown explains the fact that repression was
not used to hold the USSR together as due to a personal choice of
Gorbachev,85 Gorbachev probably knew that the status quo ante could
never be restored. As Dunlap states, ‘Events moved with such blinding
speed between 1987 and 1989 that it must soon have become evident to
Gorbachev that only a crackdown of Stalinist dimensions could halt the
changes that he had unwittingly unleashed.’86 (And, in fact, Gorbachev
tried unsuccessfully to use what repression he could to hold the Soviet
83 Lewin, p. 80. 84 Dunlap, p. 10. 85 Brown, p. 309. 86 Dunlap, p. 10.
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Union together, for example, in Tbilisi in 1989, in Azerbaijan in 1990
and in Vilnius in 1991.) Society by the late 1980s truly had changed;
Soviet-style repression would no longer be successful in keeping down
the popular movements and was accompanied by backlash.
In fact, there were two intrinsic paradoxes, or fatal flaws, of the glas-
nost and perestroika programs, which by their nature could not be imple-
mented successfully and leave the system intact. The first is concerned
more with the glasnost campaign, the second more with perestroika. First,
in embarking on the necessary reforms, the government had to main-
tain its legitimacy throughout the reform process. Yet to embark on a
more open path, the lies of the Soviet system had to be exposed. The
starting point for glasnost proponents was an open rejection of official
truth; as a result, the destruction of one-party rule was only a matter of
time. If one could question whether the Stalin era, which constructed
the Soviet system, was built upon lies, corruption and unjust repression,
one could begin to question whether the system itself was the problem –
and whether the problems in the system began not with Stalin’s rise to
power but with Lenin.
Second, the problems that were inherent in the system became more
acute when those institutions attempted, through perestroika, to start
their own reforms from the top down by giving more independence to
those at the bottom, as Steven Solnick has shown.87 The process of
correcting problems complicated and worsened the existing problems,
in turn threatening the legitimacy of the regime. Once the system was
hyper-institutionalized along vertical links, it could not undergo a com-
plete overhaul and still continue to function throughout the transition.
The existence of these dual Gorbachev-era flaws is known well by post-
Soviet society and leadership. However, rather than seeing these flaws as
providing lessons to authoritarian states, many Russians have interpreted
them as providing the paradigm rationale for curtailing further opening
up of a state that actually began the transition in the early 1990s with
democracy in greater reach than ever before.
Russia’s Post-communist Administrative History
Similarly to the course set in Poland, reforming state structures in Russia
took a backseat to economic reforms at the beginning of the transition.
Nevertheless, just as in Poland, the early 1990s saw a recognized need
for administrative reforms as several proposals began to circulate within
the presidential administration. Reform-minded experts and politicians
87 Solnick, 1997.
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who surrounded Yeltsin pushed for a new body, the Chief Department of
Personnel Training (Roskadry), which was established in 1992 to over-
see civil service reform, the training of government officials and other
administrative reforms, but was abolished in early 1994.88 Prime Minis-
ter Yegor Gaidar’s government in 1992 also made public the first draft
Law on Civil Service and sought to reorganize administrative structures –
the first of such reform attempts.89 These efforts suggest that the failure
to implement comprehensive civil service reform was not inevitable for
Russia.
In stark contrast to Poland, though, there were no regulations for
a civil service up until 1995. In 1995, the Law on the State Service
appeared. However, that document did little to reform the bureaucracy,
but rather laid out the ‘privileges, prerequisites and protections afforded
[to] civil servants and to an intricate hierarchy of titles and posts that
recalled the Table of Ranks of imperial Russia’.90 Many of its provisions
were said to remain only on paper.91 Similarly, a Civil Service Code was
drafted in 1997, but it was not adopted, let alone published.92 Mean-
while, the Bill on Countermeasures against Corruption was passed by
the Federation Council twice in the 1990s, but Yeltsin vetoed it, and the
Duma failed to pass it in 2001.93
While Soviet era personnel largely remained in place, the Yeltsin
decade did see a very diverse group of bureaucrats, including ‘people
from the 1960s’, ‘deputy directors of laboratories’, politicized intelli-
gentsia, Yeltsin’s ‘fellow countrymen’ and military to whom Yeltsin was
catering because of the fear of losing power.94 As the transition pro-
gressed, with the rise of oligarchs, however, a ‘feeding’ of bureaucrats
ensued by which administrative resources were used for profit.95 ‘The
system worked’, write Sergei Viktorov and Vadim Bardin. ‘The bureau-
crats received a small salary; one and all took bribes (especially from
the oligarchs) and looted budgetary finances. The Russian statehood in
this very way was strengthened (in the Peter [the Great] meaning of this
word. Boris Yeltsin held on to power.’96 In the absence of leadership at
the top to democratize the bureaucracies further, the old Soviet system
gradually was revived with new, post-communist forces, which were not
incorporated into formal institutional frameworks, much to the detri-
ment of long-term state goals.97
Meanwhile, just as the communist era bequeathed to post-communist
Poland several administrative law institutional structures, the Soviet
88 Kotchegura, pp. 21, 22. 89 Ibid. 90 Huskey and Obolonsky, pp. 24–25.
91 Kotchegura, pp. 21–22. 92 Ibid., p. 25. 93 Alyakrinskaya. 94 Kostikov.
95 Ibid. 96 Viktorov and Bardin. 97 See, for example, Hellman.
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period also laid an administrative legal foundation through a 1968
Supreme Soviet Presidium degree, ‘On the Procedures for Consideration
of the Proposals, Submissions, and Complaints of the Citizens’, which
continued after 1991 to regulate internal appeals regarding citizen–state
disputes.98
As the design of the reform agenda developed gradually over nearly
a decade prior to Putin’s 2005 address on administrative reform, those
within the upper levels of the Russian government were the main actors.
From September 1996 to May 1997, 12 versions of a Concept on
Administrative Reform were produced within the Presidential Admin-
istration. On May 27–30, 1997, a meeting held under the provisional
name ‘Round Table’ resulted in the establishment of five expert working
groups tasked with preparing a new Concept note. In May 1998, the
text of the Concept was awarded to the new Chairman of the RF Gov-
ernment, Sergey Kiriyenko, with the purpose of publication, but it was
not published.
In the fall of 1999, the text of the Concept note was transferred from
Putin, then, as prime minister, the Chairman of the RF Government, to
an outside, non-governmental think tank that had direct ties to the Gov-
ernment – the Centre for Strategic Research, led by German Gref, which
served as the Campaign Headquarters of then-Prime Minister Putin.
Gref’s think tank introduced the concept of nation-building, absorbed
the basic ideas of the concept of administrative reform in the 1998 pro-
posed structures and emphasized the need to revive citizens’ trust in
the institutions of representative and direct democracy. In the spring of
2000, Gref’s project lay dormant with the presidential election, but as
T.Ya. Khabrieva, A.F. Nozdrachev and Yu.A. Tikhomirov describe, ‘By
the autumn of that year, the real reason for inhibition became clearer, as
the priorities of government had been shifted to other tasks: strengthen-
ing the vertical of power, federal relations, changes in the upper chamber
of the Russian Federal Assembly, etc. Administrative reform was once
again postponed.’99
Under President Putin, a revived attempt at administrative reform was
launched in 2001. The outward goal of the reforms was to reduce the
number of ministries. However, the entire project appears actually to
have been part of Putin’s plan for creating a tightly centralized state
with the bureaucracies under greater control. Indeed, in March 2003,
Putin placed a few government agencies under the Federal Security
Service (FSB), the successor organization to the Soviet-era KGB, for
98 Galligan and Smilov, p. 277.
99 Naryshkin and Khabrievoı̆, p. 9. Translation from the Russian by the author.
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which Putin once worked and which he later headed, and the Defence
Ministry, ostensibly to streamline the government, but also to cen-
tralize control.100 Throughout the spring and summer of 2003, addi-
tional plans were announced to initiate administrative reform, but little
progress was made beyond forming commissions. Despite the fact that
Putin declared in 2002 that he wanted the reforms to be completed by
the end of 2003,101 the reform plans were declared by Vedomosti at the
time to be practically broken, as some 231.7 billion rubles allocated by
the 2003 budget for the administrative reform projects had not been
appropriated.102
Administrative reform efforts were re-started the following year with
the arrival of Mikhail Fradkov as the new prime minister in March
2004 and Putin’s re-election that same month. In a series of decrees,
Putin eliminated thirteen ministries (including the Ministry of Taxes and
Dues, which was absorbed by the Finance Ministry), two state commit-
tees, one federal commission, four federal services and four federal agen-
cies, while he created five new ministries, five new federal services and
one new federal agency on the basis of the old entities.103 In comment-
ing on the reforms, Olga Khryshtanovskaya, head of the Elite Studies
Centre at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Sociology Institute, stated
that the total number of government departments actually had increased
and that the system had become more complex.104 Former State Duma
Deputy Aleksandr Shokhin also argued that the reforms were flawed, as
oversight bodies were subordinated to the very ministries that they had
been intended to oversee.105
Putin also significantly reduced the number of deputy ministers, but
Moscow’s Kommersant-Daily soon reported that many of them contin-
ued to oversee the same areas as they previously did, but with new job
titles.106 Meanwhile, a month after his re-election, Putin also decreed a
pay raise of up to five times for top-level bureaucrats, ministers as well
as himself.107 Government privileges and in-kind benefits for bureau-
crats and their families, however, were not touched at all (even while the
government began to monetize non-cash benefits in 2005 – which were
widely perceived as welfare benefits cuts and led to the largest and most
wide-scale protests yet in the Putin era, forcing the government to do
a U-turn on the measure and cementing in the government’s thinking
regarding the critical need to secure the public’s approval with respect
100 Wines. 101 Saradzhyan. 102 Bekker.
103 RFE/RL Newsline, 10 March 2004. 104 RFE/RL Newsline, 2 March 2004.
105 RFE/RL Newsline, 19 March 2004.
106 McGregor; and RFE/RL Newsline, 26 March 2004.
107 RIA Novosti, 1 April 2004; and McGregor.
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to service delivery).108 In November 2005, Fradkov introduced another
administrative reform blueprint, a three-year action plan that sought to
update the bureaucracy with standardization and regulation reforms and
to abolish or privatize one-third of some 25,000 state enterprises and
organizations.109
The 2003-to-2005 period saw much headway made with regard to
the optimization of functions of executive bodies and structures, public
service reform and the improvement of management procedures due to
leadership from the Presidential Administration and a new Commission
for Administrative Reform.110 In 2003, President Putin noted, ‘We need
to radically reduce the functions of state organs. Of course, it should
be calculated very accurately.’111 And, in that year, Putin issued several
decrees, which became known immediately in the media as the Admin-
istrative Reform Decrees, by which he called for a radical reduction in
the functions of government agencies.112
Yet there was an increase in the number of state workers in the middle
of the decade. ‘The stated goal’, according to I.A. Baranov and N.N.
Fedoseeva, was ‘reducing staff, reducing corruption, improving the effi-
ciency of the device. The result: an increase in the number of federal
agencies, more expensive units, and an increase in bribes.’113 Further,
according to the Higher School of Economics, the number of federal
civil servants steadily increased from 2001 to 2010, regardless of reform
and the number of agencies.114
In 2004, the draft federal target program ‘Administrative Reform’ was
developed, which gave rise to a new Commission for Administrative
Reform that was envisioned to have greater authority than it eventually
did. RF Presidential Decree 910 ‘On Measures to Good Governance’
of 16 July 2004 created a Commission that comprised three interagency
working groups on major issues of administrative reform, one of which
focused on providing for openness and accessibility for citizens.115 Those
who took part in this Commission worked from the framework of foreign
108 Paton Walsh; RFE/RL Newsline, 28 July 2004; and Nemtsov and Pribylovsky.
109 Frunkin. 110 Naryshkin and Khabrievoı̆, p. 9.
111 Address of President Putin to the Federal Assembly of Russian Federation, 16 May
2003, Moscow.
112 See, for example, RF Government Resolution 451 of 31 July 2003, ‘On the Govern-
ment Commission for Administrative Reform’ and RF Presidential Decree 824 of 23
July 2003, ‘On measures for administrative reform in 2003–2004 Government of the
Russian Federation.’
113 Baranov and Fedoseeva, pp. 3–5.
114 The official site of the RF State Statistics Service accessed at <www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/gosudar/graf1.htm>.
115 Naryshkin and Khabrievoı̆, p. 10.
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reform models. ‘None of the reforms undertaken in Russia in the past fif-
teen years was so tightly developed within a context of international prac-
tice as reform’, A.B. Logunov has written. ‘Russia has chosen ideology of
administrative reform in the countries in which the public administration
is being visibly transformed into “New Public Management” and where
state institutions are actively being introduced principles and technology
of a standard business management.’116 The project proposed to cre-
ate a special agency to manage the reform – the so-called Directorate –
that was to be given wide powers. However, the Ministry of Finance did
not approve the additional costs of implementing the program. Instead,
the Centre for Strategic Research and the Ministry of Economic Devel-
opment and Trade, together with technical and financial support of
the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Develop-
ment, developed another Concept of Administrative Reform.117 At the
same time, the primary responsibility for implementing the administra-
tive reform still lay with the Government Commission on Administrative
Reform.
From 2006 to 2010, the main activities of administrative reform were
carried out in five phases:
 Late 2005 – The development and adoption of the framework of
administrative reform activities.
 2006 – The development of a regulatory framework for administra-
tive reform, including public service standards, standards for public
services provided by the federal executive bodies and their implemen-
tation at the federal and regional levels.
 2007 – The elimination of redundant government functions, develop-
ment and implementation of most of the administrative regulations of
the federal and regional executive authorities, implementation of man-
agement procedures based on priority public service standards and the
establishment of pilot multipurpose centres for state and municipal
services (MFSCs).
 2008 – The development and adoption of anti-corruption programs,
the development of a regulatory framework of public service delivery
in electronic form and the provision of public services via telecommu-
nication technologies.
116 Logunov, p. 5. Translation from the Russian by the author.
117 This concept laid the foundation made in accordance with the Protocol of the RF
Government meeting of 21 October 2004, on the Concept of Administrative Reform
in the Russian Federation in 2006–2008 and the action plan for conducting admin-
istrative reform in the Russian Federation in 2006–2008, formally approved by RF
Government Decree № 1789-p of 25 October 2005 (Lazarev).
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 2009–2010 – The creation of MFSCs to provide state and municipal
services across Russia and the transition of federal executive bodies to
the provision of public services in electronic form through the national
state data centre.
Meanwhile, the Concept note did not provide additional funding from
the federal budget for the activities of administrative reform, which were
to be undertaken by federal authorities with funds provided in the exist-
ing federal budget for relevant federal executive authorities.118 Beginning
in 2006, while not involved in the distribution of funds between fed-
eral agencies and stakeholders, the Ministry of Economic Development
began to hold grant competitions in which federal executive and regional
bodies competed for funding to implement provisions of the Administra-
tive Reform Concept.119 A similar competition was held again in March
2007.120
Administrative reform was the least funded of all the ongoing insti-
tutional reforms in public administration. For example, in 2009, M.A.
Gintova stated that the average size of the support allocated per region or
the federal executive authority was 190 million rubles for a pilot health
care reform project; 150 million for an integrated education reform
project; 100–120 million for a regional finance reform program; and
at least 100 million for an experiment to introduce performance-based
budgeting result, but only 25 million rubles for an administrative reform
project in a RF subject and 7.8 million rubles for an administrative
reform project in a Federal executive body.121 The differences in the
amount of financial support to potential participants indicate a low pri-
ority and low political importance of administrative reform in compar-
ison with other institutional reform. Consequently, according to some
experts, the theme of improved governance has been divided artificially
into several blocks in a piecemeal haphazard manner that is controlled
and managed inconsistently by various federal agencies.
Perceptions of how satisfied the Russian public is with state public ser-
vices as a whole do vary, but, overall, more Russians found government
services to be working better over the previous two to three years in 2011
than they did in 2008.122
118 The results and study methodology of federal bodies regarding administrative reform
can be found in Zhulin et al.
119 Lazarev. 120 Sharov. 121 Gintova.
122 Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, pp. 12, 13, 16–23. This is a report based on a nation-
wide public opinion survey of 6,032 Russians carried out in 64 RF Subjects in March
2011 for the World Bank/Department for International Development of the UK ‘Pub-
lic Administration Reform in the Russian Federation’ project, for which the author was
a consultant.
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Nevertheless, administrative reform of public service delivery in Rus-
sia has been bogged down by the simple fact that it is not an easy task
to introduce any reform that affects a wide spectrum of existing govern-
ment organizations that already have their own laws and regulations gov-
erning their activity and to try to do so amid changing reform objectives
and without a large-scale investment of large sums of funding at ready
disposal. As such, where administrative reform in the area of public ser-
vice delivery has been slow to progress, it has been due to the difficulty
of applying a single methodology, a single template, a single oversight
body to the process and a single path towards legislative adoption of new
laws while competing with other Kremlin policies and objectives seeking
greater control over structures.
The administrative reform plan goes hand-in-hand with Putin’s intro-
duction of seven federal districts (okrugi) as a layer of government
between the regions and the central government. ‘Federal reform as
it was being implemented was only partially about relations between
the centre and the regions’, writes Nikolai Petrov. ‘It was primarily
about power. And more about power at the national level than at the
regional level. And it is no coincidence that Putin’s presidency began
precisely with this. By creating federal districts that he fully controlled,
Putin set the stage for taking control over the military, security and law
enforcement bodies – first in the regions, then in Moscow.’123 Further-
more, in establishing the seven federal districts, Putin’s reforms also
brought under presidential control the Monitoring Administration and
the Cadres Administration, which were based in the provinces.124
Putin sought to create a ‘power vertical’, a term which, according to
Aleksandr Belousov at the Law of the Urals Division of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, does not exist in the RF Constitution and can-
not be found in Russian laws written before the Putin era. Belousov
has argued that ‘the term “power vertical” is neither a juridical term
nor a scientific concept’, but rather is a powerful ‘political metaphor’
to describe an array of things. Further, while Putin, a lawyer, has
been extremely precise when using legal terms, he has been remarkably
‘ambiguous’ when using the words ‘federal’ or ‘federation’.125
In many respects, Putin’s efforts to centralize control over Russia’s
provinces (89 in number at the start of Putin’s presidency, but, according
to the RF Constitution, 85 provinces now, after some consolidations and
after the 18 March 2014 annexation of Crimea) were a process of revers-
ing the efforts of both Yeltsin and Gorbachev to decentralize the state. A
personal example illustrates the point: In July 2000, three months after
123 Petrov, 22 May 2003. 124 Huskey, pp. 124–125. 125 Goble.
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Putin was elected president, I travelled to Yakutsk, the capital city of the
Sakha-Yakutia province, to interview federal officials based in the region.
Coinciding with my visit, a planeload of bureaucrats came from Moscow
to review the activities of the federal state in the province. When I met
with the assistant director in charge of the RF Employment Fund for the
region, he told me that in the six years he had worked there, this was
the first time someone from Moscow had come out to check on their
work.126 Clearly, from the beginning of his term, Putin sought to waste
little time in putting a strict hierarchical system of control back in place.
Since the formation of the Soviet Union in 1922, true federal-
ism, in fact, never really existed in either the USSR or the Russian
Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RFSFR.) ‘Quite unlike classical
Western notions of federalism, which strike a balance of power and
responsibilities between centre and periphery, the Soviet version of fed-
eralism denie[d] the Union’s constituent republics the crucial element of
sovereignty in handling their own political, social and economic affairs’,
Peter Pavilonis has written. ‘The republics’ constitutions [were] carbon
copies of the USSR Constitution and there [was] little difference in
republican versions of all-Union legislation drafted in Moscow.’127
Gorbachev meanwhile allowed republican leaders to adapt the USSR’s
legislation to their own republics.128 ‘Whereas Gorbachev employed
glasnost in the mid-1980s as a means of collecting reliable information
on political and economic conditions in the country’, Eugene Huskey
has written, ‘Putin opted for a new bureaucracy of kontrol’ that could
at once offer the president a more accurate picture of developments
in the periphery and incriminating evidence (kompromat) on provincial
leaders.’129 Hence, Putin did have a choice as to which legacy to fol-
low when interacting with the provinces – either to push forward with
Gorbachev–Yeltsin glasnost-like federalizing measures or to opt for trend-
reversing ‘Back in the RFSFR’ measures.
While Putin has been trying to place the bureaucracies under more
direct control, the ranks of the state agencies in the 1990s and 2000s
have been filled with older bureaucrats who mostly entered government
in the Soviet era and who were replaced by former military and law
enforcement personnel rather than by newly trained younger workers.
According to Vladimir Gimpelson, every other bureaucrat in the organs
at the federal level in the early 2000s worked in the Brezhnev era, and
126 Interview with the Assistant Director, RF State Employment Service, The Department
of Employment of the Population of the Republic of Sakha-Yakutia, 3 July 2000, in
Yakutsk.
127 Pavilionis. 128 Ibid. 129 Huskey, p. 119.
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with workers from the Gorbachev period, such bureaucrats compose 60
per cent of the current workforce. Three-quarters of higher-level bureau-
crats were hired before 1990. ‘[D]espite all of the numerous reorganisa-
tions of the ministries and institutions’, writes Gimpelson, ‘the “new”
cadre more often is extracted from the same multiply re-shuffled deck of
cards.’130
Moreover, with a 2002 presidential decree and the 2003 passage of
Putin-sponsored legislation, the Kremlin sought to establish a ranking
system for state and military employees akin to the ‘Table of Ranks’ that
Peter the Great introduced in 1722, with promotions tied to length of
time in service rather than to job performance.131 The move would make
it easier for retired army and police officers to find jobs as bureaucrats
(rather than providing for newly trained younger bureaucrats.)
Instead of promoting those with party ties, per se, Putin’s regime has
brought an influx of people with military, law enforcement or security
service backgrounds, commonly referred to as the siloviki, especially into
the tax administration, as will be shown in Chapter 5. A study by the
Institute of Sociology in Moscow found that up to 70 per cent of the
presidential envoys’ staff in the seven federal okrugi are from the military,
while the number of people with military or security backgrounds more
than doubled from 2000 to 2003.132 Khryshtanovskaya has estimated
that up to 75 per cent of Putin’s top government appointees in his first
term also had such backgrounds, while such people composed only five
per cent of Gorbachev’s Politburo.133 Meanwhile, 35 per cent of the
deputy ministers appointed to the economic ministries in the first term
have military or security backgrounds, most of whom are still ‘active
reserve officers’ of the FSB, which requires them to report to the FSB as
well as to their own ministers.134
Khryshtanovskaya and Stephen White explain that Putin’s choice of
armed forces and state security personnel is based upon the reputation
of these organizations as being more honest, apolitical, professional and
conscientious in fulfilling their duties than other societal groups. They
also state that Putin opted for the siloviki because the armed forces and
state security agencies retained their vertical organizational structures
across the country, penetrating society, even while other institutions col-
lapsed and disappeared when the Soviet Union fell.135
130 Gimpelson, p. 26. Translation from the Russian by the author.
131 Yablokova; RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, 15 July 2004; Prime-TASS News, 21
November 2002; and IPR Strategic Information Database.
132 Khryshtanovskaya. 133 Russkii Fokus. 134 Khryshtanovskaya.
135 Khryshtanovskaya and White, p. 291.
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Yevgenia Albats, meanwhile, found in 2004 that over 50 per cent of
some 706 federal officials surveyed were opposed to transparency.136 In
the 2011 survey of Russian tax officials, only four out of five (80 per
cent) bureaucrats believe that there are few dishonest tax employees,
with 14 per cent stating that there were many and 5 per cent declining
to answer (see Question #3 in Appendix I). And that 2011 survey also
shows that just less than half of the tax officials believe that the state
fights corruption well, with 34 per cent stating that the state does a poor
job, 10 per cent stating that the state does no job and 9 per cent refusing
to provide an answer (see Question #59, also in Appendix I.) Finally,
only 53 per cent of these officials trust other bureaucrats (see Question
#51.)
In 1990, there were 663,000 Russian bureaucrats.137 Statistics vary
somewhat with respect to the size of the Russian bureaucracy today.
According to the presidential office’s figures in 2002, the number of
state officials was 1.53 million, not including army, law enforcement or
emergency services personnel.138 In 2004, the RF State Statistics Service
stated that the number was 1,300,500.139 In 2005, Khryshtanovskaya
estimated in 2005 that the figure was two million.140 Meanwhile, in
2013, the number of officials was deemed to be 1.45 million.141
Since 1991, corruption has escalated dramatically in Russia. Elena
Panfilova, director of Transparency International’s office in Russia, has
argued that the corruption of government officials further enhances
greater control within the system as bureaucrats are promoted, because
the presence of corruption means greater pliability. ‘A corrupt official
is a more loyal official’, she states, adding that punishment occurs only
when spoils aren’t shared or when an official steps on somebody else’s
turf.142
Meanwhile, Georgy Satarov, head of the InDem Foundation, adds
that the State Duma often grants general amnesties that include those
convicted on charges of corruption. ‘In other words’, he states, ‘if you
have taken a bribe, there is an extremely small chance that you will be
caught red-handed. The chance that you will be convicted is even less.
And even if you happen to be found guilty, it is highly probable that you
will get a suspended sentence or an amnesty.’143
As mentioned in Chapter 2, corruption has grown significantly under
Putin, and unsurprisingly, Russians share similar views on corruption
136 Albats. 137 Paton Walsh; and Simankin and Blinova.
138 Prime-TASS News, 21 November 2002. 139 RFE/RL Newsline, 14 May 2004.
140 Abdullaev. 141 Moscow Times, 15 October 2014.
142 Economist, 20 October 2005. 143 Alyakrinskaya.
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and on bureaucrats. Of Russians polled in 1999, 61 per cent believed
that it is impossible to eradicate corruption in Russia.144 In the same
poll, 70 per cent of Russians surveyed said that corruption on the part
of government servants had increased within the last year or two.145 In
addition, 81 per cent the same year also considered local bureaucrats to
be corrupt and to be abusing their positions for private goals.146 Fur-
ther, in the 2010 Russia Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey (see
Question #59 in Appendix I), only 17 per cent of Russians stated that
their government does a good job in fighting corruption, while 51 per
cent stated that the government does a poor job and 23 per cent stated
that the government does not fight corruption at all.
In spite of widespread distrust for the state, a turnaround has been
made with regards to Russians’ trust of institutions held over from the
past and the new post-Soviet institutions. ‘It is a reversal of the situation
in the early 1990s when Russians tended to be warmer toward the new
institutions than the old ones’, Vladimir Shlapentokh has written. ‘Rus-
sians have more confidence in the old institutions than the new ones. An
important point should be made about the country’s historical processes:
the new institutions, with their low status in the Russian mind, could not
compensate for the decline of the old institutions, including the govern-
ment, security forces and the police.’147 In this respect, Putin’s focus on
revitalizing institutions through the military and law enforcement are a
reflection of how both he and his society view the more recent past, espe-
cially as confusion exists with respect to what benefits there actually are
in opening up the state’s structures to society.
Ukraine’s Default Choice to Maintain a Large,
Bureaucratic Soviet-Like State
On 24 August 1991, two days after the putsch had ended in Moscow and
roughly four months before the end of the USSR, Ukraine’s parliament
began procedures to vote for independence, during which one speaker
got up and expressed a great fear shared by many in the room as to what
life outside the Soviet Union would be by declaring, ‘I don’t see why we
should be independent. We’ve done nothing wrong.’148
While failing to stave off independence, those remarks may as well
have summed up the political leadership’s approach in the 1990s and
early 2000s to the Ukrainian state and governance – namely, that there is
144 Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, Moscow, 13–14 March 1999. 145 Ibid.
146 Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, Moscow, 12–13 June 1999.
147 Shlapentokh. 148 Cowley, p. 3.
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nothing wrong with continuing forward with a large, Soviet-style bureau-
cratic social welfare state. And, indeed, throughout Ukraine’s twenty-
five years as an independent state – amidst struggles between presidents
and parliaments, oligarchs and outsiders – the country never truly has
reformed its bureaucracies. ‘[E]ven today, the methods of governing have
been left almost unchanged since the Soviet era’, Ihor Koliushko and
Viktor Tymoshchuk observed in 2000. ‘No one carries real responsibil-
ity for the state of affairs in the country, while the non-transparency of
the state structure for the public and its totally corrupt nature have ulti-
mately undermined the trust of the citizens in their Government and
the state as a whole.’149 Similarly, as Anders Åslund wrote in 2015,
‘While it has depoliticized state administration, Ukraine has yet to reju-
venate and professionalize it. The main problem is corruption, which
is linked with the continuity of the Soviet state administration. The
Ukrainian state administration has changed less than in any other post-
Soviet country.’150
Under President Leonid Kuchma (1994–2005), the executive branch
was characterized as having ‘poor co-ordination of actions on the part
of different executive structures, inconsistency and the contradictory
nature of decisions; low executive discipline; duplication of similar func-
tions performed by different bodies; excessive concentration of adminis-
trative functions at the highest levels of the executive branch; unbalanced
regional policy; inaccessibility of the executive power bodies to public
control; corruption and economic crime within the state structures, and
the low prestige of public service in Ukraine’.151 The situation was lit-
tle better during President Viktor Yushchenko’s term in office (2005–
2010), which was characterized by a lack of coordination, inefficiencies,
shortage of personnel resources and a lack of highly professional civil
servants.152
The process of administrative reform, which began with a state com-
mission drafting the Concept in 1997, was supposed to ameliorate these
issues with the bureaucracy, but was prolonged, drawn out and criticized
for reorganizing and liquidating ministries prior to an evaluation of their
functions in a process that was not always transparent to the general
public.153 Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s, the World Bank appeared
to be the only client for administrative reforms. In other words, no one
really wanted administrative reform to take place in Ukraine except for
149 Koliushko and Tymoshchuk, p. 59. 150 Åslund, 2015, pp. 146–147.
151 Razumkov Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS), 2000,
p. 10.
152 Razumkov UCEPS, 2007, p. 66. 153 Razumkov UCEPS, 2000, pp. 19, 25 and 30.
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the Bank, which, Koliushko and Tymoshchuk remarked, ‘shared the
main ideas behind the Concept of Administrative Reform in Ukraine,
and stepped forward as virtually the only client “placing orders” for
changes in the system of state administration in our country (as unpleas-
ant as this is to admit). It was under their pressure (and as a rule, prior
to a scheduled visit for loans), at least cosmetic attempts were made to
take some steps towards administrative reform.’154
The process of administrative reform continued initially with renewed
intensity after the 2004 Orange Revolution, but it also lacked any coor-
dinator or official in charge, a situation aggravated by the fact that
the task was a secondary duty for those in the Government charged
to work on such reforms while other critical policy tasks associated
with running the government took precedent.155 Administrative reform
during Yushchenko’s term brought surprisingly little reform and more
floundering. ‘There was no qualitative breakthrough’, the Kyiv-based
Razumkov Centre’s journal National Security & Defence concluded. ‘The
key laws necessary for administrative reform in the institutional, pro-
cedural, human, and territorial domains were not passed. The lack of
a strategic vision of the process of reform and realization of individual
steps is striking. Due to the lack of a clear idea of changes in the new
authorities, a lot of time was wasted.’156
Under Yushchenko, little success was attained as well in adopting a
civil service bill in 2005 as upon its ‘finalization, involving representa-
tives of many state bodies, educational establishments, and trade unions
showed that the personal interests of civil servants prevail over the inter-
ests of the people’, according to the National Security & Defence. ‘The
reformist potential of the bill [was] impaired, while the social aspect
[was] boosted. The attention to the draft “Code of Ethics” weakened
after the Minister of Justice was replaced.’157
Meanwhile, the post-Orange parliament also exhibited a complete
lack of understanding regarding what the civil service was all about by
amending regulations for a civil service personnel reserve to extend ben-
efits to former MPs and for replacing nearly a hundred civil servants who
left supposedly ‘on their own will’ with newly hired personnel from a sin-
gle region. Such a ‘decision illustrates misunderstanding of the elemen-
tary principles of good governance by the authorities’, commented the
journal in 2007. ‘Widespread resignations of civil servants of the highest
level “at their own discretion” and dominance from one region taking
154 Koliushko and Tymoshchuk, p. 60.
155 Razumkov UCEPS, 2006, pp. 19–20; and Razumkov UCEPS, 2007, p. 23.
156 Razumkov UCEPS, 2005, p. 35. 157 Ibid.
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executive positions is testimony to systemic problems of the institution
of the civil service, as well as a compromise of citizens’ rights to equal
access to the civil service, its stability and political neutrality.’158 Hence,
outside experts in Ukraine clearly saw expectations raised several times,
but little reform of the bureaucracy in the end.
More recently, the Verkhovna Rada’s 10 December 2015 passage
of a civil service reform law showed promise. The law calls for all
civil service appointments to be made through open and competitive
appointments; the creation of a special selection committee that will
independently decide all top appointees across all of Ukraine’s govern-
ment bodies, half of whose members will come from civil society; a ban
on senior bureaucrats’ holding membership in any political party; the
creation of a new position of state secretary in all of Ukraine’s ministries –
chosen through a new competitive process – that will manage the min-
istry in alignment with the European Union, where administrative and
political functions are separated; limiting senior bureaucrats’ tenures to
a maximum of two five-year terms; and a change in the salary structure
for personnel. If implemented properly – and a summer 2016 attempt to
pass a new bill threatened to eliminate the special selection committee’s
ability to choose the heads of local administrations and pass that respon-
sibility back to the president – the law truly would bring a sea-change in
corruption within Ukraine’s administrative structures.159
The reasons for the decades-long inertia in re-creating the post-
communist Ukrainian state are multifold and, perhaps, over-determined.
First, as Taras Kuzio has remarked, Ukraine had a limited pre-Soviet
legacy upon which to draw.160 The piecemeal nature of the process by
which the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was constructed, with
parts composed of lands ruled by the Russian Empire for centuries and
other parts never having experienced Russian rule until after World War
II, meant that there was no clearly identifiable governance model for the
bureaucracy, as there was for Poland or Russia.
Second, as Åslund reminds us, Ukraine’s independence was achieved
by a compromise between the nationalists and the older communist
elites, who viewed a large state apparatus for them to rule as indica-
tive of a strong state. ‘They favoured a big state apparatus’, he wrote,
‘ignoring its quality.’161 Indeed, as the number of social welfare bene-
fits, pensions and subsidies shows, the basic policy goal was a large state
role. And maintaining such a large state led to an unorganized monolith
158 Razumkov UCEPS, 2006, pp. 18–19.
159 Cohen, 22 December 2015; Cohen, 5 July 2016; and Herbst.
160 Kuzio, p. 1017. 161 Åslund, 2015, p. 147.
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of bureaucracy. ‘[W]hile maintaining its claim to a wide scope, the state
had become porous’, commented Verena Fritz. ‘Financially, a consider-
able share of programs formulated by decision-makers went unfunded.
Moreover, the horizontal and hierarchical integration of the state was
frayed. Thus, several sources of rulemaking competed with each other,
both in the issuing of legal rules and in bringing crucial institutions (such
as the [State Property Fund], [National Bank of Ukraine]) under their
control. Faced with contradictory rules, lower levels of the administra-
tion failed to implement orders from above.’162
Third, there was a lack of vision on almost everything economic at
the top of the political system, muddling the imperative for administra-
tive reform and not allowing a larger debate in society as to what the
role of the state should be. ‘The Ukrainian leadership lacked a clear
vision of what socio-economic model to strive for’, wrote Fritz. ‘On the
one hand, leading politicians sought reforms, on the other hand, they
rejected “shock therapy” initiated by the liberal elite in Russia.’163 By
seeking out, but not yet coalescing around, an economic reform program
in the 1990s, the need for a reform of the bureaucracy – and how it could
assist in economic reform – was put off as well. Externally, the impetus
for economic reform was mooted also, since the European Union did
not provide as significant support to Ukraine, despite Ukraine’s support
for greater integration with the West, as it did to other East European
states, who were offered the ‘carrot’ of membership and were separated
off from Ukraine by the European Union in their aid programs. (The
1980s’ Poland did not become the Poland of today without significant
help from the West, foreign aid programs and the cancelling out of all
Polish historical debts in the 1990s. Moreover, Europe always divided off
the former Soviet Union (FSU) states like Ukraine, keeping the twinned
aid programs for Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, PHARE
and TACIS, separate from each other so that there was little interac-
tion programmatically across Central and Eastern Europe, including the
Baltic states, on the one hand, and the FSU on the other.)
Fourth, while power became concentrated within the presidency from
the late 1990s up until the 2004 Orange Revolution, the parliament and
the president vied over the constitutional distribution of power through-
out this period.164 Even though Poland’s political parties certainly fought
over the power to influence the bureaucracies on a ‘spoils’ basis, the con-
stitutional distribution of powers in Poland was not considered as being
up for revision to the extent that it was continually so in Ukraine. The
long delay of the Constitution, finally adopted in 1996 – and, to a lesser
162 Fritz, p. 133. 163 Ibid., pp. 113–114. 164 Ibid., p. 109.
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extent, the prolonged absence of a fundamental law ‘On the Cabinet of
Ministers’, adopted in 2008 – meant that all branches and powers of
government were open to ‘ad hoc tests of strength’ and that even the
president and the prime ministers would contest domination over pol-
icy making.’165 And, when the Constitution did arrive, it did not resolve
who was in control, as it stated that the government was ‘“responsible to
the President of Ukraine and [ . . . ] under the control of and accountable
to the Verkhovna Rada” (Art. 113)’.166 The government thus had two
masters seeking to control it.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, administrative bodies were subordi-
nated de facto to the president when they should have been subordinated
to the government – which muddled the laws and rules of the state as
Kuchma tried to create a presidential state.167 In many ways, Kuchma’s
regime focused on centralizing the government in order to maintain
strength, National Security & Defence’s editors concluded, ‘rather than to
attain democratic standards in the delimitation of powers of the bodies of
state governance, lay down a solid legal basis for their activity, and bring
the practice of governance into compliance with the Constitution’.168
Remarking on the conflicts at the top over administrative reform during
the period 1997–2000, the Razumkov Centre’s Analytical Report stated,
‘Co-operation among working groups of the Verkhovna Rada, the Gov-
ernment, and the President of Ukraine at the stage of draft law (draft
presidential decree) preparation was virtually absent. As a result of this,
almost every law approved by the Verkhovna Rada was vetoed by the
President several times; likewise, the Verkhovna Rada blocked draft laws
introduced at the initiative of either the Government or the President of
Ukraine.’169
After the Orange Revolution, a similar lack of legislative support
for Yushchenko’s attempts at administrative reform meant that many
promised fundamental laws on the running of the government were not
adopted, while efforts to strengthen the executive branch over local self-
government bodies led to increased tension between the centre and the
regions.170 A hasty dismissal of nearly 20,000 state employees in the
executive branch in 2005 was viewed as ‘political persecution’ of those
who worked under the Kuchma regime.171
Fifth, as the economy collapsed in the first half decade after the Soviet
Union collapsed (and even today Ukraine remains one of the very, very
few countries in the world that have not yet reached their own 1989 levels
165 Ibid., p. 116.; and Razumkov UCEPS, 2000, p. 13. 166 Fritz, p. 139.
167 Koliushko, p. 62. 168 Razumkov UCEPS, 2005, p. 31.
169 Razumkov UCEPS, 2000, p. 22.
170 Razumkov UCEPS, 2005, p. 35. 171 Ibid.
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in growth per capita), the structure of the Communist Party of Ukraine
was dissolved, and few strong political parties came forth (although
a re-emerged Communist Party commanded the largest parliamentary
factions from 1994 to 2002), the state was held together by ‘net-
works’ of former Communists. Hence, absent political structures that
were prevalent in other countries, the networks of former communists
from the Soviet days ensured the continuity of the Soviet bureaucratic
structures.
Sixth, Ukraine retained very little fiscal experience from the Soviet
days. Unlike Poland or Russia, Ukraine did not inherit a full set of finan-
cial and fiscal institutions or any state organizations involved in planning
and budgeting, as those tasks had been carried out in Moscow prior to
1991 – which was not helpful, as the Soviet collapse brought economic
breakdown for the newly independent state.
Finally, unlike Poland’s NIK, Ukraine’s Accounting Chamber was
very weak. After parliament overturned a May 1996 presidential veto of
a parliamentary law giving the Accounting Chamber significant powers,
Kuchma submitted the law to the Constitutional Court, which greatly
reduced the Accounting Chamber’s role so that it could not monitor
budget revenues, only budget expenditures.172
After February 2014, the world began to see what many Ukrainians
and Ukrainian analysts had known all too well – that the government of
President Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2014) brought unheard of levels of
corruption to the country. In 2012, Ernst & Young placed the country
among the three most corrupt in the world, along with Colombia and
Brazil.173 Both Yushchenko’s and Yanukovych’s terms in office also saw a
slide in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, with
Ukraine falling from 107th place in 2005 to 118th place in 2007, to
134th place in 2010 and to 142nd place in 2014.174
Indeed, the level of corruption has been perceived by Ukrainians
as being worse than their Polish and Russian counterparts. In the
Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys (see Question #59 in
Appendix I), for example, only 10 per cent of Ukrainians in 2010 and 5
per cent of Ukrainians in 2015 stated that their government does a good
job in fighting corruption – figures that are almost half and one-third of
those in Russia, respectively, and almost one-third and one-fifth of those
in Poland, respectively. Meanwhile, 54 per cent of Ukrainians in 2010
and 51 per cent in 2015 stated that the government does a poor job, and
28 per cent in 2010 and 34 per cent in 2015 stated that the government
does not fight corruption at all.
172 Ibid., p. 166. 173 Tkachuk.
174 See www.transparency.org, accessed on 5 August 2015.
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The EuroMaidan revolution, from which Yanukovych fled on 21
February 2014, led to a reform-minded government being installed
under the leadership of President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minis-
ter Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who have declared that they will fight corruption
head on. Indeed, the task is quite hefty, given the size of the public sec-
tor and the lack of an overall plan for reducing it.175 Ukraine has one of
the largest government workforces, with 4.42 million employed by the
state in 2012, amounting to 26.7 per cent of the country’s workforce.
In 2014, that figure included to 433,269 public employees in the state
administration, comprising 335,270 state-level civil servants and 97,999
local government officials.176
After the EuroMaidan revolution, the most prominent debate in Kyiv
regarding state employees focused on the issue of lustration of those who
served in top government positions during the Yanukovych era. A law
passed in September 2014 barred ranks of officials from holding pub-
lic office, and more than 700 former officials had been lustrated by
July 2015. In November 2015, those lustrated were said by Yatsenyuk
to include ‘first deputy ministers, deputy ministers, 42 per cent of the
higher officials of the State Fiscal Service [Ukraine’s tax administration]
that were closer to the status of millionaires than to the status of real civil
servants, and 15 per cent of the leadership of the State Fiscal Service in
the regions’.177 However, the reality of lustration may be quite limited
in its success. A top prosecutor in Kyiv, who should have been barred
from office, managed, through both connections and knowledge of the
legal system, to avoid the ban by obtaining in advance from a court a
preventive ban on his dismissal that was kept secret from the public for
months.178
For post-communist Poland, Russia and Ukraine, the use of legacies to
build trust and improve state–society connections has mattered greatly.
And such use has mattered more than just cultural and historical pre-
dispositions. Political leaders, societies and bureaucracies alike all view
their relations with one another based on current interactions as well as
on how they perceive similar past interactions to impact on the present.
The selection, interpretation and application of past legacies by intent or
by default are particularly important in times of transition, when choices
on which institutions need abolishing, updating or retaining are made.
For Poland, the irony is that bringing back some of the inter-war insti-
tutions in the 1980s – a decade that began with the strikes at the Lenin
175 Lough and Solonenko, p. 9. 176 Åslund, 2015, p. 134. 177 Yatsenyuk.
178 Gorchinskaya, 18 July 2015.
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Shipyard in Gdańsk, the formation of Solidarity and the establishment of
martial law – was done in order to legitimize the communist state in the
eyes of its society, but ended up legitimizing the transitional state in the
1990s. The legacy from the past that was used in the 1980s as part of an
effort to re-build communist governance actually benefited the commu-
nists’ successors, as these institutions were in place when other reform
efforts were initiated. (This becomes particularly clear in the discussion
of bureaucrats’ implementation of the new tax policies in the 1990s, to
follow in Chapter 5.) Further, as the Polish case illustrates, political par-
ties need not play a guiding role in using legacies from the past in order
to update and re-build the new post-transition states.
In some ways, the leadership in both Poland and the Soviet Union
in the 1980s began to tap into solutions to governance dilemmas that
could have been beneficial in the long run – if only, of course, their
governments had not been toppled first. The regime collapses that did
end the 1980s came about because the bold and necessary prescriptions
for better governance – greater transparency, better citizen–state interac-
tions and societal oversight of the bureaucracy – were antithetical to the
essence of authoritarianism, whether it was practiced benignly or not.
How to interpret that decade – and the legacy it left behind, replete with
still-standing state institutions and bureaucracies – became the choice
of new leaders and new societies. Poland chose which institutions to
keep and update, using the more distant inter-war legacy to further legit-
imize the state as it did so. Russia, on the other hand, saw the glasnost
efforts to build a civil society founder under Yeltsin and that legacy be
reversed in the Putin era. Meanwhile, Ukraine did not engage in much
soul-searching regarding its historical legacies bequeathed to the state,
but opted by default for a continued Soviet-like monolithic bureaucracy
that led to disarray by avoiding serious reform in any direction.
In the chapters ahead, we will explore the different approaches that
the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian systems took in the first twenty-five
years of the transition in utilizing existing state structures to collect the
newly established taxes. We’ll start in Chapter 4 with an examination of
the tax regime and different economic and tax policy explanations for tax
collection, which will be followed, in Chapter 5, with an analytical view
of the inner workings of the tax bureaucracy and, in Chapters 6 and 7,
with a focused look at how different types of state-society relationships
contribute to tax compliance.
4 Creating Post-communist Tax Regimes and
Measuring Tax Compliance
Most centrally planned socialist economies in Eastern Europe imitated
the tax system of the Soviet Union. Thus, all post-socialist states at the
beginning of the transformation to market economies had poorly func-
tioning tax administrations and falling ratios of tax revenues to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), as well as tax compliance problems.1 Yet
Poland, like a few other Central European states, moved sooner than
the other post-communist states to reform its tax system and was able to
raise adequate revenues throughout this period.2 Poland was more effec-
tive than Russia and Ukraine in collecting taxes during the past quarter
century.
Before discerning why that was the case, it is necessary to present how
it was the case. Namely, it is necessary to begin by specifying as precisely
as possible how well each country collects taxes. That is the main goal of
this chapter. Before that, the chapter provides an overview of the struc-
ture of the tax regimes in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. At the beginning
of the 1990s, Poland, Russia and Ukraine all introduced three new main
taxes (the personal income tax (PIT), the corporate income tax (CIT)
and the value-added tax (VAT)), allowing a great comparative study, as
the three states were required to make dramatic institutional changes in
the tax arena at exactly the same time. Finally, a further goal for this
chapter is to analyze the use and limitations of economic explanations
and tax rates to account for the diversity of tax revenue outcomes. In
short, this chapter provides better understanding, context and measure-
ment of the object of study, tax compliance.
Tax Regimes in Poland, Russia and Ukraine
The primary focus throughout this study is on the two direct income
taxes, the PIT and the CIT, and the indirect VAT. These three taxes,
non-existent in the communist era, are the main source of fiscal
1 Polomski, p. 6. 2 See Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, p. 290.
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revenues for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and are the basis for
taxation in the EU countries. Poland introduced the PIT and CIT on 1
January 1992 and the VAT on 5 July 1993. Meanwhile, Russia inher-
ited a profits tax for enterprises from the Soviet era and introduced
the PIT and VAT on 1 January 1992. (A 13 per cent flat rate for the
PIT was introduced in Russia in January 2001.) And, in 1992, Ukraine
introduced an enterprise income tax – which in the early years shifted
back and forth between being a tax on profits and a tax on income
and was later called the corporate income tax – and the value-added
tax, which functioned as a sort of turnover tax until 1997. A PIT with
progressive tax rates was introduced in Ukraine in 1992, while a flat
PIT rate of 13 per cent was introduced in 2004, which was increased
to 15 per cent in 2007, before a second higher rate of 17 per cent
was introduced in 2011. The second rate for Ukraine’s PIT increased
to 20 per cent in 2015, and the rate changed to a flat 18 per cent in
2016.
In his analysis of key conceptual and measurement issues raised by
cross-national taxation studies in political science, Evan Lieberman finds
that taxes on income and profits (and on capital gains), often grouped
together under the label of ‘direct taxes’, are well suited for compar-
ing state capacity because they ‘reflect levels of state–society and intra-
society coordination and cooperation’3:
Most analysts would probably agree that the ‘purest’ form of taxation includes
those taxes levied on income, profits and capital gains. Such taxes are paid over
to the state directly by individuals and firms, often with graduated rates for differ-
ent levels of income. Political scientists studying taxation have tended to develop
indicators based on the standard assumption that these taxes have the qualities of
being among the most progressive, most difficult to administer, most transpar-
ent, and least requited of any government revenue streams. As a result . . . higher
levels of income tax collections are generally associated with greater levels of
capacity . . . 4
Hence, if two different states are found to extract similar amounts of
income and profits from similar-sized and similarly wealthy tax groups,
then the states can be said to be similar in their capacities to extract
revenue, provided that the two tax groups behave and respond similarly
to their respective states’ tax authorities.
CIT, often referred in Russia and Ukraine as the profits tax, and PIT
require significant administrative work, as they affect many more taxpay-
ers and hence involve greater ‘penetration of society’ than other, more
‘indirect’ consumption taxes, such as the VAT and other sales and excise
3 Lieberman, 2002, p. 100. 4 Ibid., p. 99.
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taxes. In Poland, the PIT affects all individuals who are employed or
earn income (except for some farmers), whereas in Russia and Ukraine,
after the adoption of the flat rate for the PIT in 2001 and in 2004,
respectively, most individuals let their employers pay their taxes for them.
Out of a population of 39 million, the number of Poles who paid taxes
was around 23 or 24 million throughout most of the 1990s, whereas
17.25 million taxpayers paid PIT in 2014.5 In Russia, out of a popula-
tion of approximately 145 million, 105 million individuals were on the
tax administration’s lists in 2003.6 In Ukraine, about 20 million individ-
uals, out of a population of roughly 47 million, were deemed to be tax-
payers in 2006 and 13.87 million were deemed to be PIT taxpayers in
2014.7
Domestic consumption taxes, which include the VAT and other sales
and excise taxes, are generally paid by a limited group of retailers and
manufacturers that are fewer in number than the individuals on a state’s
income tax rolls. However, the burden of such consumption taxes is
usually carried by consumers in the form of higher prices for goods
and services. With respect to analytical constructs such as state capac-
ity, Lieberman states that such ‘indirect’ taxes are considered to be less
complex for bureaucracies than the first group of taxes, but still require
functioning and capable tax administrations. ‘Taxes on consumption’,
he writes, ‘ . . . tend to be easier to collect than taxes on income because
they are collected indirectly, incrementally, and generally at the point of
purchase.’8
Nevertheless, within the post-communist environment, the VAT tax
is a particularly tricky tax to implement and administer due to the rise
in the number of fictitious firms, which try to claim a VAT refund for
non-existent sales. Hence, by choosing to focus on the PIT, the CIT
and the VAT consumption tax when undertaking field research on how
tax laws are implemented by bureaucrats in Poland, Russia and Ukraine
(as will be shown in Chapter 5), a somewhat easier tax to collect can
be compared with the more difficult income taxes so that a more com-
plete range of administrative capabilities can be analyzed in these three
states.
5 Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (NIK), 8 June 1998, p. 62; and NIK, June 2001, p. 63; and
Ministry of Finance, 2015, p. 10.
6 RIA Oreanda.
7 Alm, Saavedra and Sennoga, p. 9; International Monetary Fund (IMF), January 2016,
p. 36.
8 Lieberman, 2002, p. 103.
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Taxation in the Command Economy
In the early 1990s, unlike Poland, both Russia and Ukraine adapted and
adjusted Soviet-era tax laws, seeking to operate within – rather than to
replace – the existing legal framework.9 Under state socialism, the econ-
omy in both Poland and the Soviet Union was based on a narrow revenue
stream, emanating from a relatively small number of large, state-run
enterprises.10 Taxes in the command economy were, basically, transfers
from the public enterprise sector to the state itself. ‘The planning office
set wages and prices at levels that would generate surpluses in the pub-
lic enterprises’, writes Vito Tanzi, who attended the first International
Monetary Fund (IMF) mission to Russia in 1991. ‘Since there were no
“parametric” or objective tax rates stated in tax laws, most of the trans-
fers were the result of negotiations between the managers of the enter-
prises and officials from what was called the tax administration. Thus,
these taxes were largely arbitrary. They often reflected administrative or
bureaucratic decisions, not legislation.’11
The nature of these taxes, then, did not require that the communists
develop a large tax administration. ‘In the pre-reform system most rev-
enues were simply transferred to the budget through the debiting of
enterprise accounts at the state bank’, Barry W. Ickes and Joel Slemrod
comment. ‘Hence there was little need for tax administration. Indeed, by
the 1960’s the Soviet tax administration system was dismantled and its
functions carried out by the Ministry of Finance. A separate tax inspec-
torate was set up in the Ministry of Finance only in July of 1990. Hence
tax administration in the Soviet Union (and by extension other reform-
ing socialist economies) is rather undeveloped.’12 For Poland as well as
for Russia and Ukraine, then, implementing, adopting and adjusting to
new forms of taxes in the early 1990s required the building of a new tax
administration system, nearly from scratch.
Poland’s Tax Regime
In Poland, the most important taxes are administered at the national
level and include, as mentioned above, the CIT, the PIT and the
9 Alexeev and Conrad, pp. 247–248.
10 Easter, 2002, p. 604. 11 Tanzi, pp. 10–11.
12 Ickes and Slemrod, pp. 387–388. In Tsarist Russia, Tsar Nicholas II approved a much-
delayed general income tax law that was to have come into effect in early 1917, but the
Russian Revolution rendered the personal income tax and Russian citizens’ experience
with it moot. (Franklin, p. 141.)
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VAT – listed in order of increasing importance to the Polish state bud-
get. Social security contributions, shared by employers and employees,
also compose an important revenue stream. The PIT is subject to a pro-
gressive income tax, and from 2014, two different tax rates on income
apply – 18 and 32 per cent with a threshold of 85,528 Polish złoty (PLN)
for the higher rate. Rates have varied over the years, with the top PIT
rate as high as 45 per cent in 1995–1996.13 Also, in 2014, the CIT was
reduced from 40 per cent (its highest since the mid-1990s) to 19 per
cent.14 The VAT has had a top rate of either 22 or 23 per cent since its
introduction in 1993. Other taxes include the tonnage tax, inheritance
and donation tax, tax on civil law transactions, agricultural tax, forest
tax, real property tax, transport vehicles tax, taxes on the extraction of
certain minerals, excise duties and gambling tax.15
Political Origins of Poland’s Tax Regime
Given the narrow tax base inherited from the command economy,
Poland, according to Gerald M. Easter, sought a social pact with labour
in order to shift the tax burden from state-run industrial enterprises that
were dependent on the state for financing to worker households through
the introduction of a new PIT.16
In many ways, the public battle over the popiwek – the Polish tax on
excess wages established in order to enforce wage ceilings on public sec-
tor workers – laid the groundwork for the introduction of the PIT. ‘The
implementation of the new tax was facilitated by certain compromises
entailed in this social pact’, continues Easter. ‘First, with the establish-
ment of the Tripartite Commission [composed of the government, man-
agement, and the trade unions], labour was accorded a formal means
for participation in the wage policy process. Second, as part of the bar-
gain, workers’ wages would keep pace with inflation. As the personal
income tax went into effect, wages were raised to offset an immediate
adverse impact on worker households. Finally, in March 1994, the popi-
wek was abandoned by the government.’17 In short, due to a combina-
tion of unproductive state firms, an unpopular tax on wage ceilings and
political negotiations that included both firm managers and workers, the
13 Trading Economics website, accessed 29 August 2016 at <http://www
.tradingeconomics.com/poland>.
14 Ibid.
15 Ministry of Finance of Poland, accessed 29 August 2016 at <http://www.finanse.mf
.gov.pl/documents/766655/936176/20111026_tax_system_of_Poland.pdf>.
16 Easter, 2002, p. 609. 17 Ibid., p. 612.
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PIT emerged in Poland as a major revenue source for the state, second
only to the VAT.
Russia’s Tax Regime
During the Yeltsin years, when regions sought greater autonomy, the
number of taxes across Russia began to mushroom. By 1999, there were
‘about 30 separate federal taxes and over 170 local and regional taxes’.18
Nevertheless, the most important taxes in Russia have been adminis-
tered at the national level and include the PIT, the CIT, the VAT and
the Natural Resource Extractment Tax (NDPI), or the Mineral Extrac-
tion Tax (MET), with the largest source of federal tax revenue varying
by year between the CIT, the VAT and the NDPI. Until 2001, the PIT
was a progressive income tax, with the top marginal rate from 1993–
1998 being 35 per cent even as most Russians paid the lower 12 per
cent marginal rate. Since 2001, Russia has had a flat personal income
tax rate of 13 per cent. The CIT has had different rates over the years,
with a high rate of 43 per cent in 2001. Since 2009, the rate for the
CIT has been 20 per cent.19 While the VAT’s standard rate was cut
in January 1993 from 28 to 20 per cent, the top rate has been 18 per
cent since 2004.20 Together with excise taxes, the VAT, the CIT and
the PIT composed roughly three-quarters of total tax collections in the
consolidated budget in the 1990s.21 Excise taxes, tariffs and mineral
taxes, which function like royalties, also have been strong sources of
revenue.22
As for how these laws are perceived by the tax collectors themselves,
even a good number of Russian tax officials think that their country’s tax
laws are unfair. According to the 2011 Russian Public Officials’ Survey,
18 per cent stated that the tax laws are not fair, with a further 10 per
cent refusing to say (Appendix I, Question #26.)
According to Michael Alexeev and Robert F. Conrad, the tax system in
Russia has been deemed to work well largely because the tax administra-
tion makes it difficult for exporters to obtain VAT refunds and because
of overtaxation of the oil and gas sector, estimates of the revenue share of
which range from 35 to 60 per cent once CIT, VAT, mineral extraction
charges and export taxes, among others, are added up.23
18 Himes and Milliet-Einbinder.
19 Trading Economics website, accessed 17 September 2016 at <http://www
.tradingeconomics.com/russia/>.
20 World Bank, 1996, p. 18; and Trading Economics website.
21 Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace, p. 2. 22 Alexeev and Conrad, p. 250.
23 Ibid., pp. 246, 253.
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Political Origins of Russia’s Tax Regime
In the early 1990s, Russia needed to construct a new tax system that
would obtain revenue from the newly privatized sectors of the economy.
To do so, it relied on elite bargaining with the owners of a very narrow,
but quite profitable and identifiable revenue base of the new economy –
the large-scale extractive industries involved in exporting commodities,
including the oil and gas firms and companies involved in minerals and
metals, which had recently broken off from the state itself, had bene-
fited from Russia’s concentrated economy and profited from the loans-
for-shares program, and were well known to the tax authorities. ‘Elite
bargaining was a hybrid system of revenue extraction that combined the
new conditions of the transition economy with practices familiar to the
command economy’, writes Easter. ‘It rested on a complex web of infor-
mal elite ties stretching across political and economic spheres and from
centre to regions.’24 Similarly, Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal
argue that after the 1998 financial crisis, the interests of government and
the large oil firms coincided, making reforms on oil-sector-specific taxes
and profits taxes possible.25
Such elite bargaining with respect to this small, but profitable and
unique-to-Russia sector of the economy led to a heavy burden for the
selected few companies. This has led Scott Gehlbach to conclude that
the structure of Russia’s taxation helps to explain the form of capital-
ism that has developed. ‘With the focus in the former Soviet Union on a
number of key revenue sources, tax authorities never learned to extract
revenues from other sorts of enterprises or from individuals’, writes
Gehlbach. ‘As a consequence, politicians . . . were led to promote those
sectors that they knew would produce tax revenue, at the expense of
those that would not. In contrast, in Eastern Europe – where tax systems
had been structured to cast the revenue net more widely – there were
fewer such perverse incentives.’26 Unsurprisingly, with the state invested
in such a focused sector of the economy, tax arrears from the energy
sector were more accepted by the state. ‘[T]he state would tolerate tax
arrears so long as the energy sector continued to supply even delinquent
customers, thus preventing too rapid a collapse of key employment-
providing enterprises and service-providing public-sector organizations’,
write Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman. ‘Of the growth in budget
arrears in [the mid-1990s], more than 90 per cent reportedly resulted
from state-sanctioned exemptions.’27
24 Easter, 2002, p. 614. 25 Jones Luong and Weinthal.
26 Gehlbach, p. 13. 27 Shleifer and Treisman, p. 73.
Creating Post-communist Tax Regimes and Tax Compliance 103
In addition to the firms involved in exported extracted commodities,
the regional governments, which gained powers in the 1990s from Rus-
sia’s dysfunctional federalism, also were involved in the elite bargaining
process, which influenced Russia’s tax structure for decades to come.
Regional governments united with the large-scale extractive industries
‘to undermine reformers’ attempts to restructure the tax system in ways
that would have improved incentives for growth and tax collection’, con-
tinue Shleifer and Treisman. ‘ . . . Large enterprises and regional govern-
ments also colluded to weaken the collection of federal taxes and thus
keep more resources in the regions. Their strategies involved diverting
a growing share of economic activity into the unofficial economy and
increasingly turning to nonmonetary means of payment.’28 As a result,
just as the state had tolerated arrears by some large firms, the federal gov-
ernment in the 1990s tolerated tax withholding (or allocated larger trans-
fers) to the regions that threatened to declare sovereignty, stage strikes
or vote for the opposition.29
The 1998 financial crisis, however, brought unity to the large-scale
extractive industries and the government, setting the stage for the major
tax reforms of 2000 and 2001, which, under President Vladimir Putin,
brought forth the 13 per cent flat PIT and the unified social tax (UST),
replacing various social contributions; reform of the VAT; and a decrease
in the CIT rate and in the dividend tax rate. Assisting in these reforms
was former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar’s Institute for the Economy in
Transition.30
Ukraine’s Tax Regime
As in its neighbours, the most important taxes administered in Ukraine
are the PIT, the CIT and the VAT, in reverse order of significance to
the state budget. The PIT rate has been less stable than in Russia. Since
January 2016, the PIT rate has been set at a flat 18 per cent for all
salaries regardless of amount. Just prior to this, the PIT rate was tied
to the amount of personal income, with a rate of 15 per cent applied if
income did not exceed ten times a minimum monthly salary or 20 per
cent for income in excess of that amount.31 Up until 2003, the PIT
was a progressive tax, but, from 2004 to 2010, a flat rate of 13 per
cent (as in Russia) and, from 2007 to 2010, a flat rate of 15 per cent
applied. Since August 2014, as a response to the war against Russia in
the Donbas region, a temporary military tax of 1.5 per cent of taxable
28 Ibid., p. 90. 29 Ibid., p. 110.
30 Alexeev and Conrad, pp. 248–249. 31 Baker & McKenzie, Kyiv Office.
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income has been introduced for all those who pay a tax on their personal
income.32 Social security contributions have been shared by employ-
ers and employees, but since January 2016, employers are deemed fully
responsible for paying a 22 per cent tax on salaries – significantly down
from rates that had earlier ranged from 36.76 to 49.70 per cent.33
Since the late 1990s, the CIT rate in Ukraine has been slowly drop-
ping from a high of 30 per cent to a current level of 18 per cent,
and the VAT has had a top rate of 20 per cent.34 Other taxes include
excise taxes, vehicle ownership tax, real estate tax, rent tax, fixed agri-
culture tax and the simplified small business tax.35 The last, which
since its introduction in 1998 has played an important role in Ukraine
due to its low rate and due to the ease with which individuals have
been able to switch their employment status from employee to ‘inde-
pendent’ consultant while still working for the same firm, applies to
individual entrepreneurs and legal entities whose annual income does
not exceed 5 million Ukrainian hryvnia (approximately U.S.$200,000
in mid-2016) – down significantly in 2016 from a previous income of 20
million Ukrainian hryvnia. From 2016, the rate for this simplified system
has increased to 3 per cent for VAT payers and to 5 per cent for non-VAT
payers.36
Political Origins of Ukraine’s Tax Regime
Whereas the 1990s debate over the tax regime in Russia was resolved in
the early 2000s, just as Putin ascended to office, the process for Ukraine
took even longer and occurred in an even more fragmented manner. Not
until late 2010 was a tax code adopted in Ukraine. Much of the delay
likely is due to the ‘unholy alliance between an executive interested in
possibilities for selective enforcement, oligarchs interested in a system
with privileges rather than a level playing field, and a Communist Party
opposed to a market economy’ that emerged in the 1990s and continued,
more or less, up to the EuroMaidan Revolution.37
Emblematic of the uncertainty and discord among policy makers in
the 1990s was perhaps the VAT tax, which constantly changed in that
decade with respect to rates, tax base and exemptions. ‘In 1999, Serhyi
Teriokhin, head of the tax and customs subcommittee of the Verkhovna
32 Contact Ukraine website accessed 18 September 2016 at <http://www.contactukraine
.com/taxation/individual-tax-in-ukraine>.
33 Baker & McKenzie, Kyiv Office.
34 Trading Economics website, accessed 18 September 2016 at <http://www
.tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/>.
35 Vasil Kisil & Partners. 36 Ibid. 37 Fritz, p. 150.
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Rada [Ukraine’s parliament]’, writes Verena Fritz, ‘estimated that “since
independence, Ukraine [ . . . ] has revised its value-added tax rules more
than 200 times.”’38 Similarly, the Razumkov Centre tracked the number
of regulatory acts that define all tax payment procedures as adopted
each year in the 1990s39:
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
21 31 103 142 291 329 436 664 500
The dramatic increases in regulations by the end of the decade surely
must have bewildered accountants and state tax employees alike!
Ukraine’s adoption in March 2003 of the flat personal income tax, two
years after Russia’s, came under a ‘For a United Ukraine’ coalition gov-
ernment with few right-wing members, veering from an East European
pattern in which right-wing governments sought the adoption of the flat
tax. Hilary Appel has argued that the passage of the flat tax largely was
due to ‘economically liberal politicians’ who held powerful positions in
the Rada, including Teriokhin, who claimed that the new flat tax rate
would bring in more taxpayers and reduce the shadow economy.’40
Under President Viktor Yanukovych, in December 2010, Ukraine at
last adopted a tax code, which sought to define the status, rights and
responsibilities of the taxpayers and of the tax administration structures.
Coming into force in January 2011, the tax code since has seen mul-
tiple changes incorporated into it. Among other things, the code abol-
ished the simplified tax for small business entrepreneurs, forcing at least
one million to close shop in the first year, while enabling easier transfer
pricing, which benefited larger businesses by enabling them to transfer
their profits abroad without paying any tax.41 In subsequent amend-
ments, after significant protests by thousands of small entrepreneurs
in Kyiv,42 the popular simplified taxation was brought back into the
code.
Since the EuroMaidan Revolution, Ukraine’s new wave of Rada
deputies and politicians have been trying to reform the country’s tax
legislation, largely in order to broaden the tax base and to simplify
38 Ibid., p. 151.
39 ‘Graph: The number of regulatory acts that define tax payment procedures’, in
Razumkov UCEPS, 2000, p. 9.
40 Appel, 2011, p. 105.
41 Åslund, 20 October 2011; Åslund, 26 November 2013.
42 RFE/RL, 16 November 2010.
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the administration of tax collection, as well as to lower rates in order
to appeal for public support for the post-Yanukovych reform process
and bring more income out of the shadow economy.43 (Broadly speak-
ing, though, these long-unfulfilled objectives have remained the same in
Ukraine since the debate over tax reform began in the mid-1990s.)
At the same time, policy-making with respect to taxation is a multi-
institutional process in Ukraine, usually forcing the Rada deputies to
depend upon other state agencies that serve as the primary authors of
draft tax legislation. In February 2015, Andrei V. Zhurzhiy, first deputy
chair of the tax committee within the Rada and a new MP since 2014,
remarked that he did not consider the package of tax reforms passed in
late December 2014 to be true reforms, as they had been prepared by
the Ministry of Finance and the tax administration and did not reach
MPs in sufficient time to review, let along make changes. New tax laws
needed to be passed before a new year began so that businesses could
begin to operate under them. Such a late arrival of the draft legislation
on deputies’ desks was quite a revelation for the former businessman.44
A year later, on the eve of 2016, a compromise was found between the
Ministry of Finance’s first draft and one prepared by the Rada Commit-
tee on Taxation and Customs Policy, headed by Nina Iuzhanina.45
International Tax Assistance for Poland, Russia and Ukraine
In creating their tax systems, Poland, Russia and Ukraine each had
different reactions to the tax system reform advice they received from
abroad. The type of tax system constructed reflected the type of econ-
omy envisaged.
From the very start of the transition, Poland, Russia and Ukraine all
faced international pressures to get their fiscal houses in order, but also
received technical and financial aid from abroad. In addition to the for-
eign aid programs of the United States, the European Union and other
foreign governments, coupled with the advice of academics and global
think tanks, particular key roles in the tax reform process were played by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.46 In the early
1990s, Poland, for one, had a tremendous foreign debt inherited from
the Polish People’s Republic (PRL) and needed the Bank and the IMF,
which provided loans that came with conditions for all three states. ‘Over
43 Åslund, 9 November 2015.
44 Author’s interview with Andrei V. Zhurzhiy, Kyiv, Ukraine, 9 February 2015.
45 Petrukhina.
46 For a full list of PHARE (EU) projects with respect to the Polish tax administration and
tax system from 1997 to 2003, see Ministry of Finance, 2004, pp. 88–89.
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the following years, the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department would play an
important role in tax policy and tax administration in Russia’, writes Vito
Tanzi in his biography. ‘During the decade of transition, the department
would help Russia establish a new tax system and a true tax administra-
tion. But it would take several years and a lot of hard work on the part of
many staff missions.’47 The World Bank also sponsored Tax Administra-
tion Modernisation Projects (TAMPs) in Russia and Ukraine, described
in greater detail in the next chapter.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) was active from the beginning of the transition as well, with
training of tax officials.48 The OECD also worked with Russia during the
enactment of its tax code in the late 1990s and early 2000s to ensure that
the legislation would coordinate with international standards.49 (Simi-
larly, by 1999, with the work on the code, Tanzi remarked, ‘things were
finally going much better than in previous years and . . . for the first time,
the Russians were listening to the advice received [from the IMF] and
there were concrete signs of progress’.50)
In terms of following the advice offered from abroad, most of the tran-
sition countries closely followed guidance on changing tax policy – and
most followed suit with legislation, but many ignored changing their tax
administrations and incorporating more established western accounting
practices.51 Poland (along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia,
and the Baltics) acted quickly on foreign advice and introduced com-
prehensive reform almost immediately, while there was less broad con-
sensual support for tax reform in countries such as Russia and Ukraine,
enabling vested interests to block reforms.52
Easter describes three waves of tax reform in Central and Eastern
Europe: A first wave of capitalist-style tax reforms that accompanied the
macro structural reforms of the early 1990s that was assisted by West-
ern economic advisors was followed, for those EU accession countries
like Poland, by a second wave in which indirect sales taxes (the VAT)
were aligned with those in the rest of the European marketplace. (VAT,
of course, became the indirect tax of choice not just for those states
aspiring to join the European Union but also for the other transition
states as well.) A third wave, caused by the transition economies’ low tax
morale, weak tax administration and poor economic capitalization, fol-
lowed in the 2000s with the arrival of the flat-tax and other rate-cutting
reforms of personal and corporate direct income taxes.53 (While Poland
47 Tanzi, p. 11. 48 Appel, 2011, p. 32. 49 Ibid., p. 32. 50 Tanzi, p. 50.
51 Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, p. 277. 52 Ibid., pp. 277–278.
53 Easter, 2013, pp. 1148–1149.
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did not adopt the flat PIT tax as did its neighbours Russia and Ukraine,
it did lower its direct tax rates during this period.) In short, the first
wave involved Western advisors, especially from the IMF; the second
involved the European Union; and the third originated from learning
and copying other Central and Eastern European states in the region –
as flat taxes became an Eastern European rather than a Western Euro-
pean phenomenon.
The IMF’s influence, especially in the first wave, was greater with
respect to tax policy, macroeconomic and technical issues than it was
with respect to providing practical advice on structural and institutional
reforms. Getting advice accepted in 1990s Russia, though, was difficult,
in part due to the fact that many Russians felt it to be ‘humiliating’ to ask
the IMF for loans.54 The IMF’s activities in the 1990s – such as tech-
nical assistance, posting a senior tax administration expert at the State
Tax Service, and setting targets for revenue collection as conditions for
loan disbursements – failed to have much of an impact on revenues in
Russia.55 However, with the drafting and adoption of the new tax code,
the IMF’s influence grew. ‘In the case of tax policy reform’, writes John
Odling-Smee, ‘major changes did not come until 2001 under President
Putin. The seeds of some components of this reform had been sown
earlier, partly by the IMF and other technical assistance advisors. The
IMF staff had opposed other components, however, notably the move to
a flat rate personal income tax, which, although desirable on structural
grounds, had seemed to the staff to carry the risk of a temporary loss of
revenue.’56
With respect to the influence of the European Union, particularly with
regard to Easter’s second wave, the evidence is mixed. To start with,
Poland was not the only CEE state to join the European Union in 2004.
Seven other states did as well, all with varying levels of tax arrears and fis-
cal imbalances. Revelations that the prime minister had lied about fiscal
imbalances led Hungarians to protest in 2006, while Bulgaria and Slo-
vakia – states that held high enthusiasm for EU accession – had difficult
tax problems. In some ways, what entrant states can do is narrowed by
the process of EU integration, and states cannot do what citizens want
them to do. On the other hand, getting into the European Union does
not provide states with any more incentives to collect more taxes in and
of itself, especially if the European Union is to provide subsidies.
Appel argues, with respect to the second wave of indirect sales tax
reforms, that the European Union maintained a strong influence on
Poland and the other EU accession countries through the exertion of
54 Odling-Smee, p. 156. 55 Ibid., p. 175. 56 Ibid., p. 177.
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international leverage supporting once-stalled tax reforms. ‘Their tax
laws had to be harmonized with existing EU law, and all areas of indirect
taxes had to follow the acquis communautaire, the body of EU law whose
adoption was required for membership’, writes Appel. ‘ . . . In practice
this meant that the East Europeans imported their consumption tax
regime from abroad with virtually no concessions to domestic groups.
Since consumption taxes generate the largest portion of tax revenue, the
loss of control over taxation was enormous.’57
Easter, on the other hand, maintains that the EU-directed reforms
were delayed, incomplete and partially successful and that domestic
political and structural constraints were just as determinative in the for-
mation of the post-communist tax regimes. ‘Even in the case when inter-
national leverage was at its highest (EU accession reform)’, states Easter,
‘domestic political considerations (rooted in revenue bargains) prompted
post-communist governments to resist, delay and renegotiate particular
features of the tax policy reform. In the end, the European Commission
acquiesced to an incomplete tax harmonization at the point when mem-
bership was conferred on the post-communist candidates.’58 Appel, for
her part, does agree that domestic politics was decisive with respect to
the development of and approach to taxing personal income in Central
and Eastern Europe.59
In short, throughout the transition, all of the transition states benefited
from advice and assistance from abroad in constructing their tax systems,
but the extent to which such foreign input mattered is mixed, piecemeal
and contested. For the most part, foreign assistance offered to all three of
these states was greatest in the 1990s and into the early 2000s. Ukraine,
though, received assistance for a more prolonged period of time, and as
will be explored in Chapter 8, some of that advice has been forthcoming
more recently, with the re-launch of reforms after the 2014 EuroMaidan
Revolution.
Measuring Tax Compliance in Poland,
Russia and Ukraine
Throughout the transition to a market economy, Poland was shown to
be consistently able to extract revenue, though it did fall short of its goals
at times and had significant (but not incapacitating) tax arrears. Mean-
while, data from Russia and Ukraine are more erratic, but show tax col-
lection to be poor throughout most of the 1990s with some improvement
after 2000.
57 Appel, 2011, pp. 2–3. 58 Easter, 2009, pp. 49–50. 59 Appel, 2011, p. 5.
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Extractive capacity, measured in terms of tax extraction, is the most
commonly used measure of a state’s capacity.60 However, obtaining
measures for the ability to collect taxes – especially in a series over
time that is comparable across countries – is not easy. One of the most
frequent methods of reporting tax revenue statistics is to present the
amount of revenue collected as a percentage of national income, usu-
ally the country’s GDP.61 In his review of different methodologies for
analysing states’ tax income, Lieberman explains that tax collection data
are often presented in this manner ‘because analysts implicitly agree that
the problem or challenge for states is to collect a portion of the total
economy in tax revenues, and that opportunities and constraints on tax-
ation for policy-makers and the bureaucracy are ultimately determined
by the size of the economy’.62
However, presenting tax collection data as a percentage of GDP does
have some limitations – especially if the focus of concern is assess-
ment of a state’s capacity to tax. First, as Lieberman has observed, dis-
playing data in this way assumes that no matter what the size of the
economy actually is, the collection of a certain percentage of a coun-
try’s national income would imply that the effort was just as difficult
as if a similar percentage in GDP terms was collected from a coun-
try with markedly different national income. ‘By looking at income tax
collections as a share of GDP’, Lieberman writes, ‘the measure con-
trols for the relative size of the economy, but assumes that the chal-
lenge of collecting direct taxes from any economy is basically the same
problem.’63 In other words, the task of collecting taxes may be far more
challenging for a new nation embarking on the task of state-building
than for a more established state with a much larger economy. The size
of the wealth and how it is distributed in society might be significant
as well.
60 Fukuyama, 2013, p. 353.
61 As a comparison from 1990 to 2011, the OECD member states collected an aver-
age of 12.0 per cent of GDP per year in direct tax revenue (measured as income,
profits and capital gains taxes) and an average per year of 11.0 per cent of indirect
tax revenue (measured as taxes on goods and services.) Meanwhile, Poland fared bet-
ter in indirect than direct taxes over the 1992–2013 period, averaging 8.1 per cent of
GDP per year collected in similarly measured direct taxes and 12.2 per cent of GDP
per year collected in indirect taxes. Russia over the 1992–2013 period fared relatively
poorly in comparison, collecting 8.7 per cent of GDP per year in direct taxes (prof-
its tax (CIT) and PIT) and 8.2 per cent of GDP per year in indirect taxes (VAT,
excise taxes). Meanwhile, Ukraine from 1994 to 2013 collected an average of 9.7 per
cent of GDP each year in direct taxes and 12.0 per cent of GDP per year in indirect
taxes. (Poland and OECD data from the OECD; Russia and Ukraine data from the
IMF.)
62 Lieberman, 2003, p. 106. 63 Ibid., p. 62.
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In addition, while readily available for cross-national purposes, such
‘taxes collected as a percentage of GDP’ data do not account for the
actual tax rates and expected tax levels. Some states do, in fact, have sig-
nificantly lower tax rates than others, but this may not imply that such
states are less capable of raising revenue that they want or need. ‘There
is a difference between extractive potential and actual extraction rates’,
writes Francis Fukuyama. ‘Actual tax rates are set not just by extractive
potential, but by policy choices regarding the optimal rate and types of
taxation.’64 The fact that the United States collected more tax revenue
during the two World Wars than before or after reflects differences in pol-
icy preferences as to what the size of government should be during times
of war and peace. Moreover, some governments have better or worse
perceptions of their own societies, including how they envision wealth
and income to be distributed. As Alexeev and Conrad also remark, ‘the
fact that a country collecting significant tax revenue is not necessarily
evidence of the tax system efficiency or even effectiveness of tax admin-
istration. This is because tax effort [taxes as a share of GDP] regressions
do not include either a measure of statutory tax burden or a measure
of welfare loss associated with tax collections. That is, a country with a
very efficient tax system and tax administration might be characterized
by low tax effort simply because its population prefers to have a small
public sector. Conversely, a country that exhibits high tax effort might
be collecting taxes in an inefficient way.’65
Hence, what may be needed is a measure of tax collection that
incorporates states’ perceptions of themselves and their societies, one
that includes, from the earlier definition of state capacity presented in
Chapter 2, the concept of state goals and objectives.
A perfect measure of tax collection, then, would be the amount col-
lected as a percentage of what the state believes should ideally be col-
lected in order for it to accomplish the tasks it would like to carry out.
Examining tax arrears as determined by a country’s Ministry of Finance
or Tax Administration – the amount of taxes not collected but what the
state thinks it should have collected – can help to approximate the state’s
view of those data at an aggregate level. Further, it is critically impor-
tant to assess, if possible, the willingness of citizens to comply with the
state and pay their dues. Therefore, this chapter will present data on
tax arrears and data from a bespoke series of surveys on citizen atti-
tudes. With this two-pronged approach, tax capacity will be assessed at
the aggregate and individual levels.
64 Fukuyama, 2013, p. 353. 65 Alexeev and Conrad, p. 250.
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Table 4.1 Overall tax arrears as percentage of all taxes collected in Poland,a
Russiab and Ukrainec
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Poland na 6.0 5.7 5.0 4.7 6.1 7.7 9.7 11.4 10.7 10.3
Russia 11.2 16.1 27.6 31.1 49.4 41.7 31.2 25.5 22.4 19.5 15.8
Ukraine na 6.0 6.5 9.5 44.0 45.2 31.7 17.4 53.3 42.0 22.3
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poland 9.3 8.9 7.7 7.7 8.3 8.8 9.1 10.4 12.8 15.2 na
Russia 19.3 13.9 10.9 7.2 8.9 8.8 7.2 6.2 6.4 6.1 6.0
Ukraine 8.7 5.7 3.6 3.7 5.3 6.0 3.9 2.6 3.1 6.7 4.7
Poland average (1995–2014) 8.8
Russia average (1994–2015) 17.8
Ukraine average (1995–2015) 15.8
a For Poland, Ministry of Finance, 2000, p. 15; 2001, pp. 4, 14; 2002, pp. 4, 29; 2003,
pp. 4, 16; 2004, pp. 5, 19; Ministry of Finance websites (<www.archbip.mf.gov.pl/bip/
7786.html>) accessed 8 July 2014 and (<www.finanse.mf.gov.pl/budzet-panstwa/>)
accessed 18 July 2016. The Overall Tax figure was compiled using data for corporate
income tax, personal income tax, taxes on goods and services, excise tax, games tax and
abolished taxes. Also, note that in 2002 overall taxes do not include arrears from excise
taxes.
b Data compiled by author with statistics from Rosstat, 1998, pp. 22–24, 59; 2000, pp.
68, 72; 2002, pp. 58, 62; 2004, pp. 72, 76; 2006, pp. 73, 77; 2008, pp. 77, 83; 2010,
pp. 82, 87; and 2012, pp. 81, 86. On 18 July 2016, 2012–2014 data were accessed
from Finansy Rossii 2014 at www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/
statistics/publications/catalog/doc_1138717651859, while 2015 data were accessed at:
<http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/finance/#> and
at <www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/finans/fin210g.htm>. The Overall Tax figure was
compiled using aggregate data for all taxes received, which include corporate income
tax, personal income tax (although arrears data are not provided separately for this tax
as in Poland and Ukraine), taxes on goods and services, excise taxes, payments for the
use of mineral wealth and natural resources, and property taxes. In 1994, a special tax
also was included in the taxes collected figure, and from 2000 to 2003, Rosstat also
includes a separate sales tax and a taxes on gross revenue.
c Unlike the Polish and Russian tax arrears data, the Ukraine data do not come from
a single source, as no institution or organization, including the Ukrainian Ministry of
Finance, has time series data from the mid-1990s until the present. Obtaining financial
and tax data in Ukraine is not just a problem for independent researchers, but also
has been regarded as a problem for government policy makers trying to make policy
projections. The 1995 data are from the IMF, 1999, pp. 100, 102. 1996–2001 data
are from a World Bank Ukraine office document entitled ‘Descriptive and Diagnostic
Analyses,’ pp. 2 and 3. 2002–2004 data are from World Bank, 2007, p. 23, but the
CIT and VAT tax arrears data for 2002–2003 are from the IMF, 2005, pp. 28, 31.
The 2005–2014 data were obtained from the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine by a direct
request from a Ukrainian parliamentary deputy’s office. The 2015 figure was provided
in a personal e-mail from the World Bank’s Washington, DC office on 2 June 2016.
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Comparing Levels of Aggregate Tax Arrears with
What Is Collected
Presenting data on aggregate tax arrears – that is, presenting information
on the size and collection of each year’s unpaid taxes – provides a view as
to how good a state is at collecting tax revenue in light of what it believes
is owed to it. Table 4.1 displays overall tax arrears as a percentage of all
taxes collected, derived by the author utilizing data from the Ministry of
Finance in Poland, from the RF State Statistics Service, and from the
IMF, World Bank and the State Fiscal Service in Ukraine.
Overall, the Polish tax system has been remarkable in its ability to
raise tax revenue for the state without any major obstacles. With respect
to unpaid taxes, the total amount of year-end arrears averaged just
8.8 per cent of all taxes received by the state for the years 1995 to 2014.
This places Poland’s performance close to the 4–6 per cent range typical
for Canada, the United States and Australia.66 By further comparison,
from 2000 to 2002, the average amount of tax arrears in the United
States as a percentage of all taxes collected was 3.8 per cent.67
As Table 4.1 shows, for all arrears in Poland from 1995 to 2014, the
amount of tax arrears for the most part can be described as significant,
but not overwhelming. Throughout the 1990s, Poland had a moderate
level of tax arrears. Indeed, the total stock by the end of 1999 was nearly
6 per cent of all taxes collected.68 Yet Poland fell out of that range after
1999, when tax arrears increased to an average of 9.1 per cent of tax
receipts for the years 2000–2010, and the overall level of tax arrears in
relation to annual total tax receipts appears to have doubled from the
1990s figures in the more recent years 2013–2014.
The relatively low rate of Poland’s tax arrears in the 1990s does not
suggest, however, that Poland was as efficient as some of the better West-
ern countries in collecting arrears. Poland’s Ministry of Finance’s own
figure of only 28.8 per cent of all tax arrears having been realized as of
31 December 1999 suggests that overall, in more than 7 out of 10 cases,
tax arrears continued to go unpaid.69 Comparing Poland with Sweden,
for example, one finds that in 1998, while Poland had an overall 4.7 per
cent ratio of net tax arrears to tax receipts, Sweden had a 1.2 per cent
ratio of new arrears to total taxes. Moreover, of these new arrears for that
year in Sweden, 33.6 per cent were paid.70 Matching that figure up with
66 IMF, April 2002, p. 61. 67 OECD, October 2004, p. 68.
68 Ministry of Finance, March 2000, p. 36.
69 Ibid., p. 33. This is a figure of realized arrears from past years, calculated as a percentage
of income on these arrears in proportion to a general sum of all arrears from past years.
70 Swedish National Tax Board, p. 152.
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the 28.8 per cent figure suggests that Poland performs somewhat well
with respect to tracking down tax arrears. Poland’s main problem (and
Russia’s and Ukraine’s, as we shall see) is that it had more arrears to start
with than a Nordic country like Sweden, posing a greater administrative
challenge from the beginning.
Meanwhile, in Russia, the total amount of year-end arrears averaged
just 17.8 per cent of all taxes received by the state for the years 1995–
2015. Further, in Ukraine, from 1995 to 2015, the total amount of
arrears averaged 15.8 per cent of all taxes received by the State Tax
Administration (STA), placing Ukraine much closer to Russia than
Poland and other OECD states.
In general, tax arrears have been far more significant in Russia and
Ukraine than in Poland. Whereas the overall stock of total tax arrears
amounted to just under 6 per cent of all tax receipts in Poland by the
end of 1999 and the total amount of tax arrears as a percentage of a
year’s tax revenue climbed gradually to 15.2 per cent in 2014, the total
amount of tax arrears never dipped below 15 per cent of total tax income
in Russia from 1995 until 2005 or in Ukraine from 1998 to 2004. More-
over, in both Russia and Ukraine, in the late 1990s (1997–2000), the
total stock of arrears averaged from a third to half of all tax income.
Indeed, around 28 per cent of all registered legal entities in Russia had
tax arrears in 1998.71 As the IMF observed, even though the stock of
arrears in the mid- to late 1990s was reduced by high levels of infla-
tion, arrears have continued to remain high in comparison with those in
OECD countries.72 (The IMF in 1999 did place Russia’s voluntary tax
compliance rate at less than 70 per cent, in contrast to compliance rates
of about 80 per cent in the United States, 85 per cent in the European
Union and 95 per cent in the Nordic countries.73)
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the annual tax arrears for the CIT and
the VAT for the three countries. (Separate data for PIT arrears were not
available at all for Russia or for many years for Ukraine.) For all three
states, the VAT tax has proven to be the most difficult of the taxes to
collect in full. However, in Russia and Ukraine, the VAT arrears have
been gigantic, averaging 36.1 per cent from 1994 to 2015 for Russia
71 ITAR-TASS News Wire, 19 February 1998. 72 IMF, April 2002, p. 61.
73 The IMF, however, does provide a caveat to making a direct comparison of the Russian
voluntary compliance statistics, suggesting that Russian tax compliance may be even
worse than such a comparison illustrates. ‘However’, it writes, ‘in Russia compliance
rates relate only to payments of assessed taxes, and not to whether or to what extent
such assessments cover the real taxes that are legally owed under the statutes. Thus,
the 70 per cent is not directly comparable to the 80–85 per cent figure for developed
countries, which covers a much higher proportion of truly owed tax’ (Ibid., p. 63).














































Figure 4.1 Total tax arrears as a percentage of annual total tax receipts
for the corporate income tax in Poland, Russia and Ukraine
and 23.9 per cent from 1995 to 2014 for Ukraine. Yet, noticeably, the
flow of total tax arrears began to lessen somewhat gradually after the
early 2000s for all three states, suggesting either that there were fewer
additional arrears each year or that the tax administration was, perhaps,














































Figure 4.2 Total tax arrears as a percentage of annual total tax receipts
for the value-added tax in Poland, Russia and Ukraine
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Moreover, despite these tax arrears statistics, outside experts differ
with regard to what are, in fact, the actual tax collection rates in Russia.
According to the Moscow-based Economic Expert Group, an indepen-
dent group which was founded by the Ministry of Finance and which
works closely with it and the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade, the collection of VAT in the early 2000s did not exceed 62 per
cent, while outside experts at the Centre for Economic and Financial
Research and the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs
(RSPP) thought in 2003 that the VAT tax was not being collected at
more than 50 per cent.74 Moreover, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov was quoted in April 2002 as stating that the current overall
tax collection rate was 92–93 per cent, compared with 55–60 per cent in
1998.75 A year earlier, Kasyanov stated that tax collection in 2000 was
60 per cent.76 Hence, the true rate of tax collection might actually be far
lower than in the data provided by the Ministry of Finance, which shows
that levels have approached Poland’s only since 2001.
The reliability of the tax arrears data presented here for Ukraine also
could be of some concern. Unlike those for Poland and Russia, the data
for Ukraine are from three distinct sources rather than from one source
throughout the time series, and the different sources – when they do
have overlapping data – are not consistent. For example, the World Bank
provides a much higher figure for 2006 when it states that the overall tax
arrears as a share of tax revenues were 18 per cent, whereas the State
Fiscal Service provides data that yield a figure of 5.7 per cent.77 Simi-
larly, using World Bank data to derive overall tax arrears yields a figure of
6.5 per cent of all taxes collected in 1996, but using IMF data yields 10.4
per cent. As the lower figures are used to assess Ukraine’s tax arrears in
Table 4.1, it is difficult to distinguish greatly between Russia and Ukraine
with respect to the annual tax arrears averages over the entire period, but
it can be firmly concluded that both countries performed significantly
worse than Poland and the OECD states.
Tax Offsets in Russia and Ukraine
Accompanying the rise of tax arrears, especially in Russia and Ukraine,
was the phenomenon of tax offsets – that is, the cancellation of debts
between the taxpayer and the government in which negligent taxpayers
exchanged their tax debts for government arrears or payables, which cre-
ated significant damage to the administration of tax collection. The tax
74 Ivanova and Onegina. 75 Prime-TASS News, 24 April 2002.
76 Associated Press Newswires, 5 April 2001. 77 World Bank, 2011, p. 69.
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offsets, as well as the swapping of promissory notes among firms and
governments (national and local), enabled some tax officials overseeing
the arrears to overestimate the value owed, opening the door to graft
and corruption and creating an incentive for firms not to pay taxes.78
In 1997, Jennifer L. Franklin wrote that the Russian Finance Ministry
had estimated that an approximate U.S.$28.6 billion worth of tax breaks
was offered to the wealthy and politically connected in Russia each
year.79
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert M. McNab have estimated that
in the transition countries, revenues collected through offsets peaked at
around half of what was actually due from tax revenues in 1996–1998.80
Hence, the decline in Russia’s revenue in the 1990s may have been even
greater, if one were only examining cash revenues and excluding non-
cash revenues, or what are referred to as ‘cash offsets’. ‘The decline in
cash revenues at the federal level has been dramatic’, write Liam Ebrill
and Oleh Havrylyshyn at the IMF. ‘Revenues for regional governments,
including tax offsets, during the period 1993 to 1997 remained at about
22 per cent of GDP, while federal government cash revenues declined
from about 14 per cent to just over 9 per cent of GDP. This differ-
ence has less to do with fiscal-federal relations than it does with the
extensive and growing use of tax offsets by regional governments. The
precise extent to which tax offsets are used by regional governments is
not known, but they are believed to account for the bulk of revenue at
present. At the federal level, the use of such offsets, on the order of
3 per cent of GDP in 1997, is reflected in the revenue data during the
years prior to 1997.’81 Moreover, the Russian state had to accept such
tax offsets, weakening its control over spending priorities and taxpayers’
dues.82 Such regular granting of tax offsets created further expectations
that their employment would be repeated, impacting tax payment disci-
pline negatively.83
An additional problem of the 1990s was the continued use of tax
amnesties, which led to increases in tax arrears as taxpayers began to
expect that such amnesties would be offered in the future.84
Hence, from the data presented here, one can judge Poland’s tax col-
lection to be ‘moderately successful’, with some decreased success in
2012–2014, while Russia’s and Ukraine’s performance can be judged as
varying from ‘quite poor’ to ‘improving’. Throughout the transition as a
78 Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace, p. 5. See also Martinez-Vazquez and McNab,
pp. 288–289; and Gaddy and Ickes, 1998.
79 Franklin, p. 159. 80 Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, p. 289.
81 Ebrill and Havrylyshyn, pp. 4, 6. 82 Appel, 2011, pp. 28–29.
83 Highfield and Baer, p. 5. 84 Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, p. 288.
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whole, the Polish tax system has been able to raise tax revenue for the
state without any major obstacles and, at times, close to or above its tar-
get levels. It consistently is able to extract revenue from society year by
year, but it does fall short of its goals at times and has significant, though
not incapacitating arrears. Meanwhile, data from Russia and Ukraine
are more erratic. Tax collection was poor and tax arrears high through-
out the late 1990s for these countries. After 2000, tax arrears are not as
great and, by measures of the state’s intentions, tax collection rates are
up.
What accounts for Poland’s moderate success and for Russia and
Ukraine’s moderately poor results? In the rest of this chapter, after pre-
senting individual-level data on tax compliance, we will examine how the
economy can affect the changes in tax collection from year to year. Then,
in Chapters 5 and 6, we will proceed to examine how the ability to raise
revenue on the part of the Polish and Russian states depends upon a mix
of bureaucratic rationalism and social compliance.
Obtaining Individual-Level Data on Tax Compliance
‘The empirical study of tax compliance is cumbersome because
individual-level data is very difficult to collect’, Marcelo Bergman has
written. ‘Most government agencies are reluctant or legally unable to
allow research on individual tax returns. Even when such information
becomes available, it is usually impossible to create data sets that also
include individual preferences and attitudes, which are needed to explain
tax behaviour.’85
While Bergman was writing about studying tax compliance in Latin
America, nowhere more, perhaps, are his words more appropriate than
with respect to trying to obtain data from tax administrations in East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union – especially with respect to
today’s geopolitical climate and Russia. Yet, in gauging specifically how
well residents in new states such as Poland, Russia and Ukraine become
true citizens, it is necessary to measure how compliant the populace is
with respect to taxes. So is it possible to delineate exactly how willing
post-Soviet and post-socialist societies are to pay taxes?
While there is a lack of data on taxpayer compliance rates in these
three countries, results from a series of unique Taxpayer Compliance
Attitudinal Surveys designed by this author and carried out by the Cen-
trum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre)
and the PBS DDG Market Research firm in Poland, the Public Opinion
85 Bergman, p. 22.
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Table 4.2 Poland, Russia and Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal
Surveys 2004, 2005, 2010, 2012 and 2015
Question: Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?

















Yes 83 77 53 52 36 44 39 45
No 6 15 28 30 37 37 36 34
Hard to
say
10 8 19 18 27 20 25 22
Sources: Surveys conducted by Marc P. Berenson; PBS DDG Market Research, Sopot;
CBOS Public Opinion Centre, Warsaw; Public Opinion Foundation, Moscow; Razumkov
Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Kyiv.
Foundation (FOM) in Russia, and the Razumkov Centre for Economic
and Political Studies in Ukraine in 2004, 2005, 2010, 2012 and 2015 do
further illustrate how Poles, Russians and Ukrainians view paying their
dues. Questions for some of the survey questions were based on earlier
studies of tax compliance in the United States.86
Recognizing the limitations of the available tax data in providing accu-
rate estimations of tax compliance in countries with a history of barter,
high levels of black market activity and less than transparent finance
ministries and tax administrations, one of the survey questions that asks
respondents whether they ‘would follow the tax laws even if you do not
consider them to be fair’ is highlighted (see Table 4.2.)
The surveys constitute an effort to obtain a direct measure, assessed
at the individual level, of tax compliance87 in light of the fact that these
countries’ tax administrations have yet to release any direct self-reports
of individual taxpayers, such as anonymized tax returns. Indeed, it would
be very difficult to gauge whether or not respondents paid their taxes in
full and on time, short of receiving such individual-level data from the
STAs in each country. (The IRS in the United States, for example, has
periodically shared such data with academic researchers, after omitting
personally identifiable data.88)
86 See, for example, Slemrod; Roth, Scholz and Witte; and Roth and Scholz.
87 The Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys are considered a ‘direct’ measures rather
than ‘indirect’ measures with respect to tax compliance in the language of Webley et al.,
pp. 29–30.
88 Ibid., p. 31.
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Obviously, obtaining such measurements through surveys is a bit
tricky, complicated especially by the fact that this survey of a sensitive
topic, laid out more fully in the first Appendix, is the first set of sur-
vey questions designed to test tax compliance theories in these states, all
of which have a history and tradition of authoritarian rule. Moreover,
the surveys are taken at just two points in time in Poland and Russia
and four points in time in Ukraine. Further, any reforms or improve-
ments with respect to tax law or tax procedures undertaken by the state
in recent years may not have caught up in the minds of respondents as
they form their current overall attitudes towards paying taxes. In addi-
tion, while attitudinal decisions are important components of behaviour,
surveying attitudes towards compliance is not precisely the same as mea-
suring tax compliance itself.89 As no one has undertaken such a com-
prehensive survey on attitudes in these transitional countries to test
tax compliance theories, the data from the surveys are suggestive, not
definitive.
Nevertheless, asking individuals directly whether or not they pay their
taxes on time and in full is not likely to yield accurate and honest
responses in most parts of the globe. But the Taxpayer Compliance Atti-
tudinal Survey Question #22 does seek to replicate as much of a ‘real
world’ scenario as possible, one in which individuals every day do choose
to follow or not the tax laws even when they disagree with them. It is a
measure of individual attitudes towards tax compliance, and the research
to come in Chapters 6 and 7 is an examination of the links between
those attitudes that are an inherent and essential part of behavioural deci-
sions to comply or not to comply. Hence, because it presents as much
of a realistic situation as possible, one in which individuals decide for
themselves what makes for fairness in taxation or not, Question #22
is chosen as the main dependent variable for analysis in the upcoming
chapters, where the focus is on why variation exists among these three
countries.
And, indeed, the three countries do have distinctly different responses
to this question on an individual level. Whereas 83 per cent of Poles in
89 The limitations of such survey data should be underscored here: Survey data reflect
what respondents tell interviewers rather than actual compliance; hence, further
research such as individual-level data over time constructed from tax returns or audit
results would be required to make the link even more conclusively. For example, as
Roth, Scholz and Witte observe, ‘survey research has consistently found that taxpayers
who report high moral commitment to obey tax laws are unlikely to report cheating
on their taxes. However, it is not clear whether this pattern reflects actual behaviour or
merely a desire to report behaviour that is consistent with one’s proclaimed attitudes.’
Roth, Scholz and Witte, p. 8.
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2004 (and a similar 77 per cent in 2010) would follow the tax laws even
if they regarded them as unfair, only 53 per cent of Russians in 2004
(and a nearly identical 52 per cent of Russians in 2010) and 36 per cent
of Ukrainians in 2005 (and a somewhat similar 44 per cent of Ukrainians
in 2010, 39 per cent of Ukrainians in 2012 and 45 per cent of Ukraini-
ans in 2015) would do the same (Question #22). (Expressed another
way, and as shown in Appendix III, when compared with the answers to
Question #26 regarding whether or not the respondent viewed his or her
country’s tax laws as fair, in 2010, a minimum of 12 per cent of Poles, a
minimum of 21 per cent of Russians and a minimum of 37 of Ukraini-
ans did not have any intention of complying with their countries’ tax
laws.)
By design, the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys focus on
individuals rather than directly on businesses. This is in part because it
is difficult to assess the intentions of businesses with respect to tax mat-
ters without examining their tax returns – largely because it is not clear
whether one should survey accountants, employees, or executives, but
due as well to access. Nevertheless, the surveys, as general surveys of the
Polish, Russian and Ukrainian publics, presented here of course include
individuals who work in businesses. Moreover, additional questions are
included in the survey (such as Question #2 in Appendix I), which
inquire as to how respondents paid their taxes – by themselves directly,
through their employers or by other means. Individuals who pay their
own taxes are likely to have higher incomes and/or work at two or more
jobs, as opposed to those who have their employers file their taxes for
them – especially in Russia and Ukraine, which had flat personal income
taxes during the time of the surveys. In addition, one of the sociode-
mographic questions employed in the surveys asked about occupation,
with an option for those who are managers and/or entrepreneurs. Both
of these factors were considered in the analysis undertaken in Chapters 6
and 7, and as will be detailed in greater detail there, both factors were
found to have little or no impact, especially compared with the criti-
cal variables under analysis, suggesting that those who work in business
have attitudes towards the state similar to those of the populations as a
whole. Nevertheless, assessing attitudes towards tax compliance in busi-
nesses through targeted surveys aimed at firms of all sizes would yield
important and interesting data, especially as the popular Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a joint project of
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and
the World Bank, only asks a few questions regarding tax issues, and none
on tax compliance.
Table 4.3 Measurements of the unofficial economy as a percentage of GDP in selected transition countries for the early
1990s by the electricity method and for 1999–2007 by the MIMIC method
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Avg
Czech Rep. 6 7 13 17 17 18 11 19 19 19 19 19 18 18 17 17 16
Georgia 12 25 36 52 61 64 63 68 67 67 66 66 65 64 62 66 56
Hungary 27 28 33 31 29 28 29 25 25 25 25 24 24 24 24 24 27
Lithuania 12 11 22 39 32 29 22 34 34 33 33 32 32 31 30 30 28
Poland 16 20 24 20 19 15 13 28 28 28 28 28 27 27 26 26 23
Russia 12 15 24 33 37 40 42 47 46 45 45 44 43 42 42 41 37
Ukraine 12 16 26 34 38 46 49 53 52 51 51 50 49 48 47 47 42
Source: Kaufmann and Kaliberda, p. A-4. Also cited in Johnson and Kaufmann, p. 183. The measurements of the unofficial economy were
calculated from differences between reported GDP and electricity power consumption figures. Kaufmann and Kaliberda produce estimates for
1994, but not exact percentages for that year. Johnson and Kaufmann use the same methodology and baseline estimates to provide the exact
percentages for 1994 and 1995. Data for the average of 1999–2007 were derived using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause model approach by
Schneider and Williams, pp. 149–154.
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The Influence of Economic Factors
The Black Market
In the first four years of Poland’s transition (1990–1993), the share of
the unofficial economy, according to an electricity consumption esti-
mate, averaged about 20 per cent of the country’s GDP.90 In contrast,
in Russia, the average was about 38 per cent of the country’s GDP in
the first four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union (1992–1995).
Ukraine’s average was about 42 per cent over the same period. In other
words, at the very beginning of the transition, Russia and Ukraine’s black
market economies were about twice as big as Poland’s relative to the
total economies. For 1999 to 2007, utilizing Daniel Kaufman and Alek-
sander Kaliberda’s MIMIC method, the share of the unofficial economy
was found to be about 27 per cent for Poland, 44 per cent for Russia
and 50 per cent in Ukraine.91 These figures could suggest that on the
average about this much of GDP is hidden from taxation each year in
each country.92 (As a means of comparison, the underground economy
is deemed to be about 2 to 10 per cent of GNP in Western economies,
with perhaps 7 to 10 per cent being a reasonable estimate for the United
States.)93
In addition, as shown in Table 4.3, Poland had less of its economy
hidden than many other transition states. In short, the black market
economy and the non-cash (or barter) economy were much larger in
Russia and Ukraine than in Poland, massively cheating state treasuries
of needed revenue.
In addition to such cross-national data, the Gdańsk Institute for Mar-
ket Reforms found in 1994 that 29.6 per cent of those Poles surveyed
reportedly had worked on the black market. The survey also found that
about 13.8 per cent of all personal income in Poland is not registered.94
Similarly, in January 2005, CBOS reported that 13 per cent of Poles sur-
veyed stated that taxes on their salaries were not paid in full or in part to
90 Such a figure is also in line with the 20 per cent estimate for 1992 calculated by the
Research Centre for Economic and Statistical Studies of the Central Statistical Office
(GUS) and the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) as described by Szołno-Koguc,
p. 159.
91 In November 2001, former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, who was then
head of the Tax Police, told the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta that up to
40 per cent of Russia’s economy was ‘in the shadow sector’, with about U.S.$20 billion
leaving the country annually. RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly. 3 March 2004.
92 Economist Vladimir Popov, among others, has made a direct link between the increase
in the size of the black market economy during the 1990s and the decline in tax revenues
over the same period of time. See, for example, Popov, November 2004.
93 Cowell, in Webley et al., p. 4. 94 Szołno-Koguc, p. 159.
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the social security system (ZUS), whereas 87 per cent stated that their
social security taxes were paid in full.95 Hence, taking these figures as a
proxy for social compliance with respect to taxation, Poles would appear
to have complied with registering their incomes from 70 to 87 per cent
of the time after the transition began.
In contrast, in Russia, in 1994, a survey of businesses carried out by
the Working Centre for Economic Reforms under the Russian govern-
ment found that only 1.5 per cent of respondents said that they registered
all business transactions on their books, 33.1 per cent acknowledged that
they hid up to 25 per cent of transactions, 28.9 per cent stated that they
hid up to 50 per cent, and 18.4 per cent admitted to not registering up to
100 per cent of transactions.96 Assuming equal weight on the size of the
transactions reported and unreported, up to 59 per cent of all economic
activity was not reported by businesses in Russia that year.
In addition, a survey conducted by the Sociology Institute of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences four months after the introduction of the flat
rate for the PIT in 2001 found that only 48 per cent of Russians polled
in Moscow and St. Petersburg received a salary paid in full compli-
ance with the tax laws. Of those polled, 39 per cent were considered
‘grave’ tax evaders, receiving their salaries in cash in agreement with
their employers.97 In 2005, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Shatalov
reported that ‘under-the-table salaries’ make up 30 per cent of the coun-
try’s total payrolls.98
Moreover, whereas 4,700,000 individual businesspeople and
3,300,000 organizations were on the tax lists as of 1 January 2003,99 as
of that date 2.2 million companies and self-employed individuals did
not submit reports to tax authorities and about 920,000 companies and
self-employed individuals submitted zero reports – figures that suggest
that 38.5 per cent of all companies and self-employed individuals do
not pay taxes.100 In 2006, despite a decrease of 1 per cent a year in the
number of ‘grey salaries’ immediately after the flat PIT was adopted,
the figure for ‘grey salaries’ rose again to more than 32 per cent.101
Similarly, even two years after the corporate tax rates were lowered,
many firms were said still to be maintaining double account books out of
95 Wenzel, p. 7. 96 Morozov, p. 8. 97 Kuzmenka.
98 ITAR-TASS, 23 November 2005. 99 RIA Oreanda.
100 RIA Novosti, 4 April 2003. Meanwhile, the RF State Statistics Service found in
2003 that the number of Russians engaged in the unofficial economy is approximately
8.6 million, or 13 per cent of the total employed population. See Andreyev.
101 RIA Novosti, 7 March 2007.
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a fear that the new tax policies and tax rates would change yet again.102
Hence, the size of the black market economy during the transition in
Russia may well range from 32 per cent to 59 per cent in the early 2000s.
If that much of the economy is out of the domain of what is taxed, only
41 to 68 per cent of economic activity may well be reported to the tax
authorities.
In the first half of 2015, Ukraine’s Economy Ministry estimated that
42 per cent of the nation’s economy, or about US$18 billion, went
unaccounted for, and according to economist Friedrich Schnieder, since
2008, an average of 44.5 per cent of Ukraine’s GDP has not been on the
books.103 And, as shown in Table 4.3, Ukraine’s share of the black mar-
ket ranges from 34 to 53 per cent in the first decade after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, suggesting that only 49 to 66 per cent of economic
activity in the country might have been reported to the tax administra-
tion. Iuzhanina, chair of the Rada’s Tax and Customs Policy Committee,
has written that around 80 per cent of PIT is collected from government
employees’ salaries, simply because ‘it is nearly impossible to dodge the
tax on government wages’, while the private sector ‘chooses to pay its
workers under the table to avoid the tax altogether’.104
If, indeed, the unofficial economies are this large and the tax dec-
laration rates were 70 to 87 per cent for Poland, 41 to 63 per cent
for Russia and 49 to 66 per cent for Ukraine, it would appear that
the tax arrears figures reported by the three state’s tax administrations
should have been much larger. The fact that they are not suggests
that these post-communist governments are neither able nor willing to
reach out and uncover all of the income derived from unreported eco-
nomic activity, and they are not considering such income when deriv-
ing estimates for real amounts of tax due. And, because the size of
the black market economy is greater in Russia and Ukraine than in
Poland, the ability or willingness of the Russian and Ukrainian state tax
organs to capture all economic activity taking place within state borders
is less.
102 Interview with lawyer at Moscow office of international legal firm, Moscow, 7 August
2003. Moreover, in Russia, there are many different ingenious schemes employers use
in order to pay little or no tax on their employees’ salaries. In one scheme, invented
by local banks, money is put on deposit in a bank and earns extraordinary high
rates of interest, which is used as salary, and is therefore taxed at a lower rate. In
another scheme, employees receive life insurance payments as salary. (Head Law Part-
ner, Moscow office of one of the Big Four international accounting firms, Moscow,
28 July 2003.)
103 Rachkevych. 104 Iuzhanina.
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The Barter Economy
A main underlying factor fuelling the unofficial economy is, of course,
the use of barter between firms in the post-communist economies.
Barter, especially as a form of payment in Russia’s and Ukraine’s regions,
in many ways was a holdover from the Soviet system, in which com-
mands and orders, rather than money, were what was needed to get
things done. From the beginning of the transition, there was a rela-
tive scarcity of money in the Russian economy due ‘to both the lack
of the very concept itself in the socialist planning system and to the
consequence of the drastic devaluation of the working capital of enter-
prises after the price liberalization of 1992’.105 David Woodruff’s Money
Unmade and Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes’s Russia’s Virtual
Economy detail precisely how the Russian state struggled as it sought
to root out barter and make money supreme again in the 1990s. The
authors also lay out precisely how political conflicts ensued between, on
the one hand, bank-led industrial groups and large firms, like Gazprom,
which stood to benefit from a monetary-based economy and for which
evading taxes had greater risks, and, on the other hand, local coalitions
in the regions, which benefited from barter and which included newly
created firms that had unaccounted cash sales and that resorted to tax
evasion.106
For those that engaged in the barter economy, there were multiple rea-
sons. Barter, or transactions by regional governments, banks or enter-
prises through the use of promissory notes (or veksels), write Shleifer
and Treisman, ‘was a way of avoiding holding cash in bank accounts that
could be confiscated by tax collectors if taxes went unpaid. It was also
a way of getting around a law that prohibited selling below cost – prices
could be artificially manipulated in a barter deal. In addition, paying
taxes in kind rather than in cash was a way to favour the regional and
local over the federal budgets, since accepting tax payments in concrete
or cucumbers was easier for a city government than for the State Tax
Service in Moscow.’107 In Ukraine, the share of the barter economy was
said to be over 35 per cent of GDP in 1994 and more than 40 per cent
of GDP in 1997–1998.108
Without a doubt, the barter economy has played a strong role in the
story of post-communist tax collection – not just because part of the
economy was hidden through barter activity, but also because the tax
105 Iakovlev, p. 82.
106 Woodruff; Gaddy and Ickes, 2002; see also Gaddy and Ickes, 1998, and Iakovlev,
p. 82.
107 Shleifer and Treisman, p. 97. 108 Luzik, p. 7.
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authorities also engaged in barter by collecting tax debts partly in the
form of nonmonetary, in-kind transactions. The rise of barter made col-
lecting taxes complicated, especially at the federal level in contrast to
the local level, where fiscal responsibilities could be conceived in less
monetary terms. ‘The builders of the Soviet economy’, writes Woodruff,
‘had “hardwired” the ability to tax particular economic actors in kind
into the very social infrastructure of Russia.’109 As a result, local govern-
ments and later the federal government began to accept in-kind taxation.
Woodruff calculates that by 1996 approximately 60 per cent of local tax
receipts were in kind, and at the federal level, the share of tax income
that was nonmonetary was about 19 per cent in 1995, 33 per cent in
1996 and 40 per cent in 1997.110
While the phenomenon of in-kind taxation appears to have been in
decline after 2000 – certainly after Russia’s 2001 tax reform – and while
this author did not encounter any reports of nonmonetary taxation after
his research began in the early 2000s, the fact that the size of the unoffi-
cial economies still has remained substantial in subsequent years implies
that in-kind taxation could well continue in some form to this day. ‘[I]t is
important to note that Russia widely uses nonmonetary taxation where
federal, regional or local authorities invite a company to participate or
invest in some sort of project where it is implicitly understood that the
company will not show a profit’, writes Mikhail Glazunov. ‘Using non-
monetary taxation gives authorities additional opportunities for realiza-
tion of important projects without dipping into the official budget, as
well as developing opportunities for the personal enrichment of mem-
bers of the authorities.’111 Hence, as the post-transition period marches
on, the forms in-kind taxation takes may well be more discreet and hid-
den than they were in the 1990s.
The Economic Explanation
Unexpected declines in economic growth are important factors in ana-
lyzing why certain tax collection goals, placed in the budget law in
August or the early fall of the previous year, may not be met. For Poland,
the tax revenues, which were higher than forecast in the budget laws for
the years up to 1998, could be viewed, for example, as being largely due
to the higher-than-expected inflation in those years,112 suggesting that
the above-perfect or near-perfect tax performance compared with the
109 Woodruff, p. 114. 110 Ibid., pp. 2, 166–167. 111 Glazunov, pp. 158–159.
112 Author’s interview with Marek Trosiński, Vice-Director, Department of the State Bud-
get, NIK, Warsaw, 8 November 2001.
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Figure 4.3 Overall tax collected as a percentage of all taxes due and
annual GDP growth, Poland
budget was based on a devaluation of money over the course of the year.
Meanwhile, in Russia, the improvement in tax collection in the 2000s
could be due to a rebound in the overall economy and to higher-than-
expected world oil prices.
To understand better the relationship between the economy and tax
collection, Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 depict comparisons of the annual rate
of GDP growth with taxes collected by the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian
states, respectively, as a percentage of all taxes due113. Overall, in com-
paring macroeconomic statistics with aggregate tax data, there are times
when there is a general direct correlation between the rise and fall of
tax income and the rise and fall of the overall general economy over the
course of the post-transition period in all three states. The amount of tax
arrears appears to rise and fall with GDP growth but not approaching a
direct correlation. For Poland, in Figure 4.3, the percentage of taxes col-
lected decreases as the GDP falls, roughly from 1997 to 2002, but after
that, the rise and fall of taxes and the GDP do not seem to be in a clear,
113 This is calculated by taking 100 per cent minus the percentage of tax arrears collected,
which is shown in Table 4.1. Utilizing tax data formulated from tax arrears information
as a comparison to economic growth statistics is preferable to comparing a country’s
GDP with the amount of taxes collected as a percentage of GDP to discern more
clearly the tax–economy relationship.










































































Figure 4.4 Overall tax collected as a percentage of all taxes due and




































































Figure 4.5 Overall tax collected as a percentage of all taxes due and
annual GDP growth, Ukraine
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direct relationship. Similarly, for Russia, in Figure 4.4 the percentage of
taxes collected rises with economic growth from 1998 to 2000, but also
continues to rise since then even though the economy sees declines. And,
for Ukraine, in Figure 4.5, there appears to be a correlation from 1997
to 2003, but the percentage of taxes collected continues to rise after
2007 despite economic declines. Hence, there are years in each graph
where the tax measures rise but the macroeconomic measures fall and
vice versa. Further, the rates at which the tax revenue rises or falls from
year to year do not seem to correlate exactly with those of the economy.
Nevertheless, the trend is there, suggesting that the general state of the
economy is a major factor in tax revenue outcomes.
In Poland, such a correlation between the health of the economy
and tax collection was noted by both the Ministry of Finance and
the Supreme Audit Chamber (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, or NIK.) With
respect to tax arrears in the 1995–1999 period, the Ministry of Finance
lists a few critical reasons, including the difficult transformation of state
sector enterprises at the beginning of the 1990s and the lack of restruc-
turing of certain branches of industry.114 In particular, the Ministry of
Finance attributes the growth in arrears from 1998 to 1999 to four
sectors of the economy that have yet to be restructured, namely the
hard coal industry, the defence industry, the steel industry and light
industry.115
NIK in its annual reports on the budget tends to concur with the Min-
istry of Finance on the rationale for such large arrears. Back in 1992,
NIK mentioned that a sizeable portion of tax arrears were from many
large state-owned firms,116 and its 1993 report on the budget even goes
as far as listing the top 20 firms in Poland with the most tax arrears and
the amounts owed.117 Its 1999 budget report also cites the growth in
VAT arrears as being due to the coal and mining industries.118
As the Russian economist Vladimir Popov (and several others) has
pointed out, from 1990 to 1998, the Russian government’s share of rev-
enues and expenditures, in real terms, decreased dramatically by two-
thirds in comparison with the Soviet days, and, as a percentage of GDP,
was cut in half, even while the GDP itself fell by nearly 50 per cent.119
While a great deal of this can be attributed to the financial crisis of
August 1998, as the collection of income and profits taxes hit the lowest
levels in 1998 and 1999, the decline, again at least for direct taxes, began
much earlier in the 1990s.
114 Ministry of Finance, March 2000, p. 8. 115 Ibid., p. 16.
116 NIK, July 1993, p. 32. 117 NIK, July 1994, pp. 29–30.
118 NIK, June 2000, p. 57. 119 Popov, November 2004.
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While budget projections, which are adopted by the Sejm in Poland,
by the State Duma in Russia and by the Rada in Ukraine at the beginning
of each year, are based on analysis of expected inflation and expected
economic conditions, a change in inflation, economic growth or, in the
case of Russia, oil prices from that which is expected can impact the
amount of tax revenue actually collected. For example, in Poland, 2001
data show a decline in taxation from expected amounts, reflecting the
downward change in the Polish economy during that year. In its report
on the fulfilment of the 2001 budget, NIK states that ‘a significant part
of the difference (about 50 per cent), between the planned and factu-
ally realized income of the budget of the state, can be explained by the
non-performance of macroeconomic indicators adopted for the budget,
that is a low pace of economic growth and a faster than expected growth
of unemployment.’120 But NIK comments that part of the blame for the
poor 2001 budget figures was due to a failure in drawing up those projec-
tions to begin with. ‘However’, NIK writes, ‘it’s necessary to attribute the
remaining amount of unrealized income . . . to an overassessment of the
results of systemic changes as well as to the infeasibility of the assumed
tax collection indicators.’ In short, NIK concludes that ‘during the draft-
ing of the 2001 Budget Law, a serious planning error was committed’.121
Measurements of the overall health of the economy do help to explain
the variation from year to year of the collection of taxes. It is clear that
the fluctuations in the economy, often unexpected, have affected the rise
and fall of tax revenue in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, as they would in
any state. Moreover, for example, when the economic conditions wors-
ened comparatively for Poland in the late 1990s (as Poland’s remarkably
high growth rate eased off), higher-than-actual rates of growth were still
utilized in the forecasting of the planned tax revenue, which was con-
ducted annually in the early fall of the previous year, leading to lower-
than-expected levels of tax returns. In short, because economic forecast
data were used in the planning of tax revenue each year, one should not
be surprised to see such a correlation, especially in comparison with the
forecasts made in each year’s original budget law.
However, even if we grant that a lot of the impact is economic, the
relationship is not as straightforward, since receiving more income cre-
ates more opportunities to hide it and opportunities to choose not to
comply, causing tax arrears to go up. And, even if Figures 4.3, 4.4 and
4.5 were to show direct relationships between taxes collected and GDP
(which they do not), the correlation between the overall health of the
120 NIK, June 2002, p. 38. Translation from the Polish by the author.
121 Ibid., p. 38.
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economy and the tax revenue levels does not undermine the role of
other factors that enable the bureaucracy to extract revenue from soci-
ety. In fact, the ability of a country’s tax administration to oversee the
collection of revenue depends on more than pure economic factors. As
will be argued in the next three chapters, the moderate success of tax
collection in Poland and the relatively poorer performance in collecting
revenue in Russia and Ukraine in the first decades after communism
depend upon institutional factors within the state and within society,
namely a mix of bureaucratic rationalism on the part of the state and
social compliance on the part of the society. Moreover, with respect to
the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys, the responses to Question
#22 were quite similar for each country across the different years of the
surveys, even though there was significant variation in the level of eco-
nomic growth across the survey years in the three countries. This fur-
ther suggests that while economic growth matters, other factors are at
play – especially in explaining individual-level attitudes towards paying
taxes.
The Impact of Tax Rates
Similarly to economic factors, tax collection also relates to changes in tax
rates and in tax structure design. One of the most discussed tax policy
changes in Central and Eastern Europe since 2000 has been the adop-
tion of the flat tax – especially the adoption of a flat, or single-rate, per-
sonal income tax for all taxpayers in at least a dozen countries, including
Russia in 2001 and Ukraine in 2003, but not Poland. The impact of the
flat tax, especially in Russia, on tax collection especially has been ques-
tioned within the literature, although Ukraine changed to the same flat
rate two years later as well. As part of a package of tax reforms passed
in 2000, Russia introduced a flat 13 per cent personal income tax (PIT)
rate, which replaced the earlier 12, 20 and 30 per cent tiered rates. The
following year, the revenues from PIT increased 46 per cent in nominal
and 26 per cent in real terms, from 2.4 per cent to 2.9 per cent of GDP.
PIT revenues increased another 3.3 per cent in the following year.122 Of
the over a dozen countries that adopted the flat tax in the region, Appel
has stated that IMF calculations in 2006 showed only Latvia, Lithua-
nia and Russia to have seen an increase in revenue in the year following
adoption.123
While some have claimed that the increases in tax collection in 2001
and 2002 were due to the lowering of tax rates, particularly with the
122 Papp and Takáts, p. 3. 123 Appel, 2011, p. 86.
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introduction of a flat personal income tax rate,124 it is very unclear
whether the increases in income tax collection in Russia were mainly due
to tax rate reduction. The IMF has stated that the increase was caused
by the expansion of the tax base, tightening control over tax minimiza-
tion schemes, primarily insurance schemes, high global oil prices and
real growth in incomes.125 In addition, the IMF also has observed that
in 2001 tax performance ‘exceeded expectations across the board, even
more so for taxes other than the PIT’.126
Vahram Stepanyan at the IMF, moreover, has written that ‘there seems
to be little evidence of a substantial improvement in personal income
tax revenues that resulted simply from a reduction in the top marginal
tax rates’.127 He points out that PIT revenues did in fact increase from
the year 2000 to the year 2001, but only from 2.5 to 2.6 per cent of
GDP. Moreover, he also points to changes in revenue sharing agreements
between the federal and local governments that might have given the
local governments more of an incentive to enforce PIT administration
better.128
Mikhail Pryadilnikov and Elena Danilova write that the increase in
tax revenue in the immediate years after the 2000 tax reforms was due
to a combination of reforms and factors, and not to the rate changes
alone. Accompanying changes to the Tax Code, rates and tax adminis-
tration structure, they write that ‘the Tax Service began a rapid effort
to expand the registration of individual taxpayers. It rolled out its plans
in a massive advertising campaign filling every Russian town with bill-
boards explaining the importance of paying taxes on time. The agency
also offered amnesty to individual taxpayers and expanded its staff to
cover the anticipated increase in individual declarations. These initial
efforts worked.’129 Appel also concurs that the flat tax was part of a
broader series of reforms. ‘At the same time as the flat tax took effect,
the Russian government issued taxpayer identification numbers, elimi-
nated ceilings for overdue taxes, increased significantly the legal author-
ity of the tax administration, and bolstered the state apparatus’, she
writes. ‘Social insurance taxes were lowered, and there were changes
to corporate taxes and later energy taxes . . . Given the simultaneity of
reforms, scholars have found it nearly impossible to calculate the effect
of the flat tax on revenue or growth.’130 Moreover, Alexeev and Conrad
124 The Wall Street Journal, 11 July 2003; The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2002;
and Katzeff.
125 Novecon, 6 March 2003; and What the Paper Say (WPS): The Russian Business Mon-
itor, 10 February 2003.
126 IMF, April 2002, p. 72. 127 Stepanyan, pp. 22–23. 128 Ibid., p. 17.
129 Pryadilnikov and Danilova, p. 34. 130 Appel, 2011, pp. 85–86.
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conclude that after the initial improvements in the immediate years
following 2000–2001, ‘the situation has deteriorated considerably a
few years later, particularly in terms of tax administration’131 and that
the 2000 tax reforms ‘had only marginal effects on tax effort and
perceptions’.132
To sort through the impact of the flat tax rate, particularly in light of
the overall 2000 package of tax reforms, Anna Ivanova, Michael Keen
and Alexander Klemm undertake several statistical analyses to deter-
mine whether the increased tax revenue was a consequence of the tax
rate changes themselves, only to find that it is unclear whether the
increased compliance came from the reforms themselves or the meth-
ods of enforcement.133 Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez and Peter
(2009), however, find that lowering tax rates can, in some situations,
reduce the level of tax evasion, using indirect methods to measure tax
evasion, but that the Russian flat tax did not lead to much of an increase
in economic productivity on the supply side.134 Appel has argued that
‘Certainly a large portion of growth in GDP and income tax revenues
can be traced to the surge in gas and oil prices. For example, speak-
ing to the efficacy of the Russian tax reform, the IMF’s representative
in Moscow attributed 80 per cent of the increase in Russian revenues
in 2001 to the strength of the oil and gas sector.’135 Hence, the data
and findings on whether the flat tax rate led to increased tax compliance
are mixed and still up for debate, largely because of other factors and
reforms that took place simultaneously.
Yet, if changing marginal rates were to have an effect on compliance,
one would expect at the individual level that attitudes towards compli-
ance would be responsive to the lowering of rates. Yew, Milanov and
Gee find in their study over a three-year period that the major changes
in Russia’s tax structure in 2001 did not impact individual tax morale.136
But, how sensitive are attitudes on tax compliance to tax rates? The
2010 and 2015 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys help pro-
vide an answer by asking questions regarding how Poles, Russians and
Ukrainians perceive tax rates. First, being reactive to low or high rates
requires that one know exactly what the rate is. In 2010, in Poland,
of those who knew the personal income tax rate (see Question #36 in
Appendix I), only 6 respondents stated that they would not obey a tax
law even if they thought it was unfair (Question #22), while 72 stated
that they would – that is, 92 per cent of those who knew the tax rate
131 Alexeev and Conrad, p. 246. 132 Ibid., p. 1. 133 Ivanova, Keen and Klemm.
134 Alexeev and Conrad, p. 247. 135 Appel, 2011, p. 86.
136 Yew, Milanov and McGee, p. 72.
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stated that they would comply with tax laws, much higher than for the
general population as a whole (77 per cent). That same year in Russia,
46 per cent (or 1160 respondents) knew their personal income tax rates,
and 750 (or 65 per cent) of them stated that they would obey a tax law
even if it were considered personally unfair – a figure higher than the 52
per cent who stated in Question #22 that they would obey. Further, in
Ukraine, in 2010, of those who knew the correct personal income tax
rate, 220, or 62 per cent, stated that they would obey tax laws even if
they found them to be unfair; and in 2015, 249, or 57 per cent, stated
the same. Hence, if being sensitive to the tax rates requires individuals to
know what those tax rates currently are, then the data from these surveys
suggest that those who do know are quite supportive of complying with
the law, regardless of the rate.
In addition, the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys also inquire
whether respondents are supportive of lowering the tax rates (see
Question #38 in Appendix I). If lowering tax rates is to have an impact
on tax compliance, then, presumably, those who supported lowering the
rates for the personal income tax (as opposed to increasing, modifying
or cancelling outright the PIT) would be less likely to support obey-
ing tax laws even if they disagreed with them. In 2010, in Poland, of
those who supported lowering the PIT, 777 respondents, or 85 per cent,
said they would obey – a bit higher than the 77 per cent who answered
Question #22 directly. In Russia the same year, 553 respondents, or
58 per cent of those who called for lowering the PIT rate, stated that
they would obey – higher as well. And, in Ukraine, of those who wanted
to lower the PIT rate, 851 respondents, or 56 per cent, in 2010, and
987 respondents, or 57 per cent, in 2015, stated that they would obey
tax laws regardless as to whether they perceived them as unfair – again,
figures that are higher than when survey respondents were asked about
their attitudes towards compliance outright. Hence, from these surveys,
there is no evidence to suggest that those who either knew their tax rates
or wanted them lowered were more supportive of being non-compliant
then the general population as a whole; in fact, the opposite appears to be
true.
Finally, even if lowering tax rates makes taxpayers comply more
because they recognize that their obligations are cheaper and that the
state recognizes a need for them to retain more of their income, no state
can, of course, continuously decrease rates to bring in more taxpayers
and revenue. At some point, there is a limit to how low taxes can go,
and to improve tax collection, other factors – including especially those
focused on the tax administration and its procedures and behaviours –
matter greatly.
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In spite all of the variation in tax rates, tax policies, tax laws and
economies over the past two and a half decades, or perhaps in part
because of all of the rapid changes taking place in transition societies,
an environment of instability was created for both taxpayers and the tax
administration, producing uncertainty and inefficacy in fulfilling their
respective tasks. Reforming the tax regimes and adopting new laws may
have been easier than building and reforming the new tax administra-
tions. Yet, for some transition states, such as Russia and Ukraine, an
insufficient amount of the latter may be causing greater problems for the
tax system. ‘[T]he way tax inspectors interact with taxpayers needs to
be reformed far more than taxes per se or tax rates’, reported Ukrainian
Week. ‘This, in fact, is the most complicated aspect of reforms and the
most challenging task facing Ukraine’s reformers. In order to attain a
balance that would prevent individual tax officials from interpreting leg-
islation as they please, to demand a bribe or to power trip, while taxpay-
ers get to pay a fair rate, the system needs to be changed from within.’137
Moving forward, the next chapter will begin to unpack the understud-
ied tax administrations, while Chapters 6 and 7 will look more carefully
at the impact of different approaches by the tax state to taxpayers at the
individual level.
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5 Building Trust, Instilling Fear
Tax Administration Reform
‘The tax administration must be constructed practically from the
ground up, yet there is a legacy of distrust of the state that will hamper
the creation of any tax system.’1
– Barry W. Ickes and Joel Slemrod, 1991
Why has Poland been able to perform much better at ensuring tax com-
pliance than Russia and Ukraine since the early 1990s? The answer is
due in great part to a partial level of bureaucratic rationalism that exists
within Poland’s tax organs. Polish efforts at administrative reform within
the tax service have focused on rationalizing the function and duties
of tax officials in a Weberian sense. In contrast, Russia has designed
a tax administration that is consistent with Anton Oleinik’s concept of
‘power in a pure form’, or, more generally, ‘power over’.2 That is, Rus-
sia’s tax bureaucracies lean towards securing their own power ‘over’ soci-
ety through their tax collection mechanisms. The tax agencies thus seek
‘power as an end in itself’ rather than focusing on rationalizing their
function and roles in order to build a more constructive state–society
relationship, built on trust and fairness, that will better serve the state
in the long run. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s tax bureaucracies also seek to
empower the state ‘as an end in itself’, but do so in a weaker manner
than their Russian counterparts, instilling less fear and less trust of their
state in Ukrainian taxpayers.
Efforts to reform the tax administrative system in Poland and Rus-
sia, therefore, have different goals in mind – one Weberian rationalism
and the other empowerment of the state over society. Polish reforms
have sought to rationalize the tax bureaucracy by focusing on institu-
tional design and by reducing the ability of bureaucrats to function with
undue discretion. Meanwhile, in Russia, the implementation of reforms
designed to make the tax administration more ‘rational’ in a Weberian
sense often fails to shift the course of the state’s goal of seeking power for
1 Ickes and Slemrod, p. 396. 2 Oleinik.
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itself, especially at the expense of society at large. Fewer comprehensive
reforms also have occurred in Ukraine’s tax structures.
Poland’s moderately successful level of taxation is due in great part
to a partial level of bureaucratic rationalism in the Weberian sense that
exists within the tax administration structures. In Chapter 3, Poland’s,
Russia’s and Ukraine’s administrative histories were analyzed, emphasiz-
ing in particular that the interwar period served as a pre-existing histori-
cal template for Poland’s later public institutions, whereas the historical
template for Russia’s current leadership appears to be the tight hierar-
chy of the Soviet Union’s military and law enforcement organizations.
Lacking a unified vision of the past, Ukraine’s leaders, meanwhile, opted
instead for continuing with a Soviet-inspired bureaucratic and patrimo-
nial welfare state (Historical References).
This chapter will show that structures and human and technological
resources, together with historical reference points, all combine to pro-
duce mixed bureaucratic rationalism on the part of the tax administra-
tion in Poland and moderately low, but improving bureaucratic rational-
ism on the part of Russia’s and Ukraine’s tax administrations. First, the
tax administrative structures are examined to show that the structural
design in Poland provides a significant number of checks and balances,
while the imperfect coordination between two branches of the tax admin-
istration in Poland, the partial adoption of major administrative reforms
in Russia and the lack of such administrative reforms in Ukraine means
that all three systems probably have not been designed in their most effi-
cient configuration (Structures).
Second, the training and planning on the part of the tax administra-
tion in introducing the new taxes in Poland show that its system is more
consumer-oriented, more compliance-driven, and less target-driven than
Russia’s and Ukraine’s. By building a more compliance-driven system,
tax collectors in Poland are less focused on reaching a monetary target
than their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts – a philosophy that treats
taxpayers more like clients. By contrast, a more collection target (plan)-
driven system, such as in Russia and Ukraine, makes the focus for tax
inspectors not ensuring compliance with tax laws, but merely trying to
fulfil quarterly or yearly targets (often to get financial bonuses), by going
after those taxpayers who have already paid, as more revenue can be
obtained from those known to have it. Such a system, by design, does
not require tax bureaucrats to seek out those who have failed to comply
altogether (Human Resources and Work Philosophy).
Third, the reforms in the hiring practices are shown to have been
more helpful in Poland than in Russia and Ukraine, but not sufficient
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for improving the quality of the tax administration personnel in any
country (human resources). Finally, the existence of certain structural
constraints in Poland is examined as being more beneficial than those
in Russia and Ukraine in the prevention of corruption (structures).
Rationalizing or Empowering Bureaucrats?
Rationalizing the State Bureaucracy: The Weberian Option
With respect to Max Weber’s characteristics of bureaucracies, Michael
Mann has stated that ‘Bureaucratic offices are organized within depart-
ments, each of which is centralized and embodies a functional divi-
sion of labour; departments are integrated into a single overall admin-
istration, also embodying functional division of labour and centralized
hierarchy.’3 Mann also has identified autonomous state power as relat-
ing to enhanced territorial centralization, a concept central to state
capacity.4 In short, for Mann and for Weber, being able to implement
certain tasks requires a state structure imbued with a certain amount of
autonomy, so that fairly consistent rules can be applied without undue
and incapacitating interference from outside groups.
The administrative reforms in the Polish tax system have sought to
‘rationalize’ the role of state bureaucrats and to limit the degree of dis-
cretion afforded to tax officials in order to constrain corruption. The
structures and the human resources provided, together with the use
of historical reference points, combine to produce mixed bureaucratic
rationalism on the part of the tax administration in Poland. It is the
appropriate choice and application of past institutional models – a struc-
tural design infused with flexibility and constraints and the availability
of personnel trained and capable – that enables the Polish tax system
to function well in implementing its policy goals. That being so, the tax
bureaucracy is more capable of building a healthy relationship with the
public, enabling long-term goals to be accomplished.
Empowering the State Bureaucracy: The ‘Power in a
Pure Form’ Option
In applying Oleinik’s concept of ‘power in a pure form’ to Russia
today, the descriptions of Valeri G. Ledyaev, who argues that President
3 Mann, 1993, p. 444. 4 Mann, 1986, p. 135.
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Vladimir Putin’s regime is one of ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’, and
of Oxana V. Gaman-Golutvina, who finds that the bureaucracy today
is even farther from the Weberian ideals than it was under the Soviet
Union, are quite apt.5 For Ledyaev, the application of the concept of
the ‘power vertical’ through administrative and bureaucratic mechanisms
enables the state to expand its control over society. Similarly, Gaman-
Golutvina argues that widespread patronage, lack of transparency and
low levels of public sector discipline, alongside extremely high levels of
corruption, have enabled Russia’s administrative apparatus to operate
as its own business group at the expense of society, particularly outside
business sectors. The significant lack of ‘Weberianness’ in the bureau-
cracy, which has led to the rise of a bureaucratic authoritarian state, can
be seen both in the state administrative organs as a whole and specifically
in the tax agencies.
With respect to the tax administration, not only have the reforms in
this sector not led to substantial improvements on the Weberian scale,
but also the tax administration itself has become a primary tool of the
bureaucratic authoritarian state – through its day-to-day contact with
the public as well as more specific and targeted political use of the
tax bureaucracy. As will be shown below, in contrast to the processes
in Poland, the administrative reforms in the Russian tax system have
brought about the ‘empowerment’ of the state, by increasing the state’s
ability to impose its control over society, while failing to limit the degree
of discretion afforded to tax officials. The task of building a healthier
relationship with the public simply does not exist for the Russian tax
administration.
Indeed, in the 2011 Russian Public Officials Survey, 22 per cent of
tax officials stated that if an enterprise were to fulfil all the demands
of the tax organs, it would be ruined – that is, nearly one in four tax
bureaucrats recognized that their system is excessive (see Appendix II,
Question #2). (A similarly asked question found in 2001 that 58 per
cent of Moscow tax inspectors and 52 per cent of Nizhniy Novgorod tax
inspectors agreed that if enterprises paid all taxes they would have gone
bankrupt a long time ago.6)
An analogous tax administration design, accompanied by fewer
administrative reforms, for the Ukrainian tax system has brought less
control over society than in Russia while failing to eliminate tax bureau-
crat discretion.
5 Ledyaev; Gaman-Golutvina. 6 Pryadilnikov and Danilova, p. 27.
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Administrative Reform in the Context of the Tax Service:
Towards Rationalization or Empowerment of the State
Poland’s Tax Administration Structure
The history of how Poland’s tax administration was constructed mir-
rors the history of Poland itself – with alternating organizational
structures that reach back to the inter-war period. The origins of some of
today’s tax agencies trace back to the beginning of the Second Republic,
when the Ministry of the Treasury was formed in 1919 with an internal
structure similar to the Austrian example and was staffed by bureaucrats
from the former Austrian territory. Similarly to today, tax chambers (izby
skarbowe) and tax offices (urzędy skarbowe) were placed in charge of the
collection of taxes, which included a personal income tax (PIT). After
the Second World War, the tax offices and tax chambers returned until
1950, when they were liquidated,7 and then, in 1983, they reappeared
as subordinates to the Ministry of Finance.8 That structure remained in
place from the beginning of the transition until 1992, when the Sejm
(the lower house of the Polish parliament) created the tax audit offices
(urzędy kontroli skarbowe) and divided up the audit function.
In contrast to countries such as Russia and Ukraine in the late 1990s
and the early part of the 2000s, the tax administration is not a separate
entity, but is headed by the Ministry of Finance, an institution that has
achieved a ‘comparable level of autonomy’ with respect to the parliament
and government and whose powers in the budgeting process gives it ‘far-
reaching control over government policy’.9 Throughout the 1990s, there
were 355 tax offices across Poland, collecting more than 85 per cent
of the income of the state’s budget.10 The tax offices in each province
(wojewódstwo) are subordinate to a tax chamber. Tax chambers and tax
audit offices both number one per province and are subordinated directly
to the Ministry of Finance. Unlike the case in other parts of the former
communist bloc, the tax offices in Poland do not depend upon the local
government, by law or in practice, which provides the system with a
degree of consolidation.
After the territorial reform of January 1999, the numbers of tax cham-
bers and tax audit offices were reduced from 49 to 16 each, reflecting the
reduction in the number of provinces. In 2000, the 16 tax audit offices
7 Author’s interview with Tax Office Head, Warsaw, 20 November 2001.
8 Author’s interview with Tax Chamber Director, Warsaw, 15 November 2001.
9 Kamiński, 1997, p. 110; and Goetz and Wollmann, pp. 874–875.
10 NIK, October 1994, p. 3.
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(also referred to as ‘fiscal control offices’) employed 8,501 people, the
16 tax chambers employed 4,147 employees, and the 355 tax offices was
staffed by 37,475 people.11 The last figure is almost double that of the
19,310 workers employed in 1991 by the then 320 tax offices.12 The
growth in staff can be attributed in part to the introduction of the new
taxes.
In 2015, in addition to the 16 tax audit offices, there were 16 tax
chambers, 380 tax offices, 20 large (specialized) taxpayer offices, six
National Information Offices that issue individual rulings and tax law
advice via call centres, and a Tax Information Exchange Office that
specializes in exchanging tax information with EU member states and
other countries.13 In 2013, over 39,000 were employed in the tax offices
and over 3,780 were employed in the tax chambers; tax administration
employees compose 35.3 per cent of all civil servants in the country.14
The actual collection of taxes appears to be a very routine proce-
dure. Most taxpayers file a declaration and pay taxes such as the PIT by
themselves. (The social security office known as the Zakład Ubezpieczeń
Społecznych, or ZUS, also provides some assistance to the collection
process by automatically deducting taxes from pensions. Approximately
20 per cent of those surveyed in 2000, 2001 and 2002 had their tax
returns filed for them by their place of employment or by ZUS.15) If
a taxpayer does not pay on time, he or she is given seven days to pay,
after which a ‘title of seizure’ is issued. (In the mid-1990s, the Supreme
Audit Chamber (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, or NIK), however, found sig-
nificant delays in issuing such ‘titles of seizure’ among the tax offices it
surveyed.16) Perhaps thanks to the ease of processing one’s tax return,
the tax office in one 1999 public opinion poll was viewed favourably by
half of the respondents – the highest among public institutions in that
survey.17 (In contrast, in 2001, businessmen in Russia were asked to rate
their attitude toward a variety of characters with whom they have to deal.
Tax inspectors and tax policemen were given the least positive appraisals
on the list, with the exception of a ‘bandit’.18)
In addition to registering and collecting taxes from all taxpayers, tax
offices usually conduct audits of taxpayers with little tax due. Tax audit
offices audit taxpayers (usually large firms) with significant liabilities.
Appeals from the initial audits of both the tax offices and the tax control
offices are made to the tax chambers. From there, a second appeal can be
11 Ministry of Finance, September 2000, p. 12. 12 NIK, April 1993, p. 3.
13 Ministry of Finance, 2014, p. 8. 14 Ibid., p. 12. 15 CBOS, May 2002.
16 NIK, May 1997, p. 4. 17 Wrobel.
18 INDEM Foundation, Part 4, pp. 23–24.
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made to the Chief Administrative Court (NSA), which judges whether
the tax chamber has infringed a law or ordinance. Hence, the tax offices
and tax audit offices are known as offices of ‘first instance’, while the
tax chambers are referred to as offices of ‘second instance’, a concept of
Polish administrative law that dates back to the inter-war regime.19
Informal cooperation does exist between the heads of the tax cham-
bers and the tax audit offices, but owing to the unique structural
arrangement between the two organizations, some incongruence, lack
of coordination, and lack of sharing of information on audited economic
entities does arise – a phenomenon that Poland’s NIK has noted on sev-
eral occasions.20 While the tax chambers supervise the tax offices, they
do not supervise the tax audit offices, from which they receive cases.
This situation was characterized by a vice-director at a tax chamber as ‘a
strange formation, [by which] the tax chamber does not possess control
over the tax audit office and can not issue to it a decision whereas the tax
chamber can give its records directly to a tax office for review’.21 The tax
audit offices, which act as a form of tax police, are distinguished in that,
unlike a regular tax office, the inspector functions as an organizational
unit himself, empowered to make decisions on his own. Hence, employ-
ees of the tax chamber can have direct contact with individual tax audit
office inspectors on cases, but they do not have direct contact with the
entire tax audit office.
In addition, the tax audit offices also have a different timeline for the
appeals process. At the tax office, a taxpayer has twenty-one days to make
an appeal, whereas this period is only three days at the tax audit office.
‘Whether a taxpayer has three or twenty-one days for appeal is at times
in general not important’, commented the vice-director, ‘but at times it
is very important – as it depends on what the audit affirms.’22
Moreover, a tax chamber may regard the tax offices directly subordi-
nate to it as being better qualified than the tax inspectors at the tax audit
office. For example, within one province in 2000, while the tax chamber
repealed 38.5 per cent of cases originating in the tax offices, it repealed
63.3 per cent of decisions from the tax audit office.23 Also telling is the
fact that NIK in 2000 regarded the level of cooperation between the tax
audit offices and the tax chambers and offices in the sharing of informa-
tion in the cases conducted by tax audit office inspectors as insufficient
and ineffective.24
19 Borkowski, p. 40. 20 NIK, December 1994, p. 4; and NIK, May 2000, p. 3.
21 Interview with a Tax Chamber Vice Director, Gdańsk, November 26, 2001.
22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 NIK, May 2000, p. 4.
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While the initial goal of separating out the tax audit offices was to draw
more attention to large cases, at the end of 2001 plans appeared within
the Ministry of Finance for dissolving the tax audit offices, placing the
inspectors in the tax chambers and tax offices in such a fashion that
the line of command is more direct and competition between the differ-
ent bodies is eliminated.25 Thus, with the exception of the relationship
between the tax audit office and the tax office, the tax administration
does appear to have a clear, disciplined structure subordinate ultimately
to the Ministry of Finance, as well as some consistent practices for col-
lecting tax revenue.
Russia’s Tax Administration Structure
In March 1991, the State Tax Service of Russia (STS) was formed on
the basis of the USSR’s State Tax Service, then part of the Ministry
of Finance.26 (In the Soviet Union, taxes existed in a narrow sense,
with turnover tax and enterprise payments tax the most common.) The
STS, which became responsible for collecting all revenue for federal and
regional budgets (except for customs duties), was separated from the
Ministry of Finance later in 1991 as an independent agency. In Decem-
ber 1998, the STS was upgraded in status as the Ministry of Taxes and
Dues. In 2004, the Ministry was eliminated, and the Federal Tax Service
put in its place under the Ministry of Finance.27
The STS grew from 50,000 to 60,000 employees at the beginning
of the transition to 161,790 in 1995 to around 180,000 in 2003 (with
around 1,100 in the central apparatus and territorial organs.)28 In July
1995, the STS had 710 employees in the central apparatus and 161,790
bureaucrats in its offices across the country; despite the mid-1990s tar-
get goals of a staff of 200,000, Tax Minister Gennadiy Bukayev (2000–
2004) stated in 2001 that the tax agencies’ staff just numbered above
160,000, suggesting that there had not been that much growth in recent
years.29 IMF representatives found there to be less than 1,000 employees
in the STS’s headquarters in Moscow in 1999, regarding the number as
far short of what was needed.30 In 2003, there were 82 directorates for
25 Zasuń.
26 Morozov, p. 1; and interview with former head of the department of civil service and
personnel, Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 8 August 2003.
27 Samoylenko, March/April 2004; and Samoylenko, November/December 2004.
28 Morozov, p. 2; and Interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and
Personnel, Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 8 August 2003.
29 Morozov, p. 2; and BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Economic, 26 November
2001.
30 Highfield and Baer, p. 4.
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the then 89 regions of Russia, plus inter-regional inspection offices in
the seven new federal districts (okrugi), which control and supervise the
directorates.31
Traditionally, Soviet institutions that were spread out across the vast
country were accompanied by a strict hierarchical system of control, usu-
ally led by the Communist Party. However, in the 1990s, relaxed rela-
tions between the regions and Moscow and the rise of locally elected
leaders weakened intra-institutional control. Such was also the case with
the tax administration. At a minimum, as a US Treasury official who had
worked with the State Tax Administration (STA) for several years in the
late 1990s observed, there existed very little communication across the
immense bureaucratic organization, in which only one-third of one per
cent of the employees worked in the centre.32
At worst, especially in the 1990s, dual subordination existed, whereby
local tax officers served two masters, Moscow and the regional govern-
ments, which often supplied infrastructure facilities (such as housing
and health-care services), as well as, in some cases, trying to finance
local tax offices through regional budgets.33 ‘As a result’, the IMF has
written, ‘[local tax offices] exerted more effort in collecting taxes for
local governments than for the national government, e.g., collecting first
those taxes where the local take was highest; did not remit to the fed-
eral government all that it was owed; and provided more favourable tax
treatment to locally based enterprises.’34 ‘With a tax inspectorate located
in just about every local political unit across Russia’, Richard Highfield
and Katherine Baer found, ‘the existing organizational setup appears to
largely reflect local tax considerations, notwithstanding that local taxes
constitute a minute proportion of the overall taxes collected . . . This has
led to the emergence in practice of a . . . variable system of revenue shar-
ing in place, [with tax officials] often competing for tax revenue from
the same pool of taxes. This problem is compounded by a headquar-
ters’ administration that emphasizes the optimal collection of federal
budget revenues, rather than the collection of all federal and regional
taxes.’35
After Mikhail Fradkov became prime minister in March 2004, a con-
solidation plan for all the Russian Federation’s ministries began to be
implemented, and the Ministry of Taxes and Dues was eliminated and
its functions transferred to a newly created Federal Committee for Tax
31 Author’s interview with division head, department of international co-operation and
information exchange, Ministry of Taxes and Dues, 22 July 2003.
32 Author’s interview with U.S. Treasury official, Moscow, 3 June 2003.
33 Morozov, p. 4. 34 IMF, 2002, p. 60. 35 Highfield and Baer, pp. 3–4.
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Control (later named the Federal Tax Service), placed under the Min-
istry of Finance. Indeed, the transfer of the tax functions to the Ministry
of Finance was part of a revived attempt at administrative reform, which
began under Putin back in 2001 and which proceeded at a relatively slow
pace. The outward goal of the reforms is to reduce the number of min-
istries. However, the entire project actually appears to be part of Putin’s
plan for creating a tightly centralized state with the bureaucracies under
greater control, as described in Chapter 3.
Hence, while being part of the government’s overall administrative
reform plans to reduce the number of ministries, the March 2004 elim-
ination of the Ministry of Taxes and Dues was thought to be part of
a move to consolidate tax policy within the Ministry of Finance so that
there is a single voice on the issue.36 Nevertheless, the transition has been
said not to be smooth, as the International Tax and Investment Cen-
tre (ITIC), an independent non-profit foundation that provides tax and
investment policy information to businesses and also trains key policy
makers in the former Soviet Union, remarked repeatedly in its monthly
bulletins that the process was fraught with disorganization, slow inte-
gration, and ‘continued uncertainty among many key staff positions’.37
The process also was delayed because a new law was required to abolish
the Ministry of Taxes and Dues and to integrate it into the Ministry of
Finance.38 Even the World Bank has cited in its own reports that the slow
reorganization was a reason for the delays and lack of progress in the sec-
ond phase of the transition.39 However, while the process has been slow
and somewhat chaotic (and late in comparison to the subordination of
tax administrations to the finance ministries much earlier in other coun-
tries such as Poland), the effort may be beneficial down the road, leading
to better supervision of tax collection activities.
In recent years, at least seven to nine specialized inter-regional tax
inspections have been established that focus on particular types of large-
scale business activity (such as oil and banking).40 Moreover, such
specialization has taken place within Moscow, where the 45 or so tax
inspection offices, each of which once concentrated on a particular geo-
graphical area of the city, now focus each on a particular type of business
or personal income activity.41 (In Poland, a smaller country, by 2011,
36 Samoylenko, March/April, 2004, pp. 1–2. 37 Ibid., p. 1.
38 Ibid., p. 2. 39 World Bank, 2005b, p. 913.
40 Author’s interview with division head, department of international co-operation and
information exchange, Ministry of Taxes and Dues, 22 July 2003; Bureau of Economic
Analysis, p. 5; and Samoylenko, June/July 2004, pp. 1–2.
41 Interview with former head of a Moscow tax inspectorate, 5 August 2003.
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there were some 20 such national specialized large taxpayer offices.42
Meanwhile, Ukraine opened a central office for large taxpayers in Kyiv
in May 2012.43) It appears that Russia’s recent reform efforts have been
the result of available technical assistance and of redoubled efforts by
ministerial leadership to improve the efficiency of tax collection. Nev-
ertheless, the greatest problem in Russia remains the fact that the tax
system is target-level driven rather than compliance-driven (in contrast
to Poland), which provides different incentives for tax inspectors.
The Tax Administration Modernization Project in Russia In the
midst of the somewhat disorganized nature of governing institutions
in Russia, a reform program, the Tax Administration Modernization
Project (TAMP), attempted to make at least part of the tax system more
bureaucratically rational. The TAMP program, which was essentially
geared towards the introduction of US-style audit-free filing of taxes in
a country where all firms generally are audited at least once every two
years, was initiated in 1994 with World Bank, IMF and US Treasury
support in two regions of Russia, Nizhniy Novgorod and Volgograd, in
addition to the capital. Prior to the reforms, neither customer service,
education or compliance activities had been carried out nor was person-
nel training organized systematically in either region.
One of the key tasks of the program was to set up special units for
information services, customer service and taxpayer education and for
tax compliance promotion and minimal contact with taxpayers as they
deliver their tax returns and accounting statements. In Volgograd Oblast,
a Training and Information Centre at the regional level tax office was
established. Taxpayer consultation offices capable of providing taxpayer
consultations, handling complaints and communicating on tax questions
with society and the media through television, radio, newspapers, discus-
sion groups and clubs also were founded in every local-level inspection
office. As a result of these reforms, taxpayers in the oblast were served
approximately nine times faster, requests were processed ten times faster,
the need to approach only the same tax inspector each time was removed
so that corruption opportunities were reduced, and an increase in tax-
payer responsibility and a reduction of errors in tax declarations by
2.2 times were observed.44
Among the many other outcomes achieved were a reduction in pro-
cessing time, a reduced number of tax procedures performed by each
42 Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency S.A., p. 5.
43 Ukrinform News, 28 May 2012.
44 Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Volgograd, 2000, pp. 3–4, 26–27.
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inspector, a doubling of settled tax arrears in Volgograd oblast in 1999
in comparison with 1998, an increase in regional tax collection that out-
paced the national average, an increase in the proportion of tax returns
filed on time from 50 to 75 per cent between 1998 and 2000, and a fall
in the arrears rate by 90 per cent in Nizhny Novgorod and by 170 per
cent in Volgograd between 1998 and 2000.45
The project itself took five and one-half years to implement, instead
of the originally planned three and one-half years, because from 1996
to 1999 project supervision was suspended, as the government wanted
to cancel it. Indeed, a former deputy head of one of the program’s
regions suggested that the government would have succeeded in nix-
ing the project just after the World Bank loan had provided new equip-
ment and computers were it not for the fact that the project region had
already begun implementing several of the new reform proposals ahead
of Moscow’s expectations and lobbied for the project to continue.46 Fur-
thermore, as evidence of Moscow’s uncertainty about the reform project,
the Volgograd project regional directorate head was dismissed even after
a few years of dramatic increases in tax collection within his region
because newer, much higher target levels set by the centre could not
be met.47 Such was the emphasis from above on target levels rather than
on improving compliance through a more rational bureaucracy.
Fast forward a decade, with the TAMP project completed and new
management in charge, and the story is a bit different in Volgograd
Oblast. In the 2012 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS), which included representative samples for 37 Russian
regions conducted by the EBRD and the World Bank and in collabo-
ration with the Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)
and Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development, the tax administra-
tion was regarded as the second biggest obstacle for firms in Volgograd
Oblast, constraining their business, second only to general ‘corrup-
tion’.48 Hence, a decade later, the benefits obtained in the early 2000s
in terms of tax administration reform in Volgograd have dissipated.
45 World Bank News Release, ‘Outcomes of the Russia Tax Modernization Project Sup-
ported by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’, 17 November 2000; and
World Bank, 2003, p. 6. As a comparison, in looking at data published by the RF State
Statistics Service of in the 2000, 2002 and 2004 editions of Finansy Rossii, the amount
of tax arrears as a percentage of total tax income to the RF Consolidated Budget as
a whole fell from 49.40 to 31.20 per cent from 1998 to 2000, a level of decline of
approximately 37 per cent.
46 Author’s interview with former deputy head of regional tax directorate, 18 August 2003.
47 Author’s interview with US Treasury official, Moscow, 3 June 2003.
48 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, pp. 43–44.
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Nevertheless, despite some earlier reluctance on the part of the gov-
ernment, some of the principles of the pilot reform project (but not
the audit-free filing aspects) began to be implemented across Russia in
2002 and a second phase of the TAMP was launched in 2003 aimed at
modernizing data-processing centres in five federal okrugi and 12 to 16
regional tax administrations with World Bank (but no longer US Trea-
sury) support.49 For example, one of the successful reform tasks involved
in the first phase of the project was to re-design the structure of the local
tax offices so that employees were not divided into units based upon tax
types or taxpayer categories (as is done throughout Russia and was done
in Poland up until 201050) but were organized according to the more
efficient and more transparent ‘functionality principle’, by which each
tax worker performs the same task regardless of the type of tax.51 In
2002, some tax organs in other regions began to be re-organized accord-
ing to the ‘functionality principle’ as part of the first stage of a federal
targeted program, ‘The Development of the Tax Organs (2002–2004)’,
confirmed by the government in late 2001.52 Up until then, the design
structure of the tax offices had varied across Russia because there were
no regulations.53
In short, at the time, the success of the TAMP program in Volgograd
and Nizhniy Novgorod illustrates that, given alternative training, a dif-
ferent structure and new incentives to allow a work philosophy oriented
towards ‘customer service’, Russian tax collectors can work much more
effectively and efficiently. Hence, even in a country with a different his-
tory and culture, a change from a target-driven method to an audit-free,
compliance-driven method yields much higher tax compliance. Thus,
the degree of policy implementation need not vary by country because
of cultural differences: Policies to improve effectiveness can be applied
across different states.
The Tax Police in Russia In 1992, within the State Tax Service
was formed the Main Division of Tax Investigations, which in 1993 was
transformed into an independent governmental body, the Department
49 World Bank, 2002.
50 Author’s interview with Kierownik Działu Obsługi Bezpośredniej, Urząd Skarbowy
Warszawa Wola, Warsaw, 27 April 2012.
51 ‘Tax Administration Modernization Project of the Russian Federation, Volgograd
Oblast, 1995 (January)–2000 (June), Report, Executive Summary, Volgograd Oblast
Tax Administration.
52 Bureau of Economic Analysis, p. 4. Translation from the Russian by the author.
53 Author’s interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel,
Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 8 August 2003.
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of Tax Police, and in 1995 became the Russian Federal Tax Police Ser-
vice. The tax police was created in response to the fact that tax inspec-
tors were not allowed into some firms that were not paying taxes in
1992.54 Also, in one year, Russian citizens were said to have burned
down the homes of 40 tax collectors.55 In 1996, 26 tax collectors were
murdered, 74 injured and 6 kidnapped, while 18 tax offices were ‘shot
up’.56 Hence, the initial ‘need’ for masks and guns when approaching
taxpayers – accessories that were used less as time wore on. The main
duties of the tax police became the ‘exposure, prevention and suppres-
sion of tax law violations and crimes’.57 In 2003, Putin signed a decree
disbanding the 40,000-strong force of tax police officers.58 However,
the tasks were merely transferred to the interior ministry and later to
a new body named the Investigative Committee, so that the federal tax
police activities continued to live on even after the official ‘demise’ of the
organization.59
The personnel for the federal tax police came from those who were
sacked from the KGB, the Soviet army and other military organizations
at the beginning of the 1990s.60 The tax police had regional and sub-
regional offices throughout Russia. While the tax police had close con-
tacts with the State Tax Service’s regional directorates and local offices,
they (and the interior ministry divisions that took over their activities in
2003) differed from the tax audit office structure in Poland in that they
were an entirely separate government organization. The tax police were
not accountable to the other tax administration bodies and did not have
their cases reviewed by them.
As Highfield and Baer of the IMF found in 2000, the regular audit
staff of the Ministry of Taxation were prevented from independently pur-
suing cases of tax fraud relating to legal and illegal economic activities, as
those cases were in the tax police’s domain.61 Cases were either located
by the tax police officers themselves or were referred to them by local tax
offices, which would provide information on an individual basis rather
than through open access to their files.62 The ITIC has remarked that
54 Author’s interview with former assistant to deputy head of Moscow city tax police,
Moscow, 28 July 2003.
55 Reynolds, Neil. 56 Franklin, p. 136.
57 Author’s interview with former assistant to deputy head of Moscow city tax police,
Moscow, 28 July 2003.
58 Nicholson. 59 Samoylenko, March/April, 2004, p. 2.
60 Author’s interview with manager, Moscow office of one of the ‘Big Four’ international
accounting firms, Moscow, 13 August 2003.
61 Highfield and Baer, p. 4.
62 Author’s interview with former assistant to deputy head of Moscow city tax police,
Moscow, 28 July 2003.
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as tax auditors ‘seem increasingly under pressure to find “problems” to
report to their superiors’, criminal investigations are automatically trig-
gered as a result of the Russian tax code, thus providing continuous work
for the ‘tax police’.63
Given the lack of transparency in the activities of both the Federal
Tax Police and the Ministry of the Interior, it is unclear to what extent
co-operation between the two bodies and the STA has been better
or worse in Russia compared with the corresponding organizations
in Poland. However, there may have been some disagreement as to
exactly how much extra revenue the tax police brought in on its own.
For example, from 1992 to 1994, according to one senior tax police
officer, the tax police collected as much as the tax authorities collected
when taxpayers willingly paid.64 Meanwhile, a former deputy head of a
regional tax directorate stated that the tax police tended to write down
that they worked on cases that actually were carried out by the regular
tax offices.65
The methods used by the tax police have been deemed questionable.
A lot of what they have done was political or paid persecution, accord-
ing to one Moscow-based international lawyer.66 The tax police are
viewed by private businesses as using scare tactics. For example, accord-
ing to another managing tax partner at one of the Big Four international
accounting firms, immediately after a company receives a visit from the
tax police, outside ‘security firms’ often approach the company offering
‘help’ in dealing with the tax police for a fee; such incidents were said
not to happen with the regular tax authorities.67 The tax police also have
appeared to work on a quota system. An inspector could open up a case
against a company at the end of one year, which he would then close at
the beginning of the New Year in order to meet his quota.68
Andrew Bowen noted that the ‘Tax Police became extremely aggres-
sive and received a portion of the money that it collected (the only lim-
itation on their equipment was that they were not allowed to use police
dogs, armoured vehicles or water cannons) . . . The Tax Police was known
to simply show up at a business and threaten the owner with investigation
unless they paid a percentage of their assumed tax bill . . . ’69 Meanwhile,
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Robert McNab wrote in 2000 that ‘The
prejudgement that all taxpayers are potentially criminals predisposes tax
63 Witt, p. 2. 64 Morozov, p. 2.
65 Author’s interview with former deputy head of regional tax directorate, 18 August 2003.
66 Lawyer, Moscow office of a leading international law firm, Moscow, 11 August 2003.
67 Head law partner, Moscow office of one of the ‘Big Four’ international accounting
firms, Moscow, 28 July 2003.
68 Ibid. 69 Bowen.
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administrations in [transition states] to call in the ‘tax police’ to solve
issues of compliance and erodes voluntary compliance.’70
Just before the Federal Tax Police Service was officially disbanded,
the Tax Police gained in February 2003 the right to use lie detectors on
those suspected of committing tax crimes or deemed likely to do so.71
Within the legislation of the Tax Police, according to one tax lawyer,
informers on those who did not pay taxes were eligible to receive a 10 per
cent cut.72 Moreover, the Tax Police also had the right to place people
undercover in companies, although this was not heard of in practice.73
Finally, Tax Police officers have been regarded as a breed apart. After the
difficulties in deciphering the tax legislation, one senior Tax Police officer
named the ‘presumption of innocence’ on the part of accused taxpayers
as the greatest obstacle to the work of the Tax Police.74
In 2003, to approach Russian government officials and to seek out the
assistance of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), the United States and the United Kingdom, the ITIC
formed a working group to help promote changes in the regulations gov-
erning the criminal tax enforcement activities of the Tax Police (Min-
istry of Interior), including the automatic ‘triggering’ of criminal investi-
gations whenever disputes are over the ruble equivalent of U.S.$50,000,
which had resulted in such investigations being a regular routine for most
firms.75
As large companies began to comply more with paying taxes under
Putin, such tactics have been deemed excessive for use in pursuing small
and medium-sized firms. However, the tax police were judged to have
been used successfully as a political weapon of sorts, as Vladimir Gusin-
sky and Boris Berezovsky’s businesses, among others, were targets of
their investigation in 2000. In addition, the fact that Putin might have
wanted to bring more control and a more accountable structural design
to the organization may have been his reason for disbanding it in 2003
and centralizing the activities in another ministry.
In September 2007, a new, powerful agency named the Investiga-
tive Committee of the Russian Federation was created with Aleksandr
70 Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, p. 288. 71 Moscow Times, 17 February 2003.
72 Partner, Moscow office of one of the Big Four international accounting firms, Moscow,
28 July 2003.
73 Ibid.
74 Author’s interview with former assistant to deputy head of Moscow City Tax Police.
75 Samoylenko, March/April 2004, p. 2; Samoylenko, September/October 2004, p. 2; and
Samoylenko, November/December, 2004, p. 2.
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Bastrykin, a former law school classmate of Putin’s, as its chair.76 It was
later given the right to investigate tax-related cases based on information
given to it by tax inspectors – something that had previously been vested
in the Ministry of the Interior and other law enforcement bodies.77
In late 2013, the Russian Duma passed a bill that gave the Inves-
tigative Committee the authority to initiate at their discretion crimi-
nal prosecutions in the tax arena based on information submitted by
other law enforcement agencies, and not necessarily by tax inspec-
tors of the Federal Tax Service. Back in 2011, then President Dmitry
Medvedev had abolished such practices, but this new bill, introduced to
the Duma by President Putin over the heads of the government, revived
the approach.78 When, for the first time since he became prime min-
ister, Medvedev spoke out publicly against the bill on 12 November
2013, which had caused consternation among the business community,
stating, ‘Anything can be initiated, especially on order and for money,
which often happens when one structure fights against another one’,
Putin responded by suggesting that Medvedev could leave the govern-
ment if he disagreed.79 As political analyst Tatiana Stanovaya relayed of
the incident, ‘Putin chose the path of boosting the repressive machine.
At the same time, he made it clear that all those displeased, including
the Russian prime minister, can resign.’80
Ukraine’s Tax Administration Structure
The Ukrainian STA, like other state institutions, can trace its origins as
a weak tool of the state back to the early 1990s, when the main head-
quarters of all Soviet-era governing ministries remained in Moscow, and
Ukraine thus had to build new ones in Kyiv, essentially from scratch.81
As in Poland, the tax administration in Ukraine was founded on the
basis of the Soviet Ministry of Finance’s financial and revenue offices,
76 Brian Whitmore, ‘Russia: Powerful New Investigative Body Begins Work’, RFE/RL,
accessed 8 March 2015 at <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078611.html>.
77 Tatiana Stanovaya, ‘A Warning to Medvedev’, Institute of Modern Russia website,
accessed 25 August 2015 at <http://www.imrussia.org/en/politics/608-a-warning-to-
medvedev>.
78 Bowen; Ernst & Young, Russia Tax Brief, p. 2, accessed 25 August 2015
at <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-RTB-July-2014-Eng/$FILE/EY-
RTB-July-2014-Eng.pdf>.
79 Bowen; Stanovaya, ‘A Warning to Medvedev’.
80 Stanovaya, ‘A Warning to Medvedev’.
81 Author’s interview with Vladimir Dubrovsky, Centre for Social and Economic Research,
Kyiv, 20 October 2005.
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which existed in every district throughout the country.82 While the law
‘On the Taxation System’ was adopted on 25 June 1991, former Soviet
Union regulations existed from the very beginning until the tax and
financial system of the new country was fully formed. Initially, until
1992, Ukraine’s tax service was a division of the Ministry of Finance,
although most revenue agents were said to come from internal security.83
In the early days of the 1990s, the few firms that did exist were likely to
have been more cooperative with the state. One regional tax official in
an oblast commented that at the beginning of the 1990s, ‘the work was
a lot, but such words as “arrears” we almost never heard as enterprises
and organizations transferred adequate funds to the budget in a timely
manner.’84 Nevertheless, a few years into the decade saw economic insta-
bility, hyperinflation of the country’s currency up to September 1996
(the Ukrainian karbovanets) and chronic state budget deficits, which did
affect the tax administration’s activities as well as its internal resources.
Already in the 1990s, criminal groups were alleged to have close ties
to the tax administration in Ukraine that they used to extort money
from businesses, which found it cheaper to pay the groups than the tax
authorities.85 The weakness of the STA as it interacted with society con-
tributed to a feeling of less fear of the state and the tax authorities than
in Russia. This was the case even as President Leonid Kuchma and STA
chief (and more recently finance minister and then prime minister under
President Viktor Yanukovych) Mykola Azarov began to turn the STA
into a stronger tool in the second half of the 1990s by establishing a strict
hierarchical structure, which has been widely referred to as zhorstkoyu
kontrol’ (cruel or strict control), putting political pressure on larger firms
while letting smaller and medium-sized firms fall under the discretion
of local tax officers. Anders Åslund regarded the STA as having been
the ‘main repressive organ of the state’ under Azarov.86 Such changes
coincided with the formation of the STA, replacing the Ukrainian tax
service, in 1996. In short, Ukraine built a tax system based on a mixture
of coercion and bureaucratic discretion.
In the years that followed, Azarov’s successors, who led the STA under
Kuchma before the Orange Revolution, varied in the degree to which
82 Fritz, p. 117; and Interview with State Tax Inspector in a Ukrainian Oblast, Ukraine,
20 May 2011.
83 Emil Sunley, Formerly of the IMF, Interview with the author, Washington, DC, 20
August 2014.
84 ‘[Regional Oblast]’s Tax Service Past and Present’, Unpublished manuscript, 2009.
Translation from the Russian by the author.
85 Shelley, p. 655.
86 Anders Åslund, Interview with the author, Washington, DC, 22 August 2014.
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they created a more ‘Weberian’ tax bureaucracy in order to strengthen
the state. A former STA official stated that STA head Yuri Kravchenko
gave more autonomy to his subordinates, whereas his successor, Fyo-
dor Yereshenko, a protégé of Azarov who earlier had served as his first
deputy, was said to have taken away any personal initiatives on the part
of the STA staff in a manner more like a ‘Beria’ – a reference to Lavrenty
Beria, the notorious Soviet secret police boss who carried out purges
under Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s.87 (In March 2005, Kravchenko
was found shot twice in the head, with a suicide note, on the day that
he was to be questioned by the prosecutor regarding the murder of the
Internet journalist Georgi Gongadze.) Meanwhile, the corruption of the
Kuchma years most likely did not help raise public support for the STA.
Before the 2004 election, for example, corrupt VAT refund schemes were
rumoured to have been employed in the nation’s regions for political
campaigns by both sides.88
After the Orange Revolution, the STA continued to have an ambigu-
ous status because it reported only to the president, giving the govern-
ment little authority to change its behaviour and practices and enabling
it to continue to be a political tool of sorts.89 In early 2006, a con-
stitutional amendment addressed the subordination issue, making the
STA accountable directly to the central government. Yet even after this
amendment (but before the August 2006 selection as prime minister of
Yanukovych, who quickly named Azarov’s protégé, Anatoliy Brezvin, as
the new STA chief), the STA was subordinated in practice to President
Viktor Yushchenko, who once in office appointed a friend, Oleksandr
Kireev, as its head.90 Kireev was seen by local analysts as wanting to see
the STA become a partner with society rather than a mere tax collector,
but politics did become a factor, because his position enabled him to
‘punish’ some more than others.91
While, at times, the STA formally has been subordinated to the Min-
istry of Finance, problems of coordination existed in practice, even when
the STA was underneath the Ministry. By the end of the Kuchma era,
the tax administration was subordinated directly to the Cabinet of Min-
isters, but with the arrival of the Yushchenko government in 2005, the
87 Author’s interview with former senior official, State Tax Administration, Kyiv, 29 July
2006.
88 Author’s interview with U.S. government official, Kyiv, 10 August 2006.
89 Author’s interview with senior associate, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four international
accounting firms, Kyiv, 26 October 2005.
90 Author’s interview with Igor Lavrinenko, expert, Centre for Political and Legal
Reforms, Kyiv, 24 July 2006.
91 Author’s interview with Bohdan Senchuk, Blue Ribbon Analytical and Advisory Centre,
United Nations Development Program, Kyiv, 17 October 2005.
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STA was brought under Ministry of Finance control.92 Nevertheless, in
that year, the Razumkov Centre noted that the Ministry of Finance’s
powers with respect to human resources management at the State Cus-
toms Service and the STA were limited.93 By 2006, when such subor-
dination of the STA to the Ministry did exist, the Ministry of Finance
and the STA already had a long-standing disagreement as to whether the
Ministry could gain certain information from the STA – something that
Yushchenko had yet to make a decision on whether to permit.94 And, in
2015, when the STA was no longer formally under Ministry of Finance
control (as it is in Western countries), Åslund commented that the Min-
istry of Finance had control and information only on the STA’s expen-
ditures but not on revenues.95
Despite a significant lack of external structural restraints on the STA’s
activities, one of the improvements since the Orange Revolution has
been the transfer in September 2005 of the authority to resolve dis-
putes between the STA and taxpayers from the commercial courts to the
administrative courts, which has provided greater protection of the rights
of taxpayers.96 Hence, some alternation of the administrative design can
affect the type and nature of citizens’ interaction with the tax system,
providing a strengthening of trust in the state. Meanwhile, a ‘Charter
of Tax Relations’ was drafted in 2005 by the National Commission on
Fiscal Reform, consisting of deputies and representatives of the Presi-
dential Secretariat, the Cabinet of Ministers, other state agencies and
non-governmental organizations, calling for a number of bold new initia-
tives, including reduction in public spending on the tax service, improve-
ment in the culture of service to taxpayers, elimination of the tax police,
decentralization of tax revenues, expansion of the role of local budgets,
merger of the tax and customs services and implementation of further
activities under the control of the Ministry of Finance, which ultimately
was unfulfilled.
Under Yanukovych, the signing of presidential decree 1085, ‘On the
Systems Optimization of Central Executive Organs’, on 9 December
2010, did not bring any immediate changes to the tax administration,
despite the fact that that administrative reform decree was expected to
bring a reduction in the numbers of tax personnel. In fact, in 2011,
one Ministry of Finance official complained that there was a lack of
strategic policy documents at the Ukrainian government level on the
main directions of the tax administration’s development, and what few
92 Fritz, p. 200. 93 Razumkov UCEPS, 2005, p. 32.
94 Ibid. 95 Åslund, 2015, pp. 135, 147.
96 Author’s interview with senior partner, leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, 3 August
2006.
Building Trust, Instilling Fear: Tax Administration Reform 157
had been adopted seemed to be annulled by new, succeeding govern-
ments. In February 2007, the Cabinet of Ministers approved a Con-
cept of reform that was cancelled in 2009, when the new government in
December 2009 adopted a different tax system reform strategy, which in
turn was cancelled by the new prime minister in June 2010, leaving the
tax administration without a strategic document in 2011.97
During Yanukovych’s presidency, an alternative ‘tax system’ also was
created by which the country was divided up into a system of so-called
‘ploshchadki’ (or ‘playing fields’) – groups of enterprises that minimized
their taxes through fictitious VAT refunds offered by the ‘optimiza-
tion services’ of tax bureaucrats, who received a set percentage of ficti-
tious transactions.98 Åslund has described something on a similar scale.
‘Billions of dollars have disappeared from the Ukrainian government
each year, equivalent to an amount sufficient to cover the US$30 bil-
lion budget deficit run up during Yanukovych’s term’, he has written.
‘ . . . Billions of dollars are extracted each year out of the State Tax
Administration and the State Customs Committee. Some appears to
be sheer embezzlement, some is in the form of bribes passed on to
the top, and some comes from commissions demanded on VAT refunds
for exporters. A reasonable assessment of this embezzlement would be
$3 billion to $5 billion a year.’99 Meanwhile, Ukrainian economist
Vladimir Dubrovsky has said of the Yanukovych years that ‘The offi-
cial public servants were stimulated to collect as much fines as possible
and actually destroy business . . . This is a kind of institutional memory
that cannot fade away quickly. It’s selective enforcement of impractica-
ble laws. At least some of the tax departments are corrupted 100 per
cent.’100
After the EuroMaidan revolution, Tax Agency Head Oleksandr Kly-
menko, a close ally of Yanukovych, was suspected of large-scale cor-
ruption and became wanted on criminal charges. His successor, Igor
Bilous, meanwhile, was suspended amid concerns of financial corruption
in February 2015. After a probe indicated that the performance of tax
and customs offices worsened under his watch, Bilous was permitted to
continue, but resigned and was replaced through a competitive process
by Roman Nasirov, who himself was accused of corruption for leaving off
a London apartment from his list of properties.101 Meanwhile, in 2014,
97 Fritz, pp. 164, 176, and 193.
98 Author’s email correspondence with an anonymous expert who is a tax consultant and
professor at the Ukrainian State Trade and Economic University, 1 June 2016.
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the Ministry of Revenues and Dues was replaced, or renamed, as the
State Fiscal Service of Ukraine, which was headed by Nasirov and which
has begun a process of decentralization that will see more revenue going
to local budgets. In August 2016, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Yuriy
Lutsenko announced that U.S. $120 million was stolen by the tax ser-
vice during Yanukovych’s presidency under the leadership of Klymenko
as the post-EuroMaidan leadership tried to recover funds lost during the
previous regime.102
The Tax Administration Modernization Project in Ukraine Begin-
ning in 2003, a much-delayed project, titled the ‘Modernization Pro-
gram of the State Tax Service of Ukraine’, funded by the World Bank
and the Ukrainian government and with outside advice from the Nether-
lands, the European Commission, and others, finally began and ran until
2012, aimed at reorganizing and modernizing the tax authorities, espe-
cially with respect to the registration of taxpayers’ payment records, pro-
cessing tax statements and payments, document management and tax
employee training with benchmarks for the voluntary payment of taxes,
taxpayer costs for paying taxes, the likelihood of tax evasion and the qual-
ity of the functioning of the tax authorities. The project resulted in the
establishment of an automatic Call Centre enabling taxpayers to obtain
information by phone or e-mail and the introduction of risk-based audit
selection for planned audits, reducing the on-site inspection burden for
firms, as well as implementation of electronic filing of VAT and Enter-
prise Profit Tax returns.103
Despite the ambitious plans and the laudable results, the project’s
implementation has been assessed fairly critically. First, the end-date
of the project, initially set for June 30, 2008, was delayed twice. Sec-
ond, according to the published results of several audits conducted
by the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, the project disbursed only
U.S.$19 million of its U.S.$40 million budget (or 47.5 per cent) over
the first seven years, while part of the World Bank funds helped finance
other tax authorities’ needs.104 Other criticisms of the project included
weak performance monitoring and remarks that the project’s Super-
visory Board’s observations were left without proper evaluation and
without reaction from the leadership of the STA and the Ukrainian
government.
The Tax Police in Ukraine In Ukraine, the Tax Police, which
exists as part of the tax administration, was formed in February 1998
102 UT Ukraine Today, 10 August 2016. 103 World Bank, 2012.
104 Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, March 2011.
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on the basis of staff from the Ministry of Interior who had worked on
economic crimes, so that the cases could be conducted ‘in house’ rather
than be transferred to the Ministry of Interior. The organization consists
of special subdivisions for combating tax offenses, and it monitors com-
pliance with the tax laws and carries out operational-search, criminal-
procedural and protective functions. Yushchenko, when he was running
for president in 2004, promised the liquidation of the Tax Police, which
he called a ‘repressive body used to exert pressure on businessmen’,
but the status of the Tax Police did not change once he was in office,
and, unlike in Russia, the Tax Police still exist at the end of 2016, both
formally and in practice.105 The Tax Police are tasked with preventing
crimes and other offenses in the area of taxation; tracing taxpayers who
evade taxes and other payments; and security and prevention of corrup-
tion in the tax administration itself.106
After the Orange Revolution, the Tax Police occupied an uncertain
position, formally existing but seen as less of a threat due to the reduction
of raids on private offices.107 Nevertheless, even before 2005, the Tax
Police were never seen as a strong, coercive threat in Ukraine as they
were in Russia.108 After the EuroMaidan Revolution, it was uncertain in
early 2016 whether the Tax Police would be abolished. Pavlo Kukhta, an
expert at the Reanimation Package of Reforms, said that cuts already had
succeeded in trimming half of the Tax Police, which was once 40,000 to
50,000 at its peak and which might be reduced to 5,000 or 6,000, mostly
to personnel sitting in Kyiv and the oblast centres.109 At the same time,
the IMF was said to support the idea of liquidating the Tax Police, while
the State Fiscal Service head, Roman Nasirov, was less than keen on the
idea.110
Table 5.1 summarizes how historical references have been used in the
formation of the tax administration structures in the three states.
Reducing or Broadening the Scope of Tax
Bureaucrats’ Discretion
How the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian states view their ‘power’ rela-
tionship with the public is best illustrated, perhaps, by the degree of
discretion afforded to their tax bureaucrats. And, despite some recent
105 Razumkov UCEPS, 2005, p. 41.
106 Author’s interview with State Tax Inspector in a Ukrainian Oblast, Ukraine, 20 May
2011.
107 Author’s interview with senior partner, leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, 3 August
2006.
108 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international account-
ing firm, Kyiv, 1 August 2006.
109 Kovensky. 110 Kyiv Post, 12 July 2016; and UNIAN News Service, 1 June 2016.
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Table 5.1 Historical references in tax administration structures
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reforms in Russia, the basis for the differences in the degree of discre-
tion given to the tax officials in the three states is accounted for largely
by the fact that the Polish tax system focuses to a greater extent on com-
pliance, while Russia’s system is more target-level driven. Compliance-
and target-driven systems provide different incentives for tax inspectors,
which are illustrated best by explaining how the tax collection process
operates in practice and by examining additional corruption constraints
placed (or not placed) on the tax inspectors.
Collecting the New Taxes in Poland
Just as NIK and the tax offices harken back to designs from before 1989,
the taxes collected in the 1990s are based on earlier taxes as well, even
though the goals of taxation under state socialism and capitalism are
entirely different. The commonalities of the taxes enabled the function
and workload of those employed in the tax offices to share some similar-
ities as they were being implemented. For the tax administration work-
ers, many of whom still held the same jobs they had in the communist
era, this made the task of collecting the new taxes less daunting. For
example, the PIT replaced the payroll tax, the tax on pay collected from
employers; the equalization tax, a rural tax that covers the income from
certain types of farming; and the income tax for those who worked at
their own expense.111 The CIT replaced a previous enterprise tax that
111 Szołno-Koguc, p. 122.
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dated back to 1989. Meanwhile, the VAT tax replaced the turnover tax.
For some, VAT was viewed as being much easier to implement because
the tax offices already had information about the firms and knew how
many there were, and concretely who they were, due to past tax data on
hand.112
In the early 1990s, several administrative reforms designed to have
the bureaucrats interact more constructively with the public were intro-
duced by the Polish tax administration in order to ensure that the newly
adopted taxes would be implemented appropriately. First, training of
heads and managers of selected divisions of the tax offices was conducted
by the tax chambers in 1991, with tax office workers being trained in the
first two months of 1992 prior to the rollout of the PIT that year.113 Sim-
ilar training was conducted in 1992 and 1993 for the introduction of the
VAT.114
Second, a tax information campaign coordination unit was formed
in the Ministry of Finance, which oversaw activities that disseminated
knowledge about the new taxes to the public.115 In advance of the intro-
duction of the new taxes, the tax chambers published brochures and
conducted a mass media program, including special tax broadcasts on
radio and television. As part of their work, tax administration employees
were interviewed. ‘On the one side, society was interested’, commented
one tax chamber vice-director, who took part in such interviews. ‘On
the other side, we were interested that the tax laws were understood and
worked.’116 In this regard, Poland truly was unique among the three
countries in that tax bureaucrats really went out into the public to edu-
cate people as to what this newly founded thing called taxes was. That
type of public interaction simply did not take place farther east.
Third, inside the tax offices and tax chambers, ‘information points’
were established and staffed by employees who knew the laws. Already,
in 2001, many tax offices and tax chambers had their own websites,
which enabled taxpayers to write to their own tax offices.117 This ties
into the fact that many employees within the tax administration, when
interviewed, described taxpayers as ‘clients’ whom they assisted. At the
beginning of the 2000s, one large tax office even was sending out a sur-
vey asking its ‘clients’ how the tax office treated them and how they could
be better served.118
112 Author’s interview with Tax Office Manager, Gdańsk, 27 November 2001.
113 NIK, April 1993, p. 34. 114 NIK, October 1997, p. 28. 115 Ibid., p. 27.
116 Author’s interview with a tax chamber vice director, Gdańsk, 26 November 2001.
117 Author’s interview with tax chamber director, Warsaw, 15 November 2001.
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162 Taxes and Trust
Fourth, the tax offices were instructed by the Ministry of Finance
not to penalize taxpayers too harshly when these taxes were first being
introduced.119
Finally, the numbers of those working in the tax offices increased with
the introduction of the new taxes. Hence, all of these Weberian reform
programs were geared towards ensuring that tax bureaucrats would help
the taxpayer comply with the new tax legislation and making the transi-
tion smoother for bureaucrat and taxpayer alike.
However, despite such preparation, an audit by NIK of selected tax
offices revealed that 90 per cent of them had increased delays in book-
keeping regarding PIT information, which negatively influenced the reli-
ability of budget reports.120 In defence of the tax office workers, many
of the regulations, especially with respect to the VAT, were seen as being
adopted too quickly and without preparation.121 (In fact, nearly all of
the bureaucrats within three tax chambers, six tax offices and three tax
audit offices interviewed by this author in the fall of 2001 mentioned that
the constantly changing and poorly worded new laws and regulations on
taxes were the greatest problems in completing their work.)
Some of these problems aside, the tax administration’s numerous
efforts to make the transition to the new tax system smooth appear to
have been successful. A year after the PIT came into existence, about
half of taxpayers chose to file directly with their local tax offices, while
the others chose to file through their employers, forgoing the opportu-
nity to claim any deductions, but during the second year, queues would
form at banks in mid-December as the state offered citizens the opportu-
nity to buy government bonds in exchange for tax reductions.122 ‘Today,
in the seventh year since the introduction of the new tax requirements’,
wrote Joanna Szczesna in 1998, ‘the average citizen has become a true
expert in tax law . . . [O]ne thing is certain: the past six years have seen
a period of fundamental legal education for the average citizen who, if
more than 40 years old, could sense for the first time the workings of the
law in a state living under the rule of law.’123
Collecting the New Taxes in Russia
In contrast to Poland, the work of the tax authorities in Russia has
been more target-driven and less consumer-oriented – an emphasis that
provides the tax bureaucrats with greater discretion, to the extent that
119 Author’s interview with tax chamber department head, Bialystok, 3 December 2001.
120 NIK, April 1993, p. 34. 121 Szołno-Koguc, p. 101.
122 Szczesna, pp. 76, 77. 123 Ibid.
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the state can ‘impose’ its will over the public as the state’s coffers
are filled. This is noticeable especially in the manner in which the tax
inspectors have been conducting audits. In 2005, the federal tax service
deputy head, Tatyana Shevtsova, remarked, ‘Every tax audit visit must be
100 per cent effective. Otherwise the inspector has merely wasted his or
her time.’ The comment provides a concise overview of how the tax ser-
vice sees its own function, and Russian tax experts interpreted it as an
explicit instruction for tax inspectors to increase the tax bill with each
audit rather than to seek and verify taxpayer compliance.124 Moreover, it
also implies that the tax administration views every firm as a tax violator
and therefore expects that every company should be inspected.
Indeed, according to the Russian Public Officials Survey (2011),
48 per cent of tax officials – or nearly every other tax bureaucrat – stated
that the job of tax inspectors was ‘to replenish the budget at any cost’ (see
Question #4 in Appendix II), and 44 per cent of tax officials stated that
their work was assessed by the ‘amount of taxes collected’ (see Question
#7 in Appendix II.) Further, 47 per cent of these tax bureaucrats stated
that the overwhelming reason for which penalties or sanctions have been
given out to someone in their organization was ‘non-fulfilment or viola-
tion of duties’ (Question #13.)
The biggest issue with respect to audits is who is selected. Tax inspec-
tors, pressed to reach target (plan) goals, mostly pursue legitimate tax-
payers who have all their paperwork together, rather than locating com-
panies that are paying no taxes at all.125 This was especially the case
during the late 1990s, when more than half of local companies were
bankrupt, many of which simply did not report income. ‘This non-
reporting of income is facilitated by the Russian tax police’s tendency
only to scrutinize those taxpayers with the “cleanest financial records
and transparent investments,”’ commented Jennifer L. Franklin in 1997.
‘Therefore, generating no paper trail with the State Tax Service almost
guarantees that the tax police will not come knocking.’126 Further, the
system even allowed unlimited time to return and do audits; multiple
audits also could be conducted simultaneously.127 (Even in 2015, a firm
could still be subjected to multiple audits, with the authorities able, if
certain criteria were met, such as a higher tax authority reviewing the
124 Vremya Novostei, 10 October 2005.
125 Author’s interviews with head law partner, Moscow office of one of the ‘Big Four’
international accounting firms, Moscow, 28 July 2003; and with lawyer, Moscow office
of a leading international law firm, Moscow, 11 August 2003.
126 Franklin, p. 150.
127 Interview with partner, Moscow office of one of the ‘Big Four’ international accounting
firms, Moscow, 28 July 2003.
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audit of a lower authority, to undertake more than one field tax audit
with respect to the same taxes and the same tax period.128) By 2009, the
Federal Tax Service was said to have introduced ‘a system of risk assess-
ment which quickly became the guiding principle for selection of firms
for additional auditing.’129
In the 2011 Russian Public Officials Survey, approximately one-third
(32 per cent) of tax bureaucrats stated that inspectors are unable to
‘catch out’ those who fail to comply with the requirements of the tax
organs – suggesting that it is far easier to demand payment, pre-payment
or extra payment from firms known to exist and have funds than to
seek out those that have interacted very little with the tax authorities
(Question #3 in Appendix II). (In a similarly worded question asked in
2001, 52 per cent of Moscow tax inspectors and 66 per cent of Nizhniy
Novgorod inspectors concurred that tax inspectors are unable to catch
those who avoid paying taxes.130) Also, in the 2011 survey, over 30 per
cent of tax officials thought that anyone could easily hide income from
the authorities (Question #5 in Appendix II).
Moreover, when looking at deductions during audits, the tax authori-
ties lacked the ability to look through the substance and merit of a deduc-
tion, but instead often focused on paperwork – whether it was in order,
completed, signed and stamped appropriately, in an attempt to throw
out as many deductions as possible (and, most likely, try to reach the
tax collection quota).131 Before the tax code of 1999, there were many
gaps in the legislation that were subject to interpretation, which enabled
the tax authorities to interpret the legislation as they wanted it to be –
sometimes in a very inconsistent manner within and between regions.132
Similarly, today, the tax officers are viewed as intentionally creating prob-
lems in order to compensate for solving them. ‘Generally, [a] tax officer
tries to create as many problems as possible, to be remunerated for a
solution of the problem’, a former tax inspection officer has stated. ‘Cre-
ating obstacles is a cheap activity (in fact it is pronounced as protection
of state interests) and remuneration is high, so it never ends.’133
Following the Kremlin’s 2003 assault on the Yukos oil company and
its ‘oligarch’ chief executive officer and owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
who was charged with fraud and tax evasion in a move deemed to be
political, businessmen have viewed the affair as giving tax bureaucrats
128 Deloitte, pp. 81–82, 85. 129 Pryadilnikov and Danilova, p. 27. 130 Ibid.
131 Author’s interview with head law partner, Moscow office of one of the ‘Big Four’
international accounting firms, Moscow, 28 July 2003.
132 Author’s interview with partner, Moscow office of one of the ‘Big Four’ international
accounting firms, Moscow, 28 July 2003.
133 E-mail correspondence with Moscow-based lawyer on 26 January 2016.
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the go-ahead to interpret tax laws as they like. The tax service also has
seen a so-called beneficial ‘Yukos effect’ on tax collection. Federal Tax
Service Deputy Head Tatiana Shevtsova stated in 2005 that tax receipts
had more than doubled within the previous year and a half, due to the
fear generated in the business community by the Yukos case.134
Such arbitrary power, combined with a lack of detailed knowledge on
the part of tax inspectors regarding the firms and industries they audit,
has even allowed the prosecution of taxpayers for ‘bad faith’. Such a
‘rationale’ for prosecution has been seen as a creative necessity for the
tax service officials, given the fact that Yukos’ efforts to reduce its tax
liabilities before 2003 were deemed by the business community to be
within the law.135 A further shock to the business community was the
2007 raid on Price Waterhouse Coopers’ Moscow office, which led to
the international audit firm facing allegations of concealing evasion by
Yukos in its 2002–2004 audit of the oil company; Deloitte & Touche,
another leading international accounting firm, also had been brought up
on tax evasion charges in 2004.136 Ernst & Young, a third of the ‘Big
Four’ accounting firms, also received a U.S.$16 million back tax claim
in 2008.137
In the late 1990s, when audits were not adequate in raising extra rev-
enue to meet a quota, some tax inspectors were said to have contacted
good companies requesting payment in advance because of the regional
budget crisis or because the tax collector had a target plan that needed
to be reached for him to receive his bonus.138 Furthermore, when a tax-
payer went before a tax office with a view to paying arrears, some even
have said that the tax inspector received 10 per cent of the extra revenue
received.139 Historically, tax authorities have had an informal relation
with taxpayers whereby each taxpayer was assigned to one person in the
tax inspection office during ‘kameralny’ audits (audits at the tax agency
office), which led to lots of issues being dependent upon personal rela-
tions. However, since the adoption of the 1999 tax code, which specified
taxpayer rights, the relationship has been more formal than it used to
be.140
134 Vremya Novostei, 10 October 2005. Similarly, Hilary Appel also noted that the rise
of the siloviki under Putin at this time brought forth an ‘atmosphere of fear, which
spurred greater compliance with tax laws.’ (Appel, 2008, p. 312.)
135 Bush. 136 Medetsky and van der Schriek. 137 RIA Novosti, 9 April 2008.
138 Author’s interview with partner, Moscow office of one of the ‘Big Four’ international
accounting firms, Moscow, 28 July 2003.
139 Author’s interview with Aleksei A. Mukhin, director of the Centre for Political Infor-
mation, Moscow, 23 May 2003.
140 Author’s interview with lawyer at Moscow office of international legal firm, Moscow,
7 August 2003.
166 Taxes and Trust
In fact, by 2003, in Moscow (one of the sites of a reform program),
there often was no direct interaction with the taxpayer, who dropped off
his tax documents in a drop box. (Taxpayers would drop off two copies,
one of which was stamped and returned.141) Back in the mid-1990s,
the situation was a bit different, as taxpayers were required in practice
to appear before tax inspectors with their tax documents, and would be
liable if the mail lost the documents or if the tax inspectors had any
questions; this resulted in long queues on the two or three days a week
in which Moscow tax offices received taxpayers (and in fines for delayed
tax reports.)142
In 2005, the ITIC took note of the recent high-profile tax disputes
involving Russian firms, stating, ‘Perhaps the greatest cause for concern
is subjecting employees of companies to criminal liability that automati-
cally arises from tax disputes that can themselves be the result of honest
mistakes and disagreements with tax auditors . . . The tax auditors seem
increasingly under pressure to find “problems” to report to their superi-
ors. While many of these audit findings are overturned by administrative
or judicial appeal, Russian legislation (Part I of the Tax Code) automat-
ically triggers a ‘tax police’ (Ministry of Interior) criminal investigation.
This poses a criminal liability for key company employees (both Russian
and foreign.)’143
In a 2005 survey of large Russian and international firms published
by Ernst & Young, some 80 per cent stated that they had had some type
of dispute with the tax administration within the previous three years.
Interestingly, though, some 92 per cent of those disputes were taken to
court by the taxpayers, and 90 per cent of such cases were resolved to
the satisfaction of the firms.144 Hence, for all of the coercive measures
practiced by the tax service, the courts have become, at times, a remedial
tool for private enterprises. That said, Russian firms and the tax service
have different perceptions as to who wins in tax litigation. While firms
claim victory if the court reduces even slightly the total amount of taxes
due, the tax service will claim that it has won a case if not all of the
taxpayers’ demands are accepted, enabling the vast majority of cases to
be claimed as ‘won’ by both sides simultaneously.145 Further, the tax
administration also initiates cases with the courts regarding tax offences,
with fines ranging from 10 to 40 per cent of the amount unpaid usually
collected through the courts. Almost 91 per cent of cases filed by the tax
141 Author’s interview with Manager, Moscow office of one of the Big Four international
accounting firms, Moscow, 13 August 2003.
142 Morozov, p. 8.
143 International Tax and Investment Centre, p. 2. 144 Dranitsyna.
145 E-mail correspondence from a Moscow-based lawyer, 26 January 2016.
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agencies at the Higher Arbitrazh Court from 1999 to 2004 were won by
the plaintiffs, with most cases regarding defendants who refuse to pay
taking no more than ten minutes of the court’s consideration.146
After the 2014 judicial reform that unified the Supreme Court and
the Higher Arbitration Court, when most Higher Arbitrazh Court judges
were fired, firms were not finding the court system to be so favourable to
them, as many judges, some of whom were said to be Federal Security
Service (FSB) members also, appeared to rule in favour of a state that
was urgently seeking revenue.147
As the new taxes were introduced throughout the 1990s, the tax
authorities in Russia did not engage as much in public education cam-
paigns as in Poland. According to some, the tax administration placed
a low priority on educating taxpayers.148 For example, there were few
or no seminars between tax officials and taxpayers. While the 1999 tax
code allowed taxpayers to ask the tax authorities for explanations, the
tax authorities were reluctant to provide them, and the responses were
found by some taxpayers to be usually not very helpful, although courts
at times have provided more stable answers.149
Nevertheless, beginning in the late 1990s, the tax authorities began to
try to persuade the population of the necessity of paying taxes. Eighty-
seven per cent of Russians surveyed in 1999, for example, had seen tele-
vision advertisements urging them to pay taxes.150 In one very mem-
orable television advertisement, a man clutches his head in frustration
in a darkly lit bedroom with an attractive, frustrated woman awake in
bed beside him when a caption displays the words: ‘Lost your drive? Pay
your taxes and sleep peacefully!’151 Other television adverts consisted
of frightening cartoons aimed not so much at children as adults.152 The
encouragement in Soviet times to denounce one’s neighbours still existed
in 1998 when 10 per cent of the tax amount recovered was written into
the Tax Code for those individuals who informed on others for evading
taxes.153
And yet a significant portion of society did not know how to pay taxes.
While admittedly most taxpayers do not pay their own PIT (because,
especially since 2001, taxes usually are withheld from salaries by
146 RosBusinessConsulting.
147 Telephone conversation with Moscow-based lawyer, 17 August 2015.
148 IMF, 2002, p. 63.
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employers), the percentage of those who did not know the procedures
for paying taxes increased, not decreased, throughout the late 1990s:










I know (as a percentage) 55 65 43 42
I don’t know (as a percentage) 36 33 48 52
A lack of basic procedural knowledge on taxes also is evident from
the fact that the vast majority do not even realize that they are entitled
to tax deductions. While 41 per cent of Russians surveyed in February
2002 had expenses the previous year for medical treatment or education,
only 15 per cent knew that they had a right to receive a tax refund for
such expenses and only 4 per cent had applied for such a refund.155
(By comparison, the numbers of Poles who utilized a tax exemption
or tax allowance on their tax return grew from 10 per cent in 1993 to
65 per cent in 1997 – a relatively short time after the introduction of
taxes there.156) Hence, even though the tax authorities have been engag-
ing in active propaganda on the importance of paying taxes, sufficient
education of the population on the mechanisms for doing so appeared to
be lacking.
Proposed reforms during 2005–2006 further illustrate ambiguity
within the government as to how coercive and client-oriented the tax
collection system should be. In 2005, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin,
whose ministry took control of the STA in the previous year, proposed
that each tax inspectorate should have a separate complaints department,
an internal review for tax claims above a certain amount and further
restrictions on the types of tax investigations and methods used.157 An
additional measure suggested later was the imposition of a limit on the
number of tax audits performed on a taxpayer within a year.158 Busi-
nesses were able to agree with the tax administration that there should
be no more than two tax inspections per year, but the business
community in mid-2005 was said to be unable ‘to identify which offi-
cial body will sanction additional inspections of large companies.’159
154 Yadova.
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Other proposals, however, would not restrict the ‘power’ of the tax
bureaucrats or require them to be particularly ‘consumer-oriented’. In
2005, the government suggested giving the tax agencies the power to fine
companies without a court decision, and in January 2006 such a law went
into force, allowing fines to be levied, provided that the penalty for each
tax was no more than 5,000 rubles for entrepreneurs and 50,000 rubles
for firms.160 Furthermore, the tax authorities were said in 2005 to be
turning to individual taxpayers and to be intentionally failing to inform
citizens regarding property and car taxes so that fines for unpaid taxes
were ‘accumulating like an avalanche’.161 Back in 1995, tax collectors’
salaries also were said to be tied to the amount of fines they brought
in.162
In 2005, there was some ambiguity with respect to whether the tax
administration would still use tax collection ‘targets’ as a way of manag-
ing the activities of its tax inspectors rather than requiring tax inspectors
to focus on seeking to ensure citizen compliance with the tax laws. Fol-
lowing President Putin’s annual address to the nation on 25 April 2005,
in which he renounced the use of such ‘targets’ in favour of broad ‘bud-
get directives’, the Federal State Tax Service stated four months later that
it was now giving its inspectorates ‘indicative indices’.163 ‘The change
did not immediately benefit the tax agency’, Mikhail Pryadilnikov and
Elena Danilova found, ‘as a number of inspectors complained that their
bonuses were still tied to the plan fulfilment (renamed general budget
directives).’164 To muddle the issue of targets further, the finance min-
istry’s draft budget for 2006 was said in August 2005 to assume that
an extra U.S.$1 billion would be collected through additional inspec-
tions of businesses by the end of 2005, and that more than double
that amount would be collected through additional corporate audits in
2006.165 Meanwhile, a former tax inspector confirmed that targets were
still in place after 2005 and that they still existed in 2016.166 Today,
a collection ‘target’ is presented by the analytical department within a
tax inspection that is the result of preliminary tax analysis of a firm to
be audited, which is given to tax inspectors prior to making a field tax
audit at the site of the firm. Meanwhile, the notion of a ‘target’ (or ‘plan’)
refers to the general target plans for the entire tax inspection office and is
based on the average sums of taxes levied from an average inspection.167
Hence, it appears that targets never really went away.
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In any case, the frequency of audits has become a real issue for busi-
nesses in Russia in recent years. In 2010, Ernst & Young found that
6 per cent of firms were audited more than once a year, 23 per cent
were audited once a year and 37 per cent were audited once every two
years.168 In other words, two-thirds of all firms were audited at least
once every two years. Further, nearly two-thirds (63 per cent) of firms
surveyed in 2010 stated that they were charged with additional tax liabil-
ities as a result of tax audits performed in 2009.169 Of these, 97 per cent
were charged with additional profit tax (CIT) liabilities and 77 per cent
were charged with additional VAT liabilities.170 Only 29 per cent agreed
with the additional tax liabilities charged by the tax authorities as a result
of on-site tax audits performed in 2009.171 Such is Russia’s approach to
collecting revenue through labour-intensive audits.
And what the tax service has been unable to uncover during audits,
it has tried to obtain through tax amnesties. One such amnesty, which
took place in 2007 as a result of tax collections having decreased since
the 2001 introduction of the PIT flat tax reform, left many taxpayers
confused as to what safeguards or protections would be provided if they
decided to participate.172
Thus, it perhaps should not be surprising that when asked which issues
should be considered for reform by the Russian state, 76 per cent of
firms in 2010 declared improving tax administration, which also was the
second most cited issue three years in a row after requests to simplify tax
legislation, and 44 per cent also cited the need to enhance control over
the tax authorities.173
Political Use of Tax Collection in Russia In 2003, the Kremlin
began its assault on Yukos and Khodorkovsky by charging both with
fraud and tax evasion. Khodorkovsky was immediately jailed and later
given an eight-year sentence in a Siberian labour camp. It has been
assumed that he became a target once Putin saw him as a political
obstacle.
In recent years, although perhaps not due to politics in every case,
other large firms and oligarchs have been sent hefty tax bills, including
oil giant Sibneft, which was owned by Roman Abramovich, was planning
to merge with Yukos in 2003 and was taken over by the state-controlled
gas monopoly Gazprom in 2005; the Tyumen Oil Company (TNK-BP),
a Russian–British concern formed in 2003 with British Petroleum; the
head of Hermitage Capital Management, Bill Browder, who had had a
168 Ernst & Young, p. 5. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid.
171 Ibid., p. 7. 172 Stickgold. 173 Ernst & Young, pp. 24–25.
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multi-billion US dollar investment fund in Russia since the 1990s; and
the mobile phone operator VimpelCom. In September 2007, the Federal
Tax Service announced plans to create a special inspections unit to carry
out audits of ‘major taxpayers’, a move that was considered to be aimed
at ensuring that the oligarchs kept in line during the upcoming election
cycle.174
Other cases, however, appear to be linked to the preservation of the
current authoritarian regime in Russia. In many ways, though, the tax
systems in Russia and Ukraine were probably not designed chiefly just
for extracting revenue from society. They are also about control, in the
way an internal affairs organization such as the KGB was in different era.
In September 2005, the United States-funded Russian–Chechen Friend-
ship Society – a small, non-profit human-rights organization that was one
of the few entities to provide independent information about the war in
Chechnya – was accused by the Federal Tax Service of evading taxes.175
In 2006, tax authorities demanded 5 million rubles from the Centre
for the Promotion of International Defence, which had helped Russian
citizens prepare appeals to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg.176 Tax authorities also conducted raids against Hermitage
Capital (which led to the ouster of Bill Browder from Russia, led to
the death in Butryka prison of Sergei Magnitsky and led the company
to accuse Moscow tax bureaucrats of tax refund fraud) and Alexander
Lebedev (the owner of the United Kingdom’s Independent and Evening
Standard newspapers).177
Moreover, since returning to the presidency in 2012, Putin has gone
after Amnesty International, Transparency International and Human
Rights Watch, and domestic human rights NGOs such as Memorial,
Ksenia Sobchak (the daughter of the late former St. Petersburg Mayor
Anatoly Sobchak under whom Putin once served), election watchdog
group Golos, the Moscow offices of the German Friedrich Ebert Foun-
dation and Konrad Adenauer Foundation and even a chocolate factory
owned by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, among others, with
accusations of tax violations, and the tax system was the institutional
mechanism of deliberate choice for this.178 Clearly, opening tax investi-
gations is the repressive mode of choice as a cover for silencing or jailing
dissidents, as such cases cause less public outcry at home and abroad.
Using the tax authorities as a method of curbing opposition both in
174 RFE/RL Newsline, 26 September 2007. 175 Myers.
176 Interfax (Moscow); Tishinsky and Shmelev, 24 July 2006. 177 Pan; Parfitt.
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politics and in civil society is viewed as effective by the Kremlin, at least
in the short term.
With the uncertainty surrounding what the Kremlin’s preoccupation
with political control will lead to next, businesses in Russia have been
given more reason to be wary in recent years, adding to an increased
lack of trust in the state on the part of a vital sector of society. Coercive
measures, therefore, are viewed at all levels of the tax system as being
effective both financially and politically.
Collecting the New Taxes in Ukraine
Despite the fact that laws were being enacted in Ukraine in the first
half of the 1990s, few tax inspectors actually were familiar with these
laws, which enabled them to use ‘bureaucratic discretion’ in applying the
rules to the process of tax collection.179 Hence, the nation’s bureaucrats
could define the rules by which they played rather than have the rules
defined for them, as is typical in a Weberian bureaucracy. The newly
appointed bureaucrats found an opportunity to behave as they had for-
merly done by selectively applying the law, enabling the public not to
perceive that there was a ‘rule of law’ but rather to experience the rule of
the nachal’nyk (the government official who acts as a boss rather than as
a chynovnyk, or bureaucrat).180 Thus, this discretionary process focused
less on ensuring actual compliance on the part of taxpayers and failed in
the construction of healthier bureaucrat–citizen relations.
As STA head and creator of the existing tax administration, Azarov
instituted a coercion-based approach to tax collection in Ukraine, which
included setting tax collection targets by region and by tax type.181 The
number of fines and sanctions was even said to have targets.182 Up until
1998, a provision was said to allocate 30 per cent of fines for STA
development purposes, providing a further financial incentive to collect
fines.183 In 2016, inspectors were still said to receive bonuses based on
the fines they collected.184 Moreover, because a target-based approach
to tax collection provides an incentive to return to those taxpayers who
have paid their taxes, as they are known to have money, rather than
to seek out those individuals and firms that have yet to pay their taxes
179 Author’s interview with Dubrovsky. 180 Ibid.
181 Author’s interview with World Bank official, Kyiv, 21 October 2005.
182 Author’s interview with senior associate, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four interna-
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altogether, Ukrainian firms have recognized that they can enter a Catch-
22 of sorts because the more often one is audited, the more one needs
to show a profit, and the more profit one has, the more one is audited so
that the state can extract extra revenue.185
One common practice among Ukrainian tax inspectors as part of the
‘tough fiscal measures’ has been to request over-payment of income
taxes (also known as ‘payment in advance’) to ensure that the state
budget goals were achieved. Under the leadership of both Azarov and
Kravchenko, tax inspectors collected taxes in advance from firms and
individuals in order to fulfil targets (most likely based on plans for dis-
tricts rather than for specific firms) – a practice that can place firms
in the trap of being compelled to do so again and again after they
once have paid ahead of schedule. So, in 2004, one finance ministry
employee revealed that the implementation of the state budget was
achieved through the overpayment of income tax, with tax overpayments
amounting to 4.1 billion Ukrainian hryvnia in the first ten months of
2004 and to 7.2 billion for the first 11 months.186
Under the Yushchenko presidency, it is believed that collection of taxes
in advance also occurred, but to a more limited extent from 2004 to
2006.187 The aftermath of the 2004 presidential election brought forth a
need for the state to focus first and foremost on raising revenue to cover
its debts from the previous regime, which may have provided a reason
for maintaining a target-based collection approach. Indeed, because the
STA had a need to fulfil this plan, several companies paid their taxes
early, in August 2005 rather than in September.188 Some Ukrainian firms
in 2006 maintained that such targets still existed, even though the STA
had stated that they did not, suggesting perhaps that the targets might
have been internal.189
Once the financial crisis hit in 2008–2009, similar practices contin-
ued, with the amount of overpayments of tax payments being 4.2 bil-
lion hryvnia in 2007, 8.6 billion hryvnia in 2008, 11.7 billion hryvnia in
2009 and 14.5 billion hryvnia for the first 9 months of 2010. Of course,
making additional tax payments or payments deprives firms of their
185 Author’s interview with Yurij Kuz’myn, research analyst, International Finance Cor-
poration (IFC), Kyiv, 20 October 2005.
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working capital and can lead to depressed economic growth and wage
arrears.190
Such practices also are said to have continued into the post-
EuroMaidan era. Dubrovsky in 2015 remarked that ‘Burdensome
administration and other “implementation problems” hide the fact that
the whole system is essentially grounded on blackmailing, which is the
main tool for “mobilization of taxes” according to planned targets and
to large extent regardless of the law. For example, Ukrainian firms were
forced to pay “in advance” UAH 26 billion [Ukrainian hryvnia, or about
USD $2 billion] by September 2014 allegedly as their CIT for some
future times.’191
Because Azarov was primarily concerned with focusing on big firms
for political and economic reasons, he largely gave local STA offices
more autonomy in how to handle small and medium-sized businesses.192
Furthermore, one tax lawyer has speculated that Azarov’s desire to uti-
lize the tax system as both a political weapon and a method of dis-
pensing political favours for the Kuchma regime gave him an incen-
tive not to build a truly modern, efficient and transparent system.193
Hence, from its creation under Azarov in 1996, the system was not
designed to create trust or focus on compliance on the part of the
public; instead, it was constructed with both political and fiscal pur-
poses in mind, leaving great discretion to local tax inspectors as they
fulfilled their tasks. Moreover, because family prosperity is seen as a
more important goal by Ukrainians than being caught evading taxes,
given that the chances of being caught are deemed to be low, Ukrainians
believe that even if one is caught, the practice of ‘bureaucratic discretion’
will enable them to negotiate (or bribe) local tax officials to escape full
punishment.194
Some of this discretionary practice was said not to have changed
after the Orange Revolution.195 In 2005, there was still a lack of proper
monitoring, systems control, ability to audit electronically and general
oversight.196 However, a new modernization project was aimed at reduc-
ing direct contact between tax bureaucrats and taxpayers by enabling
190 Ministry of Finance official, 14 November 2011. 191 Dubrovsky.
192 Author’s interview with senior partner, leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, 3 August
2006.
193 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international account-
ing firm, Kyiv, 1 August 2006.
194 Author’s interview with senior associate, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four interna-
tional accounting firms, Kyiv, 26 October 2005.
195 Author’s interview with Dubrovsky.
196 Author’s interview with World Bank official.
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more taxpayers to file their taxes electronically.197 And part of the
reforms introduced in early 2015 was to make the VAT process elec-
tronic. This should have decreased the ability of tax bureaucrats to prac-
tice personal ‘discretion’ as to which firms were able to receive a VAT
refund, reduced corruption and led to an end for the haphazard admin-
istration of VAT refunds that had plagued Ukrainian businesses for years.
As in Russia, full inspection audits of taxpayers were done much more
frequently than in Western countries. Back in the mid-1990s, large firms
were to be inspected once every six months, if there were enough tax
personnel.198 Since then, the frequency of scheduled audits of taxpayers
has been determined by the degree of risk associated with taxpayers’
activities. Taxpayers with low risk are included in the audit schedule,
which is formed and approved by the STA in Kyiv, no more frequently
than once every three years; with average risk, not more often than once
every two years; and with high risk, no more than once per year.199 In
2008, research prepared by the GfK market research group illustrates
the high frequency of audits, as their survey found that 81.9 per cent of
some large firms, 68.2 per cent of medium-sized firms and 51.1 per cent
of small firms stated that they had been audited by the STA within the
previous year.200 Meanwhile, during the financial crisis of 2008–2009,
some taxpayers were given the option of paying their dues to the state in
instalments.201
Even with all the political changes in recent years, there is still some
question as to whether patterns of corruption have been altered signif-
icantly in the collecting of taxes. Corruption in Ukraine in general was
said to have decreased in the first nine months of 2005, perhaps due to
a psychological holdover from the Orange Revolution, but it began to
increase in the fall of that year, after Yulia Tymoshenko was fired from
the post of prime minister, and was said to have continued through the
summer of 2006, when there was great uncertainty as to whether there
would be a new government and what form it would take.202 While
Tymoshenko was prime minister in the first half of 2005, she tried to
197 Author’s interview with head of State Tax Administration of Chernihivskiy Oblast,
Chernihiv, 11 August 2006.
198 Sluchinsky.
199 Author’s interview with State Tax Inspector, in a Ukrainian Oblast, Ukraine, 20 May
2011.
200 GfK Ukraine, 25 May 2009. The N for the study was roughly 500 large firms, 500
medium-sized firms, and 500 small firms.
201 Author’s interview with State Tax Inspector in a Ukrainian oblast, Ukraine, 20 May
2011.
202 Author’s interview with Lavrinenko; and interview with executive director, leading
foreign business association, Kyiv, 8 August 2006.
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fight corruption by increasing salaries, especially of those who headed
tax offices and were responsible for making decisions.203 Even so, in the
opinion of one tax inspector, when internal anti-corruption campaigns
seeking to ‘uncover’ bad inspectors do occur, with a ‘plan’ with respect
to how many, there is a risk that attempts by the tax authorities to catch
corrupt tax officials can sweep up good inspectors as well.204
In any case, the level of tax collection was deemed in 2010 to have ‘low
profitability’. That is, the costs of collecting 100 units in the domestic
currency were judged to be higher in Ukraine by 3 to 4 times than in
other EU member states, indicating that the tax service collects at a poor
rate of efficiency.205
Political Use of Tax Collection in Ukraine In contrast to Russia,
political attempts in Ukraine to use the tax system to overtake or repriva-
tize firms are seen as requiring tremendous effort and as capable of fail-
ing, leading to a further comparative lack of fear of the state.206 Azarov
was well known for using the Kuchma-era tax administration to attack
opponents – a skill that no doubt was deemed useful for Yanukovych,
who appointed him prime minister in 2010.207 Yet even attempts made
before the 2004 presidential elections by the outgoing Kuchma regime
to use the STA as a political weapon against local firms were not coordi-
nated and met strong resistance by firms, which were able to go to law
enforcement agencies and to the courts, so that the threats largely were
not fulfilled at the stage of implementation.208
In the 1990s, as the Ukrainian tax administration developed, it
became, in the words of Verena Fritz, a true ‘state within the state’,
which was used to oppress political opponents and media organizations
as securing and consolidating power became the focus for the Kuchma
regime.209 At the same time, fictitious export VAT refund schemes were
used as the vehicle for rewarding pro-government businesses.210 In this
time period, this author’s former office, Freedom House, in Kyiv itself
203 Author’s interview with Lavrinenko.
204 Author’s interview with State Tax Inspector, in a Ukrainian oblast, Ukraine, 20 May
2011.
205 Mollovan, Shevchenko, and Egorova, p. 8.
206 Author’s interview with senior partner, leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, 3 August
2006.
207 D’Anieri, 2011, p. 39.
208 Author’s interview with senior partner, leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, August
3, 2006.
209 Fritz, p. 138.
210 Author’s email correspondence with an anonymous expert who is a tax consultant and
professor at the Ukrainian State Trade and Economic University, 1 June 2016.
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became the focus of the tax authorities with extra inquiries, but ulti-
mately no wrongdoing materialized. The so-called Kuchma tapes, in
which a security guard had made secret electronic recordings of Kuchma
that were alleged to implicate the Ukrainian president in the disappear-
ance of Internet journalist Georgi Gongadze and which were later sent
to Central Europe for authentication by Freedom House, also confirmed
that Kuchma had called upon the tax administration to pressure busi-
nesses and other groups during the 1999 presidential campaign.211
The Media and Public Outreach in Ukraine In Ukraine, the tra-
dition of not communicating with the public did not change after the
Orange Revolution.212 A wide-scale outreach campaign educating the
public on how to comply with the tax laws has never really taken place in
Ukraine.213 The introduction of new taxes in the 1990s was quite unlike
the rollout in Poland. In Ukraine, there was a lack of such efforts to
educate the country on the new taxes.214 Some seminars on how to pay
the new taxes, however, were conducted by firms connected to the STA,
which then monopolized the information they gave out.215 Meanwhile,
explanatory letters from the STA were regarded by accountants to be as
significant as court decisions.216 In many ways, as one Ukrainian lawyer
put it, the state did not care to explain to citizens how the state and its
laws work, indicating an utter lack of concern for citizens.217
However, what has changed since the Orange Revolution is that STA
officials have been more responsive than in the past in issuing letters
explaining their reasoning, which are more useful to taxpayers.218 In
addition, among the aforementioned Ukraine tax administration mod-
ernization project programs was included the construction of an infor-
mation centre, initially in Kyiv and Kyiv oblast, so that taxpayers could
call, e-mail, send a facsimile, or directly post questions on the Web
regarding the STA’s approximately 2,000 tax laws and decrees.219 A
211 Fritz, p. 164, 176, and 193.
212 Author’s interview with Inna Golodniuk, executive director, Centre for Social and Eco-
nomic Research, Kyiv, 14 October 2005.
213 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international account-
ing firm, Kyiv, 1 August 2006.
214 Author’s interview with senior associate, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four interna-
tional accounting firms, Kyiv, 26 October 2005.
215 Author’s interview with Dubrovsky. 216 Ibid.
217 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international account-
ing firm, Kyiv, 2 August 2006.
218 Author’s interview with senior associate, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four interna-
tional accounting firms, Kyiv, 26 October 2005.
219 Author’s interview with senior tax official, Modernization Department, State Tax
Administration of Ukraine, Kyiv, 10 August 2005.
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series of group seminars to which taxpayers are invited, public speeches
by tax officials, and the distribution of brochures and other materials also
were seen by the STA as steps forward.220
The STA in the mid-2000s also took a keen interest in surveying its
employees across the country to discern how workers generally related
to their bosses, and it commissioned public opinion surveys to gauge
Ukrainians’ reactions to its improvements. In particular, the STA points
to a survey it commissioned from an independent firm in December
2005 as indicating that it is perceived as doing a better job vis-à-vis
taxpayers. Although the survey’s exact results, including the starting
points of trends, were not released to the public (or to independent
researchers!), the STA states that the results show a better relationship
between taxpayers and tax workers, an increase in the willingness of tax-
payers to make payments, and a slight worsening in the public’s per-
ceptions of the STA’s fulfilment of laws.221 The STA also states that
payments to the budget increased two and one-half times in 2005, indi-
cating greater trust in the service.222 Hence, the STA’s modernization
efforts during the Yushchenko years could have led to a greater increase
in trust on the part of ordinary Ukrainian taxpayers that they would be
treated fairly by their state.
Nevertheless, in the more recent Yanukovych era, there was some
recognition, according to the director of the Department of Interac-
tion with the Media and the Public of the State Tax Service of Ukraine,
Olga Semchenko, that it had become ‘fashionable for entrepreneurs to
brag about who and how cheated the state’ and that measures needed
to be undertaken through the media to combat such a culture. Such a
media outreach program included the printing of materials in the Tran-
scarpathian oblast, the use of billboards and a local public television pro-
gram in Kharkiv oblast, as well as billboards displaying public service
advertisements regarding employment laws in Donetsk oblast.223 Also,
the STA developed a popular tax education program for schoolchildren,
complete with colour drawing competitions.
Table 5.2 summarizes the differences in the work philosophies of the
three states’ tax administrations.
Additional Structural Constraints to Prevent Polish,
Russian and Ukrainian Tax Official Corruption
Poland’s tax system also appears at first glance to be designed in such
a manner as to provide barriers to corruption better than those of
220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Germanova.
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Russia and Ukraine. For example, within the tax chambers and tax
offices, many people oversee particular cases. One team working on a
case must transfer the paperwork to another unit; cases considered by
employees require the director’s signature; and taxpayers do not have
direct access to the audit organs. In general, the system is designed in
a manner that sacrifices some Weberian autonomy for the greater cause
of uniformity and security. As one tax chamber department head put
it, ‘Corruption appears where the bureaucrat has discretion in making
a decision’.224 Moreover, the tax chambers conduct their own audits –
complex or thematic – of the tax offices that they oversee, and undertake
the complex audits every other year.
Another such barrier is the fact that tax allowances (exemptions) are
no longer given out at the discretion of the tax offices in Poland. Back in
1995, NIK asserted that the decision-making process in the awarding of
tax allowances was conducted in many cases incorrectly, with decisions
made without an audit of the taxpayer who was receiving the exemption.
Moreover, a significant number of tax allowances, granted under the
influence of recommendations from the Ministry of Finance, were not
issued after careful research was conducted to justify such a decision.225
224 Author’s interview with tax chamber department head, Gdańsk, 26 November 2001.
225 NIK, May 1995, p. 57.
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NIK also found it problematic to conduct a review of the size and effect
of such allowances owing to the lack of a register of such tax relief deci-
sions, which NIK had earlier proposed that the Ministry of Finance
should create.226 Hence, a change in legislation on tax allowances pre-
vents opportunities from arising whereby taxpayers try to influence tax
administration employees to obtain such relief.
What was possible in 2001, however, was that tax office employees
could have options for assisting those who incur tax arrears. On an indi-
vidual basis, the tax office or the tax chamber (but not the tax control
office) could change the terms of settlement periods so that the indi-
vidual could pay in instalments, delay the date of payment or amortize
the debt, although the latter was regarded as very rare.227 Although such
assistance was checked by supervisors, NIK found violations of this prac-
tice, suggesting that the structural constraints are not as strong as they
should be.228
A final barrier for the tax bureaucrat with respect to his relation to tax-
payers was that new legislation in 2001 stipulated that, unlike in Russia,
a bureaucrat could no longer issue a fine or punishment to a taxpayer,
but specified rather that only a court can do this.229
The controls seemed to have some resonance with taxpayers. A 2003
survey of small and medium-size businesses in three voivodeships found
that 98 per cent of respondents stated that they did not have the impres-
sion that a tax office worker expected any benefits in exchange for a posi-
tive settlement of their case and that 70 per cent viewed officials auditing
them as impartial when conducting audits.230
In contrast to all these controls placed on a tax bureaucrat’s work in
Poland, Russia’s and Ukraine’s tax systems relied heavily throughout the
1990s on individual relations between tax inspectors and taxpayers. This
practice, though, has been diminishing. In Russia, in the 1990s, a tax-
payer would turn in his or her tax return to a single tax inspector, who
would review the accuracy of the documents – a situation that would pro-
vide an opportunity for collusion between the two parties.231 Moreover,
according to some, as mentioned above, when a taxpayer would pay his
or her tax arrears, the tax inspector would receive a portion of the extra
226 Ibid.
227 Author’s interviews with vice-director, department of the state budget, NIK, 8 Novem-
ber 2001; manager of a department, tax chamber, Warsaw, 15 November 2001; tax
office head, Warsaw, 20 November 2001; and tax control office director, Bialystok,
4 December 2001.
228 NIK, April 1993, p. 6; and NIK, April 2001, pp. 9–10.
229 Author’s interview with tax office head, Bialystok, 4 December 2001.
230 Ministry of Finance, 2004b, p. 42. 231 Ebrill and Havrylyshyn, p. 13.
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revenue received.232 However, thanks to the 1999 tax code, a more for-
mal relationship began to develop in some parts of the country.233
Departments inside the tax administration and tax police departments
in all countries do conduct internal audits and checks designed to exam-
ine corruption issues.234 In Poland, an external organization that audits
the tax collection process is the NIK, mentioned above as having a his-
torical legacy dating back to the pre-war period. As for analyzing the dif-
ferent organs of the tax administration, NIK conducts thematic audits
(analyzing activities of the different tax bodies) and problematic audits
(analyzing the computerization of the tax organs, the collection of tax
arrears, the installation of the information system POLTAX, the col-
lection of the PIT, etc.) Generally, these reports do not take a broader
view and do not suggest alternative structures or practices; they merely
judge whether rules or regulations were followed with respect to paper-
work filed and decisions made. Indeed, for example, they have found at
one time the tax chambers to be too slow and bureaucratic in processing
complaints, and at another time that the tax audit offices increased the
number of inspectors only to see a reduction in the number of audits.235
On another occasion, NIK surveyed 38 tax offices from July 1993 to
December 1996 with respect to giving VAT refunds back to firms and
found that ‘[i]n three-quarters of tax offices audited tax refunds were
completed without being preceded by an audit of the taxpayer in spite
of such a responsibility appearing in the guidelines of the Ministry of
Finance to the organization of work in tax offices in the framework of
the tax on goods and services’.236 The rise of arrears in the late 1990s
led NIK, in another report, to conduct a special audit into whether the
tax offices have been using all legal means to obtain tax debts and to
prevent them in the first place.237 Separately, NIK also has found that
there appears to be significant variance among the tax offices that collect
arrears due to some inappropriate behaviour and ineffective supervision
by the tax chambers.238
Moreover, despite the fact that NIK is generally respected in the soci-
ety at large (receiving favourability ratings of 49 to 61 per cent from
232 Interview with Mukhin; and Valencia.
233 Author’s interview with lawyer at Moscow office of international legal firm, Moscow,
7 August 2003.
234 Author’s interview with former assistant to deputy head of Moscow City Tax Police,
Moscow, 28 July 2003; interview with former head of a Moscow tax inspectorate,
5 August 2003; and interview with former head of the department of civil service
and personnel, Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 8 August 2003.
235 NIK, June 1993, p. 32; and NIK, December 1994, p. 4. Translation from the Polish
by the author.
236 NIK, October 1997, p. 7. 237 NIK, April 2001. 238 NIK, May 1997, p. 3.
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1997 to 2001 in one set of opinion polls239), several employees within
the tax system find that the work of NIK has no bearing upon their day-
to-day work. (Commenting on the relevance of NIK, one manager at a
tax chamber even went so far as to joke that ‘NIK checks how many pub-
lished brochures were printed more than needed; they provide a general-
ized accusation [as to it being so]; and then it is confirmed that too many
brochures were printed.’240) At times, though, there have been real con-
flicts between the Ministry of Finance and NIK over a report’s results.
In May 2001, then Minister of Finance Jarosław Bauc criticized NIK for
its report on the collection of tax arrears. According to the report, the
tax offices only collected 23 groszy for every złoty of tax arrears in 1999,
whereas the Ministry of Finance placed the number at 44 groszy.241
Hence, the value of NIK’s involvement in the process of tax collection
in Poland is mixed. On one hand, NIK does provide for a comprehen-
sive accounting as to whether certain procedures are implemented and
how government money was spent by various administrative structures.
Occasionally, it will even uncover incidents of malfeasance or corrup-
tion. This information, no doubt, is useful for the parliament and for
the Ministry of Finance, even if the latter does not always agree with
the final assessment. On the other hand, for reasons perhaps due to the
methodology of its reports, its mission, and how it is perceived in the
bureaucracy, NIK does not appear to be utilized by the tax administra-
tive structures as an aid in evaluating what constructive changes could
be made in the system. The extent to which the tax structures actually
make use of NIK’s reports can be called into question. Because there
is room for the maximization of its role as an oversight body, NIK can
be deemed to make a positive, but limited contribution to tax adminis-
tration in Poland, helping to qualify the entire tax collection process in
Poland as an example of partial bureaucratic rationalism.
Meanwhile, in Russia, the Accounts Chamber, accountable to the
Federal Assembly, conducts mostly financial audits, but not perfor-
mance audits. (On the basis of personal experience, NIK is a far more
transparent organization, accessible to outside researchers, than Russia’s
Account Chamber.) The regional upravlenie (administration) was said to
check the tax inspection offices about once every three years, while the-
matic checks could be ordered by the Ministry of Taxes and Dues at the
regional level.242 The Accounts Chamber appears to be underutilized as
239 CBOS, January 2002.
240 Author’s interview with a Tax Chamber Manager, Gdańsk, 26 November 2001.
241 K., L., 16 May 2001. One hundred groszy equal one złoty.
242 Interview with former head of a Moscow tax inspectorate, 5 August 2003.
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an external inspection agency, as only 12 per cent of tax officials in the
2011 Russian Public Officials Survey stated that their organization had
been inspected in the last two years by an Accounts Chamber represen-
tative; Russia’s tax organs, it seems, appear to be much more likely to be
inspected by internal supervisory bodies (see Question #12 in Appendix
II). At the same time, Russian tax bureaucrats have been accused in the
media of massive corruption through VAT refund claims.243
Similarly, in Ukraine, the Accounting Chamber was said in 2006 to
have provided little oversight of the STA, because its reports are often
only read when members of Parliament can use them to support their
points of view.244 Ukraine’s Procuracy and the Accounting Chamber also
were said not to have good contact with one another, because the former
was not reading the latter’s reports. The Accounting Chamber also had
been struggling for seven years to gain the right to check income to the
state, including, especially, the revenue collected by the STA, but it has
only been able to review expenditures made by the state.245 Meanwhile,
the tax administration’s oblast-level offices undergo a complex internal
audit by the STA once every three years.
Despite some of these administrative controls, over the last decade,
society has viewed corruption as a greater problem in all three countries,
as detailed in Chapter 3. In spite of the occasional violation at the bot-
tom of the system, there is a greater perception both from within and
from outside the tax system that corruption tends to occur to a greater
extent at the top of the political system, with laws and tax allowances
or exemptions written with special interest groups in mind. As one Pol-
ish tax chamber office division manager stated, ‘In small offices, small
cases of corruption occur; if someone wants to commit a large crime, he
begins at the top level.’246
Writing generally about the Polish bureaucracy, Antoni Kamiński has
stated that ‘it appears that many loopholes in Polish law, above all eco-
nomic, are not found there for no reason, [and] that the only rationale
for certain laws are the narrow particular interests promoting them. This
results in the covering up of the differences between the public and pri-
vate spheres.’247 The public at large also has had the perception that the
top of the political system – rather than the middle or bottom – is where
selected interest groups receive the most attention. This belief coincides
243 BBC Monitoring, 4 April 2012.
244 Author’s interview with Lavrinenko. 245 Ibid.
246 Author’s interview with Tax Chamber Department Manager, Gdańsk, 26 November
2001. Translation from the Polish by the author.
247 Kamiński, 22 March 1999. Translation from the Polish by the author.
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Table 5.3 Structural design and oversight of tax administrations
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with a 1999 survey in which 75 per cent of Poles deemed that recent pro-
posed tax law changes were written above all for wealthy taxpayers.248
Table 5.3 summarizes the differences in the structural designs and
oversight processes with respect to the three states’ tax administrations.
Computers as Resource Tools
The computerization of the Polish tax administration in the early days
is a perfect example of why the Polish tax system has been an exam-
ple of mixed bureaucratic rationalism. On one hand, computers and
databases have been recognized by the tax system as being necessary
to catalogue cases and to speed up coordination between offices regard-
ing audits of taxpayers. Poland successfully developed and implemented
in 1996 a taxpayer identification number (NIP) system, by which all
entities that possess the status of a taxpayer were assigned numbers. On
the other hand, computerization was implemented slowly in the early
1990s. While work on an information system began in 1989,249 the
system was not complete in the early 1990s, necessitating work being
done by hand.250 The tax offices lacked computer programs to handle
the data accompanying the introduction of the PIT in 1992.251 In the
248 CBOS, 1999. 249 NIK, October 1994, pp. 14 and 38.
250 NIK, April 1993, pp. 35–36; and NIK, June 1993, pp. 7 and 43.
251 NIK, June 1993, p. 8.
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mid-1990s, tax offices lacked a unified information system, which would
provide easier disclosure of tax debtors and a more expedient issue of
titles of seizure.252 A 1997 NIK report on the tax on goods and ser-
vices attributed the delays in accounting most significantly to the lack
of proper preparation of information, with some offices doing book-
keeping by hand and others using different local accounting computer
application programs.253 One tax office department manager remarked
in 2001 that full computerization had existed for only two years while,
since 1994, only records for a few types of taxes were available on a com-
puter system.254
More problematic in 2001 was that the Polish tax audit offices did
not have constant electronic access to the significantly larger databases
of the tax chambers or even to the Ministry of Finance, despite the fact
that the effort to provide access to such data was begun when the tax
audit offices were created in 1992.255 A director of planning, analysis
and information at one tax audit office stated that he would go to the
tax chamber once a year to obtain data on certain taxpayers, writing
down some of the data by hand.256 (Indeed, the problem concerning
the lack of database information was noted in NIK’s first evaluation of
the then-new tax audit offices in 1992 and 1993.257) In addition, nearly
three years after the administrative reform combined territorial provinces
to lower their overall number, one province’s main tax audit office was
found in late 2001 still to have problems linking with its branch office,
which covers the territory of an entire former province, despite the fact
that both offices share the same computer system.258 Moreover, the tax
audit offices also find that they lack funds to buy up-to-date computer
programs such as the LEX legal program, used by revenue inspectors of
criminal investigations.259
Finally, the POLTAX information system still was not completely
implemented in 2001, which one expert at NIK pointed to as a rea-
son arrears are not always collected.260 The delay in the implementation
252 NIK, May 1997, p. 4. 253 NIK, October 1997, p. 54.
254 Author’s interview with a Tax Office Division Leader, Warsaw, 21 November 2001.
255 Author’s interview with Tax Audit Office Director, Bialystok, 4 December 2001; and
NIK, May 2000, p. 3.
256 Author’s interview with Tax Audit Office Department Leader, Gdańsk, 27 November
2001.
257 NIK, December 1994, p. 4.
258 Author’s interview with Tax Audit Office Department Leader, Gdańsk, 27 November
2001.
259 Author’s interview with Manager, Department of Criminal Investigations of Tax Rev-
enue, Tax Audit Office, Gdańsk, 27 November 2001.
260 Author’s interview with Marek Trosiński, Vice Director, Department of the Budget,
NIK, 8 November 2001. Two other reasons given for arrears not being collected were
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of the POLTAX system by a French company in the early 1990s was
explained in part by NIK as being due to the lack of a leader of the
project from the Polish side, the liquidation of a quality control depart-
ment and the refusal of free assistance from the US and Swedish govern-
ments to assess the quality control.261 NIK viewed the process as being
bungled:
The experience connected with the work of preparing and implementing the
complex information system for the service of taxes – within the framework of
the contract with the [French] firm BULL S.A. – shows exactly the lack of effec-
tiveness and efficacy of the actions taken in the Ministry of Finance by a series of
under-secretaries who coordinated the work of organization of the information
system in the department of finances as well as directors of the organizational
entities that created the Council of the Program System POLTAX.262
In short, there was a lack of a unified conception of the goals of the
functioning of the system.263 Nine years after the process of a creating
a unified computerization system for the tax organs, the goals of the
project were found not to be fully realized, the system was found not
to serve all of the tasks of the tax organs, and individual tax offices were
forced to utilize local applications or even to keep records in handwritten
ledgers.264 Hence, for years, full computerization was still a goal to be
realized. (And yet, in Poland, a body external to the Ministry of Finance
and the tax system investigated the issue and published a report freely
available to the public.)
Given the lack of accessible, independent and substantive audits of
Russia’s tax administration, it is difficult to judge how quickly Russia
has computerized its tax administration. While Poland introduced a tax-
payer identification number (TIN) system in 1996, Russia had such a
system in place from the beginning of the transition period for legal
entities, while in 1996–1997, such TIN numbers were distributed for
individual persons.265 However, a single state register of all commer-
cial legal entities, numbering 3.2 million enterprises on 1 July 2002,
was not completed until the end of 2002, after some 1.5 million firms
had been re-registered.266 Computerization varied across the country
at the beginning of the Putin era, with project regions having more
the facts that the tax offices have a lot of work and that many tax cheats work too
quickly for the system.
261 NIK, January 1996, p. 19.
262 Ibid., p. 20. Translation from the Polish by the author.
263 NIK, May 2001, p. 10. 264 Ibid., p. 10.
265 Interview with acting head of the division of methodology, Department of Moderniza-
tion of the Tax Organs, Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 22 July 2003.
266 Bureau of Economic Analysis, p. 5. Translation from the Russian by the author.
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up-to-date equipment and more computers than the others. For
Moscow, there was a computer network by the mid-2000s, but the tax
administration was said to be still working on such a network across the
country.267 Despite the fact that all tax offices are part of the same federal
organization, there have been different computer programs used across
the country; at first, within Moscow, for example, different programs
were tested at different inspectorates, but now all within the capital have
the same program.268 Another project, the ‘System of Electronic Pro-
cessing of Information of the [Inspection offices of the Ministry of Taxes
and Dues] at the local level’, had set as its impressive goal the presenta-
tion by 50 per cent of taxpayers of their accounts in electronic form by
the end of 2003.269 In 2011, a consultative call centre for Moscow tax-
payers was said to have opened; in 2012, individual taxpayers were able
to submit their tax documents electronically to the Unified Registration
Centre; and in 2014, an electronic submission service was launched for
corporate taxpayers.270
Former Minister of Taxes and Dues Bukayev also may have been espe-
cially interested in automating the tax system, as he introduced an auto-
mated system of recording taxpayers, their incomes, their real estate and
their personal assets while previously serving as the head of Bashkor-
tostan’s Tax Inspectorate in the late 1990s. (Under his direction, the
Bashkir tax officials began to complete the tax forms themselves and
then send them to taxpayers – all in violation of federal law.271) Hence,
what evidence does exist on Russia’s computerization activities suggest
that, as in Poland, the process has not been smooth, but unlike Poland,
it is not uniform across the country. And, as success has been made in
computerizing taxpayer data, new problems also have arisen for the tax
administration. In November 2005, after a leak of some sort from the
tax service, a database for 2004 incomes and other personal information
of Moscow city and oblast taxpayers began to be sold around the capital
for as little as U.S.$50 on a compact disc.272
In Ukraine, meanwhile, there is some similarity to the Polish situa-
tion with respect to the degree of access to taxpayer databases. The Tax
Police have access to all databases, while the tax inspection offices have
no access to the Tax Police databases.273
267 Interview with former head of a Moscow tax inspectorate, 5 August 2003.
268 Ibid. 269 Bureau of Economic Analysis, p. 4.
270 Prime-TASS News, 23 November 2010; Prime-TASS News, 14 March 2011; and
Medetsky.
271 Kochetov.
272 RFE/RL Newsline, 15 November 2005; and Moscow Times, 17 November 2005.
273 Author’s interview with State Tax Inspector, in a Ukrainian oblast, Ukraine, 20 May
2011.
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Personnel Resources
The tax administrations in these three countries are large entities. As
mentioned in Chapter 3, in Poland, tax administration employees com-
posed 35.3 per cent of all civil servants in the country in 2013.274 In
Russia, the head of the Personnel Directorate of the Federal Tax Service
stated in 2015 that the staff limit for the Russian Federal Tax Service
was 154,000.275 In Ukraine, by the end of 2000, the STA already had
personnel of 56,500, making it the largest single administrative body in
the country.276 In many ways, to study the state, one has to study the tax
administration.
‘[R]evenue collection practices are nevertheless by comparison with
more advanced countries considerably labour-intensive, which explains
in part the very low salaries on offer to tax officials’, Highfield and Baer
wrote with respect to Russia in 2000. ‘Not surprisingly, and in line with
experience in other transition and developing economies, this has fuelled
an environment for corrupt practices which have served to undermine
respect for government and the institutions concerned.’277
Part of building an effective civil service within the tax bureaucracies
is recruiting state officials in a competitive process to compose impar-
tial personnel. As one Polish tax chamber head put it, ‘The role of the
bureaucrat in Poland is to be [part of] a cultured, white-collar, merit-
based service.’278 Such personnel are provided in a number of ways in
Poland but appear to be lacking in Russia and Ukraine. By 2004, nearly
half of the civil service corps in Poland comprises personnel from the
fiscal administration.279
First, top positions within the Polish tax administration offices are
filled by an open, competitive process.280 (For example, two out of three
heads of tax chambers interviewed in 2001 received their positions via
such a process; the third had been in the position since a time that
274 Ministry of Finance, 2014, p. 12.
275 ‘Interview with the head of the Personnel Directorate of the Federal Tax Service
of Russia Igor Shevchenko’, accessed 21 February 2016 at <http://www.fa.ru/
faculty/nin/news/Pages/2015–04–02-intervyu-s-nachalnikom-upravleniya-kadrov-
federalnoy-nalogovoy-sluzhby-rossii-shevchenko-igorem-viktorovichem.aspx>.
276 Fritz, p. 163. 277 Highfield and Baer, p. 10.
278 Author’s interview with a Tax Chamber Director, Warsaw, 15 November 2001.
279 Ministry of Finance, 2004b, p. 48.
280 Despite these advances, however, the European Union in its October 2002 report on
the progress of EU candidates specifically criticized Poland for suspending a civil ser-
vice law to permit the recruitment of high-level administrative staff without an open
competitive process of selection, which was perceived by some as a direct reference to
the ruling coalition’s decision earlier in the year to pack the Agency for Restructuring
and Modernization of Agriculture with ‘political cronies.’ (RFE/RL Poland, Belarus
and Ukraine Report, 15 October 2002.)
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pre-dated such competitions.) While required by law in Russia, the hir-
ing of top officials in the tax administration by competition does not
exist in practice, with personal connections viewed as the best way to
get a job within the tax service.281 Within one Ukraine oblast, com-
petitions for positions requiring higher education degrees were said to
exist in 2011, but all senior managers in the tax administration were said
to be appointed solely by connections and in accord with the classical
Ukrainian principle of ‘kum, brat, svat’, or ‘godfather, brother, friend’,
as one tax inspector relayed:
For example, the previous chairman of our regional tax administration was
a native of Donetsk (like our president [Yanukovych]). When he came to
power, the heads of our most ‘profitable’ departments were dismissed, and were
replaced by the relatives and friends of our chairman (for example, they took
charge of audit management, legal, personnel, foreign economic activity and
other departments.) Also, half of the heads of the regional (raion) tax inspec-
tion offices were replaced by Donetsk newcomers. In addition, the nephew and
brother of the chairman were appointed department heads.282
Second, in Poland, in the tax audit offices, inspectors, who usually have
a higher education degree, must endure three years of training plus pass-
ing an exam before starting work.283 Moreover, to provide an incen-
tive for the inspectors on the job, a ranking system within each province
was established for the inspectors, who numbered 1,519 when the tax
audit offices came into existence in 1992 and numbered around 2,500
in 2001.284
In Russia, tax administration employees usually come from the mili-
tary and are used to working for the government, or they are young peo-
ple who come only for two to three years of experience and then leave for
the private sector.285 Most of the workers in the Russian tax organs had
middle (technical) educational backgrounds when the Law on State Ser-
vice was introduced in 1995, which mandated higher education degrees
for high-level positions. Therefore, since 1998, such workers have been
281 Author’s interview with former head of a Moscow tax inspectorate, August 5, 2003;
Interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel, Min-
istry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, August 8, 2003; and e-mail correspondence with
Moscow-based lawyer on 26 January 2016.
282 Author’s interview with State Tax Inspector, in a Ukrainian oblast, Ukraine, 20 May
2011.
283 Author’s interview with former head of a Moscow tax inspectorate, 5 August 2003;
and Interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel,
Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 8 August 2003.
284 NIK, December 1994, p. 3; and Interview with Senior Specialist, Department of Anal-
ysis of Tax Control, Ministry of Finance, Warsaw, 1 October 2001.
285 Author’s interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel,
Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 8 August 2003.
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given the opportunity to pursue higher education.286 In the tax admin-
istration, employees receive additional training not less than once every
five years.287
Despite this, the Main Audit Administration of the President evalu-
ated the performance of the Russian tax organs and cited the low quali-
fications of tax administration employees as the main reason for the poor
levels of tax collection in 2002. More than 30 per cent of tax workers
in the regions were said to lack higher education.288 Similarly, while up
until 1995 the education level of tax police officers was very high, the
quality of the tax police workers became worse and worse with respect
to hiring those with higher education as the 1990s wore on.289
Tax morality among Russian officials may not be uniformly high across
the tax administration. In the 2011 Russian Public Officials Survey,
nearly one in four refused to state that they would follow the tax laws
even if they did not consider them to be fair (Question #22 in Appendix
I). This response from officials working in the tax administration to
uphold Russian law and to ensure compliance with the tax laws is even
slightly worse than the responses to similar questions asked of Polish tax-
payers at large in 2004 and 2010 (also Question #22.) Further, roughly
one in five Russian tax officials failed to state in the 2011 survey that
they would not evade taxes if they were sure they could get away with it
(Question #16 in Appendix I); nearly one in five did not disagree that
they could avoid paying taxes if they knew for sure that they would not
receive a serious punishment (Question #17); nearly one in five stated
either that there were many dishonest tax co-workers or that it was too
difficult to say (Question #3); and approximately one in four stated affir-
matively that if the state does not fulfil its obligations to its citizens, then
tax evasion is justified (Question #28.)
Further, while still significant in 2011, the number of tax officials who
recognized a place for dishonesty in the workplace might have gone down
over the decade before. In 2001, Pryadilnikov and Danilova found that
46 per cent of Moscow tax inspectors and 56 per cent of Nizhniy Nov-
gorod tax inspectors agreed that it was impossible under current circum-
stances for tax officials to work honestly.290
Third, being impartial also means withstanding outside influence. Of
the more than 45 bureaucrats in the Polish Ministry of Finance and
tax–related offices interviewed in the fall of 2001, none mentioned any
286 Author’s interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel,
Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 21 June 2003.
287 Ibid. 288 Lyashenko.
289 Former assistant to deputy head of Moscow City Tax Police, Moscow, 28 July 2003.
290 Pryadilnikov and Danilova, pp. 27–28.
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party affiliation and several stated that as civil servants, their job was to
be politically neutral. Neutrality also appeared to mean having no con-
tact with outside groups. Outside of the tax system, tax office and tax
chamber heads meet with the local and regional governments regard-
ing economic growth and planning of budgetary income levels, but that
appeared to be it. Meanwhile, in Russia, while the 1995 Law on State
Service requires political neutrality on the part of officials, in reality,
there is no mechanism to prevent political party affiliations.291 More-
over, the influx of those with military backgrounds is thought to provide
a branding of political allegiance of a common sort.
Fourth, a problem for the bureaucracy and for the tax administrative
offices is that the level of pay is relatively low compared with job oppor-
tunities within the private sector. ‘Bureaucrats, who have reached a rel-
atively high position, do not compare their salary with the national aver-
age’, writes Antoni Kamiński, ‘but with the incomes of representatives
of the private sector.’292 Salaries in Poland tend to be similar between
the state and the private sector for entry-level positions, but the higher
up one goes in the tax bureaucracy, the larger the difference in pay with
the private sector.293 Indeed, accounting firms are able to hire the best
people, depleting the tax system of its best and brightest.294 Often those
outside the system know the tax laws better than the bureaucrats, and
those who have viewed the system from the outside criticize it for its
paucity of good specialized experts on different aspects of tax and finan-
cial law.295 The structure of the system should be altered to allow such
specialists to exist.
A related problem, NIK found in the 1990s, at least with respect
to those working on the indirect taxes, is that the number of person-
nel in the tax system is too small to handle the accounting and book-
keeping required to audit those taxpayers declaring a tax refund, espe-
cially for taxes such as the VAT.296 This finding occurred despite the
fact that, as mentioned earlier, the number of staff positions had been
growing.
291 Author’s interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel,
Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 8 August 2003.
292 Kamiński, 22 March 1999. Translation from the Polish by the author.
293 Author’s interview with a Tax Chamber Department Manager, Warsaw, 15 November
2001.
294 Author’s interview with Robert Gwiadowski, Tax Lawyer, Expert for Adam Smith
Centre, 21 September 2001.
295 Author’s interviews with Gwiadowski; and a tax lawyer, Andersen, Warsaw, 18 Decem-
ber 2001.
296 NIK, October 1997, p. 61.
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Similarly, in Russia, young people come into the system, get educa-
tion and then leave for the business world.297 Turnover of cadre is high
everywhere and at all levels of the system, due to the low salaries and
the fact that it is hard to find replacements in the more rural areas.298
As a former head of the Ministry’s Department of Personnel put it, ‘the
salaries do not stimulate the process of preparing smart, driven people to
work in the bureaucracy’.299 Indeed, the 2011 Public Officials’ Survey
found that 53 per cent and 52 per cent of tax officials viewed insufficient
staffing levels and low salaries, respectively, as restricting their organi-
zation from working effectively. Combined with insufficient quality of
legislation, these were the most popular reasons offered for a less than
effective tax administration (Question #11 in Appendix II).
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, despite the fact that Yushchenko was brought
to power in large part by hundreds of thousands of protesters clamouring
for a more accountable, competent state, the quality, skills, and educa-
tion of the STA personnel were said in 2006 still to be poor, according to
local tax lawyers who interact regularly with tax offices.300 Few tax offi-
cials are regarded by these lawyers as having a good understanding of tax
legislation. When invited by local, private accounting firms to seminars
on tax legislation and international practices, STA bureaucrats initially
say yes, recognizing the educational value of such meetings, but they
eventually decline the offers, presumably after speaking with higher offi-
cials in their organization.301 Further, there has been a lack of stable and
experienced cadres because most bureaucrats work at the STA for only
a year before heading off to higher-paying jobs in the private sector and
because those who were present at the start of the transition are not still
with the STA.302 However, in the STA’s view, there has been an increase
in the quality of tax cadre workers, and there has been a concerted effort
in recent years to implement competitions for senior positions within the
STA in the provinces.303
297 Author’s interview with former head of a Moscow tax inspectorate, 5 August 2003.
298 Author’s interview with former head of the Department of Civil Service and Personnel,
Ministry of Taxes and Dues, Moscow, 21 June 2003 and 8 August 2003.
299 Ibid.
300 Author’s interviews with senior associate, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four inter-
national accounting firms, Kyiv, 26 October 2005; and with partner, tax and legal
services, leading international accounting firm, Kyiv, 27 July 2006.
301 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international account-
ing firm, Kyiv, 1 August 2006.
302 Author’s interview with tax manager, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four international
accounting firms, Kyiv, 26 July 2006.
303 Author’s interview with senior tax official, Modernization Department, State Tax
Administration of Ukraine, Kyiv, 10 August 2005.
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At the same time, the application of Russian tax laws has been deemed
to vary so significantly from one office to another that at least one foreign
investor, Andrei Movchan, chief executive of the Third Rome Invest-
ment Fund, relayed at a conference that his firm discusses with their
investors to which tax office they should go.304
Similarly, Ukrainian and foreign enterprises often have chosen to
locate their main offices in certain districts of a province or in certain sec-
tions of a large city such as Kyiv in order to have a constructive and trans-
parent dialogue with better-qualified tax bureaucrats, because there has
been a widely held belief that the quality of tax bureaucrats varies widely
from one tax office to another.305 With large numbers of tax returns,
the occasional lack of basic stationery goods, and the absence of inter-
nationally recognized computer software for tracking tax returns, some
local STA offices have given the impression of disorganization behind the
counters.306 The variation across offices is further shown by the fact that
in recent years, offices in a few districts have made tremendous improve-
ments through more training of personnel and the procurement of new
computer equipment, enabling them to be better equipped to distin-
guish between fraudulent and legitimate taxpayers and to impress some
taxpayers with significant levels of sophistication.307
Thus, while in all three countries, low salaries compared with the mar-
ketplace hamper the tax systems from performing at their best, the tran-
sition has brought higher criteria and impartial measures for hiring per-
sonnel that are able to withstand outside influence in Poland to a greater
extent than in Russia and Ukraine.
Finally, an organization’s internal culture can suppress efforts by
employees to make the system work better. One tax inspector in
Ukraine complained that initiative is punished, rather than rewarded or
encouraged.308
Table 5.4 summarizes the human resources available in the three
states’ tax administrations.
304 Vasilyeva.
305 Author’s interview with senior partner, leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, 3 August
2006; and telephone interview with president, leading foreign business association,
Kyiv, 10 August 2006. Similarly, judges across the country vary in terms of their exper-
tise in tax legislation. Judges in Kyiv are deemed to be better equipped with handling
tax issues due to their higher volume of cases.
306 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international account-
ing firm, Kyiv, 1 August 2006.
307 Author’s telephone interview with president, leading foreign business association, Kyiv,
10 August 2006.
308 Author’s interview with State Tax Inspector, in a Ukrainian Oblast, Ukraine, 20 May
2011.
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Table 5.4 Human resources in tax administrations
Poland Russia Ukraine
Findings  Civil service
personnel:




















 Personnel: poor quality,
skills and education
 Yanukovych filled top
positions with Donetsk
natives
 Few tax officials
understand laws well
 Firms choose to locate
main offices in certain




More citizen-based More coercive Weakly coercive
Conclusion
Such a discussion of the structural means of preventing corruption
of bureaucrats brings the topic back full circle to the Weberian ide-
als of a rational bureaucracy staffed by independent, professional
employees. In comparing Poland, Russia and Ukraine’s tax administra-
tions, we can look at how rational and society-oriented they are with
respect to their historical references, structures, human resources and work
philosophy.
 Historical References: Poland’s rational structural design draws upon its
inter-war past for some of its current institutions, whereas Russia and
Ukraine, to a lesser extent, appear lately to be drawing on some aspects
of Soviet bureaucratic administration in an effort to obtain strong hier-
archical control at the expense of bureaucratic autonomy.
 Structures: Poland’s tax administration has maintained a structure that
has direct lines of subordination both between offices and within them.
The uniquely separate, but integrated, position of the tax audit offices
in Poland, though, does not always provide smooth interactions with
the other tax administration components, suggesting that the struc-
ture is not completely rational. Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s
there appear to have been insufficient barriers placed on Russia and
Ukraine’s tax inspectors as they interacted with taxpayers. Poland also
has an external watchdog organization (NIK) that actually produces
critical financial and performance audit reports, available to the public
(unlike Russia’s and Ukraine’s accounts chambers).
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 Human Resources: Poland’s tax administration has utilized different
employee training techniques to control how the new taxes were to
work.
 Work Philosophy: The methods by which the Polish authorities work,
and how they educate the public about tax procedures, appear to be
more compliance-driven and less focused on reaching a monetary tar-
get than in Russia and Ukraine – a philosophy that tends to treat the
taxpayers more as clients.
In short, in the model of Poland’s tax bureaucracy, a mixture of successes
and failures with respect to the use of its historical reference points, struc-
tures, human resources and work philosophy – all oriented towards improv-
ing the trust that taxpayers have in the tax administration – combine
to produce a case of partial bureaucratic rationalism. Meanwhile, a less
successful mix of these Weberian components produced a lower level
of bureaucratic rationalism on the part of the Russian tax administra-
tion in the 1990s, with some significant reform successes in the past
couple of years. Poland has thus opted for rationalizing the tax bureau-
crats, whereas Russia has sought to empower them so that the state can be
perceived as holding power over society – ordinary taxpayers and busi-
nesses alike. Ukraine has similarly sought to empower the tax bureaucra-
cies with some ‘strengthening’ of their powers over Ukrainian taxpayers
under Yanukovych, but still to a lesser extent historically than in Russia.
Moreover, the Polish model also shows that a state agency not only
needs to be internally strong and autonomous from outside groups in
order to get the job done; it must also involve society by creating citizens’
trust in the tax collection agencies through mechanisms such as ‘audit-
free’ filings, tax office information booths and other means of public
outreach. A strong structure alone does not produce effective implemen-
tation of tax collection policies. Nor should effective internal oversight
or a unified esprit de corps be seen as preferable or contrary to being
an outward-focused state agency. The two approaches – internally and
externally motivated – go hand in hand.
Finally, the fact that for a short time there was significant progress
in two Russian provinces (Nizhny Novgorod and Volgograd) suggests
that Russian tax offices can perform in a rational bureaucratic manner
once comprehensive reforms are initiated to overhaul the power relation-
ship between tax bureaucrat and taxpayer, from one based principally on
coercion to one based largely on trust, through ‘audit-free’ filings. The
Russians clearly are capable of building effective Weberian state agencies
as well, provided Moscow allows it.
As the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian paths and methods of gover-
nance diverged during the course of the transition – and became more
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distinct during the Putin era – comparing how bureaucrats collect taxes
does help illustrate that a state that seeks to ‘impose power’ may not be as
effective as one that engages with society on more equal terms. ‘Empow-
ering’ bureaucrats so that the state will be ‘strengthened’ vis-à-vis society
may not provide as successful an implementation of state policy in the
long run as an approach based upon ‘rationalizing’ the state.
With respect to the Russian state, one of course can ponder whether
historical patterns of governance from the distant past have any saliency
for Russia’s more coercive style of governance today. Yanni Kotsonis has
described the pressure placed on tax collectors in the early eighteenth
century to address the arrears that appeared with the very first poll taxes
in the 1720s. The tax collectors, he writes, ‘were the only people with
whom the government interacted directly. It was easy to not only focus
on them but also assume that they were causal factors in the arrears;
any other causes were invisible. The collectors in each region and estate
were regularly accused of corruption and then arrested, flogged and
exiled . . . Empress Anna was especially fond of blaming the collectors,
and large punitive detachments rounded up the tax farmers, the bailiffs
on state lands, the gentry’s managers, and the peasant elder and beat
them with whips and birch rods. Some were executed. Even noblemen
who withheld their serfs’ taxes were arrested, but the practice was dis-
continued because noblemen tended to die in prison at a high rate.’309 In
spite of such terror, Kotsonis remarks, the arrears under Empress Anna
Ivanovna were never collected. While tax collectors are no longer treated
in such a manner, the focus on collection target goals appears to be just
as strong today.
309 Kotsonis, pp. 49–50.
6 Citizens, Subjects and Slackers and
Paying Taxes
To function properly and to provide for the welfare and security of its cit-
izens, every state must undertake the critical task of raising revenue from
its populace. When it comes to collecting taxes, the most critical ingre-
dient, no doubt, is the attainment of a sufficient level of compliance on
the part of society. Citizens must agree to the levels of taxation required
of them and must file tax returns accordingly. Payment of one’s dues to
the state is the hallmark of becoming a citizen, and it is a duty that all cit-
izens, including those in the new states that emerged from communism
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, must take up.
In gauging specifically how well residents in new states such as Poland,
Russia and Ukraine become true citizens, who are capable of fulfilling
their obligations to their governments, it is necessary to measure how
compliant the populace is with taxes.
The Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys of 2004, 2005, 2010,
2012 and 2015 (see Appendix I), introduced in Chapter 4, indicate not
only that the Polish polity is far more willing and compliant in its attitude
towards paying taxes than the Russian and Ukrainian polities are, but
also that Russians respond to their state with greater fear of deterrence,
albeit perhaps more in 2004 than in 2010, while Ukrainians, showing
the lowest levels of support for obeying the law, react to state efforts to
increase tax compliance with less fear and little trust, especially in 2005.1
The important question, then, becomes ‘why?’ Why are Poland, Rus-
sia and Ukraine so dramatically different attitudinally with respect to
paying one’s share to the government? Where does such tax compliance
(or lack thereof) actually come from?
This chapter will address this question. Three main theories of tax-
payer compliance will be explained. First, I will consider the deterrence
1 Great care was given to ensure that the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian survey questions
were as equivalent as possible in terms of meaning and interpretation. Final versions of
the questions were made in consultation with linguistic specialists at each survey firm to
make sure that all survey questions were worded naturally for the ears of native speakers
and equivalent in meaning to the questions used in the other country surveys.
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theory, which emphasizes that those governments eager to extract tax
revenues from society should provide the public with sufficient fear of
the consequences if one does not pay. Second, notions of trust in govern-
ment to provide goods and in other fellow citizens to pay their fair share
(also referred to as the theory of ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’) will be
examined. And, third, paying taxes on the basis of prior experience and
interaction with the tax authorities will be explained through a theory
that suggests that obeying the law is dependent upon prior encounters
with the tax bureaucracy.
These theories will be tested utilizing the Polish (2004 and 2010),
Russian (2004 and 2010) and Ukrainian (2005, 2010 and 2015) Tax-
payer Compliance Attitudinal Survey data. The findings suggest that an
important aspect of the theory of ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ that relies
on taxpayers’ trust in their government to fulfil its obligations to society
holds up well in all of the surveys. Within the Russian and Ukrainian
2004–2005 surveys (but not the Polish 2004 survey), the deterrence the-
ory, however, was shown to be just as significant, but had an even greater
effect in increasing the predicted likelihood of expressing support for tax
compliance in the Russian 2004 survey. In the 2010 Polish, Russian and
Ukrainian surveys and in the 2015 Ukrainian survey, in contrast, citi-
zens’ trust in their states mattered more across the board in accounting
for why taxpayers would support complying with tax laws.
Furthermore, with respect to examining the impact of having had
prior interaction with bureaucrats, the results are quite different for
the three cases and across the multiple surveys, as they show that
the nature of the past conduct of the tax officials can make a crit-
ical difference in terms of future support for complying with tax
laws.
How Do Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Attitudes Differ
with Respect to Paying Taxes?
While nearly equivalent percentages of respondents to the Poland and
Russia Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys conducted in 2004,
79 per cent and 71 per cent, respectively, stated that a citizen should
always follow the tax laws even if he or she considers them to be unfair
(Question #21), only 57 per cent of Ukrainians in 2005 stated the same.
Figures for the 2010 surveys were quite similar: 81 per cent of Poles and
74 per cent of Russians in 2010 stated that a citizen should always follow
the tax laws even if he or she considers them to be unfair, while only
64 per cent of Ukrainians in 2010 concurred. (The corresponding fig-
ures for Ukraine in 2012 and 2015 were stable at 59 and 61 per cent,
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respectively.) Hence, obligations for citizens are viewed as significantly
more limited by Ukrainians.
Interestingly, though, in both Russia and Ukraine (but not in Poland),
there is a dramatic difference when it comes to whether individuals state
that they would follow the tax laws even if they personally did not con-
sider them to be fair. Whereas 83 per cent of Poles in 2004 (and a similar
77 per cent in 2010) would follow the tax laws in such cases, only 53 per
cent of Russians in 2004 (and a nearly identical 52 per cent of Russians
in 2010) and 36 per cent of Ukrainians in 2005 (and a somewhat similar
44, 39 and 45 per cent of Ukrainians in 2010, 2012 and 2015) would
do the same (Question #22). Expressed another way, and as shown in
Appendix III, when compared with the answers to Question #26 regard-
ing whether or not the respondent viewed his or her country’s tax laws as
fair, in 2010, a minimum of 12 per cent of Poles, a minimum of 21 per
cent of Russians and a minimum of 37 per cent of Ukrainians (42 per
cent in 2012 and 37 per cent in 2015) did not appear to have any inten-
tion of complying with their countries’ tax laws. Hence, in both Russia
and Ukraine, there appears to be a disconnect between what obligations
individuals believe to exist for citizens at large and what individuals state
that they would do personally, and this has been sustained throughout
the era of President Vladimir Putin in Russia. Such a disconnect between
citizens’ and one’s own personal obligations does not appear to exist in
Poland.
Other findings of the surveys indicate that the disconnect between cit-
izens and their state is greater in Ukraine than in Russia. For example,
remarkably, according to the survey (Question #36), far fewer Ukraini-
ans (9 per cent in 2005; 10 per cent in 2010; 13 per cent in 2012; and
13 per cent in 2015) than Russians (38 per cent in 2004 and 46 per cent
in 2010) stated that they knew the correct personal income flat tax rate,
suggesting a populace that is further removed from the activity of the
state.2
Clearly, Poland’s population differs dramatically from those of Russia
and Ukraine with respect to attitudes on fulfilling tax obligations to the
state, and generally Ukrainians appear to be less compliant attitudinally
than their neighbours to both the East and West. It is also extremely
important to note that in Ukraine the 2005 survey came exactly one year
after the Orange Revolution and that the 2015 survey came some twenty
months after the EuroMaidan Revolution. Despite the efforts of those
2 An additional factor might also contribute some lack of knowledge of the PIT rate in
Ukraine: Ukrainian legislation allows an ‘entrepreneurial’ flat tax of as little as 200 hryv-
nia (or U.S.$40) per month, for which any self-employed individual qualifies.
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who organized the extraordinary 2004 and 2014 events to bring in a gov-
ernment more accountable to the people, Ukrainian citizens appeared to
have the lowest levels of support for paying taxes to their state.3 This sug-
gests that the efforts to re-make the citizen–state relationship in Ukraine
towards more mutually constructive ends for both state and society will
remain a tremendous challenge for Ukraine’s political leaders.4
Obviously, these survey figures are tricky measurements, complicated
especially by the fact that this is the first set of survey questions designed
to test tax compliance theories in these states, all of which have a his-
tory of authoritarian rule. Moreover, the surveys were taken just at two
points in time in Poland and Russia and four points in time in Ukraine.
Further, any reforms or improvements with respect to tax law or tax
procedures undertaken in recent years by the state may not have caught
up in the minds of respondents as they form their current overall atti-
tudes towards paying taxes. In addition, while attitudinal decisions are
important components of behaviour, surveying attitudes towards com-
pliance is not precisely the same as measuring tax compliance itself.5
Finally, of course, as discussed in greater length earlier in Chapter 4, the
Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey Question #22, chosen as the
main dependent variable for analysis in this chapter, seeks to replicate as
3 The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has found a similar low level of support
for paying taxes on the part of Ukrainian firms. Only 16 per cent of respondents in the
IFC’s 2004 survey of some 2,800 small and medium-sized businesses stated that they
paid their taxes in full the previous year, with 20 per cent stating that they underreported
their income by more than 20 per cent (IFC, 2004, p. 58). A year later, the IFC found
in its 2005 survey that only 18 per cent indicated that companies similar to theirs did
not underreport revenue for tax purposes and that one in four respondents who under-
reported revenue estimated that the amount concealed from tax was more than 50 per
cent (IFC, 2005, p. 29).
4 It should be noted that the survey taken in Ukraine came at a time of relative economic
strength compared with the 1990s, but that Ukraine’s strong economic growth did slow
in 2005. (According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) website, the rate of GDP
growth for Ukraine in 2004 was 12.1 per cent, while in 2005 the rate is estimated to
have been 2.4 per cent.) Meanwhile, the stark differences between the Polish and Rus-
sian states are even more remarkable considering that the surveys were undertaken at a
time in which there was a relative downturn in the Polish economy and a time of rela-
tive strength in the Russian economy in comparison with previous years. (According to
figures compiled from EIU data, the average GDP growth rate for Poland from 2001 to
2005 was 3.0 per cent, whereas the average for Russia was 6.1 per cent and for Ukraine
7.7 per cent over the same period. This contrasts with average GDP growth rates of
3.73 per cent for Poland from 1991 to 2000, and -3.61 per cent and -7.71 per cent over
the same period for Russia and Ukraine.)
5 The limitations of such survey data should be emphasized here: Survey data reflects what
respondents tell interviewers rather than actual compliance; hence, further research such
as individual-level data over time constructed from tax returns or audit results would be
required to make the link more conclusively.
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much of a real world scenario as much as possible, one in which individ-
uals choose every day to follow the tax laws or not, even in cases where
they disagree with them.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Russian and Ukrainian publics are
with their state to a significant degree less with respect to fulfilling their
citizenship obligations and paying their tax dues than the Polish public.
The question, then, is why?
Why Do Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Attitudes Differ
Dramatically with Respect to Paying Taxes?
Within social science, there is a lack of consensus as to which conceptual
model or theory best explains variation in taxpayer compliance. There
are few activities that governments engage in that pose more difficulties
with respect to issues of trust and compliance than tax collection. States
generally can take three main approaches, none of which are mutually
exclusive, to improve tax compliance on the part of their citizens – deter
taxpayers into complying by fear of punishment, gain citizen trust so
that taxpayers will comply quasi-voluntarily, and improve ‘customer ser-
vice’ by emphasizing procedural fairness as the tax system interacts with
taxpayers. For a compliant society interacting with a citizen-based state,
the expectations would be that tax compliance depends largely on trust
in the state and/or satisfaction with tax bureaucrats’ level of customer
service from prior encounters. For a society interacting with a deterrent-
based approach to tax collection, tax compliance would be expected to
depend largely on citizens’ being susceptible to deterrence.
Generally speaking, with respect to the tax policy area, Poland’s tax
administration has a work philosophy that is more compliance-driven
and outward-focused. The tax system there is less focused on reaching a
monetary target, which promotes a philosophy that treats taxpayers more
like clients. Meanwhile, in Russia and Ukraine, the focus has been more
target-driven, which makes tax inspectors merely try to fulfil quarterly
or yearly targets and go after those taxpayers who have already paid, as
more revenue can be obtained from those known to have it.
The Deterrence Model
Economists, as Joel Slemrod has explained, by and large have viewed the
task of tax collection as a problem of ‘rational decision making under
uncertainty’ – one in which ‘cheating on your taxes is a gamble that
either pays off in lower taxes or, with some probability, subjects you
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to sanctions’.6 The assumption, then, within the Hobbesian deterrence
model is that the fear of being detected or punished by the coercive pow-
ers of government embodied in the tax administration will reduce illegal
or noncompliant behaviour for the betterment of society at large. The
model also suggests that compliance will increase as the odds of being
detected and the penalties for tax evasion also increase. Hence, only out
of rational self-interest will citizens comply with the will of their state.
According to the results of the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Sur-
veys, when asked what they would do if the risk of punishment was com-
pletely taken away, 53 per cent of Poles in 2004 (47 per cent of Poles
in 2010), 40 per cent of Russians in 2004 (45 per cent of Russians in
2010) and 34 per cent of Ukrainians in 2005 (38 per cent of Ukrainians
in 2010; 29 per cent of Ukrainians in 2012; and 39 per cent of Ukraini-
ans in 2015) stated that they personally would be more likely to evade
paying taxes if they thought they could get away with it (Question #16 in
Appendix I.) Hence, more Poles than Russians and Ukrainians seem to
indicate that on an attitude basis, at least, they would be more responsive
to a relaxation of a punishment risk.7 Later, I will explore how signifi-
cant a susceptibility to a relaxation of deterrent measures is in explaining
differences in overall attitudes towards tax compliance.8
6 Slemrod, p. 2.
7 When adding in those who stated that it was ‘difficult to say’, the totals for the Polish,
Russian and Ukrainian survey responses to Question #16 are the same. Nevertheless,
one possible reason for the disparity between Poles, Russians and Ukrainians on the
issue of evasion without risk of punishment might be different connotations of what
it means to evade. Perhaps for some Poles ‘evasion’ could mean hiding some taxable
income, while for Russians it might be non-payment altogether. Further surveys testing
attitudes towards different gradations of cheating might be beneficial here.
8 While this Question #16 and that chosen for the dependent variable in the logit analysis
(Question #22) both ask respondents about tax evasion, the concepts behind the ques-
tions are theoretically distinct. Asking individuals whether they would be more likely to
evade taxes if there were no punitive consequences is not the same as asking whether they
would evade a tax law personally deemed unfair (or one they disagreed with) regardless
of whether the state employed deterrent force or not. The former question asks about
individuals’ views on the effectiveness of removing the risk of punishment for themselves
personally, while the latter asks about the extent to which personal notions of fairness
(regardless as to what those personal notions of fairness actually are or how they differ
from individual to individual) could outweigh the fulfilment of the civic duty to pay one’s
share in taxes. Hence, the first question is about deterrence and parses out deterrence as
to whether it works at all or not. The model shows the impact of deterrence – how big
is that impact on compliance with tax laws that one deems to be unfair, that one disagrees
with. Indeed, in examining the distribution of the variables constructed from Questions
#16 and 22 to be used in the logit analysis, for example in the 2004–2005 surveys, the
responses are not clustered together. Roughly 12 per cent of Russians surveyed would
neither obey tax laws nor evade if they knew there would be no punishment, roughly
25 per cent of Russians would not obey tax laws and would evade if they knew there
would be no punishment, 38 per cent of Russian would obey tax laws and would not
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The Two Trusts
Other social scientists have begun to argue within the last twenty years
that the payment of taxes constitutes a transaction made on the basis
of trust, which comes in two forms: trust of the government to provide
goods and services to its citizens and trust in other citizens to also pay
their own taxes. Citizens and the state will benefit if such trust can be
maintained.
Margaret Levi, in Of Rule and Revenue, has introduced the con-
cept of quasi-voluntary compliance with respect to the payment of
taxes to the state in a manner that reduces the costs of enforcement.
‘[Quasi-voluntary compliance] is voluntary’, she writes, ‘because taxpay-
ers choose to pay. It is quasi-voluntary because the noncompliant are
subject to coercion – if they are caught.’9 To occur, quasi-voluntary com-
pliance requires the two forms of trust previously mentioned. ‘Quasi-
voluntary compliance’, she continues, ‘will occur only when taxpayers
have confidence that (1) rulers will keep their bargains and (2) the other
constituents will keep theirs.’10 Hence, taxpayers will comply in a quasi-
voluntary manner if they have some confidence and relative certainty that
the state will provide the goods (and/or services) that it has promised and
if the taxpayers also have similar confidence and certainty that others are
also complying with the state so that the goods (and/or services) will be
paid for. (An additional, important component of trust in the state is of
a more moral, less material nature – trust that the state acts and will act
fairly towards its citizens.)11
Once quasi-voluntary compliance declines, Levi is very pessimistic
about the opportunities to reconstitute and rebuild it. Re-establishing
it, she concludes, ‘often requires an extraordinary event – such as war,
revolution, or depression – that makes people willing to negotiate a new
evade if they knew there would be no punishment and 26 per cent of Russian would
both obey tax laws and evade if there was no punishment. For the Polish 2004 survey,
the corresponding percentages were 2, 5, 38 and 55 per cent, respectively. Similarly, for
the Ukrainian 2005 survey, the corresponding percentages were 24, 26, 30 and 20 per
cent, respectively. Likewise, the scale reliability coefficients of the variables are very low
in the Polish survey (0.1108), low in the Ukrainian survey (0.2263) and still not high
enough to form a scale in the Russian survey (0.4103.) All of this suggests that the con-
cepts behind the questions were most likely distinct in the minds of the respondents as
well as of the author of the survey.
9 Levi, 1988, p. 52. 10 Ibid., pp. 52–53.
11 Similarly, Sheffrin and Triest, in an econometric analysis of the U.S. 1987 Tax-
payer Opinion Survey, found that ‘attitudes are important determinants of compliance
behaviour. They find that having a negative attitude toward the tax system and perceiv-
ing other taxpayers as dishonest both significantly increase the likelihood that a person
will evade taxes.’ (Sheffrin and Triest, cited in Ickes and Slemrod, p. 391.)
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bargain’.12 In the aftermath of its 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014
EuroMaidan Revolution, Ukraine, for example, may have been given a
rare second and even rarer third shot within a twenty-five year period
at rebuilding the state’s relationship to taxpayers. (Indeed, in the first
few months of 2005, preliminary reports stated that tax and customs
revenues were significantly higher than usual there.13)
Trust in the Government to Provide Goods Leaving aside trust in
other taxpayers for the moment, Levi states that the government leaders
‘must create confidence in their credibility and their capacity to deliver
promised returns for taxes’ and ‘must convince taxpayers that taxpayer
contributions make a difference in producing the desired goods’.14
According to the results of the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Sur-
veys, 21 per cent of Poles in 2004 (23 per cent in 2010), 42 per cent
of Russians in 2004 (35 per cent in 2010) and 52 per cent of Ukraini-
ans in 2005 (53 per cent in 2010; 55 per cent in 2012; and 47 per cent
in 2015) believe that there are many dishonest tax service employees in
their country, with nearly a third of respondents in these countries stating
that it was difficult to say (Question #3 in Appendix I.) This provides one
assessment as to how citizens view bureaucrats at the bottom of the polit-
ical system with regard to trustworthiness. Clearly, Ukrainians are more
distrusting of tax bureaucrats than their neighbours both to the East and
to the West, and it appears that there were a bit fewer Russians who
distrusted their bureaucrats in 2010 than six years earlier. (Additional
assessments as to how trustworthy are actors at the top of the political
system – namely, the president in Poland, Russia and Ukraine and the
parliament and government in Poland and Ukraine – are included in the
analysis of what accounts for differences in overall attitudes towards tax
compliance as further proxy measurements for how trustworthy the state
is in the eyes of citizens.15)
12 Levi, 1988, p. 70.
13 On 18 August 2005, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko stated that Ukraine
already has collected 50 per cent more in budget revenue so far in 2005, compared with
2004. ‘All of the tax rates are exactly the same, yet the revenue received is 1 1/2 times
greater’, Tymoshenko said (Reynolds, Garfield).
14 Levi, 1988, p. 53.
15 The author does recognize that there are limits in utilizing such measures of trust
in individual political personalities such as Presidents Aleksander Kwasniewski, Bro-
nisław Komorowski, Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor
Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko, for example, as the survey questions asked do pick
up respondents’ additional perceptions of their leaders and their politics rather than
focusing entirely on their perception of their leaders’ honesty or trustworthiness. (This
is less the case with measures of trust in institutional bodies such as the parliament or
government.) Nevertheless, the questions chosen for analysis here are the same as those
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While not available for the Polish and Russian surveys in 2004, addi-
tional survey questions do suggest that there is a significant lack of trust
in the state. With respect to the provision of goods and services, in 2005
only 9 per cent of Ukrainians believe that their government fulfils its
obligations to citizens, in 2010 and 2012 only 10 to 12 per cent believe
that their state fulfils its obligations to citizens, and in 2015 only 6 per
cent (!) believe that their state fulfils its obligations. From 2005 through
to 2015, some 50 to 60 per cent of Ukrainians flatly deny that their state
or government fulfils obligations (Question #55). Meanwhile, the figure
for Poles and Russians in 2010 who believed their state fulfils its duties
to citizens was much higher at 21 and 24 per cent, respectively, and only
26 to 27 per cent viewed their state as not fulfilling its tasks. Clearly,
Ukrainians do not believe that they get much from their state, and the
downward trend in 2015 is not encouraging for the Ukrainian state.
Moreover, when Ukrainians were asked whether they could trust their
government to do what was right in 2005 and their state to do what was
right in 2010 and 2012, only 9 or 11 per cent stated that they could
(Question #56). Further, the figure was little more than half that in
2015, when only 6 per cent could trust their state to do what was right.
Similarly, the 2015 survey saw a drop to 7 of the percentage of those
who view the state as relating to all citizens in an equal, fair manner –
down from 15 per cent in 2010 and 2012 (Question #57.) Again, Poles
and Russians are a bit more trusting of their state, with 21 and 26 per
cent, respectively, stating in 2010 that they can trust their state to do
what is right, and with 21 and 20 per cent, respectively, stating that they
trust their state to treat all citizens in an equal, fair manner. Hence,
as trust in the state on the part of citizens involves both a material trust
that the state will continue to provide goods and services and a moral
trust that the state will treat its citizens fairly, Ukrainians appear to be
stating flatly after both revolutions that they cannot trust their state to do
either, and the latest data on the levels of Ukrainians’ trust in their state
are the lowest ever recorded in these surveys.
Trust in Other Taxpayers to Pay Their Fair Share As mentioned,
those who view tax compliance as based on a combination of trust rela-
tionships also give significant relevance to whether or not taxpayers have
confidence that their fellow citizens also will pay their dues to the state.
In Poland, Russia and Ukraine, distrust in others paying their fair share
in taxes is, perhaps surprisingly, quite high. According to the results of
used regularly by the respective polling firms in their surveys used for tracking changes
in such attitudes.
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the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys, some 69 per cent of Poles
in 2004 (65 per cent in 2010), 77 per cent of Russians in 2004 (67 per
cent in 2010) and 70 per cent of Ukrainians in 2005 (69 per cent in
2010 and in 2012; and 72 per cent in 2015) believe that there are ‘many
people’, as opposed to ‘few people’, in their country who evade taxes
(Question #13 in Appendix I.)16 In contrast to some of the other survey
data presented in the first part of this chapter, levels of trust in one’s
fellow citizens, at least with respect to paying one’s tax dues, might not
be dramatically different in the three states.
Prior Personal Experiences and Interaction with the Tax Authorities
Some theories that explain civic obedience rely on whether citizens have
had past interactions with relevant government officials.17 In the Tax-
payer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys, survey questions were utilized to
explore whether previous experiences with the tax authorities affect cit-
izen views on complying with the law. According to the surveys, nearly
half of all Poles in 2004 (38 per cent in 2010), a quarter of all Russians
(in both 2004 and 2010) and only 12 to 19 per cent of all Ukrainians
stated that they had dealt with tax service employees within the previ-
ous five years on matters of business (Question #6 in Appendix I.) Of
these individuals, 51 per cent of Poles in 2004 (50 per cent in 2010),
30 per cent of Russians in 2004 (37 per cent in 2010) and 27 per cent
of Ukrainians in 2004 (30 per cent in 2010; 28 per cent in 2012; and
31 per cent in 2015) had overall positive impressions of their individ-
ual contact with the tax bureaucrats, while 19 per cent of Poles in 2004
(17 per cent in 2010), 29 per cent of Russians in 2004 (27 per cent
in 2010) and 30 to 32 per cent of Ukrainians (in 2005, 2010, 2012
and 2015) had negative impressions (Question #7.) Hence, while Poles
overall had more positive impressions, nearly as many Russians and
Ukrainians had negative impressions as positive ones.
16 It should be noted that levels of trust in others in Russia generally today are not high,
which might also provide some cultural context regarding levels of trust in fellow tax-
payers and, in turn, regarding attitudes towards tax compliance generally. For example,
according to a poll conducted by the Bashkirova and Partners market research firm in
June 2005, only 25 per cent of Russians agreed that, ‘generally most people can be
trusted.’ In addition, while Russia places somewhere in the middle of some 80 nations
polled in the World Values Survey as to whether one should trust people in general,
Russia and Bulgaria were the only two nations in Eastern Europe where more people
said they did not trust ‘most people in this country’ than said they did, according to a
2004 poll conducted by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of
Strathclyde in Glasgow. (See Fak.)
17 See, for example, Tyler.
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Testing the Theories of Taxpayer Compliance
How do the different theories on tax compliance, derived largely from
the study of the US case, test against data on attitudes associated with
tax compliance? As mentioned, the expectations for a compliant soci-
ety interacting with a citizen-based state would be that tax compliance
depends largely on trust in the state and/or satisfaction with tax bureau-
crats’ level of customer service. For a society interacting with a state that
employs a more deterrent-based approach to tax collection, tax compli-
ance would be expected to depend largely on citizens’ being susceptible
to deterrence.
Appendix IV presents the results of tests of the different variables rep-
resenting the tax compliance theories discussed through logit analyses
of the 2004 and 2010 Poland and Russia and of the 2005, 2010 and
2015 Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys, respectively.
The dependent variable in these tests is whether one agrees to obey the
tax laws even if they are personally deemed to be unfair (Question #22 in
Appendix I.)18 Before proceeding, though, it is important to emphasize
that the analysis presented here is not an evaluation of the behaviour
of Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, but rather an examination of the
links in attitudes that are essential part of behaviour decisions whether
or not to comply. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it is important to
recognize that there are challenges in conducting quantitative surveys
on these sensitive topics in countries with a tradition of authoritarian-
ism. Further, no one, to the author’s knowledge, has undertaken such
a comprehensive survey on attitudes in these transitional countries to
test tax compliance theories. Hence, the data here are suggestive, not
definitive.
With regard to the independent variables in the regression analysis,
they are divided into four categories.19 Viewing evasion as OK if one
18 Regarding the choice of the dependent variable, this dependent variable was most
favourable to Poles as well as to Russians and Ukrainians. For example, in the 2004
and 2005 surveys, with near even splits (in Russia, 53 per cent of Russians would obey
a law personally deemed unfair while 28 per cent would not and 19 per cent were
unsure; and in Ukraine, the corresponding figures were 36, 37 and 27 per cent, respec-
tively) provides opportunity to explain Russian and Ukrainian non-compliance. For
obvious reasons, respondents were not asked directly about their own payment of taxes,
nor were the respondents subject to any type of outside assessment to see if their taxes
were paid in full. However, this survey question was the most direct question on what
a respondent personally would do with respect to making a choice regarding tax eva-
sion. Hence, despite the limitations of such an exercise, the focus here to examine what
impacts attitudes towards tax compliance as a proxy for tax compliance itself.
19 With the exception of Age and Income, all of the independent variables, as with the
dependent variable, are coded 0 and 1. Mean replacement replaces missing values at
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could get away with it (Question #16) is a proxy variable for the deter-
rence theory, as it will help examine whether the extent to which one is
susceptible to a relaxation of deterrent measures affects attitudes towards
tax compliance.
The second category comprises a set of variables that examine the
‘two trusts’ behind theories of ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’ – the need
both to trust the state to deliver the goods and the requirement to trust
others to pay their fair due before one agrees to pay one’s own taxes.
The first of these variables in this set focus on trust of government –
its leaders at the top (Presidents Aleksander Kwasńiewski (2004), Bro-
nisław Komorowski (2010), Vladimir Putin (2004), Dmitry Medvedev
(2010), Viktor Yushchenko (2005), Viktor Yanukovych (2010) and Petro
Poroshenko (2015)); in Poland and Ukraine, the parliament and the gov-
ernment as a whole; and in Russia (2010), the prime minister (Putin)
and parliament (State Duma) – as proxy variables for trust that the gov-
ernment fulfils its obligations to its people.
Meanwhile, for additional versions of the regression analysis, scales
were compiled in the Ukraine 2005 surveys and in the Poland, Rus-
sia and Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys to reflect respondents’ general
trust in the state at the top of the system. The Trust in the State Scale
for the Poland 2010 survey is a composite of trust in the president, the
prime minister, the Sejm, the Senate and the government and trust in
the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.
The Trust in the State Scale for the Russia 2010 survey includes trust
in the president, the prime minister, parliament (the State Duma) and
the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its
duties. Further, the Trust in the State scale for Ukraine 2005 and 2010
surveys is a composite of trust in the president, the parliament and the
state (government in 2005) and trust in the state (government) to do
what is right and to fulfil its duties.
Further, for all surveys, the variable ‘Many Dishonest Tax Bureau-
crats’ (Question #3) serves as a proxy for trust in the lower levels of the
state bureaucracy, while ‘Many People Evade Taxes’ (Question #13) is
a good proxy for estimating one’s views as to whether others pay their
dues.
Whether or not one has had contact with tax bureaucrats within
the previous five years (Question #6) allows us to test whether
prior contact, in and of itself and irrespective of the nature of that
the mean, but mean-replaced variables were not used as the dependent variable in these
logit regressions.
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contact or its outcome for some individuals, matters with respect to
attitudes towards tax compliance. A final set of control variables also
are considered.20
Poland 2004 As Appendix IV illustrates, the logit regression pro-
vides evidence to suggest that the Polish public does not react signifi-
cantly to the first approach option for the state (deterrence) in 2004,
but does to the second approach through ‘trust in government’. First,
the deterrence theory, as measured by the proxy variable regarding what
one would do if the risk of punishment were taken away, is shown to be
insignificant. How one would respond to the withdrawal of the risk of
punishment does not appear to have anything to do with whether one
would say they would obey the tax laws. Second, prior contact with the
tax bureaucrats also does not appear to matter significantly – although
the analysis presented here does not separate out the impact of having
had unsatisfactory prior contact on tax compliance. Moreover, income
and being male are shown to be significant. (The fact, though, that the
higher the income, the less willing Poles appear to be compliant suggests
that compliance does not depend upon an individual’s ability to pay.) In
addition, age and having graduated from a higher education institution
do not matter (although the latter’s substantive effect, described below,
does show some slight significance).
While binominal logit analysis is an appropriate method for analyzing
dichotomous dependent variables, coefficients in such analysis – at least
compared to those in ordinary least-squares regression – lack substantive
meaning. To remedy this, a measure of the substantive effect of each
variable is made by calculating what is referred to as a ‘first difference’ of
the change in the predicted probability in the dependent variable. Here,
the ‘substantive effect’ is the change in likelihood of declaring that one
would obey tax laws even if personally viewed as unfair when the variable
in question is shifted from its minimum to its maximum and all other
independent variables are held even at their means.21 Such estimates for
20 Those control variables concern socio-economic and additional effects and include the
monthly income one declared as part of the omnibus survey, who actually files one’s
personal income taxes (Question #2), whether one is male, one’s age and what is the
highest education one has achieved.
21 The substantive effects presented in Appendices IV, V, VI and VII reflect the change in
likelihood of declaring that one would obey tax laws personally viewed as unfair when
shifting the variable in question from its minimum to its maximum for all variables with
the except of ‘Age’, which is varied from one standard deviation below the mean to one
standard deviation above the mean.
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the variables (with substantive effects that have p-values estimated to be
0.05) are depicted graphically in Table 6.1.22
The variable with the most significance and with the largest substan-
tive effect in the Polish survey was a proxy variable for ‘quasi-voluntary
compliance’. Namely, obeying tax laws appears to depend more than any
other variable in Poland on whether one trusts the government – which
in Poland’s system of government directs, leads and bears the most direct
responsibility for policy making in the country (as opposed to the presi-
dent or the parliament at large). The other proxy variables for the main
theories tested were not that significant, and hence do not appear in
Table 6.1 for Poland. Noticeably and peculiarly, trust in other citizens is
not significant.
Poland 2010 As Appendix IV also illustrates, the logit regression
suggests that six years later the Polish public did react to the deterrence
measures taken by the state in balance with a number of other variables
that assess ‘trust in the state’, both at the higher and lower levels in the
state, measured either individually (Versions 1 and 2) or as part of a
Trust Scale (Versions 3 and 4). (Versions 3 and 4 are, perhaps, a more
complete assessment of Trust in the State, as they encompass a variety
of trust questions regarding one’s view of the state at large and is compa-
rable with regressions undertaken in the 2005 Ukraine, 2010 Russia and
2010 Ukraine surveys, but as some of these questions were not asked
in 2004, Versions 1 and 2 are provided to make possible a comparison
between the 2004 and 2010 Poland surveys.) Collectively these ‘trust in
the state’ variables – either the measurements for trust in the president or
the parliament or those for the Trust in the State scale of seven variables
and the separately measured trust/distrust of tax bureaucrats – do have
greater substantive impact on one’s willingness to obey tax laws than the
deterrence measure alone. As before, prior contact with tax bureaucrats
22 The substantive effects presented in Appendices IV, V, VI and VII contain an indi-
cator of statistical significance but no standard errors. While it is not possible to cal-
culate a probability distribution of a first difference, we can simulate this distribution
using stochastic simulation as described in King, Tomz and Wittenberg. Therefore,
instead of calculating one estimate of each first difference, 1,000 estimates of the first
difference are calculated using the program Clarify, Version 2.1, Tomz, Wittenberg and
King, 5 January 2003. The value listed for the substantive effect is the mean of those
simulations. To provide a measure of uncertainty in deriving the substantive effects,
the p-value is estimated by the proportion of simulations that are greater (or less, if
the mean is negative) than zero. So p  0.01 means that at least 990 of the simulations
were greater than zero for a positive variable, p  0.05 means at least 950, etc. One
article that employs such a method of estimating substantive effects is Markowski and
Tucker, 2005.
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Table 6.1 Citizens, subjects and slackers: Substantive effects that are
significant in the Poland, Russia and Ukraine 2004–2005 Taxpayer
Compliance Attitudinal Surveys
(cont.)
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Table 6.1 (cont.)
Note: Substantive effects possess p-values  0.05.
does not appear to matter significantly. Moreover, being male again is
shown to be significant, as now is education.
Hence, as shown in Appendix IV, the variables that together have the
most significance in both the Polish 2004 and 2010 surveys were the
proxy variables for ‘quasi-voluntary compliance’. By and large, obeying
tax laws even if they are considered unfair appears to depend more than
any other variable in Poland on whether one trusts the state. Therefore,
if, as has been shown in the first part of this chapter, the Polish polity
is viewed as more compliant with respect to taxes, it might very well
be because the Polish state has maintained some degree of trust with
its citizens that it will continue to fulfil a significant proportion of its
obligations to its citizens to ensure that life will be still be better – despite
voter apathy, corruption scandals and the rapidly changing nature of the
Polish political party system.
One of the implicit assumptions regarding these countries is that
Poland, unlike its eastern neighbours, has developed a civil society that
possesses citizens who are more politically active and demand greater
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openness and transparency on the part of the state. This is deemed
to have come about, in significant part, due to the historical role the
Catholic Church played in the Polish People’s Republic and its collapse
in 1989. Once a regime established by outside forces met its demise
and a new state was built by, for and of Poles, citizens then could place
greater trust in their state, allowing development of the particular type of
civil society that is, perhaps, familiar in more consolidated democracies.
As such, this greater trust in the state aids societal compliance.
Russia 2004 As for the results of regression analysis of the Rus-
sian 2004 survey, shown in Appendix V, the contrast with the Polish
2004 and 2010 survey results is quite striking. The logit regression pro-
vides evidence to suggest that deterrence theory does hold significant
weight among the Russian public. Meanwhile, the theory of ‘quasi-
voluntary compliance’ appears to be applicable in part, as proxy vari-
ables for trust in the president but not for trust in other citizens are quite
significant. As for prior contact, it was not very significant in the regres-
sion, although it was somewhat close to significance. (The p value was
0.166.) Additionally, age seems to be significant. Like prior contact, pos-
sessing high education was not very significant in the regression, but its
substantive effect picks up slight significance. Interestingly, income has
no effect at all in Russia, while having filed one’s taxes oneself only has
slight significance (the p value was 0.193).23
For Russia, the independent variable with the largest ‘substantive
effect’, as shown in Table 6.1, is the proxy variable for the deterrence the-
ory. However, somewhat close behind with respect to size of ‘substantive
effect’ are several of the variables that are part of the ‘quasi-voluntary
compliance’ theory, such as, among others, trust in the president and
distrust in tax bureaucrats, suggesting that Russian tax compliance may
very well hinge somewhat on the degree to which citizens trust the state.
Russia 2010 Six years farther along into the Putin-Medvedev
era of governance, Russians show that they are no more supportive of
obeying tax laws even if they find them to be unfair. The logit regres-
sion shows that the deterrence proxy variable continues to hold signifi-
cant weight among the Russian public. Meanwhile, the theory of ‘quasi-
voluntary compliance’ is applicable, as proxy variables for trust in Putin
23 As income and education variables do possess some strong relations to one another,
additional regressions were run to show whether income would matter if education
were dropped out (it did not) and to see whether possessing high education would still
matter without including income (it did and became stronger.)
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(as prime minister, this time), trust in the State Duma and trust in tax
bureaucrats are quite significant (Versions 1, 2, 5 and 6). A ‘trust in
the state’ scale, composed of five questions, also was found to be quite
significant in a separate regression (Versions 7 and 8).
However, what is interesting to note is that (in Versions 5 and 6) trust
in the president (Medvedev in 2010) now appears to have the opposite
sign from 2004. That is, the more one trusts Medvedev, the more one is
less likely to support complying with tax laws with which one disagrees.
Having had prior contact was not that significant in the regression, nor
was filing taxes oneself.
In 2010, the independent variables with significant substantive effects
are the proxy variable for the deterrence theory and those for the theory
of quasi-voluntary compliance. Unlike in 2004, the deterrence variable,
while sizeable, is smaller than that the variable for trust at the bottom
of the state system (the tax bureaucrats). In short, when the 2004 and
2010 Russian surveys are compared, what has really changed – besides
the change in the effect of trust in the new Russian president – is that the
coercive threat of the state does not have as strong an effect as before.
This raises the question of whether the Russian state is ‘feared’ just a bit
less than earlier in the Putin era.
Further, with respect to socio-economic variables, the Polish 2004 and
Russian 2010 surveys also give support to the theory, derived from the
study of tax compliance in the United States, that men are less compliant
than women. In Russia 2010, being male meant that, other things being
equal, you were nearly 4 per cent less likely to state that you would obey
tax laws. The 2010 Russian survey also showed that the older you are,
the more likely you were to state that you would be compliant.
Ukraine 2005 Although Ukrainians in 2005 appear to have
somewhat lower levels of support for tax compliance than Russians, the
results from the regression analysis examining why Ukrainians support
obeying a tax law even if it is personally deemed unfair suggest that
Ukrainians are influenced almost equally by their reactions to the state’s
deterrent measures and by their own trust in government. With respect
to the three main theories on how citizens respond to state efforts to
increase tax compliance, two sets of variables stand out as strongly sig-
nificant and nearly as great in terms of ‘substantive effect’.
Table 6.1 illustrates that alternating the proxy variable for the deter-
rence theory (whether one would respond to relaxation of the coercive
threat to pay) from its lowest to its highest values while maintaining the
other independent variables at their means decreases the likelihood that
a Ukrainian respondent would state that he or she would obey tax laws
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by about 12 per cent. Meanwhile, as is shown in Appendix VI, alternat-
ing the trust in state scale variable from its lowest to its highest values
increases the likelihood of saying that one would obey such a law by
2 per cent. Similarly, distrusting tax bureaucrats decreases the likelihood
of stating that one would obey tax laws by 9 to 11 per cent (depending
on whether the Trust in the State scale is used in the regression). Hence,
such numbers indicate that unlike Poland in 2004, deterrent measures
do matter and unlike Russia in 2004, trusting government matters nearly
as much.
Interestingly, like the Polish 2004 and 2010 and the Russian 2004
surveys, the secondary type of trust that is part of the theory of quasi-
voluntary compliance, trust in other citizens to pay their taxes, does not
matter at all for Ukrainians in 2005. This suggests that, for the most
part, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians do not place themselves in relation
to others in society when deciding whether to agree to obey a tax law even
if it is personally deemed unfair and that citizens of all three countries do
not respond as ‘rationally’ in terms of estimating whether the state has
enough tax revenue from others to be able to deliver goods and services
back to its citizens.
Having had any previous contact with tax bureaucrats, regardless of
whether the interaction was good or bad, does not appear to have any
impact whatsoever on whether Ukrainians state that they would obey a
tax law that they personally deem to be unfair.
With respect to the socio-economic variables tested, whether or not
one files one’s own taxes appears to be significant but has a negative sign,
suggesting that those who file their own taxes in 2005 are less likely to be
observant of tax laws than those who do not. Also, education appears to
be significant. As in Poland in 2004, levels of income matter with respect
to tax compliance attitudes in Ukraine. However, unlike the case with
Poles, the higher the income of Ukrainians, the more likely they are to
agree to obey tax laws. This finding conflicts with some theories from the
study of tax compliance patterns in the United States, but suggests that
wealthier individuals in Ukraine can afford to pay their taxes. Curiously,
while those with more income in Ukraine might be more likely to pay
taxes in Ukraine themselves, those who stated that they do file taxes on
their own actually are less likely to state that they would obey tax laws
even if they considered them unfair. As for education, the findings are
more consistent with the Russian 2004 case than with the Polish one –
that is, lower levels of education correspond with lower levels of support
for tax compliance.
Overall, the mixed nature of the survey results in Ukraine for 2005 –
that is, the fact that proxy variables for reacting to state deterrence and
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for trusting the state matter with respect to attitudinal support for tax
compliance in near equal amounts – does suggest that Ukraine does not
strictly follow the pattern of either Poland or Russia. Poland appears to
be a case that possesses a compliant society interacting with a citizen-
based state such that tax compliance depends largely on trust in the
government. Russia, on the other hand, has a society interacting with
a state that strongly employs a deterrence-based approach to tax col-
lection, where the significance of the effect of coercive measures is still
strong in 2010, albeit with perhaps a bit smaller effect.
Ukraine is a different case altogether. The employment of deterrence –
perhaps to an extent that is not as great as in Russia – is the state’s
primary tool for ensuring tax compliance through the State Tax Admin-
istration of Ukraine. Yet the greater freedom of information on the short-
comings of the state and its political leaders in Ukraine in November
2005 might have allowed Ukrainians as a whole to balance their support
for tax compliance between reactions to deterrent measures of the state
and their trust in the state. The fact that deterrent force might not be
as great in Ukraine as in Russia might be due to the fact that in late
2005, when the poll took place, Ukrainians were better informed about
their state’s government and politics. (In addition, it has been suggested
by several experts in Kyiv that the dynamic of corruption on the part of
state workers changed after an Orange Revolution ‘honeymoon’ period
from January through August 2005, increasing around the time of Yulia
Tymoshenko’s dismissal as Prime Minister in September 2005, if not a
bit before.24)
Moreover, the fact that Ukrainians might not be as trusting of their
state as Poles are of theirs might account for the fact that Ukraine had
the lowest rate of support for obeying a tax law deemed unfair among the
three states surveyed. Indeed, as Questions #55 and #56 in Appendix
I illustrate, only 9 per cent of Ukrainians in 2005 feel that the gov-
ernment fulfils its obligations to its citizens, and similarly, only 9 per
cent of Ukrainians agree that their government can be trusted to do
what is right. Clearly, Ukraine’s post-Orange transition from a coer-
cive and corrupt state to a more open, democratic one has come about
without rebuilding citizens’ trust that their state can act fairly and can
deliver goods and services, and the failure to create and draw upon
such trust may very well curtail the state’s capacity to administer its own
policies.
24 Interview with Igor Lavrinenko, Centre for Political and Legal Reforms, Kyiv, 24 July
2006; and interview with a director at an international business association, Kyiv,
8 August 2006.
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As shown in Table 6.1, the substantive effects from the analysis of the
first, basic surveys from 2004–2005 suggest that the three cases can be
labelled ‘Citizens, Subjects and Slackers’ in terms of the citizen–state tax
relationship. Ukrainians acted neither as true ‘citizens’ (i.e., out of trust,
like the Poles) nor as ‘subjects’ of their state (i.e., out of fear, like the Rus-
sians), but rather sought to avoid interacting with their state altogether,
as tax ‘slackers’.25 That is, Poles in 2004, who possessed a high willing-
ness to obey the tax laws, reacted more out of trust towards government
when expressing support for obeying tax laws even if they disagreed with
them. Russians in 2004 showed that their fear of being caught had more
of an effect on their willingness to obey tax laws than their trust in the
state. And, Ukrainians, with effects for trust and fear in balance coupled
with low levels of support for obeying tax laws even if they are deemed
unfair, can be termed ‘slackers’ with respect to observing tax dues.
Ukraine 2010 The big story for the Ukraine 2010 survey is, as
for Russia, that trust variables matter more than they did in the ear-
lier survey, but unlike the case in Russia, deterrence matters far less. As
shown in Appendix IV, alternating the proxy variable for the deterrence
theory (whether one would be respond to the relaxation of the coercive
threat to pay) from its lowest to its highest values while maintaining the
other independent variables at their means decreases the likelihood that
a Ukrainian respondent would state that she or he would obey tax laws
even if deemed unfair by about 3 per cent. Meanwhile, alternating the
‘trust in the state’ variable (Versions 3 and 4) from its lowest to its high-
est values increases the likelihood of saying that one would obey such
a law by 8 per cent. (Trust in the government and trust in the parlia-
ment, when shown separately in Versions 1 and 2, have somewhat high
levels of predicted likelihood as well.) Similarly, distrusting tax bureau-
crats decreases the likelihood of stating that one would obey tax laws by
10–11 per cent, nearly identical to the decrease in 2005.
Hence, five years after the Orange Revolution, the 2010 Ukraine sur-
vey indicates that trusting the state may matter the most when it comes
to explaining why Ukrainians continue to demonstrate the lowest levels
of support for paying taxes among citizens in all three countries.
25 It is important to emphasize that the selection of the term ‘slackers’ is applied to
Ukrainians only within the context of taxpaying and does not imply in any way that
Ukrainians ‘slack’ in any other particular sphere of activity; moreover, given their envi-
ronment and state–society relations, it may even be considered to be quite ‘rational’
on an individual-level basis for Ukrainians to ‘slack’ in the area of tax compliance at
different points in time.
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Ukraine 2015 Some twenty months after the EuroMaidan
revolution, the Ukrainian public, perhaps due to the departure of
Yanukovych’s regime, appears to be reacting out of trust concerns
as demonstrated by strong substantive effects in the logit regression.
Namely, while taking away the deterrent threat completely may make
Ukrainians 9–10 per cent less likely to state that they would obey tax
laws, altering trust in Poroshenko from its lowest to its highest levels has
a larger impact of 18 per cent. Distrusting the tax bureaucrats in 2015
also made Ukrainians 10–11 per cent less likely to obey the tax laws.
Additionally, distrusting other taxpayers by confirming that many peo-
ple evade taxes has an almost equal impact of 17–18 per cent, but the
effect is positive – quite the opposite of what Margaret Levi would pre-
dict. That is, the more Ukrainians in 2015 recognized that others evade
taxes, the more likely they were to state that they themselves would be
compliant. This phenomenon did not occur in any of the other surveys,
and is, perhaps, due to a desire on the part of Ukrainians in 2015 to
distinguish oneself as being and behaving differently from perceived law-
lessness and improper behaviour elsewhere. Finally, while filing one’s
own taxes appears to have no effect, having more income and being older
were factors associated with a greater willingness to obey.
Why Focus on Individual Attitudes and Not Those of Businesses?
Before moving on, it is important to observe that the results from the
analysis of these surveys likely would not have been much different if
these respondents were solely managers, business owners, individuals
who file taxes themselves (because they have more than one source of
income or more complicated tax returns) and/or individuals who inter-
act with tax bureaucrats (even if most Russians and Ukrainians, at least,
do not.) While conducting a survey of business attitudes (or especially
of the attitudes of those within businesses that are directly respon-
sible for the paying of taxes) in transition environments is especially
challenging, as mentioned in Chapter 4, these public opinion surveys
actually do include the attitudes of those in business in Poland, Russia
and Ukraine.
Moreover, three questions included in the analysis highlight factors
attributable to those in business. Namely, the survey – and the logit
regressions analyzed above – did ask respondents whether they were a
company director, top manager or entrepreneur or not (highlighted in
the variable ‘occupation’); whether they have had previous contact with
tax bureaucrats (more common for those involved in business than ordi-
nary citizens); and whether they filed their taxes themselves (rather than
had their employer do so for them, which is more common for employees
than it is for entrepreneurs or executives).
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In none of the eight surveys was ‘occupation’ deemed to be significant
at p  0.10, either in the logit regression or as shown by the p-values for
the substantive effects, although one, but not all, of the Ukraine 2005
regressions (Version 4 in Appendix VI) did have some slight negative
significance. (If significant, for those Ukrainians with higher-status jobs,
the likelihood that one would obey tax laws deemed unfair decreases
about 6 per cent.) Having had previous contact with the tax bureaucrats
also never appeared to be significant in any logit regression at p  0.01,
p  0.05 or p  0.10, although the substantive effects for having had
prior contact did pick up slight significance at p  0.10, a broader con-
fidence interval, for some versions of the Russia 2004 and 2010 and the
Ukraine 2010 regressions.
Similarly, filing one’s own taxes was not a significant factor in any
of the Polish and Russian survey regressions, but substantive effects for
this variable did pick up similar slight significance at p  0.10 in the
Polish 2010 and Russian 2004 regressions. Where filing one’s own taxes
mattered significantly was in the Ukraine 2005 and 2010 surveys (but
not in the 2015 survey). In these cases, the influence was negative – that
is, the more Ukrainians were likely to have filed their own taxes, the
less likely they were to state that they would comply with tax laws even
if considered unfair. Further, the size of the substantive effect for this
variable was smaller than for others that were significant – especially in
the 2010 survey. Hence, for these years, needing to file one’s own taxes
was associated with even less willingness to obey than the already low
levels offered by Ukrainian respondents as a whole (36 and 44 per cent
in 2005 and 2010).
Thus, with respect to the dependent variable in question, the level
of support for obeying tax laws expressed by individuals who share
‘business-like’ factors appears to be broadly similar to the level of the
public at large across all eight surveys, with the slight possibility that the
support for tax compliance might even be a bit lower than for the general
public in 2005 and 2010 in Ukraine.
Finally, as other socio-economic variables were selected as control
variables based on their significance in explaining taxpayer compliance,
largely in US studies, it is important to observe that none of these addi-
tional variables uniformly had influence or lacked influence in the Pol-
ish, Russian and Ukrainian surveys. With respect to income, having
more income was correlated with less willingness to obey tax laws in
Poland in 2004, but not in 2010; had no effect in either Russian sur-
vey; and was associated with greater willingness to obey in Ukraine in
2005 and 2015, but not in 2010. This finding does not, therefore, help
resolve the question of whether wealthier taxpayers are more willing to be
compliant (because they have more money to offer the state) or less
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willing to be compliant (because they are more reluctant to relinquish
money the more they acquire it).
Being male made one less likely to support tax compliance in Poland
in 2004 and 2010 and in Russia in 2010, but had no effect in Ukraine
in any year. Such results suggest that men are unlikely to be more sup-
portive of tax compliance than women, but do not definitively find that
they are always less likely to be supportive of compliance. Being older
was associated with less willingness to comply in Poland only in 2010,
but had a positive effect on supporting compliance in Russia in 2004
and 2010 and in Ukraine in 2015, with no effect in other years. Educa-
tion also produced mixed results, with the more educated possibly being
willing to support tax compliance more in 2004 in both Poland and Rus-
sia and in 2005 in Ukraine. Being more educated, however, was associ-
ated with less support for compliance in Poland in 2010 and had no
effect in other years. Hence, with respect to other socio-economic vari-
ables, the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys only give support to
the theory that men are likely to be less supportive of compliance than
women.
Testing Tyler’s Theory for Those Who Had Prior Encounters with
Tax Bureaucrats
Some of the questions for the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys
are adaptations of survey questions used by Tom Tyler in his book Why
People Obey the Law, which argues that the procedural aspects (conduct
of the government officials) of prior previous experiences with the law
affect citizen views of the legitimacy of the authorities, which in turn
affect the degree of compliance. Likewise, in the survey questions devel-
oped for Poland, Russia and Ukraine, inquiries are made not only as to
what the citizens’ views are with respect to why people pay taxes but also
about their previous experiences with the tax authorities and personal
assessments of the tax administration’s work.26
26 Tyler measures support for legitimacy in two ways: as the perceived obligation to obey
the law and as support for legal authorities. Perceived obligation to obey the law was
measured as the percent of people who agreed that ‘a person should obey the law even if
it goes against what they think is right’ and other such statements. (See, especially, Tyler,
pp. 40–56.) Such a measure of legitimacy, at least with respect to perceived obligation, is
very similar to the dependent variable selected here in this chapter’s analysis of attitudes
towards tax compliance regarding whether one would obey tax laws even if they were
perceived personally to be unfair. As mentioned earlier, a direct measure of compliance
(i.e., did you pay your taxes?), or preferably, an outside assessment of whether taxes
were paid in full, is not presented here. Hence, the dependent variable selected is an
attitudinal proxy for tax compliance. While it would be enormously helpful and ideal to
have a separate measure of compliance, for now, the measure chosen, which does shares
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In the 2004–2005 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys, 470
Poles – practically half of all those surveyed in Poland; 410 Russians –
about a quarter of all surveyed in Russia; and 583 Ukrainians – about
15 per cent of all polled in Ukraine – had contact with members of the
tax administration during the previous five years. In 2010, 760 Poles –
38 per cent of those surveyed, 707 Russians – still just a quarter of all
surveyed, and 489 Ukrainians – about 12 per cent of those surveyed –
stated that they had contact with tax bureaucrats. Meanwhile, in 2012,
232 Ukrainians – 11 per cent of those surveyed – and, in 2015, 746
Ukrainians – 15 per cent of those surveyed – stated that they had met
with tax officials.
What is interesting is when specific close tests are undertaken of the
two Tyler specific variables (Conduct and Result) to establish whether
it is the judgements about the justice or injustice of past experiences –
the procedures and/or the outcomes of these experiences – that influ-
ence attitudes towards tax compliance. Question #9 in Appendix I asks
respondents who had prior contact with the tax administration whether
or not they were satisfied by how the tax service employees spoke with
and treated them. Similarly, Question #8 inquired whether respon-
dents were satisfied with the results of their meetings with tax service
employees.
A closer examination of the interaction of the responses to these ques-
tions is provided in Table 6.2, which presents charts of the percentages
of those who stated that they would obey tax laws deemed unfair. In
the Poland 2004 case, any combination of being satisfied or unsatisfied
with respect to Conduct or Result does not seem to impact whether one
would obey tax laws even if one considered them unfair. (Indeed, the
percentages of those who would obey in the different boxes of the table
vary only from 88 to 96 per cent.) Meanwhile, the Russian 2004 survey
yields entirely different results. For Russians, in 2004, if one is satis-
fied with either Conduct or Result or with both, then the percentages of
those who would obey tax laws is about the same (72 to 76 per cent.)
However, if one is dissatisfied with both the Conduct and the Result, the
percentage of those who would obey drops down to 56 per cent.
For the Russia 2004 survey, it appears that it is the interaction of
bad Conduct and bad Result that depresses compliance. (In contrast,
in Poland, bureaucratic conduct may be important to taxpayers, but
does appear to affect attitudes towards compliance.) Satisfaction with
a great deal with Tyler’s concept of legitimacy, will have to do. Thus, due to the lack
of a direct measure of compliance, a true, two-step model approach replicating Tyler
exactly cannot be followed for now.
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Table 6.2 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys: Percentage of prior
tax bureaucrat contact respondents who would follow the tax laws even if
personally considered to be unfair
Poland 2004 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the









Poland 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the









Russia 2004 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the









Russia 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the
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Table 6.2 (cont.)
Ukraine 2005 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the









Ukraine 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the









Ukraine 2012 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the









Ukraine 2015 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Were You Satisfied with the Result of
Your Contact with the Tax Bureaucrats?
No Yes
Were You Satisfied with the
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Conduct is important. But how important depends upon its interaction
with another variable (Result). As Tyler delineated, there are, indeed,
two types of negative experiences associated with contact with the law.
Attitudes towards tax compliance when Result is negative, or unsatis-
factory, can be significantly affected by what Conduct is. Hence, in the
Russian 2004 case, for those who had such prior contact with the tax
administration, it is the interaction of Conduct and Result that makes a
difference.
The Poland 2010 and Ukraine 2010 surveys follow a similar, albeit
less pronounced, pattern. That is, for Poles, in 2010, of those who are
satisfied with either Conduct or Result or with both, the percentages of
those who would obey tax laws even if deemed unfair is about the same
(83 to 87 per cent.) However, of those dissatisfied with both the Conduct
and the Result, the percentage who would obey drops to 74 per cent. For
Ukrainians, in 2010, the corresponding figures were 54 to 56 per cent of
those who would obey tax laws if they were satisfied with the Conduct
or Result or both, dropping to 42 per cent if they were dissatisfied with
both Conduct and Result.
The patterns with the Russians in 2010 and the Ukrainians in 2005
are relatively flat, and it is difficult to discern significant differences.
However, what differences there are illustrate that if the 2005 sample
of Ukrainians and the 2010 group of Russians are satisfied with both
Conduct and Result, they are a bit more likely to obey tax laws, whereas
if they are dissatisfied with Conduct, with Result or with both, the per-
centage who would obey drops a bit. This would imply that tax officials
would have to offer both satisfying Results and satisfactory Conduct when
interacting with Ukrainians and Russians today in order to raise levels of
taxpayer compliance – a greater burden to hurdle than that of the Polish
tax administrations. Further, it is also interesting to note that Russians
who are dissatisfied with both Conduct and Result still respond favourably
to obeying the tax laws to a greater extent (56 per cent in 2004 and
63 per cent in 2010) than of those Ukrainians who are satisfied with both
Conduct and Result in the 2005 and 2010 surveys (51 and 54 per cent,
respectively.)
In the much smaller 2012 Ukraine survey, fewer respondents answered
these questions with respect to prior tax bureaucrat interaction. Never-
theless, the survey marked the first time that Ukrainians with positive
prior experiences expressed a willingness to obey that was higher than
that of the Russians who were dissatisfied with both Conduct and Result
in 2004. Moreover, the percentage of Ukrainians who stated that they
would obey tax laws even if deemed unfair after having experienced both
unsatisfying Conduct and Result was the lowest – 33 per cent.
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Finally, the 2015 survey strongly shows that Ukrainians who are sat-
isfied with both how they are treated and the result of meeting a tax
bureaucrat will be much more likely than not to obey tax laws even if
they are personally considered unfair.
Why Ukrainians Who Pay Taxes Choose to Be Compliant
The blatantly transparent schemes whereby Ukrainians attempt to avoid
taxes have amazed the Western executives who work in the country. One
foreign lawyer was stunned to learn that a car dealer would opt for a
‘power of attorney’ document instead of taking title on a U.S.$80,000
vehicle that was being traded to him in order to avoid paying a tax of
1,000 hryvnia (U.S.$200) on the title ownership.27 There is also a wide
perception that more salaries are paid in envelopes under the table in
Ukraine than in Russia.28
Some have surmised that less fear of the state, compared with that
in Russia, has existed in Ukraine since the start of the 1990s, in large
measure due to a general weakness of the state and the disorganization
of policies from the start of the transition to democracy. More recently,
during the prolonged period from March to August 2006, when a new
government coalition had yet to appear, there was a decrease in the func-
tioning of the tax system because of great uncertainty as to what poli-
cies would emerge from rapidly changing but indefinite political devel-
opments and the lack of political will to implement current policy in
general.29 In addition, the greater lack of faith in the government than
in other post-communist states may also be due in part to the fact that
Ukraine has lacked an ‘imperial mentality’, which has contributed to
a lack of desire on the part of Ukrainians for their state to be ‘great’
and ‘strong’.30 Further, Ukrainians are said to have a more deeply held
belief that they should try to solve their own problems without the help
of the state and judge for themselves what is fair and reasonable rather
than accept the state’s word on obligations of citizenship.31 Indeed, the
27 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international accounting
firm, Kyiv, 27 July 2006.
28 Author’s interview with Valeriy Kochetov, director, National Centre of Monitoring of
Compliance and Defence of the Constitutional Rights and Basic Freedoms of People,
Kyiv, 26 July 2006.
29 Author’s interview with senior partner, leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, 3 August
2006.
30 Author’s interview with Kochetov.
31 Author’s interviews with senior STA official and with partner, tax and legal services,
leading international accounting firm, Kyiv, 2 August 2006; and with senior partner,
leading local tax and legal firm, Kyiv, 3 August 2006.
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findings on Ukraine tax compliance correlate with an observation of John
Lough and Iryna Solonenko, who remarked that, ‘In contrast to their
counterparts, Ukrainians do not have a historical experience of success-
ful identification with the state despite depending on it. As a result, they
tend to distrust the government and seek ways to work around it.’32
Just as those who evade taxes do so without fear of the state, in many
ways, those who do comply with the state do so without regard for what
the state does or does not do. Some tax lawyers argue that Ukrainian
firms are today more likely to comply not out of either fear of or trust in
the state but because of external competitive pressures. These pressures
include the need to gain access to capital markets abroad in order to find
foreign investors, which before investing will hire auditors to verify that
a Ukrainian firm has its accounts in order.33 Additionally, local banks
require proof of income earned officially from their clients who wish to
take out loans and receive financing for cars and mortgages, providing a
further incentive for firms to place everything on their books.34 Others
have attributed post–Orange Revolution increases in tax compliance not
to any changes in the STA’s interaction with the public but to amend-
ments in tax legislation that have led to decreases in tax rates.35 Finally,
the trust that has existed in the state, as one tax lawyer surmised, has
been due to a trust that things will get better in the future, that better
laws will be adopted, and that the state will be more responsive to its
citizens.36 Hence, in the opinions of those who work with leading firms
in Ukraine, neither a stick nor a carrot provided by the state is the under-
lying motivating factor that influences decisions by companies to comply
with the tax laws. One local tax lawyer has summed up the state’s rela-
tionship with society in the arena of tax collection as ‘not so much strakh,
but bezsyllya’ (‘not fear, but impotence’).37
Conclusion
A strong belief in the limitations of duties to the state and a firm trust
in the government seem to suggest that in both 2004 and 2010 Poles are
32 Lough and Solonenko, p. 13.
33 Author’s interviews with partner, tax and legal services, leading international account-
ing firm, Kyiv, 27 July 2006; and with partner, tax and legal services, leading interna-
tional accounting firm, Kyiv, 1 August 2006.
34 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international accounting
firm, Kyiv, 1 August 2006.
35 Author’s interview with tax manager, Kyiv office of one of the Big Four international
accounting firms, Kyiv, 26 July 2006.
36 Ibid.
37 Author’s interview with partner, tax and legal services, leading international accounting
firm, Kyiv, 2 August 2006.
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paying their taxes out of notions consistent in part with quasi-voluntary
compliance.
With respect to Russia and Ukraine, there is support within the analy-
sis of the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys for at least two of the
three main theories of tax compliance discussed here, suggesting a much
more complicated path towards becoming citizens. Russians appear to
have reacted significantly to the ‘deterrence’ method of tax collecting in
2004 and continue to react more strongly to the ‘deterrence’ method
than Poles and Ukrainians in 2010. The fact that citizens are suscep-
tible to deterrence in Russia is indicative of a society interacting with
a relatively more deterrent-based approach to tax collection. Russians
may actually react more to deterrent measures – or to the removal of
such measures – when it comes to shaping their attitudes as to whether
to comply with their state’s tax laws. This scenario, though, becomes a
bit more complex for Russia as the Putin era progresses, with overall
support for tax compliance appearing to be identical to that in 2004,
but with deterrence having less of an impact than before in motivating
those who choose to support compliance. Nevertheless, ‘deterrence’ still
maintains a significant role in motivating Russians to pay.
Meanwhile, the fact that, in the Ukrainian surveys, the ‘trust in the
state’ variables are estimated to predict an increase in the likelihood of
expressing attitudes in support of tax compliance about as large as the
‘deterrence’ proxy variable in 2005 and are significantly more substantive
in impact in 2010 and 2015 does suggest that the deterrence efforts of
the Ukrainian state may not have had as strong an impact on its populace
as those of the Russian state did on its taxpayers earlier on under Putin.
Ukrainians’ attitudes towards paying taxes are based almost equally on
their degree of fear of the state and their lack of trust in it in 2005. And
2010 and 2015 attitudes towards taxes are based almost solely on their
lack of trust in the state in those years. Thus, while the legitimacy of the
state matters for Poles, Russians and Ukrainians as they begin to fulfil
their duties of citizenship by paying their dues, precisely how Russians
and Ukrainians as a whole view and comprehend that legitimacy might
be more varied and much more complicated than the manner in which
the Polish polity views its state.
Therefore, the implications from this research are twofold. First, post-
transition governments and their tax administrations must find ways to
create and build up levels of trust on the part of citizens in their state.
How government behaviour impacts upon societal trust – that is, how
the state maximizes or minimizes the levels of trust that society has – will
affect, then, how well the state goal of ensuring the public’s tax compli-
ance is accomplished. And, second, these governments and tax admin-
istrations must also emphasize ‘procedural fairness’ in order to improve
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compliance with state regulations. Good ‘customer service’ can make a
real difference.
The survey of Russian tax officials that was undertaken in the fall
of 2011 reveals that, in many ways, tax officials share similar attitudes
towards taxes, the tax system and the state to those of Russian citizens,
highlighting how even those working in the tax system must be aware
of such trust issues and the need to emphasize good ‘customer service’.
Namely, as shown in survey Questions #21 and 22 in Appendix I, like
their citizen counterparts, Russian tax officials are more solidly behind
supporting the notion that citizens should follow the tax laws than they
are in upholding the view that they themselves should do so (91 versus
75 per cent). Moreover, only 47 per cent of Russian tax officials agreed
that the state fulfils its obligations to its citizens (Question #55), 50 per
cent can trust their state to do what is right (Question #56), some 23 per
cent (with 7 per cent declining to reply) stated that if the state does not
fulfil its obligations to its citizens then tax evasion is justified (Question
#28), and 51 per cent stated that the state treats all citizens equally fairly
(Question #57). While the numbers differ from those for citizens, many
officials appear to have a trust gap with the state themselves. Further,
more than one in five recognized that if an enterprise were to follow all
the demands of the tax organs then it would be ruined (Question #2,
in Appendix II) and about a third of all tax officials stated that inspec-
tors were unable to catch out all who fail to comply (Question #3, in
Appendix II), indicating that there may be some uncertainties as to how
the system treats citizens in practice.
But how can states accomplish the two policy objectives – to build
up trust and to emphasize ‘procedural fairness’? Specific suggestions
are offered in Chapter 8. In general, though, the post-transition tax
administrations should look for ways to rationalize their bureaucracies
and to make them more society- and outward-oriented. Locating and
implementing policies that both build levels of public trust in the state
and increase the level of customer service provided by the tax administra-
tion personnel can help taxpayers become true citizens, who are capable
of fulfilling their obligations to their governments.
7 All Together?
Lack of Trust in the Tax State Unifies Ukraine
The post-communist transition began with a large state–society discon-
nect. In the aftermath of the 1989 and 1991 revolutions, societies across
the region shared a deep disillusionment with their bureaucratic states,
now viewed as dishonest and untrustworthy.1 At a time in which much
was required of both state and society, such inherited distrust of the
state on the part of society made the tasks at hand more difficult. And,
nowhere, perhaps, were they more difficult than in Ukraine.
Ukraine, which demonstrates the lowest support for paying taxes in the
Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys, becomes a critical case and is
the focus of this chapter. The country’s regional, linguistic and religious
diversity; its location between largely Catholic Poland and Orthodox
Russia; and its relatively stable and consistent state institutional struc-
ture across the country provide an excellent testing ground for discern-
ing how much religion matters with respect to fulfilling an obligation to
the state.
Further, the unique presence of a socio-political cleavage between
Ukraine’s provinces, some of whose histories trace back to Polish or Rus-
sian rule or both, allows a more focused study on how such differences,
which are not as easily discernible in Poland or Russia, can make an
impact on state–society relations. Similarly to the red–blue state divi-
sions in recent US presidential elections, the provinces of Ukraine in
recent years have divided themselves starkly between the ‘orange’ (or
‘yellow’) west and the ‘blue’ east. If attitudes and levels of trust towards
the state can vary because of different types of society–state relations,
born out of different legacies of civil society traditions and church–state
relations, then the Ukraine case, with consistently similar state institu-
tions throughout the country, should illustrate this.
Yet, in additional comparative analysis of different regions of the coun-
try, what emerges as surprising, perhaps, is that not only do the respon-
dents from the four main regions of the country – East, West, Centre and
1 Rose-Ackerman, 2004a, p. 1.
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Table 7.1 Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys 2005, 2010, 2012 and 2015:




















% would obey 2004 83 53
% would obey 2005 36 36 37 36 47 38 43 32 26
% would obey 2010 77 52 44 43 47 44 50 39 47 49 57
% would obey 2012 na na 39 33 36 38 43 39 44 39 58
% would obey 2015 na na 45 46 50 46 44 44 43 39 na
Note: Appendix II: Question #22, percentage of responses.
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South (not including Crimea) – not differ greatly when it comes to over-
all support for obeying tax laws, but the rationale for doing so also does
not differ greatly between the otherwise seemingly different eastern and
western parts of Ukraine with respect to how deterrence and trust issues
impact individual-level decisions to support tax compliance. When they
are paired alongside each other, the support for obeying tax laws, even
if considered unfair, on the part of the Ukrainian regions is more similar
to each other than to either Poland or Russia.
Moreover, what is also striking is the relatively modest, but significant
difference in the level of support for tax compliance between Catholics
and Slavic Orthodox Ukrainians in 2005, which appears to fade away by
2015. There are noticeable differences between those with different reli-
gious backgrounds in the earlier Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudi-
nal Surveys, but the differences are not great and certainly not nearly as
great as those between largely Catholic Poland and mostly Slavic Ortho-
dox Russia. All of this suggests that differing societal and religious beliefs
and values regarding state–society interactions do not hold predominant
explanatory weight for variations in post-communist state–society inter-
actions. Rather, trust – or lack of trust – in the state appears to matter
more across critical Ukraine.
Brief Results for Ukraine Regions
As shown in Table 7.1, when broken down into the different regions of
Ukraine, including the main East, West, Central and South divisions,2
the 2005, 2010, 2012 and 2015 Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudi-
nal Surveys illustrate that the percentage of those who responded affir-
matively to the question ‘Would you follow the tax laws even if you do
not consider them to be fair?’ varies little across the country. And, with
the exception of Crimea in 2010 and 2012, such support for obeying the
tax laws even if considered unfair is consistently lower than the overall
levels of support in Poland and Russia.
2 ‘West Ukraine’ is represented by Chernovitskaya, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne,
Ternopil, Volnysk, and Zakarpat Oblasts; Central Ukraine by Kyiv (city), Kyiv
Oblast, Vinnitsk, Zhitomyr, Kirovograd, Poltava, Suma, Khelmnitskie, Cherkassa, and
Chernigovskiye Oblasts; ‘East Ukraine’ by Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkov, Luhansk
and Zaporizhskye Oblasts; and ‘South Ukraine’ by Kherson, Mykolaev and Odesa
Oblasts. The Razumkov Centre, which carried out the survey, divides the country into
these four main divisions, although for analysis here I have taken Crimea out of the
‘South Ukraine’ region. In addition to ‘West Ukraine’, ‘Central Ukraine’, ‘East Ukraine’
and ‘South Ukraine’, I have also conducted analysis on four additional, smaller regions:
‘Far West Ukraine’ represented by Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volnysk and Zakarpat Oblasts;
‘Kyiv Ukraine’ by Kyiv (city) and Kyiv Oblast; ‘Donbas Ukraine’ by Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts; and ‘Crimea Ukraine’ by the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.




















2010 12% 21% 37% 40% 40% 37% 37% 43% 35% 29% 14%
2012 Na na 42% 46% 42% 49% 53% 40% 39% 26% 27%
2015 Na na 37% 38% 37% 35% 39% 37% 34% 43% na
∗ Percentage of those answering the questions ‘Would you follow the tax laws even if you do not consider them to be fair?’ and ‘Are the tax laws
in your country fair?’ who answered both negatively.
No Mean Replacement: Not included in the percentage calculations are respondents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these
two questions.
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As the 2010, 2012 and 2015 surveys also asked respondents, in a sep-
arate section of the survey, whether they viewed the tax laws in their
country as fair, it is possible to determine what percentage of Ukraini-
ans in each region both found the tax laws to be unfair and stated they
would not obey the tax laws even if deemed personally unfair. This pro-
vides a suggested minimum level of tax non-compliance in each region,
as shown in Table 7.2.
Again, the entire country of Ukraine and the different regional divi-
sions all show much higher support for non-compliance than in Poland
and Russia, with the exception of Crimea in 2010. Hence, with respect to
attitudinal support for tax compliance, the regions of the country – even
in the Far West and Far East – resemble each other much more than
emulating bordering Poland and Russia. The country is largely united –
in a relatively high lack of support for paying taxes.
Testing the Theories of Taxpayer Compliance on
Ukraine’s Regions
Ukraine is divided into four main regions to test the significance of resid-
ing in Ukraine’s western, eastern, central or southern parts. Crimea also
is separated out in its own analysis, albeit with a large caveat regard-
ing the number of respondents in the surveys there. In addition, to
assess the impact of two extremes of differing civil society outlooks
within the same country, the two Donbas provinces (Donetsk and
Luhansk oblasts), which share borders with Russia, and four of the
seven western provinces (Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volynsk and Zakarpa-
tia oblasts), which are the most western oblasts and are located along
the western border, are selected as representatives of the far east and far
west regions of the country for comparative analysis. (The findings for
the larger ‘West’ versus ‘East’ parts of the country were largely similar to
those for the Far West and Donbas regions, as shown in Appendix VII,
but the latter two will be the main focus of analysis for clarity. Additional
analysis is also conducted on the Kyiv region as well.)
Far West and Donbas
Western Ukraine strongly supported President Viktor Yushchenko dur-
ing the 2004 Orange Revolution and President Viktor Yanukovych’s
ouster during the 2014 EuroMaidan Revolution, and looks towards
Poland and the West for future collaboration. Meanwhile, Eastern
Ukraine actively supported Yanukovych prior to the 2013–2014 demon-
strations, and its Donbas region became involved in a Russia-backed
secessionist conflict in mid-2014. Eastern Ukraine is where Russian is
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most commonly spoken and has strong trade and cultural links to Russia.
Most of the country had been under Russian control except for portions
of western Ukraine prior to 1945.
Eastern Ukraine has large firms, many of which have been tied to
the gas and coal sectors, while Western Ukraine’s economy is com-
posed mostly of small and medium-sized businesses. These differences
are borne out a bit in the 2010 survey (four years before the Donbas
region was partially occupied), where five times more Far West Ukraini-
ans regarded themselves as ‘upper class’ than Donbas Ukrainians did
(1.14 per cent versus 0.21 per cent). Meanwhile, the proportion of
respondents who stated that they were enterprise or institution division
heads or entrepreneurs was nearly 32 per cent greater in the Far West
than in the Donbas (6.08 per cent of Far Westerners considered them-
selves as such versus 4.62 per cent of Donbas interviewees.) The propor-
tion of respondents who identified themselves as employees or workers
(skilled or unskilled) was 28 per cent more in the Donbas than in Far
Western Ukraine (30.12 per cent of the Donbas respondents as opposed
to 23.57 per cent of the Far West respondents.) However, the propor-
tion of individuals who regarded themselves as agricultural workers or
farmers (1.47 per cent of Far Westerners surveyed and 1.20 per cent of
Donbas interviewees) and pensioners (27.81 per cent of Far Westerners
and 28.51 per cent of Donbas respondents) was more similar.
In comparing the regression analysis of the question regarding whether
one would obey tax laws even if personally considered unfair for the
selected far eastern oblasts (the two Donbas provinces of Donetsk and
Luhansk) with the far western oblasts (Ivano-Frankivisk, Lviv, Volnysk
and Zakarpat), as shown under the labels ‘Donbas’ and ‘Far West’ in
Appendix VII, one finds that the trust variables (trust in the president,
parliament and government and distrust in tax bureaucrats) predominate
for both groups in the 2005, 2010 and 2015 surveys (except for Far West
Ukraine in 2010, when neither deterrence nor trust issues were very sig-
nificant but previous contact with tax bureaucrats was.) In other words,
when all of the independent variables are held even at their means and
the proxy variables for trust in the state were individually altered from
their lowest levels to their highest levels, the trust variables had much
higher substantive effects than the proxy variable for the deterrence-
based approach to ensuring tax compliance.3 Hence, Ukrainians in
the far eastern portion of the country (where fewer Catholics live)
have the same primary, underlying motivations (the degree of trust in
the state) as Poles and western Ukrainians in deciding whether or not
3 On substantive effects, see Chapter 6, Footnotes 21 and 22.
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Does your state/government fulfil its obligations to citizens?
2005 10% 17% 15% 11% 10% 3% 2% 9% 8%
2010 11% 10% 6% 13% 7% 9% 13% 15% 6%
2015 7% 5% 5% 9% 8% 6% 5% 5% na
Do you think you can trust your state/government to do what is right?
2005 10% 18% 14% 12% 13% 3% 2% 7% 6%
2010 11% 7% 5% 11% 7% 12% 21% 16% 2%
2015 7% 6% 6% 10% 9% 5% 3% 6% na
No Mean Replacement.
to be supportive of tax compliance. Generally speaking, trust is the more
important ingredient for compliance with the state in both East and West
Ukraine.
And trust in the state was lacking in both Far West and Donbas
regions, just not at the same time in 2005 and 2010. In the 2005 survey,
the trust divide between the two regions was stark. Some 78 per cent of
Far Western Ukrainians trusted Yushchenko versus just 9 per cent in the
Donbas. Similarly, 24 per cent of Far Westerners trusted the parliament
as opposed to just 5 per cent of those in the Far East Donbas region.
And 35 per cent of Far Westerners as opposed to 4 per cent of Donbas
respondents trusted the government. Meanwhile, the next survey five
years later yielded nearly opposite responses. In 2010, some 58 per cent
of Donbas Ukrainians trusted Yanukovych, whereas only 16 per cent of
Far Western Ukrainians did. Similarly, 37 per cent of Donbas Ukrainians
trusted the parliament versus 7 per cent of Far Westerners, and 45 per
cent of individuals in the Donbas trusted the government as opposed to
10 per cent of those in the Far West. (Trust in the tax bureaucrats and in
fellow taxpayers was roughly the same across all regions of the country.)
Such a pattern for 2005 and 2010 also is mirrored in how East and
West replied to questions regarding whether their state fulfilled its obli-
gations to citizens and whether their state could be trusted to do what is
right, as shown in Table 7.3. In replying to both of these questions, the
East and particularly the Donbas region show the lowest support for the
state in 2005 and among the highest in 2010. Similarly, Western and Far
Western Ukrainians show the highest levels of trust in their state fulfilling
its obligations and doing what is right in 2005, but among the lowest in
2010.
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Meanwhile, with a new president, parliament and government, the
2015 survey saw trust in the state similar – and dramatically low – across
both the Far West and Far East of the country, as only 18 per cent and a
nearly identical 16 per cent of Far Westerners and of Donbas residents,
respectively, trusted President Petro Poroshenko. Similarly, trust in the
parliament was 5 and 2 per cent in the Far West and Donbas regions,
respectively, and trust in the government was 6 per cent in the Far West
and 2 per cent in the Far East. Thus, not only are both extreme sides of
the country responding to questions regarding motivations for tax com-
pliance similarly and in correlation with similar trust concerns, but also,
by 2015, both far western and far eastern regions are unified in their
high distrust of the new, post-EuroMaidan regime in Kyiv.
Moreover, in the logit regressions in Appendix VII, two very interest-
ing anomalies can be observed that illustrate a negative attribute of hav-
ing trust in the state. First, for Donbas Ukrainians, in 2005, the more one
trusts the government, the less likely one would be to express support
for obeying the tax laws – and the substantive effect for this was −76 per
cent. Second, for Far Western Ukrainians, the more one trusted the pres-
ident in 2005, the less likely one was to give support for tax compliance –
the substantive effect for this was −41 per cent. This was repeated in
2015, when the substantive effect for trust in the president was −22 per
cent. These two effects suggest that trust in the state matters, but it
also can act negatively upon state–society relations. Why? One possi-
bility is that if one identified with a particular branch of government (in
2005, western Ukraine was more supportive of the president while east-
ern Ukraine, perhaps, was more supportive of those in the government),
then one might feel as if one would not need to be as strict when it came
to paying taxes because ‘your guy’ or ‘guys’ was in control at the top.
Comparing the Donbas with the four most western provinces shows
that trust – or lack of trust – in the state is the prime motivation asso-
ciated with deciding whether to support tax laws, even those personally
deemed to be unfair.
Centre and South
Akin to the Far West–Far East comparison, Ukrainians in the Central
part of the country, generally speaking, were more trusting of the pres-
ident in 2005 than those in the Southern part of the country, with the
reverse being the case in 2010 after the change in government. However,
the differences are less stark than those above between East and West.
In 2005, 49 per cent of Central Ukrainians and 32 per cent of Southern
Ukrainians expressed trust in Yushchenko, whereas in 2010, 28 per cent
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of Central Ukrainians and 55 per cent of Southern Ukrainians trusted
Yanukovych and in 2015, 22 per cent of Central Ukrainians and 15 per
cent of Southern Ukrainians trusted Poroshenko. With respect to trust
in the parliament and the government, though, support was largely con-
stant across both the Centre and the South. In 2005, 18 and 20 per cent
of the Central Ukrainians surveyed trusted the parliament and the gov-
ernment, respectively, and the corresponding figures were 21 and 22 per
cent in 2010 and 9 and 9 per cent in 2015. Meanwhile, in 2005, 18 and
21 per cent of Southern Ukrainians expressed trust in the parliament
and government, respectively, while the figures rose slightly to 34 and
38 per cent, respectively, in 2010 before falling again to 6 and 8 per cent
in 2015.
The logit regression analyses of the question ‘Would you obey tax
laws even if you considered them unfair?’ for the Central and South-
ern regions of Ukraine both broadly mirror the surveys for the country
as a whole, especially the overall 2005 result, where Ukrainians reacted
largely and relatively equally in response to both coercive and trust-
building measures.
For Central Ukraine, the 2005 survey finds that withdrawing the
deterrent threat of punishment and a lack of trust in street-level tax
bureaucrats have nearly equally strong substantive effects. Withdrawing
deterrence fully made respondents 16 per cent less likely to voice support
for obeying unfair laws, whereas distrusting tax bureaucrats made them
15 per cent less likely to do so. For the 2010 survey, Central Ukrainians
reacted a bit more strongly to trust-building measures. Affirming full
trust in Yanukovych corresponded with being 14 per cent more likely to
be supportive of compliance, and voicing complete trust in the govern-
ment corresponded with being 20 per cent more likely to be supportive
of compliance. Meanwhile, trusting the parliament and distrusting tax
bureaucrats corresponded with being 26 and 22 per cent less likely to
obey the tax laws, respectively. Withdrawing the deterrent threat in 2010,
interestingly, also made one more likely to support compliance with the
tax laws. In 2015, for Central Ukrainians, both withdrawing deterrence
and the ‘trust in the state’ variables had strong significance in explain-
ing why some individuals decided to support obeying tax laws even if
deemed unfair, but the substantive effects for the trust variables, which
ranged from 18 to 24 per cent, were slightly greater in magnitude than
the substantive effect for withdrawing deterrence, which had a value of
12 per cent.
For South Ukraine, the 2005 survey finds that Ukrainians are nearly
equally influenced by the withdrawal of deterrence and by their trust
in parliament with respect to deciding whether to be supportive of
238 Taxes and Trust
complying with the tax laws even if deemed unfair. Trust in govern-
ment, though, had the biggest substantive effect. If Southern Ukrainians
stated that they trusted government, they were 41 per cent more likely
to agree to comply with tax laws they deemed personally to be unfair.
In 2010, trust variables had slightly greater impact, as fully trusting the
government made one 38 per cent more likely to support compliance
while withdrawing deterrence made one 31 per cent less likely to voice
a willingness to obey. Ironically, not trusting other taxpayers to comply
coincided with a 40 per cent increase in the likelihood of voicing sup-
port for obeying the tax laws, perhaps because Southern Ukrainians may
have been more willing to distance themselves from the ‘bad’ behaviour
around them. The 2015 survey shows a very different result for South-
ern Ukrainians, whose decision to support obeying tax laws even if
deemed to be unfair only had one significant explanatory variable – the
‘trust in the president’ variable, which held a large substantive effect of
51 per cent.
Generally speaking, southern Ukraine has been more distrusting of the
government in Kyiv (with an exception when Yanukovych was in power,
as shown in the 2010 survey) than central Ukrainians. Further, when it
comes to explaining why some citizens choose to obey tax laws even if
deemed unfair, those in the South were more responsive to ‘trust in the
state’ variables than their fellow citizens in the Centre. The comparison,
therefore, highlights the extra importance for the central state to pursue
the trust of citizens in the South, even considering that trust in Kyiv is
low across the entire country.
Crimea
Crimea is a different case altogether. Unlike the other regions of Ukraine,
it is the only one with a majority ethnic Russian population and, of
course, it was annexed by Russia in the spring of 2014. And, while the
sample size drawn from Crimea was the smallest, the overall support for
complying with the tax laws was more similar to that of Russia in 2010
and 2012 (but not in 2005). Compared with the other regions above,
the 2010 survey sample from Crimea had the lowest percentage of the
population with a higher education (24 per cent) and the lowest percent-
age who identified themselves as being ‘upper class’ (0 per cent), but,
contrary to being described often as a retiree area, the region did not
have the greatest number of individuals above 60 years of age, as the
Central, East and Donbas region samples had slightly larger numbers of
respondents in that age group. Further, in addition to having a percent-
age of those who were employees or workers (skilled or unskilled) that
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was among the highest of the regions, Crimea also had the highest num-
ber of those employed in the agricultural sector (7 per cent, over double
the national average.) Meanwhile, the number of enterprise or institu-
tion division heads or entrepreneurs was the lowest in the country, at
3 per cent, half that of Far Western Ukraine.
‘Trust in the state’ levels (president, parliament and government) were
the lowest of the Ukrainian regions in 2005 – with trust in the president
at 13 per cent, in the parliament at 9 per cent and in the government
at 11 per cent – and the highest in 2010 – with support at 77, 74 and
76 per cent, respectively. Yanukovych, after all, owes his 2010 victory to
the support he received in Crimea. This support contributed directly to
high levels of compliance in Crimea in 2010 and 2012 compared with
the rest of the country.
Unsurprisingly, then, trust plays the strongest role for Crimea in both
the 2005 and 2010 logit regressions. In 2005, Crimeans were 31 per
cent less likely to express support for obeying tax laws if they trusted
Yushchenko (although this particular finding was not significant) and
54 per cent more likely to obey if they trusted the government. In 2010,
only one respondent out of 199 had previous contact with a tax bureau-
crat, causing that variable to drop out in the regression. In a regres-
sion that excludes prior contact with a tax bureaucrat, Crimeans were
33 per cent less likely to state that they would obey the tax laws if they
said their behaviour was affected by the withdrawal of deterrence and
were 66 per cent less likely to do so if they trusted Yanukovych. Trusting
the parliament in 2010, however, made them 94 per cent more likely to
voice support for compliance. Hence, in Crimea, the lack of popularity
of Yushchenko and the stronger support a few years later for parliament –
balancing along with the effects of increased support for a new president
and government – likely account for the dramatic shift in willingness to
support tax laws even if deemed unfair from 2005 to 2010 and 2012.
Bureau Contact for Ukraine Regions
In the logit regressions of the 2005, 2010 and 2015 surveys for the
Ukraine regions, having had contact with a tax bureaucrat during the
previous five years only mattered significantly for East and Donbas
Ukrainians in 2005 and for West and Far West Ukrainians in 2010 with
respect to the question of whether one would obey the tax laws even if
they were considered unfair. For the rest of the country, and for East
and Donbas in 2010 and West and Far West in 2005, previous bureau-
crat contact did not appear to have any impact on decisions to support
complying with the tax laws in the regressions. Moreover, the impact
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Table 7.4 Nature of contact with Ukrainian tax bureaucrats by region:
Those who stated that they would obey tax laws even if personally considered unfair
as a percentage of those who were satisfied with both the conduct and the result of



















2005 51% 48% 53% 47% 75% 40% 29% 79% na
2010 54% 38% 33% 56% 60% 63% 54% 59% na
2012 59% 69% 77% 51% 50% 63% 50% 62% na
2015 70% 65% 67% 73% 91% 72% 68% 64% na
No Mean Replacement: na = too low number of respondents with prior contact in Crimea
in 2005–2012 surveys; Crimea not surveyed in 2015.
Light grey shaded = lower than 50 per cent.
of having had such contact, where it mattered, was negative, except in
South Ukraine, where, while insignificant in the regression in 2005, the
substantive effect showed slight significance.
Table 7.4 depicts the impact of having met with a tax bureaucrat pre-
viously by showing the willingness to obey tax laws even if deemed per-
sonally unfair of those who had good experiences with tax bureaucrats
(being satisfied both with how one was treated and with the result one
received.) Shaded in light grey are the regions where more than half of
the respondents still would not agree to obey the tax laws even after such
good encounters with tax bureaucrats.
Further, the difference in the willingness to obey tax laws between
those who did not have prior contact and those who did was most neg-
ative in the East and, especially, in Donbas Ukraine in 2005, but in the
West and, especially, in Far West Ukraine in 2010. In those areas, one
was more likely to agree to obey tax laws if one did not have interaction
with bureaucrats than if one did have such interaction and the experience
was satisfactory all around.
These results, shaded in grey in Table 7.4, seem a bit counterintu-
itive. As examined in Chapter 6 and based on the work of Tom Tyler,
it is the nature of previous interactions with authorities that can have a
positive or negative effect on one’s willingness to obey the state in the
future. Given that East and Donbas Ukrainians in 2005 and West and
Far West Ukrainians in 2010 who had previous contact with tax bureau-
crats were less likely to be supportive of compliance than those who did
not have such contact, does this mean that the nature of the interac-
tions with tax bureaucrats in these regions was somehow more negative?
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Table 7.5 Percentage of those with good prior tax bureaucrat experience who trust




















2005 51% 79% 67% 55% 67% 28% 19% 50% na
2010 59% 47% 41% 64% 63% 60% 78% 65% na
2015 42% 50% 52% 51% 47% 33% 44% 32% na
a Percentage of those who had prior interactions with tax bureaucrats that were found
both to be satisfactorily conducted and to have produced satisfying results who trust the
Ukrainian president.
No Mean Replacement: Calculations were made only of those who had stated that they had
had contact with a tax bureaucrat in the previous five years and had provided answers for
the following three questions: ‘Do you trust the president of Ukraine?’ ‘Were you satisfied
with the results of your meeting with the tax service employees?’ and ‘Were you satisfied
by how the tax service employees spoke with and treated you?’
na = too low number of respondents with prior contact in Crimea in 2005–2012 surveys;
Crimea not surveyed in 2015.
Light grey shaded = lower than 50 per cent.
Actually no, in all of these four cases, more respondents were satisfied
both with how they were treated in such past interactions and with the
results of such interactions with the tax bureaucracies. Rather, in these
particular regions, even those who were satisfied with both the conduct
and the result of meeting tax bureaucrats in the past were more likely to
be unsupportive of complying with the tax laws. In fact, this is a finding
that is unlike the other regions or in Poland and Russia as a whole, where
previous positive interactions (in terms of satisfied conduct and results)
always coincided with support for compliance at a level above 50 per
cent. Clearly, something other than the nature of these tax encounters in
East and West Ukraine is having an impact here.
Given that Yanukovych replaced Yushchenko in 2010 and that the East
broadly supported the former and the West the latter (with little support
for Poroshenko across the country in 2015), Table 7.5 explores the trust
levels for the president across the different regions of Ukraine in the
2005, 2010 and 2015 surveys for all respondents, as well as for those
who had previous contact with tax bureaucrats and were satisfied with
both the conduct and the result of such interactions.
What emerges is that, in 2005, less than 50 per cent of Ukrainians who
had good prior bureaucratic contact in the East and the Donbas (and in
Crimea) expressed trust in Yushchenko; elsewhere in the country, those




















During the past five years, have you had business with employees of the tax service? (% Yes)
2004 49% 23% na na na na na na na na na
2005 na na 15% 12% 11% 17% 14% 12% 9% 20% 11%
2010 38% 24% 12% 16% 15% 12% 13% 12% 11% 12% 0.5%∗
2012 na na 12% 12% 11% 13% 7% 9% 8% 13% 14%
2015 na na 19% 16% 15% 21% 20% 19% 14% 17% na
What is the personal income tax rate in your country today? (% correct answer)
2004 na 38% na na na na na na na na na
2005 na na 9% 9% 10% 8% 4% 12% 12% 9% 7%
2010 22% 46% 10% 13% 17% 7% 9% 7% 9% 6% 50%
2012 na na 13% 12% 14% 8% 6% 14% 20% 17% 28%
2015 na na 13% 13% 15% 15% 18% 11% 13% 9% na
∗ In the 2010 survey, only one respondent out of 199 in Crimea stated that he or she had had contact with a tax bureaucrat in the previous five
years.
Light grey shaded = lower than Ukraine average
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who had good prior interactions with tax bureaucrats voiced trust in
Yushchenko to a greater extent. Similarly, in 2010, less than 50 per cent
of Ukrainians who had satisfactory prior interactions with tax bureau-
crats in the West and Far West regions affirmed trust in Yanukovych,
whereas elsewhere in the country that year those who had good prior
bureaucrat contact were more trusting of Yanukovych. Finally, while
support was low across the country in 2015 for Poroshenko, the low-
est levels of support – even from those who approved of their interaction
with the tax bureaucracy – were in the East and South.
Hence, it is likely that it was the nature of the extreme lack of trust
among these populations that overrode even satisfying past experiences
to account for a low willingness to comply with the state’s tax laws. Thus,
trust – or lack thereof – in the state, as represented by who was president
at the time, trumps good street-level interactions across both East and
West. Trust matters most of all, but for who and when, depends upon
who is in charge of the state.
Tax Awareness across Ukraine Regions
While a more thorough and vastly more intensive study would be
required to assess whether the tax system interacts with taxpayers con-
sistently across the unitary state of Ukraine, the Taxpayer Compliance
Attitudinal Surveys do illustrate to what extent awareness of and inter-
action with the tax system vary across the country. Table 7.6 illustrates
what percentage of the Ukrainian public interacted with the tax bureau-
cracy nationally, across the regions, and in comparison with Poland and
Russia, and what percentage of the public knows the correct personal
income tax rate.
Compared with their neighbours to the East and West, Ukrainians
have been the most disconnected from their tax regime, with less knowl-
edge of and less interaction with the tax system. Yet, across the coun-
try, that disconnection was fairly similar, without great disparities from
the national average in any region. True, Ukrainians in both the Far
West and the Donbas areas were less likely than the country as a whole
to have had previous meetings with tax bureaucrats, but such interac-
tions were generally no more than one-third less than the already low
national average. Western Ukrainians were more likely than their fel-
low countrymen in the Centre, East and South to know the correct per-
sonal income tax rate, but no region had a level of knowledge of the tax
rates approaching that of Poland or Russia. In short, no single region of
Ukraine can be shown to be either consistently more or less aware of the
tax regime than other parts of the country – suggesting that efforts that
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try to raise tax awareness among citizens should not be restricted to any
particular region. Such a finding related to governance is different from
other research, such as that of Ralph De Haas, Milena Djourelova and
Elena Nikolova, who have found stark differences between East and West
Ukraine when it comes to attitudes supporting market-based economies
and democracy.4
Religion and Civil Society
In recent years, explanations for why some post-communist states have
been able to govern their peoples better than others have pointed to
differing conceptions of what constitutes a civil society. Such compet-
ing visions of civil society are perceived to have been mediated through
both long and short-term relationships between states and societies. John
Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, among others, have argued that
the conditions that favoured consolidation of the post-communist tran-
sition in Central and Eastern Europe are those relating to a set of values
and beliefs, or ‘inherited world views’, that are shared within a society
that were formed in the past, which carries the transition forward in
different ways.5 So, do country-specific values and beliefs matter with
respect to state–society relations?
With respect to post-communist Europe, there is a much-observed
religious divide corresponding roughly to that between Catholicism in
Central Europe, including Poland, on one side, and Slavic Orthodoxy in
the former Soviet Union states, including Russia, on the other. Poland
has developed a civil society that possesses citizens who are more politi-
cally active and demand greater openness and transparency on the part
of the state than the countries to its east. This is deemed to have come
about, in significant part, through the historic role the Catholic Church
played during the Polish People’s Republic and its collapse in 1989. Once
the regime established by outside forces met its demise and a new Pol-
ish state was built, citizens then could place greater trust in their state,
allowing the development of the particular type of civil society that is,
perhaps, familiar in more consolidated democracies.
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan also have sought to explain how the dif-
ferent natures of branches of Christianity can impact the type of sup-
port given to nascent democratic groups, while carefully recognizing that
Orthodox Christianity is not inherently anti-democratic. They argue that
‘Roman Catholicism as a transnational, hierarchical organization can
potentially provide material and doctrinal support to a local Catholic
4 De Haas, Djourelova and Nikolova, pp. 92–107. 5 Elster, Offe and Preuss.
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church to help it resist state opposition.’6 Hence, the Catholic Church
could be considered as supporting ‘a more robust and autonomous civil
society’.
With respect to the nature of the transition’s aftermath, the 1989 tran-
sition was perceived in Poland dramatically differently by the state and
the society than the 1991 transition in Russia, as noted earlier. The
Catholic view of civil society, Oleg Kharkhordin has argued, can be
found in Polish Solidarity literature. ‘Solidarity spoke about the con-
flict between civil society and the state, while in practice it followed the
example of the Catholic Church – a most serious stronghold of Polish
national liberation in the 19th and 20th centuries and the only real bul-
wark of resistance after the imposition of communist rule.’7 Hence, the
vision of civil society from which the new Polish state was born in 1989,
was based in some significant part upon the Catholic foundations of Pol-
ish society.
The Orthodox Church, on the other hand, does not stand as much in
opposition to the state, providing a different outlook as to how an ethical
society should be constructed. ‘Concerning civil society and resistance
to the state, Orthodox Christianity is often (not always) organizationally
and doctrinally in a relatively weak position because of what Max Weber
called its “caesaropapist” structure, in which the Church is a national
as opposed to a transnational organization’, Linz and Stepan have writ-
ten. ‘In caesaropapist churches, the national state normally plays a major
role in the national church’s finances and appointments. Such a national
church is not really a relatively autonomous part of civil society.’8 How
the state’s bureaucrats behave towards citizens in society would appear
to depend upon how committed state leaders and the Orthodox Church
are to greater transparency and civic oversight.
Along the same lines, Russia’s society some two decades after com-
munism often has been described as one in which citizens are less prone
to be active in demanding transparency on the part of the state and less
trusting of it. The development of Russia’s civil society, in particular,
could be seen to be due in part to a different type of long-term historic
church–state relationship, which has complemented a more subject–
ruler relationship in everyday governance.
The absence in the Soviet Union of a non-state institutional actor that
would play an oppositional role to the state like the role the Catholic
Church played in Poland could be seen as having prevented greater
transparency and openness from developing. And, because Russians do
not view themselves as participating in political life, they would be more
6 Linz and Stepan, p. 453. 7 Kharkhordin, pp. 954–955. 8 Ibid., p. 453.
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likely to have greater distrust of the state and negative views of the
bureaucrats that interact with them. So, differences in religion, or even,
perhaps, in religious-based conceptions of state–society relations, may
help explain from where long-term distrust of the state can come.
Thus, to aid in the re-creation of a constructive state–society relation-
ship, differing religious conceptions of civil society can help explain the
nature of and fundamental basis for society’s trust in the state and the
state’s trust in society. The implication of these distinct outlooks would
be that Catholicism, through the Church, promotes an associational life
in society that is more independent from the state and that associations,
including the Church itself, challenge the state from the outside. This
implies that a civil society will respond to the state when individuals
trust the state and are in tune with its objectives. In contrast, an Ortho-
dox outlook implies that the state and society should be unified for a
civil, ethical life to be achieved.
In order to examine the extent to which the relative legacy of par-
ticular religious viewpoints on civil society in post-communist Europe
matters for explaining long-term trust/distrust in the state and how they
affect state–society interactions on the ground, a close examination of
the Ukrainian case is necessary. Whereas Poland and Russia are predom-
inantly Catholic and Slavic Orthodox, respectively, in religious make-up,
Ukraine maintains a population that is nearly 10 per cent Catholic, most
of whom are geographically concentrated in western Ukraine.
Moreover, while the majority of Catholic Ukrainians are Greek
Catholics and Poles are Roman Catholics, one can still regard Ukrainian
Catholics as holding a distinctly different outlook on civil society than
their Orthodox compatriots and one that is more in line with that of Pol-
ish Catholics. The Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine is subordinated
to the Pope in Rome, has been influenced heavily by the Polish Catholic
Church over the centuries, follows the same doctrine (but not rites) of all
Catholics, and stood in opposition to the Soviet state, which persecuted
it much more than Orthodox Ukrainians and Catholic Ukrainians who
converted to Orthodoxy. Therefore, the distinctions between branches
of Catholicism should not have significant impact on utilizing Ukraine
as a testing ground for differing religious perspectives on state–society
relations.
Tax Compliance and Religion in Ukraine
Further analysis along the East–West political and economic divide
of Ukraine and along the mostly coinciding societal cleavage between
Catholics and non-Catholics (almost entirely Slavic Orthodox) in the
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country – a religious mix that does not exist in the neighbouring states –
can provide insight as to whether different religious outlooks on civil
society provide a background for how citizens react to their states.
In comparing the willingness of Catholic and non-Catholic Ukraini-
ans to obey tax laws, there are differences, as shown in Appendix VII,
suggesting that the culture and practice of different religions lead to the
construction of very different relationships between citizens and their
states. The four far western oblasts of Ukraine (grouped together as ‘Far
West Ukraine’) are as a whole nearly split equally between Catholics and
non-Catholics. Trust matters more for both Catholic and non-Catholic
Ukrainians in the west than the proxy variable for being motivated more
to support tax compliance by the state’s deterrence approach in 2005,
2010 and 2015 (with the exception of Catholic Ukrainians in 2010, for
whom neither trust nor deterrence variables mattered), but as with this
regional area as a whole, in 2005, trusting the president makes Catholics
as well as non-Catholics less likely to support obeying tax laws.
Whereas the trust variables and the deterrence variable all had about
equal weight, in terms of substantive effect (the change in likelihood that
one would obey tax laws even if deemed unfair) in the overall Ukraine
regression for 2005, trust issues matter most for Catholic Ukrainians in
2005, 2010 and 2015, as Appendices VI and VII illustrate. That is, if
all of the independent variables are held even at their means and trust in
parliament is varied from its lowest to its highest levels, Catholic Ukraini-
ans were 54 per cent in 2005, 25 per cent in 2010 and 41 per cent in 2015
more likely to be in favour of compliance.9 Hence, Catholic Ukrainians
do appear to respond to the state more out of trust – similar to Poles in
2005 and 2010.
While not entirely surprising, given that 91 per cent of the country is
not Catholic, non-Catholic Ukraine’s attitudinal behaviour towards tax
compliance is shown to be nearly identical to that of Ukraine as a whole
in 2005, 2010 and 2015 – ‘trust in the state’ variables are practically
9 The Ukrainian regressions utilized a trust scale, which is a composite of trust in the
president, the parliament and the government and trust in the state to do what it right
and to provide goods and services, but when trust in the parliament is disaggregated out
it becomes very, very much more significant, with a strong substantive effect. Further,
interestingly, about 97 per cent of those Catholic Ukrainians in 2005 who trusted the
parliament also trusted the president and the government (but nowhere near the other
way around). For a Catholic Ukrainian, then, to be trusting of the parliament, which at
the time was very fractious and not aligned with the west-leaning president, who was the
choice of the Catholic vote, he or she must have been more trusting overall of the state.
(Also interesting to note is that if Catholic Ukrainians voted for president in 2004 Orange
Revolution election, they were 31 per cent more likely in 2005 to support complying with
the tax laws.)
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equivalent in substantive effect to the deterrence proxy variable in 2005,
but such trust variables have stronger substantive effects than deterrence
does in the 2010 survey, while they are broadly all similar in the 2015
survey.
Perhaps these differences between Catholics and non-Catholics in
Ukraine help elucidate further the differences between largely Catholic
Poland and largely Slavic Orthodox Russia with respect to attitudes
towards tax compliance. However, one should be cautious in making
such claims. Nationally, in 2005, Catholic Ukrainians were only nearly
13 per cent more likely to state that they would obey tax laws even if
deemed unfair than their Slavic Orthodox countrymen (47 per cent to
35 per cent)10 whereas Poles were 27 per cent more likely to state that
they would obey such a law than Russians (83 per cent to 56 per cent.)
Meanwhile, by 2010, the gap was even narrower, as Catholic Ukrainians
nationally were only 5 per cent more likely to state that they would obey
the tax laws than their fellow Orthodox citizens (48 per cent to 43 per
cent), whereas Poles were more likely to state that they would obey than
Russians by 25 per cent (77 per cent to 52 per cent). And, in 2015,
the gap was just 2 per centage points in Ukraine. Catholicism, in and
of itself, may account for contributing to a more compliant population,
but it does not appear to be enough to explain the entire cross-national
differences.
Perhaps, though, the degree to which one is committed to (or indoc-
trinated by) a particular religion might make one be more in line with
a particular religious outlook on civil society interaction, affecting how
one reacts to the state. This could be measured through assessing the
impact on compliance of attending church frequently. However, this
does not appear to be the case in Ukraine. Only 36.22 per cent of all
Ukrainians in 2005 who told pollsters that they attend church once a
week or more also stated that they would obey tax laws even if consid-
ered unfair – compared with 35.70 per cent of Ukrainians who attended
church less often. In 2010, the corresponding figures also were nearly
identical, at 43.44 per cent and 44.97 per cent, respectively. Moreover,
both Catholics and Orthodox who stated that they attended church once
a week or more were less likely (by a slight margin) to state support
for tax compliance than those who attended less often. Only 42 per
cent of frequent Catholic churchgoers (as opposed to 47 per cent of all
Catholics) stated that they would obey the tax laws and only 31 per cent
10 This figure does not change regardless of whether we are speaking of Greek or Roman
Catholic Ukrainians, as 47 per cent of Greek Catholics (who overall represent 8.23 per
cent of those participating in the Ukraine 2005 survey) and a similar 48 per cent of
Roman Catholics (0.83 per cent of the Ukraine 2005 survey) stated that they would
obey the tax laws.
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Ukrainian Catholics (9 to
10% of survey)
47% 48% na 46%
Ukrainian non-Catholics
(90 to 91% of survey)
35% 43% na 44%
Ukraine (all respondents)
(100% of Survey)
36% 44% 38% 45%
Far Western Ukrainian
Catholics (51 to 56% of
Far Western Regions are
Catholic)
45% 53% na 48%
Far Western Ukrainian
non-Catholics (44 to
49% of Far Western
Regions are
non-Catholic)
30% 42% na 51%
Far West Ukraine (all
respondents)
37% 47% 36% 50%
of frequent Orthodox churchgoers (as opposed to 35 per cent of all
Orthodox) expressed similar support for complying with the tax laws.
(In 2010, only 46 per cent of frequent Catholic churchgoers (as opposed
to 48 per cent of all Catholics) and only 43 per cent of frequent Ortho-
dox churchgoers (as opposed to 45 per cent of all Orthodox) supported
obeying the tax laws.) Hence, it appears that the degree of ‘exposure’ to a
religious outlook on civil society may not matter directly on an individual
level.
Therefore, in testing how much weight religious background within
a society holds in explaining governance issues, the research here
also suggests several findings that give great caution when associat-
ing the ability and methods of governance with the existence of a
Catholic/Orthodox divide across Eastern Europe. First, namely, as men-
tioned, the Orthodox–Catholic gap in Ukraine in support for tax compli-
ance narrows to 5 per cent in 2010 and to 2 per cent in 2015, as shown
in Table 7.7. Similarly, trust issues mattered more for non-Catholic
Ukrainians in 2010 than they did in 2005.
Second, the fact that a majority of Ukrainian Catholics in 2005 (and
2010 and 2015) did not state that they would be compliant with any
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tax law suggests that religion does not alone (or predominantly) make
for ‘better citizens’. Such a ‘Catholic effect’ – even if stronger in 2005
than in 2010 and 2015 – is insufficient to cause a majority of Catholic
Ukrainians to support abiding by the tax laws even if deemed unfair.
Third, the fact that the differences in attitudinal support for tax com-
pliance within Ukraine were much smaller than the differences between
neighbouring Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia also suggests a weak
relationship between religious preferences and governance. Hence, the
significantly higher support in willingness to obey the tax laws of Poles
than of Russians, previously observed in other surveys, would not likely
be due to the largely Catholic makeup of Poland or the Slavic Orthodox
composition of Russia.
Moreover, the fact that the underlying motivations for obeying or not
obeying are quite similar between the far eastern and far western por-
tions of Ukraine, as shown at the beginning of this chapter – that is, that
at both sides of the country those motivations are based on issues related
to trust – also suggests that underlying religious differences across East-
ern Europe might not matter greatly.
Finally, as shown in Table 7.7, within the Far Western regions of
Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Volnysk and Zakarpat Oblasts, where the popu-
lation was almost equally divided between Catholics and non-Catholics,
there are sizeable differences between the two groups’ willingness to obey
tax laws even if deemed unfair that are even larger than the differences
between Catholics and non-Catholics in the country as a whole in 2005
and 2010. This suggests that the differences noted here are associated
less with some aspect of being of one religion or another than with being
in one particular area of the country or another. On the other hand, of
course, such differences between Catholics and non-Catholics in the Far
Western regions are nearly bridged in the 2015 survey, as they are for
the country as a whole. Moreover, even though the Far Western region
contains more Catholics than elsewhere, comparing the overall results
for the Far Western Region with the overall results for all of Ukraine
finds that in 2005, 2010 and 2012 the differences between that region
and the country as a whole are not that large, suggesting that regardless
of internal differences within this part of the country, overall the effect
compared to the nation as a whole is limited.
Tax Compliance, Nationality Self-Identification and
Language in Ukraine
In addition to religion, Ukraine has been said to be divided both by
nationality and by language. In the 2015 survey, additional questions
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Table 7.8 National self-identification and the Ukraine Taxpayer
Compliance Attitudinal Surveys
Would Obey Tax Laws Even If
Considered Unfair 2015
Russian Nationality (8% of survey) 47%
Ukrainian Nationality (89% of survey) 44%
were asked of respondents to discern their impact on willingness to obey
a tax law even if one considers it to be unfair. When asked which nation-
ality they considered themselves to be, 8 per cent stated ‘Russian’ while
89 per cent identified themselves as ‘Ukrainian’. Yet, as Table 7.8 shows,
stating that one was ‘Russian’ correlated only with a minimal difference
(3 per cent) in willingness to show support for tax compliance than if
one identified more with being ‘Ukrainian’. Hence, it would seem that
even if one identified more with being ‘Russian’, one was just as willing,
or perhaps a bit more, to follow Ukraine’s tax laws than if one identified
as ‘Ukrainian’.
Similarly, respondents in 2015 were asked about the languages they
mainly speak at home, and Table 7.9 shows that the differences between
those who favoured one language or the other are not great. In fact, it
made no difference whether respondents said they spoke Russian or both
Russian and Ukrainian equally at home. And those who said they spoke
Ukrainian at home were just 6 per cent more likely to voice support
for obeying tax laws, even if they disagreed with them. Hence, language
does not appear to be a significant variable that dramatically divides the
Ukrainian public with respect to their personal views on tax compliance.
Thus, even if there is some evidence for the existence of a religious or
language effect, there may well be limits to the impact of religious out-
looks and language on post-communist governance. It may, in fact, not
matter greatly how or whether long-held and local religious, regional or
Table 7.9 Language and the Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance
Attitudinal Surveys
Would Obey Tax Laws Even If
Considered Unfair 2015
Russian speakers (29% of survey) 42%
Ukrainian speakers (42% of survey) 48%
Speakers of both (28% of survey) 42%
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cultural outlooks on civil life play a significant role today in how society
frames its trust (or distrust) of the state. Instead, the answers as to where
that deep societal distrust in the state in Russia and, even more signif-
icantly, across all of Ukraine, comes from would appear to be found in
more recent and current interactions that citizens have with their states,
as shown in Chapter 6 and the first half of this chapter.
Given that neither religious, nationality, linguistic, nor regional dif-
ferences are that salient across Ukraine with respect to explaining cit-
izen willingness to undertake a critical obligation towards their state,
Ukraine appears to be a much more unified country than is expected.
That is, trust, or rather the lack of it, across the country appears to
account greatly for the very low levels of tax compliance. Trust in the
state may vary by region with respect to who is in power in Kyiv, but
the entire country is vulnerable to low levels of compliance based on low
levels of trust. To improve the government’s ability to implement policy,
increased confidence in the state is needed across the board, all together.
To address that great need, the next chapter concludes with some tax
administration policy suggestions by which transitional states such as
Ukraine can create and build up levels of trust on the part of citizens in
their state so that greater tax compliance can be achieved.
8 Towards Greater Trust and Tax Compliance
Coercive states may be successful in getting some things done (and
clearly even the Russian government functions well enough so that it
is not in danger of collapsing in the near future). However, the Polish–
Russian–Ukrainian comparison suggests that a state that seeks to build
up and to maintain trust with its citizens will be more effective than one
that treats its citizens in a more coercive manner. And studying the ori-
gins of tax compliance in these countries shows that political parties, the
relative strength of society versus the state, religious culture, legacies of
corruption or the presence of a federalist structure do not exclusively
explain why some transitional states are more capable of administer-
ing policy than others. Rather, it is the construction of a bureaucratic
rational state oriented towards society, the use of constructive historical
legacies when available and a focus on mutually cooperative citizen–state
interactions that enable trust to build up between citizen and state so that
state activity will be accomplished more successfully.
To alter fundamentally a legacy of poor state–society relations, a break
from the past, afforded by a dramatic transition such as the 1989 and
1991 revolutions in Eastern Europe, provides a fresh opportunity for the
state to construct a newer, healthier relationship built on mutual trust
between state and citizen. States such as Russia in the 1990s that did not
fully take advantage of such a unique opportunity may find that coer-
cive measures suffice in the short term, but a fundamental overhaul of
state–society relations may be necessary so that the state will function
effectively for years to come. Authoritarian rule ended up not working
out well for Russia in 1917 and in 1991. A return to more coercive mea-
sures today will not work out for Russia in the long run either.
In reaching such conclusions, this book has been about both testing
existing theories on state capacity, drawn largely from the comparative
politics literature, and building a new theory on state capacity, specific
to post-communist states on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
It also serves as a call for political scientists to engage in the study of
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economic activities within states, specifically those that seek to evaluate
how economic policies are implemented.
This project, thus, not only contributes to theoretical debates regard-
ing the origins of capable states, but also discerns where, given lim-
ited resources, transitional states should focus their efforts in re-creating
themselves in order to implement their own policies successfully.
Moreover, as Poland and Russia symbolize two contrasting routes
of post-communist development and as Ukraine lies in the crossroads
between the two (figuratively as well as geographically), this book takes
up cases that are not just theoretically justified but also critically impor-
tant for the global study of governance and development.
When governments are perceived as treating citizens unfairly and
unequally, citizens’ faith in the state is undermined. State and society
need to be wedded to each other. Broader, mutually cooperative rela-
tionships between state and society lead to the accomplishment of state
goals. In short, by focusing on taxation, this book seeks to make sophis-
ticated analytical connections between the levels of civil society and the
type of post-communist state that has emerged.
The aims of the research presented in this book have been threefold:
At the meta-level, this study has sought to discern how a state transitions
from a coercive state to a legal, legitimate tax state; at the macro-level,
it has sought to determine how the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian states
implement policies to ensure tax compliance; and at the micro-level, it
has sought to establish what exactly is going on inside these countries
that affects tax collection and, more broadly, governance.
In evaluating tax compliance, the project has employed qualita-
tive process-tracing research methods – such as extensive documen-
tary research and interviews with key informants to assess institutional
design, organizational history and reform paths of bureaucracies – as well
as unprecedented quantitative survey methods – through eight Taxpayer
Compliance Attitudinal Surveys in Poland, Russia and Ukraine and the
Public Officials Survey in Russia. While governments of all stripes can
be very reluctant to provide data to independent researchers, the process
of analyzing how institutions function on the ground can be particularly
difficult in countries such as today’s Russia, where bureaucracies are not
especially transparent regarding what they do or how and why they do
it. Nevertheless, this project has succeeded in obtaining data in such
environments.
Comparing the origins of tax administration capacity for post-
communist Poland, Russia and Ukraine clarifies the importance of build-
ing and maintaining a mutually trusting relationship between the state
and its citizens. To be deemed trustworthy, the state must be viewed by
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its citizens as being capable of fulfilling its obligations through the pro-
vision of goods and services and of treating citizens in a fair manner.
Further, for citizens to be deemed trustworthy by their state, they not
only must recognize what the duties of being a good citizen are, such as
complying with tax laws, but also must individually be willing to carry
such tasks out. Trust in the governed on the part of the government can
build up as citizens respond to the state constructively when they deem
the state to be trustworthy (and vice versa.) Further, such mutual trust
will provide successful policy implementation to the benefit of all. Good
governance requires both good citizens and a trustworthy state.
Testing the Three Theories on State Capacity
In comparing the collection of taxes, three main theories on state capac-
ity, drawn largely from the comparative politics literature – state capac-
ity as a function of either political institutions such as parties, state–
society relations or state structures – have been tested with respect to
post-communist Poland, Russia and Ukraine. The first, regarding polit-
ical parties, was shown not to be relevant. State–society relations and
the structure of the state were found to be important for building state
capacity in these three countries, but not precisely in the ways predicted
by the second and third theories.
State Capacity as a Function of Political Parties
Chapter 3 showed, somewhat surprisingly, that political parties – how
well they direct attention to the post-communist state organizations and
civil service – need not play a substantial role in the construction of the
capacity of state bureaucracies. With respect to examining the relevance
of political parties to shaping the agenda and impacting the administra-
tive structures significantly so that policy can be administered, Poland’s
relatively greater state capacity has not been due to a competitive politi-
cal party system. While no governing party was re-elected in Poland from
the first post-communist election in 1991 up until 2011, the party bat-
tles back and forth over civil service reform were not overly productive
even as the tax service took shape.
Further, as described in Chapter 5, in interviews with several Pol-
ish personnel within six tax offices, three tax chambers, three tax audit
offices and the finance ministry, bureaucrats continuously stated, ‘We
are civil service. We are not allied to parties.’ Hence, the differences in
governance levels in the three post-communist states are not due to the
presence of stable, competitive political parties in Poland and the lack
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of them in Russia and Ukraine. Strong political party influence is not
necessary for constructing an effective bureaucratic rational state.
State Capacity as a Function of State–Society Relations
Among the core intuitions of the standard state–society literature is that
governance depends on whether the society can be subordinated to the
state or society is strong enough to resist or co-opt the state. Yet, despite
the efforts at increased state control at the expense of society in Russia
under President Vladimir Putin, governance is not stronger there than
in Poland, where there are less of a divide between citizens and their
government and less coercion.
In addition, certain cultural aspects also have been commonly viewed
as important in distinguishing Russia’s state–society relationship from
Poland’s. Yet, with respect to tax collection, the success of the Tax
Administration Modernization Project in Nizhny Novgorod and Vol-
gograd oblasts, as discussed in Chapter 5, indicated that once a part
of the Russian tax service is given permission from Moscow to reform,
renounces targets and introduces an audit-free tax collection system that
requires greater trust of citizens, tax arrears can decline dramatically.
Hence, utilizing less coercion works in Russia, too!
Moreover, as shown in Chapter 7, at least with respect to the case of
Ukraine, religion, self-identified nationality and language had very little
impact on tax compliance, suggesting that getting the right ‘software’
rather than possessing the right ‘culture’ is what matters.
Therefore, mutually constructive state–society relations are necessary
for good governance – just not in a manner in which a society is pitted
against the state. Indeed, the post-communist transition began with a
large disconnect between state and society in all the East European and
Eurasian countries that simply had to be overcome. In fact, in spite of an
ongoing and, perhaps, increasing dislike for corruption scandals, party
politics and politicians, Poles, as shown in Chapter 6, after the transi-
tion, have maintained general support for the new system and for those
more directly responsible with governing. Thus, trust in the state by soci-
ety is the foundation for a constructive and non-zero-sum state–society
relationship.
State Capacity as a Function of the Structure of the State
While the third theory on state capacity plays down the relevance
of state–society interactions, the state structural argument does hold
well for explaining, in part, the dynamics that accounts for effective
governance. As shown in Chapter 5, the design of administrative
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structures, the human and technological resources afforded to bureaucracies
and the work philosophy among bureaucrats are necessary to provide for
effective policy outcomes.
However, the existing theory that links state capacity to the structure
of the state fails to account for two important provisions for better gover-
nance. First, historical reference points, such as the use of previous insti-
tutional structures, should be utilized, whenever possible, to link back
to healthier state–society interactions. History matters, but it matters in
terms of how it is used and applied in the present as a model for cur-
rent, constructive state–society relations. Previous paths towards creat-
ing cooperative state–society interactions that were laid down by earlier
state–society efforts should be continued. Second, the state structures,
human and technological resources and work philosophy must be directed
towards society so that trust in their state is built up among citizens.
The research presented here provides some evidence to refute the
notion that the structure of the Russian state, particularly federalism,
accounts principally for the relatively poor implementation of policy. The
Nizhny Novgorod and Volgograd tax modernization programs, men-
tioned above, show that once Moscow allows a target-based approach to
tax collection to be eased, regions can perform in a manner more similar
to that in, say, Poland. In addition, under Putin, the Russian Federation
has become much more like a unitary state than it was under President
Boris Yeltsin and is governed as such. Putin’s expressed desire for a strict
‘power vertical’ is not compatible with notions of federalism. There also
has been a lack of clear provision for the rights of the regions in the fed-
eral structure, and sovereignty has not been shared at different levels of
government in Russia. Thus, state structure matters, as do state–society
relations, but an exclusive focus on either one or the other misses out on
the important links between the two theoretical approaches.
A New Model of State Capacity for the
Post-communist States
Analyzing the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian cases makes possible
proposing revisions to the second and third theories in order to build
a new theoretical model for state capacity that better explains how post-
communist governments govern. In Chapter 2, I constructed a new
model for state capacity, which focuses on the extent to which the state
is organized in a Weberian sense and focuses on the manner in which
society is ready to be a willing partner in state activity. The role of
citizens’ trust in the state and the state’s trust in citizens to comply with
the state without overuse of coercion is also emphasized.
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Figure 8.1 State capacity in transition from coercion to trust
This study distinctively has underlined the construction and accumu-
lation of trust as state and society engage with one another as the pri-
mary instrument for transitioning from a coercive tax state to a mod-
ern, legal and legitimate one. Trust is inherent in the revenue collection
process.
In essence, the new model suggests that where a state is bureaucrati-
cally rational – embodied with well-organized structural designs, human
and technological resources and a work philosophy all oriented towards
involving society – and a society is able and willing to be compliant,
trust will develop as the two interact so that state goals can be realized
more successfully.
This book has provided an evaluation of this new model by viewing
more closely how state and society interact to ensure tax compliance
in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Good tax compliance was shown to be a
product of a bureaucratic rational state, necessary for building up societal
trust on taxes, and a society of individuals, shown to be willing to partner
with the state more because of their trust in the state (rather than because
of their fear of the state.)
An effective tax state is one that provokes some fear as a higher author-
ity – all states need to rouse some fear in order to get people to comply
with paying taxes – but does not employ the extreme coercion that lim-
its state effectiveness in the long run. Russia is at that sub-optimal level,
with a state often evoking more fear than trust, while Ukraine is at the
bottom of the trough, trying to transition, if you will, from Russia to
Poland. (See Figure 8.1.) Meanwhile, of the three, Poland is the case
that has transitioned successfully from coercion to trust and, as a result,
enjoys the highest state capacity.
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For the state to be trustworthy before its citizens in order to receive
cooperation and compliance so that state policy can be administered
effectively, how street-level bureaucrats treat citizens – whether they treat
them more like clients – matters with regard to whether or not the state
can build up its trust to function properly. This was shown most clearly
in Chapters 6 and 7 with the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys.
To strengthen the state’s legitimacy, then, improving the quality of street-
level bureaucracies is vital. The provision of poor ‘customer service’ by
bureaucrats has a negative effect on society, which may decline to ful-
fil its obligations to obey the state, whereas good ‘customer service’ can
mitigate the impact of bad ‘outcomes’ that can emerge from interactions
with the tax authorities.
To make such dramatic increases in citizens’ trust in the state gener-
ally and in street-level bureaucracies in particular, states need to update,
if not overhaul, their administrative structures so that they are directed
at society. Transitioning from communism allows the state to re-create
such citizen–state trust radically not only because the 1989 and 1991 rev-
olutions were dramatic events but also because the communist legacy of
socio-economic equality makes it easier for the state to focus on building
trust in society generally rather than focusing exclusively on one sector
of society at the determent of others. The fact that the legitimacy of the
transition itself was less certain in the minds of Russians than in those
of Poles or even Ukrainians, however, has posed a greater hurdle for the
post-Soviet Russian state.
To aid in the re-construction of a healthy state–society relation-
ship, past legacies have been shown through the evidence presented in
Chapter 3 to be very beneficial. Which historical reference points post-
communist states choose to utilize to transform partly into a version of
their former selves, modelled on a time when the state is perceived to
have been quite capable, can give a substantial boost to society’s per-
ception of the legitimacy of the state. Hence, the book contributes to
the study of comparative bureaucracy by introducing the argument that
reforming bureaucracies – especially those caught up in regime change –
will be shaped by historical models from decades past via ‘model
transference’.
Moreover, as evidence from the Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Sur-
veys confirms, trusting the state to provide goods and to treat oth-
ers fairly is not related to citizens’ trust in one another. State–societal
trust requires a unique and special relationship, irrespective of levels of
social capital within society itself. A powerful interplay directly between
citizens and their government will enable both state and society to
mutually reinforce each other’s capacities so that policies can be imple-
mented successfully.
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For Poland, as time elapses from the start of the transition and as pol-
itics takes a more nationalist turn, the question remains whether and
how such mutually reinforcing trust between citizen and state – created
in great part during a post-1989 period of extraordinary politics – will be
maintained. For Russia, with few signs of economic recovery appearing
in the near future due to the decline in global oil prices, economic sanc-
tions imposed by the West after the Crimean invasion and a downturn in
investment, among other things, the question becomes whether Russia
will be even more coercive in the future to achieve state tasks. And, for
Ukraine, the question, of course, remains whether it will gain enough
trust from the public to transition to a stable rule-of-law democracy.
State Capacity Puzzle Posed by Ukraine
One of the questions at the core of this project has been whether the
changes that Ukraine has undergone have increased the propensity of
citizens to trust their state. The past couple of years alone have witnessed
significant change in Ukraine: the ‘EuroMaidan’ uprising, the departure
of Viktor Yanukovych from power, the extraordinary presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2014, the catastrophic loss of control over ter-
ritory in Crimea and the Donbas, a seemingly intractable low-grade war
with Russia, the conclusion of a deep and comprehensive Free Trade
Agreement with the European Union, and a spiral of economic destruc-
tion. The question is whether these changes will be truly transforma-
tional. Earlier episodes of heightened political contestation in Ukraine –
from ‘Kuchmagate’ to the Orange Revolution – failed fundamentally to
alter the nature of the relationship between Ukrainian citizens and their
state: citizens retreated into angry disaffection, and leaders took corrup-
tion to new heights, as evidenced not only by a gilded presidential palace
but also by the glittering and golden spa rooms, salt therapy room, cry-
onic saunas and special interrogation facilities hidden deep inside the
tax administration’s main Kyiv headquarters on Lʹvivsʹka Ploshcha (Lviv
Square). More recent issues – such as the release of the Panama papers
in the spring of 2016 and the ensuing allegations that President Petro
Poroshenko had sought the restructuring of his assets abroad with the
intention of decreasing taxes paid in Ukraine (a Kyiv Post editorial car-
toon depicted Poroshenko telling others, ‘Pay your own taxes or get
your own offshore company!’1), the July 2016 protest in the occupied
Donetsk city of Horlivka against the Donbas separatist militants’ meth-
ods of collecting taxes, which required everything to be inventoried, in
1 Published in Kyiv Post, 8 April 2016, p. 5.
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preference for Ukraine’s simplified tax system for small entrepreneurs2;
and the persistent possibility that southeast Ukraine might support pro-
Russian political parties – all highlight the challenges of building trust in
the state.
The EuroMaidan – a revolution staged by a public that had had
enough of a corrupt leader who had used public revenue (and taxes)
for private gain – was meant to put an end to that cycle, by so radically
altering the incentives of politicians that they would have no choice but
to work for the trust of the people. If the changes in Ukraine are to be
truly transformational, they will have to lead to new levels of trust – a
willingness on the part of citizens to move from ad hoc, individualized
strategies towards engagement with formal institutions and rule-based
mechanisms.
No more than 7 per cent of Ukrainians in November 2015 felt that
their state fulfils obligations to its citizens and provides them with goods
and services, that their state can be trusted to do what is right and that
their state treats individual citizens fairly – much lower than in Poland
and Russia. This finding represented a significant decline from pre-
EuroMaidan levels and found trust at its lowest level since the Ukraine
Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys began in 2005.
The research findings, however, highlight important opportunities for
the Ukrainian government to rebuild its relationship with its citizens
through key reforms to taxation. Overcoming distrust of the state is a
difficult, but common task for any society, especially Ukraine. ‘In sum,
it makes far readier sense to distrust government than to trust it’, writes
Russell Hardin. ‘The kinds of understanding necessary for trusting gov-
ernment are almost logically ruled out for typical citizens, while the kinds
necessary for distrusting it are commonplace and resonant with ordinary
life experience.’3
Ukraine does not adhere exactly to the model of either Poland or Rus-
sia. Poland is a case that enjoys a compliant society cooperating with
a citizen-based state so that tax compliance depends greatly on trust
in the government. Russia, meanwhile, has a society interacting with
a state that strongly employs a coercion-based approach to tax collec-
tion in an environment with decreasing opportunities to be critical of
the state through the media and through political contestation, or even
to become aware of the state’s shortcomings. There, tax compliance
appears to depend largely on citizens’ being susceptible to coercion and
deterrence.
2 Coynash. 3 Hardin, 2002, p. 167.
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Ukraine is a different case. The use of coercion – to a degree that
is not as extensive as in Russia – has been the state’s primary method
for securing tax compliance through its State Tax Administration, now
renamed the State Fiscal Service. Yet the prevalence of greater media
freedom than in Russia, which helps expose the failings of the state and
its leaders, might have allowed Ukrainians as a whole to square their
support for tax compliance between reactions to coercive measures of
the state and their trust in the state.
Ukrainians are not as trusting of their state as Poles are of theirs, and
with such low levels of trust in the state, Ukraine demonstrates the low-
est support for obeying tax laws among the three states surveyed. Clearly,
Ukraine’s transition from a coercive, corrupt state to a more open, demo-
cratic one has taken place without (re-)establishing citizens’ trust that
their state will act fairly and will supply goods and services; the failure to
build and draw upon such trust may very well limit the state’s ability to
administer its own policies.
Hence, the Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys suggest
that the state probably needs to continue to undertake its own revolution
and to embark on an overhaul of its own relationship with its citizens in
order to gain (if not regain) their trust. The tentative position of critical
state reforms in the aftermath of the Orange and EuroMaidan Revolu-
tions raises the question of whether Ukraine’s political leaders will lose
a great opportunity to undertake such an overhaul so that the Ukrainian
state actually will be able to govern on the ground to a greater extent.
In Ukraine, you have the worst of both – a society that neither trusts
nor fears the state, and one that is very capable of shunning obligations
anyway and getting away with it. Twenty-five years after Ukraine secured
its independence, Ukraine’s statehood is no longer questioned by its cit-
izens, but the Ukrainian state itself is.
Clearly, the trust that a bureaucratic rational state and a compliant
society have in each other, as shown in the case of Poland, provides for
greater implementation of state policies than the fear and distrust that
exist between a more coercive state and its society, as demonstrated in
Russia. Ukraine’s present difficulties in building trust in the state rightly
raise the question of how possible making such a transition can be with-
out a short-term loss in the capacity of the state to function becom-
ing permanent. Ukraine has never been able to reconcile a state–society
divide, and this has been a mutually reinforcing process, fuelling antag-
onism between state and society. Yet, if the immediate hurdles can be
overcome, a successful re-creation of the state will yield far more sta-
ble and successful governance, mutually empowering both state and
society.
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To build trust across the state–society divide, there also needs to be
an enlarged, spirited intellectual and political debate over the future of
Ukraine – not just regarding its independence, but as to what type of
state and what type of society should develop there. Admittedly, most of
the conversation recently has been about the war in the East, whether
and how the state should be decentralized and the desired return of
Crimea. But there has been little intellectual debate among prominent
civil society members with respect to where Ukraine is going and how the
old regime’s void should be filled. Ukraine needs a much more vibrant
debate regarding its future direction, what type of democracy should
develop and how the society should interact with the state.
Despite the absence of such discussion, there has been much – and
perhaps surprising – consensus within Ukraine and its parliament, the
Verkhovna Rada, regarding the need to push further with reforms, as
well as lively discussion as to whether the Yanukovych-era elites should
be allowed to work for the state. A legal basis also has been created to
push forward the process of decentralization, by allowing local taxes and
granting budgetary powers to local governments.
Tax administration reform is currently also on Ukraine’s reform
agenda.4 In addition to the efforts of key members of the Rada and the
government, both the IMF and the OECD have been pushing Ukraine
to make progress in this arena in order to help restore the country’s finan-
cial stability and investment climate.5 In the autumn of 2016, Ukraine
and the IMF signed a Memorandum of Economic and Social Policy that
included a commitment to reduce the tax administration staff from about
58,800 to about 44,000; to dissolve the tax police and, in consultation
with IMF staff, establish ‘a new civil service with new staff under the
Ministry of Finance that will be responsible for investigation of financial
and economic criminal offenses against the State, including tax-related
offenses, while removing the role of other government agencies in this
area’; to implement targeted compensation reform at the State Fiscal
Service, in order to make salary levels comparable with those in other
reformed government agencies, such as the new National Patrol Police
in many Ukrainian cities; to establish a new internal investigation divi-
sion at the State Fiscal Service with new staff who will assess risks, ana-
lyze reports on assets of high-ranking State Fiscal Service officials, and
carry out investigations as part of efforts to tackle corruption – all under
the control of a recently established independent expert group; and to
conduct regular independent surveys to monitor public perception.6
4 Interfax-Ukraine. 5 Talant. 6 IMF, 1 September 2016.
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Such recent reform efforts highlight that a discussion has begun as to
how the state institutions, agencies and bureaucracies – the real guts and
heart of the state apparatus that sit below the elites and interact at the
street level with citizens – should be reformed and made less corrupt in
Ukraine.
Policy Recommendations for Tax Administrations
Transitioning to Trust
Transitioning from fear and distrust to trust can provide greater state
viability. How to create ‘good governance’ and especially how to create
a high level of administrative capacity after regime change is very high
on the academic and global policy agendas. While the book has focused
on former communist ‘transition’ countries, the approach taken and the
results obtained are very likely to have ‘universal’ value, applicable to
others who study, work in and advise developing countries.
Transitional states such as Ukraine must find ways to create and to
build up levels of trust in the state on the part of citizens and to focus on
‘procedural fairness’ in order to improve compliance with state regula-
tions within the tax administration and across other government agencies
and services. How government behaviour impacts societal trust – that is,
how the state maximizes or minimizes the levels of trust that society has –
will affect, then, how well the state goal of ensuring the public’s compli-
ance is accomplished.
But how can states accomplish the two policy objectives – to build
up trust and to emphasize ‘procedural fairness’? The most fundamen-
tal question of all, perhaps, is how the tax administration officials iden-
tify who the client is. Is the client the government or the taxpayers? In
Russia and Ukraine, the tax administration was established to serve the
authorities in power, not the people. Going forward, the success of the
reforms will depend on to what extent ‘taxpayers’ become the answer to
that basic question, in recognition that the state bureaucracy should be
‘rationalized’ in a Weberian sense rather than ‘empowered’.
More broadly, though, in the tax arena, the post-transition tax admin-
istrations should look for ways to rationalize their bureaucracies and to
make them more society- and outward-oriented. Further, detailed sug-
gestions on how to create trust and improve ‘customer service’ might
include utilizing constructive historical references, structures, human and
technological resources and work philosophies, which are all oriented towards
society.
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A. Historical References
How the state has treated citizens in the past and how the state and soci-
ety view past state activity vis-à-vis citizens are important in determining
how well citizens currently fulfil their obligations. Therefore, what may
matter in terms of helping create better citizens is which historical model
a current state applies or references when attempting to make itself capa-
ble and legitimate before society. At the crux is a need to focus on repeat-
ing and routinizing past and current experiences of well-perceived pro-
cedural fairness whenever and wherever possible, even for those states
that may have a scarcity of such experiences in the past. Specific policy
activities might include the following:
 Good governance at the street level can yield greater citizen trust
and a greater ability to implement policy across transitional states like
Ukraine – both across the state and within its tax administration.
 Improving trust on the part of all citizens and taxpayers toward
the state, which has been low, for example, throughout post-Soviet
Ukraine’s history, must be deemed a prime, focal point for the entire
state – including leading politicians, political leaders, administrative
agencies and government bureaucracies alike. Indeed, as the findings
from Chapter 7 showed that Ukrainian willingness to pay taxes can
be highly dependent upon individual attitudes towards the president –
even more than past positive experiences with the tax authorities – it
is incumbent upon all political leaders to seek out and maintain long-
term trust among citizens.
 Building upon good, healthy experiences – even if they are relatively
new – should be a key focus. For example, Ukrainians, who have very
low expectations that the state will treat them fairly, need to experi-
ence and witness first-hand that the post-2014 state will interact with
them differently henceforth. Just as the public relations surrounding
the National Police of Ukraine, launched in July 2015 by Poroshenko,
has showcased a new manner of state authorities relating to the public,
so, too, must other administrative services, including the tax admin-
istration, be re-launched to highlight a new manner of working with
citizens at the ground level. The police reform in cities across Ukraine
shows that the state can overhaul an agency and gain trust at the grass-
roots level. Good ‘customer service’, copied and mimicked from other
state agencies, can make a real difference.
 Create new historical trends. When tax policy reforms are changing
how much citizens are paying, it is also vital to make public spending
and budget expenditures effective, less costly, transparent and visible.
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Since 2014, Ukrainians have been voluntarily giving money to their
state’s military directly or through friends even while they do not trust
the state itself to allocate tax revenue effectively to the military. In other
words, Ukrainians are voluntarily giving if they know such contribu-
tions will be targeted and go to the right place, but they do not trust
the state to fund those places directly through taxes.7 ‘In this kind of
situation, even ideal tax reforms will not succeed if the state fails to
learn to manage taxpayer contributions in an efficient, thrifty manner’,
Lyubomyr Shavalyuk has written, ‘because ordinary Ukrainians will
continue to distrust it and not pay taxes.’8 The lower the tax com-
pliance, the greater the need for the state to show it is spending tax
revenue wisely.
B. Structures
A rational structural design is one that is infused with both flexibility
and constraints. In general, it is critically important to limit the degree
of discretion afforded to tax officials in order to constrain corruption so
that citizens can trust the system. This can be done, in part, through
an organizational structure that has direct lines of subordination both
between offices and within them, eliminating all forms of opportunity
for partiality as much as possible. Suggested policy activities in this area
might include the following:
 In transitional states such as Ukraine, reform of the tax bureaucracy
needs to happen at the top, bottom and middle layers of the admin-
istration – simple lustration for a few is not sufficient. Such thor-
ough reforms would empower tax officials and employees to behave
more like true Weberian bureaucrats in a more publicly transparent
organization.
 Monitoring activities need to be undertaken as new procedures, activ-
ities and reforms are carried out.
 Further, the establishment of departments inside the tax admin-
istration to conduct internal audits and checks and the establish-
ment of an external watchdog – such as an empowered, independent
national accounting chamber like Poland’s Supreme Audit Chamber
(Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, or NIK) – to produce critical financial and
performance audit reports, available for the public, are critical to pro-
viding for a more effective administration and for gaining citizen trust
in government activity.
7 Bychenko. 8 Shavalyuk.
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C. Human and Technological Resources
In addition to seeking out and employing professional, capable per-
sonnel and new, cost-efficient technologies, the tax administrations
can employ a variety of employment training techniques and outreach
activities to help bureaucrats better interact with the public in explain-
ing how the (new and old) taxes work. Such public-outreach proce-
dures taken up by tax administration personnel might include the estab-
lishment within local tax offices of low-tech ‘information checkpoints’,
staffed by employees who know the tax laws well; a more high-tech mass
media campaign, in which local tax bureaucrats appear on radio, televi-
sion, web and social media to explain new laws and procedures; and the
maintenance of websites, which enable taxpayers to write to their own
tax offices, as detailed below:
 Real taxpayer outreach programmes (such as those that took place in
Poland in the 1990s when that country rolled out its new tax system)
need to be undertaken in transitional countries. In the early 1990s,
Poland truly was unique among the three countries in this study in
that tax bureaucrats really went out into the public to educate people
as to what these newly founded things called taxes were. The Polish
experience, which saw ordinary, local tax bureaucrats go on local tele-
vision and radio programmes and open special tax assistance booths
inside the tax offices in order to explain what the new tax system was all
about, did help improve citizen perception of the state and increase the
numbers of those filing taxes. By the end of the 1990s, Poles rated the
tax administration – yes, the tax administration! – as the most favoured
state agency due to this type of outreach.9 That type of public interac-
tion did not take place farther to the East, but states such as Ukraine
now have the opportunity to re-boot their tax outreach reforms along-
side tax policy reforms. One of the Ukraine Tax Administration’s more
successful civics activities has been colour drawing competitions for
elementary schoolchildren, but outreach can be much more than that.
 In lieu of individual personal income tax filing, employees should be
made much more aware of the fact that they are paying taxes, what
their pre-tax and post-tax salaries are, the tax rate and the withhold-
ing process in general, even if their employers file for them. By being
informed how much and at what rate employers are deducting, citizens
will become more aware that they actually are paying taxes and that the
state should be accountable to them.
9 Wrobel.
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 An advertising campaign employing websites and social media, as well
as literature distributed along with monthly pay cheques, should be
targeted at all citizens who pay taxes to inform them of the new tax
changes regardless of who files taxes. At times when there are changes
in tax rates, especially a lowering of rates, it is not sufficient that the tax
policy reforms simply yield larger pay cheques. Citizens and employees
should also be made aware of what the old tax policy was and what the
new tax policy is. (In Ukraine’s case, only some 9 to 13 per cent of
Ukrainians knew the correct personal income tax rate.)
 In countries where individuals file their own personal income taxes,
the taxpayer takes on a greater role as a citizen by completing self-
assessments and tax declaration forms. Such an interactive mode of
paying taxes was even understood by Imperial Russian tax authorities,
as Yanni Kotsonis has described, as a way of making citizens out of
them. Such an assessment process ‘produced the notion that the citi-
zen, not the state, was doing the taxing or that the state was taxing only
to the extent that it comprised the citizenry. The mode of thinking was
expressed in taxation as “self-assessment.”’10 While more complicated,
individual filing of taxes has been shown to increase citizens’ interest
in and sense of accountability over the state; by simply recognizing
that they are paying for the state’s income, individual filing encourages
citizens and society to take a more accountable view of the state.
 Citizens must become more aware of the availability of reimburse-
ments through the tax system for items such as medical, prescrip-
tion and/or education expenses, and the tax administration should be
encouraged to make such ‘tax refunds’ easier to claim with new tech-
nologies. Being able to claim money back from the state will encourage
greater interaction with the state and encourage compliance, as was the
case in Poland in the 1990s when within a period of about five years
the number of citizens filing taxes in order to get reimbursements from
the state increased dramatically.
 Surveys should constantly be undertaken by tax administration staff of
those directly affected by reforms in order to get feedback and to fine
tune reform actions to get best results, as well as to showcase wins and
to demonstrate that the state is listening to public.
D. Work Philosophy
A primary basis for differences in the degree of discretion given to tax
officials often can be accounted for by the overall work philosophy (esprit
10 Kotsonis, p. 16.
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de corps) of the tax system – specifically, whether the system focuses
to a greater extent on compliance than on reaching collection target
goals:
 A compliance-driven approach promotes a work ethic that tends to
treat the taxpayers more like clients, which can encourage good cit-
izenship. Further, whether a system is compliance- or target-driven
provides different incentives for tax inspectors. A more target-driven
approach can lead the focus away from ensuring compliance with tax
laws and towards making tax inspectors merely try to fulfil quarterly or
yearly targets, and to seek additional payments from those firms and
individuals who have paid their dues rather than to locate those who
have not paid at all. In Russia and Ukraine, such internal target levels
have never really gone away. A system built on incentives and bonuses
for collecting revenue – and for levying more fines on taxpayers – leads
to firms being pressured to pay taxes in advance and takes away from
the prime tax collection function of aiding and helping taxpayers to
comply with the law.
In short, the extent to which state tax administrations utilize historical
reference points, structures, human and technological resources and a work
philosophy that are oriented outward towards the public may well impact
the extent to which taxpayers can trust their tax system, leading them
to be more compliant. Identifying and implementing policies that raise
both levels of public trust in the state and the level of ‘customer service’
offered by the tax administration does assist taxpayers in becoming true
citizens, who then can follow through on their obligations to their state.
By making changes and adopting some of the above policy prescriptions,
tax administrations will find that their personnel’s mentality will change
as well.
Borderland states are always concerned that their friends one day will
abandon them. And, with agendas of those in the European Union and
North America always susceptible to adjustments, whether out of fatigue
or in pursuit of new interests elsewhere, it is important to recognize
that transition states are not failed states, but simply weak ones, requir-
ing effective guidance and support to see the transformation through.
By being at the heart of the state, the tax administration becomes the
epicentre of this state transformation process.
So how does a state transition from a coercive state to a legal, legiti-
mate tax state? Poland’s path, of course, is the ideal one, but Ukraine’s
protracted route is the reality for too many states – including one day,
perhaps, Russia.
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Those interested either in the establishment of an accountable, highly
capable state or in the transition of any coercive state to a more
compliance-oriented one must be concerned with states such as Ukraine,
caught in the middle. Ukraine matters not just because of its location and
geography, but also because its development will show whether a state
can transition successfully from post-Soviet rule to the rule of law rela-
tively late in the game – and tackling such a task is in the interest of the
West.
Appendix I: Poland, Russia and Ukraine
Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys
2004–2015 and the Russian Tax Officials
Survey 2011
In Poland, the CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre conducted the
2004 survey, designed by this author, on 5–8 November 2004. The sam-
ple size was 988 respondents. The method employed was face-to-face
PAPI, in which the interviewer filled out a paper questionnaire. The
margin of error did not exceed 3.2 per cent. The Polish 2010 survey
was conducted in September 2010 on 2,021 Poles nationwide by the
PBS DDG Market Research firm, based in Sopot.
For the Russian 2004 survey, carried out by the Public Opinion Foun-
dation on 23–24 October 2004, nationwide home interviews were con-
ducted in 44 regions. The sample size was 1,500 respondents. Addi-
tional polls were made of the Moscow population, with a sample of 600
respondents. The margin of error did not exceed 3.6 per cent. The Rus-
sian 2010 survey also was carried out by the Public Opinion Foundation
on 7–12 July 2010 with a nationwide sample size of 3,000 respondents.
In Ukraine, the survey was carried out nationwide on 3,995 Ukraini-
ans on 20–29 November 2005 by the Razumkov Centre for Economic
and Political Studies. The method employed was face-to-face interviews.
The response rate was 70.6 per cent. The margin of error did not exceed
2.3 per cent. The Ukrainian 2010 survey was also carried out by the
Razumkov Centre on 4,015 Ukrainians nationwide from 10 August to
5 October. The Ukrainian 2012 survey also was carried out by the
Razumkov Centre on 2,008 Ukrainians nationwide in April 2012. The
Ukrainian 2015 survey also was carried out by the Razumkov Centre on
4,025 Ukrainians nationwide (excluding Crimea and areas of occupied
Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that were inaccessible to researchers) on
30 October–7 November 2015.
In Russia, the Public Opinion Foundation carried out a survey, also
designed by this author, from 15 September to 31 October 2011, of
1,015 public officials, of whom 39.5 per cent, or 401 individuals, were
tax officials.
All survey responses are rounded to the closest per cent.
Blank = not asked
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Yes 83 66 75 61 59 59 60
No 15 30 22 30 35 35 33
Difficult to say 2 4 3 9 6 7 6




















I, myself, do 54 22 13 17 7 7 8 9
My employer
does
5 44 47 50 46 44 43 43
No one does 6 6 7 13 13 12 12
Somebody else
does
19 4 6 6 8 9 7
I don’t have to
pay taxes
19 6 24 16 17 19 20 18
Other situation 3 22
Difficult to
answer
1 2 6 5 11 9 8 10
3. Are there many dishonest people who work in the tax service?
Russian Tax Officials Survey 2011: In present conditions is it difficult for tax ser-































43 53 25 32 20 27 21 26 81
There are no
such people
2 4 2 2 1 1 1 1
Difficult to say 33 20 31 30 28 20 24 26 5
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4. How, in your opinion, do the tax service employees cope with their responsibili-




















Excellent 2 2 3 2 2 2 1
Good 26 33 15 19 15 16 14
Satisfactorily 27 35 29 42 34 40 35
Bad 17 10 14 9 16 12 17
Very bad 4 3 5 3 4 3 4
Difficult to
answer
24 16 33 25 29 27 30
5. Do you think the taxpayers who have had to deal with tax service employees are



















































Yes 49 38 23 24 15 12 11 19
No 50 61 73 75 82 85 85 79
Difficult
to say
1 2 4 1 4 3 4 3
274 Appendix I
7. What was your impression of the individual contact you had with the tax service
employees?




















Positive 51 50 30 37 27 30 28 31
Neutral 30 32 38 34 35 38 40 36
Negative 19 17 29 27 31 30 31 32
Difficult to say 0 1 3 2 6 2 2 1
8. Were you satisfied with the results of your meeting with the tax service employees?




















Satisfied 76 79 58 66 47 52 56 49
Not satisfied 23 17 33 31 40 41 37 44
Difficult to say 1 4 10 3 13 7 7 6
9. Were you satisfied by how the tax service employees spoke with and treated you?




















Satisfied 77 75 63 67 49 54 56 52
Not satisfied 22 21 34 29 41 40 40 42
Difficult to say 1 4 3 4 11 6 4 6
10. Are the procedures and basis of the tax service understandable to you?
(Poland 2010, Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 Surveys: Only asked of those who




















Yes 48 58 49 24
No 48 38 47 55
Difficult to
answer
4 4 5 22
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11. Can one always count on the assistance of bureaucrats in the tax office?
(Poland 2010, Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 Surveys: Only asked of those who




















Yes 64 36 31 25
No 31 54 63 44
Difficult to
answer
5 10 7 32
12. Does contact with the tax service take up a lot of time?
(Poland 2010, Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 Surveys: Only asked of those who




















Yes 37 73 75 37
No 62 23 20 16
Difficult to
answer
1 4 5 37




















Many 69 65 77 67 70 69 69 72 74
Few 17 21 8 18 14 21 16 16 21
There are no
such people
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
Difficult to
answer
13 14 15 15 16 10 14 11 4
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14. What do you think encourages people more to pay taxes: a sense of civic respon-























27 22 36 40 38 35 40
A fear of
punishment
69 73 49 52 49 54 50
Difficult to
answer
5 5 15 8 14 11 11
15. Some people believe that tax evasion is unacceptable in any case. Others believe
that there are situations in which it is permissible to evade taxes. With which




















With the first 49 53 30 53 47 53 48
With the
second
37 35 50 34 33 30 34
Difficult to
answer
14 12 20 14 20 17 18





















Yes 53 47 40 45 34 38 29 39 14
No 34 45 38 40 40 43 47 41 81
Difficult to say 14 8 22 15 26 19 24 20 5
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17. Is it possible that you could avoid paying taxes if you knew for sure that you would
not receive a serious punishment?
(Ukraine 2005: Is it possible that you could avoid paying taxes if you knew for




















Yes 44 42 30 35 28 36 14
No 49 40 43 47 47 42 81
Difficult to say 8 17 29 19 26 22 4





















Yes 55 47 38 44 35 43
No 37 39 40 41 43 40
Difficult to say 8 14 22 16 22 17
19. Is it possible that you could avoid paying taxes, if you were sure, that there would





















Yes 40 36 24 30 25 32 9
No 50 46 45 50 48 45 84
Difficult to say 10 19 31 20 27 23 6
20. Would a majority of people avoid paying taxes, if they thought that they would




















Yes 88 71 75 63 66 65 73
No 6 14 15 19 21 18 25
Difficult to say 6 15 10 19 14 14 2
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14 12 17 18 28 24 25 25 7
Difficult to say 7 7 12 8 15 12 16 14 2



























6 15 28 30 37 37 36 34 22
Difficult to say 10 18 19 18 27 20 25 22 3
23. Would a majority of taxpayers follow the tax laws even if they did not consider






















Difficult to say 5
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24. Are you confident that the tax service would never try to take more money from




















Yes 56 40 33 27 24 24
No 31 40 35 51 48 50
Difficult to say 14 20 32 22 28 26
25. How do you suppose, does the ordinary citizen have a possibility to defend his or





















Yes 34 37 35 33 20 19
No 53 43 45 45 60 56
Difficult to say 13 19 20 22 20 26




















Yes 21 32 19 16 12 72
No 62 45 61 63 68 18
Difficult to Say 14 23 21 21 20 10




















Simple 18 18 13 7 19
Complicated 72 57 67 70 77
Difficult to Say 10 25 20 23 4
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Yes 40 44 60 52 47 51 48 23
No 44 44 23 33 31 33 35 69
Difficult to Say 16 12 18 14 21 16 17 7
29. Do you feel that when you pay taxes, the money is returned to you and your close




















Yes 45 43 15 41 41
No 46 43 42 40
No answer 9 14 17 19
No/no answer 85




















Yes 60 52 19 41 41
No 32 30 40 37
No answer 8 18 19 22
No/no answer . 81





















Yes 49 45 14 44 45
No 42 39 40 35
No answer 9 15 15 19
No/no answer 86
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Yes 43 40 12 35 32
No 48 40 45 45
Difficult to
answer
10 19 20 23
No/no answer 88





















Yes 39 52 22 52 55
No 52 30 28 24
Difficult to
answer
9 18 20 21
No/no answer 76
34. When you pay taxes, do you think that while taxpayers’ money is not stolen, it is




















Yes 70 61 22 60 53
No 19 19 21 23
Difficult to
answer
11 20 19 23
No/no answer 78
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Satisfied 18 18 9 6
Not satisfied 70 61 75 77
Difficult to say 12 21 17 17






















22 38 46 9 10 13 13
I don’t know 63 21 52 39 73 68 68
Incorrect
answer
16 5 3 30 16 20 8
Difficult to say 0 11 0 28 0 0 12
No response 24
∗ 13% for Russia in 2004 and 2010 and for Ukraine in 2005. 15% for Ukraine in 2010 and
2012. Either 15% or 20% for Ukraine in 2015 (15% for monthly income not exceeding 10
minimum salaries (UAH 12,180) and 20% for income that exceeds that amount.) For Poland
in 2010, responses of 18, 19 or 32% or a combination thereof were considered ‘correct,’ as PIT
is progressive with an individual rate of 18% or 32%. Individuals also can choose, under certain
conditions, to pay a flat rate of 19% on business income.






















34 12 32 23
I don’t know 45 74 63 61
Incorrect
answer
22 13 5 5
Difficult to say 0 0 11
No response
∗ In 2010, it was 22% in Poland, 18% in Russia and 20% Ukraine. In 2015 it was also 20% in
Ukraine.
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1 3 2 1
Don’t need to
modify
30 38 21 15
Need to
reduce
48 38 44 52
Need to cancel
outright
7 6 6 8
I don’t know
this tax
6 2 5 6
Difficult to
answer
8 13 21 19
39. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the company pay-
roll charges?
(Poland 2010 Survey: ‘Company contributions to social, pension and medical
insurance (ZUS)’; Russian 2010 Survey: ‘Company deductions for social, pen-






















7 29 7 6
Don’t need to
modify
34 40 20 17
Need to
reduce
41 12 40 44
Need to cancel
outright
6 2 4 6
I don’t know
this tax
3 2 7 7
Difficult to
answer
9 15 22 21
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40. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the single tax for
individual entrepreneurs?























3 15 9 7
Don’t need to
modify
32 36 27 21
Need to
reduce
29 18 32 37
Need to cancel
outright
3 2 3 4
I don’t know
this tax
20 5 6 8
Difficult to
answer
13 24 23 23























11 18 12 12
Don’t need to
modify
30 37 21 20
Need to
reduce
19 14 31 33
Need to cancel
outright
3 2 3 4
I don’t know
this tax
24 4 8 7
Difficult to
answer
13 26 25 25
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1 3 2 1
Don’t need to
modify
29 31 16 14
Need to
reduce
53 23 37 45
Need to cancel
outright
6 7 15 15
I don’t know
this tax
4 6 7 3
Difficult to
answer
6 30 23 21
43. Is it necessary to increase, reduce, modify or outright cancel the excise duties on






















28 37 26 23
Don’t need to
modify
33 30 22 23
Need to
reduce
26 14 28 29
Need to cancel
outright
5 3 6 6
I don’t know
this tax
3 3 3 2
Difficult to
answer
7 13 15 17
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27 29 23 50 45 53 20
No, I don’t
trust
37 27 13 12 17 16 26 5
Difficult to
answer
7 4 4 2 5 3 4 4
45. Do you trust parliament?

























32 31 64 55 56 27
No, I don’t
trust
71 40 36 14 18 35 12
Difficult to
answer
12 3 7 6 3 3 6
46. Do you trust the upper house of parliament?


























































32 33 36 29 24 23
No, I don’t
trust
70 37 19 37 39 66 9
Difficult to
answer
3 6 8 4 1 6

























































26 29 25 19 24
No, I don’t
trust
29 31 50 69 10
Difficult to
Answer
12 14 11 6 6
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50. Do you trust the police?
(Poland 2010 Survey: ‘Policja’; Russia 2010, Ukraine 2010 and 2015 Surveys:

























28 30 26 23 28
No, I don’t
trust
24 44 53 64 16
Difficult to
answer
3 8 7 6 6

























37 27 27 20 29
No, I don’t
trust
29 51 56 70 12
Difficult to
answer
4 10 7 5 6

























27 31 23 17 27
No, I don’t
trust
26 32 55 72 9
Difficult to
answer
6 13 10 5 6
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53. Do you trust the regional (oblast, wojewod) state administration?

























29 33 32 24
No, I don’t
trust
21 19 45 11
Difficult to
answer
21 6 12 5






















18 26 10 6
Sometimes 62 52 49 43
Almost never,
never
15 13 34 34
Difficult to
answer
5 10 8 7
55. Does your state fulfil its obligations to its citizens?

























50 44 35 35 29 29 37
No 26 27 50 52 54 60 14
Difficult to say 4 5 5 3 5 4 2
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56. Do you think you can trust your state to do what is right?

























50 52 32 49 40 43 31
No 26 13 51 34 43 44 7
Difficult to say 4 10 8 8 7 7 11




















Yes 21 20 15 15 7 51
No 75 73 81 79 87 45
Difficult to say 4 7 5 7 6 4




















Yes 43 42 28 28 23 71
No 43 48 64 63 68 21
Difficult to say 13 10 8 10 9 8




















Well 27 17 10 5 47
Poorly 46 51 54 56 34
Not at all 15 23 28 34 10
Difficult to say 12 9 8 4 9
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60. How would you assess the current political system in your country? Give your
answer on a scale from ‘1’ to ‘7,’ where ‘1’ means that the political system is very




















1 11 8 12 27
2 10 8 17 20
3 19 17 24 22
4 35 33 23 15
5 16 16 10 6
6 5 7 6 2
7 1 3 2 1
Difficult to
answer
4 9 8 8
61. Generally speaking, do you think the events in your country are developing in





























Appendix II: Russian Public Officials
Survey of Tax and Social Welfare
Bureaucrats, 2011
In Russia, the Public Opinion Foundation carried out this survey,
designed by this author, from 10 August to 25 October 2011, of 1,015
public officials, of whom 39.5 per cent were tax officials. Also surveyed
were those working in the government services responsible for child-
care benefits (20.9 per cent of those surveyed), unemployment benefits
(19.8 per cent) and registration of property (19.8 per cent.)
With respect to the status of the officials, 20–30 per cent were fed-
eral officials, heads of regional offices and their deputies or heads of city
departments or their deputies, and 70–80 per cent were officials of mid-
dle and lower units.
All survey responses are rounded to the closest per cent.
blank = not asked
1. Has the tax pressure on business over the last two to three years on average
increased, decreased or not changed?




Difficult to Say 13
2. If an enterprise were to fulfil all the demands of the tax organs, would it be
ruined?
Russian tax officials 2011
Yes 22
No 71
Difficult to Say 7
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3. Are inspectors unable to ‘catch out’ those who fail to comply with the require-
ments of the tax organs?
Russian tax officials 2011
Yes, they are unable 32
No, they are able 63
Difficult to say 5
4. Is the job of the tax inspectors to replenish the budget at any cost?
Russian tax officials 2011
Yes 48
No 48
Difficult to say 3
5. Can anyone easily hide his or her income?
Russian tax officials 2011
Yes 31
No 63
Difficult to say 6
6. With which enterprises, agencies have you most of all had work over the past
year?
Russian tax officials 2011
Small enterprises 38
State agencies 27
Medium-sized, private enterprises 43
Large, private enterprises 26
State enterprises 18
Other 11
I did not have work with enterprises, agencies 9
Difficult to say 1
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7. According to which indicators is your work assessed?
Russian tax officials 2011
Amount of fines, penalties collected 21
Quantity of on-site inspections conducted (considering
the size of the enterprise)
20
Effectiveness of on-site inspections conducted 31
Quantity of in-office inspections (desk audits) conducted
(considering the size of the enterprise)
20
Effectiveness of in-office inspections (desk audits)
conducted
31
Quantity of violations uncovered 30
Quantity of cases opened (prosecutions) regarding
administrative violations
14
Amount of taxes collected 44
Another Indicator 29
Difficult to say 11
8. To what extent do these factors reduce the effectiveness of your organization
in collecting taxes?
Russian tax officials 2011
Poor awareness among businesses about the rules and procedures of taxation
Significantly reduces 28
Insignificantly reduces 44
Does not reduce 18
Difficult to say 9
Dishonesty of business in dealing with your organization
Significantly reduces 55
Insignificantly reduces 27
Does not reduce 7
Difficult to say 10
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9. Generally, according to which standards is your professional activity assessed?



















Number of fulfilled tasks
given by superiors
54 45 51 59 52
Number of documents
processed
50 48 42 66 51
Number of clients/visitors
served
27 44 43 35 35
Quality of administrative
services provided
46 60 61 44 51
Positive evaluations by
citizens, clients, visitors
42 54 41 44 45
Timeliness of fulfilled tasks 67 61 64 62 64
Other 12 1 6 2 7
Not assessed by any
evaluation standard
2 2 1 2 2
Difficult to say 3 4 1 4 3
10. What methods of encouragement used for employees who excel in your organi-



















89 71 80 76 81
Promotion 57 34 39 35 44
Announcement of gratitude 79 67 74 65 73
Other 1 3 4 3 3
No incentives exist 1 5 6 8 4
Difficult to say 1 4 0 4 2
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11. From the factors listed below, please select no more than five that, in your opin-

















Insufficient level of staffing 53 31 19 47 41
Lack of competence among
personnel
18 12 13 18 16
Lack of financial resources 32 36 25 52 35
Lack of understanding
among personnel of their
duties and functions
3 3 5 3 4
Low salary 52 46 52 64 53
Bad management in the
organization
2 6 4 0 3




5 11 20 7 10
Lack of equipment and
technical support
33 36 18 33 31
Lack of space 11 32 19 29 21
Contradictory instructions
within the organization
5 13 16 5 9
Insufficiently quality of
legislation
52 41 40 42 45
Prevalence of corruption 4 1 1 1 2
Too strict regulation of
personnel’s activity
6 3 9 3 6
Other 2 2 2 3 2
Nothing 10 13 14 5 11
Difficult to say 2 3 1 2 2
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12. Has your organization been inspected in the last two years by representatives of




















88 69 84 62 78
Offices of the Public
Prosecutor
58 50 72 82 64




6 26 43 16 20
Inspectorates or offices of
finance and budget
oversight of the regional
administration
11 34 35 13 21
Independent audit 3 3 1 1 3
Internal audit 12 6 4 5 8
Other 1 4 5 0 3
No one 0 1 0 1 1
Difficult to say 4 9 6 7 6
13. Has anyone in your organization been penalized or sanctioned in the last two



















6 3 2 7 5
Non-fulfilment or violation
of duties
47 24 30 46 39
Overstepping one’s official
authority
2 1 1 3 2
Taking bribes 3 0 0 7 3
Other 2 2 3 2 2
No one has been 29 61 52 30 40
Difficult to say 18 10 13 19 16
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Agree 94 89 92 92 92
Disagree 6 8 6 7 7
Difficult to say 0 2 0 0 1
15. The majority of citizens understand how decisions are made in the organiza-

















Yes 79 76 88 86 81
No 16 20 9 8 14
Difficult to say 4 4 2 5 4
16. Has the quality of government services provided by your organization

















Increased 90 87 86 83 87
Remained the same 5 7 10 10 8
Decreased 2 2 1 1 2
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17. How has the level of professionalism of the co-workers of your organization

















Increased/more operatively 82 66 83 78 78
Remained the same 8 18 8 12 11
Decreased/less operatively 5 10 4 3 5
Difficult to say 6 5 5 7 6

















Head of the institution
(organization, agency)
5 4 13 8 7
Deputy head of the institution
(organization, agency)
19 11 15 13 15
Head of department (or other
structural government
division) of an institution
(organization, agency)
18 25 22 25 22
Deputy head of department
(or of a structural unit) of
an institution
(organizations, agency)
10 10 5 3 8
Assistant (advisor, consultant)
of the head of the
institution (organization,
agency)
0 2 0 3 1
Chief specialist-expert 3 12 4 14 7
Leading specialist-expert 4 10 16 12 9
Specialist-expert 3 10 4 8 6
Chief state inspector 10 0 0 0 4
Senior state inspector 9 0 1 0 4
State inspector 8 0 2 2 4
Senior specialist (specialist 1st
category)
6 6 4 4 5
Specialist (specialist 2nd or
3rd category)
3 5 2 5 4
Other position 1 2 8 2 3
Difficult to say 0 0 0 0 0
300 Appendix II




















2 1 1 1 2
Largely unclear,
unintelligible
1 1 1 1 1
Mostly clear,
understandable
26 25 32 26 27
Absolutely clear and
understandable
70 70 58 67 67
No official job regulations 0 2 6 2 2
Difficult to say 1 0 1 2 1

















Absolutely not regulated 0 0 1 0 0
Largely not regulated 1 2 1 2 2
Mostly regulated 43 50 49 45 46
Absolutely everything is
regulated
55 45 44 50 50
Difficult to say 1 2 4 3 2
21. In your opinion, how well developed are the mechanisms for responding to citi-

















Weakly 3 4 5 4 4
Strongly 93 89 90 87 90
Difficult to say 4 6 5 9 6
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22. Indicate which of the following factors influence your decision to work in the
public sector, to be public servants. Choose the most significant factors. (Choose

















Stable employment 79 78 79 75 78
High level of wages 5 5 8 16 8
Social benefits (health care,
availability of pre-school
facilities, etc.)
24 17 25 20 22
Flexible working hours 2 3 2 3 3
Balance workload 9 19 17 14 13
Good opportunities for
personal development
35 36 27 26 32
High social status and
prestige
17 16 7 14 14
Power, wide authorities 1 1 0 1 1
Lack of other employment
opportunities
11 14 17 14 13
Personal interest and job
satisfaction
36 39 46 44 40
Attractiveness of the goals
and objectives of the
organization
23 18 24 23 22
Possibility of obtaining
additional income
0 1 1 0 1
Good team relations 45 48 49 50 47
Provision of housing and/or
service car
1 2 0 0 1
Possibility of taking a high
position in business in
future
2 4 0 1 2
Possibility of being
promoted to the state
service (as a career post)
28 27 11 22 23
Acquisition of personal
connections
5 6 5 3 5
Continuing family tradition 2 2 2 1 2
Other 2 3 3 1 3
Difficult to say 1 2 0 3 1
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Yes, I trust 53 57 40 38 48
Sometimes I trust,
sometimes I don’t trust
29 25 31 38 30
No, I don’t trust 12 11 25 15 15
Difficult to say 6 7 4 9 6
Appendix III: Suggested Minimal Tax
Compliance Levels for 2010–2015 Surveys
Poland 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Would you follow the tax laws even if
you do not consider them to be fair?
No Yes




N = 197 N = 973
Yes
4% 24%
N = 58 N = 395
The table suggests that at least 12 per cent of Poles in 2010 do not have
intentions to comply with their country’s tax laws. No Mean Replacement:
Not included in this table are 398 respondents who did not provide an
answer to either one or both of these two questions.
Russia 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Would you follow the tax laws even if
you do not consider them to be fair?
No Yes




N = 423 N = 717
Yes
15% 28%
N = 296 N = 548
The table suggests that at least 21 per cent of Russians in 2010 do
not have intentions to comply with their country’s tax laws. No Mean
Replacement: Not included in this table are 1,023 respondents who did
not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.
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Ukraine 2010 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Would you follow the tax laws even if
you do not consider them to be fair?
No Yes




N = 998 N = 1004
Yes
15% 10%
N = 406 N = 259
The table suggests that at least 37 per cent of Ukrainians in 2010 do
not have intentions to comply with their country’s tax laws. No Mean
Replacement: Not included in this table are 1,348 respondents who did
not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.
Ukraine 2012 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Would you follow the tax laws even if
you do not consider them to be fair?
No Yes




N = 534 N = 458
Yes
7% 14%
N = 94 N = 177
The table suggests that at least 42 per cent of Ukrainians in 2012 do
not have intentions to comply with their country’s tax laws. No Mean
Replacement: Not included in this table are 745 respondents who did not
provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.
Ukraine 2015 Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Survey
Would you follow the tax laws even if
you do not consider them to be fair?
No Yes




N = 981 N = 1222
Yes
6% 10%
N = 148 N = 272
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The table suggests that at least 37 per cent of Ukrainians in 2015 do
not have intentions to comply with their country’s tax laws. No Mean
Replacement: Not included in this table are 1,402 respondents who did
not provide an answer to either one or both of these two questions.
Russia 2011 Tax Officials Survey
Would you follow the tax laws even if
you do not consider them to be fair?
No Yes




N = 22 N = 46
Yes
16% 65%
N = 56 N = 226
The table suggests that at least 6 per cent of Russians tax officials in
2011 do not have intentions to comply with their country’s tax laws. No
Mean Replacement: Not included in this table are 37 tax official respon-
dents who did not provide an answer to either one or both of these two
questions.
Appendix IV: Poland Taxpayer Compliance
Attitudinal Surveys
Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes
(DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even
If Personally Considered To Be Unfair)


















































































































































∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01 See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the
p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would
obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to
one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other
substantive effects measured are changes in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when
variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables held even at
their mean.
1 The Trust in the State Scale for the Poland 2010 survey is a composite of trust in the president, the
prime minister, the Sejm, the Senate and the government and trust in the state to do what is right
and trust in the state to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.












































































































































∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the
p-values for the substantive effects.
Note: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would
obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to
one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other
substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws
when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were
held even at their means.
1 The Trust in the State Scale for the Poland 2010 survey is a composite of trust in the president, the
prime minister, the Sejm, the Senate and the government and trust in the state to do what is right
and trust in the state to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.
2 2004: specialists, managers, self-employed; 2010: white-collar workers, owners.
Appendix V: Russia Taxpayer Compliance
Attitudinal Surveys
Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes
(DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even
If Personally Considered To Be Unfair)
























































































































































































































∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the
substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws
when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean
while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for
stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all
other variables were held even at their mean.
1 The Trust in the State Scale for the Russia 2010 survey includes trust in the president, prime minister, parliament (State



































































































































































































































∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the
substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws
when the “Age” variable are shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean
while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for
stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all
other variables were held even at their means.
1 The Trust in the State Scale for the Russia 2010 survey includes trust in the president, prime minister, parliament (State
Duma) and government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to its citizens.
Appendix VI: Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance
Attitudinal Surveys
Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes
(DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even
If Personally Considered To Be Unfair)




























































































































































































∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the
tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to
their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their mean.
1 The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president, parliament and
government and of trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The Trust
in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and the



























































































































































































∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnote #28 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the
substantive effects.
Note: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above
the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change
in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to their
maximum value and all other variables are held even at their means.
1 The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president and parliament
and in government and trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The
Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and






























































































































































































∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values
for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the
tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum
to their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their means.
1 The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president, in parliament
and in government and trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The
Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament
and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens.
Appendix VII: Ukraine Taxpayer
Compliance Attitudinal Surveys – By Region
Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes
(DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even
If Personally Considered to Be Unfair)




































































































































































































% would obey 47.37 – 34.57 – 36.43 – 37.18 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum





































































































































































































% would obey 44.57 – 29.60 – 36.39 – 46.87 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum



























































































































































































% would obey 37.61 – 42.60 – 32.35 – 26.00 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum



































































































































































































% would obey 48.18 – 43.04 – 42.61 – 47.43 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum






































































































































































































% would obey 52.69 – 41.89 – 43.96 – 49.71 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the
tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum

























































































































































































% would obey 39.06 – 47.20 – 48.97 – 56.78 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum
to their maximum value and all other variables were held even at their means.




































































































































































































% would obey 46.33 – 44.46 – 46.27 – 49.82 –
∗  0.10, ∗∗  0.05, ∗∗∗  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the —-values for the
substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum





































































































































































































% would obey 48.37 – 50.95 – 45.86 – 44.44 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for
the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax
laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation
above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the
change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables were shifted from their minimum




















































































































































% would obey 44.21 – 42.50 – 39.13 –
∗p  0.10, ∗∗p  0.05, ∗∗∗p  0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the
p-values for the substantive effects.
Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would
obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable was shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to
one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other
substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws
when variables were shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables were
held even at their means.
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Szczecińskiego).
Cohen, Josh. 22 December 2015. ‘Civil Service Reform May Revolution-
ize Ukraine’, Atlantic Council, accessed 6 January 2016, at <www
.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/civil-service-reform-may-
revolutionize-ukraine>.
5 July 2016. ‘Could Ukraine’s New Civil Service Law Be Undermined?’
Atlantic Council, accessed 13 July 2016 at <www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
new-atlanticist/could-ukraine-s-new-civil-service-law-be-undermined>.
Cowell, Frank A. 1985. ‘The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion’, Bulletin of
Economic Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 163–193.
Cowley, Andrew. 7 May 1994. ‘Ukraine: The Birth and Possible Death of a
Country’, in Ukraine Survey Supplement, The Economist.
330 Bibliography
Coynash, Halya. 16 July 2016. ‘Large Protest in Occupied Horlivka Against
Crippling Militant “Taxes,”’ Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group Website,
accessed 19 July 2016 at <http://khpg.org.index.php?id=1468789216>.
D’Anieri, Paul. 2006. Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics and Institu-
tional Design (Baltimore: M.E. Sharpe).
February 2011. ‘Structural Constraints in Ukrainian Politics’, East European
Politics and Societies, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 28–46.
D’Anieri, Paul, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio. 1999. Politics and Society in
Ukraine (Oxford, UK: Westview Press).
Daunton, Martin. 2001. Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain,
1799–1914 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
De Haas, Ralph, Milena Djourelova, and Elena Nikolova. 2016. ‘The Great
Recession and Social Preferences: Evidence from Ukraine’, Journal of Com-
parative Economics, Vol. 44, pp. 92–107.
Deloitte. 2015. Doing Business in Russia 2015, accessed 13 January 2016,
at <www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ru/Documents/tax/doing-
business-in-Russia-2015.pdf>.
Dempsey, Judy. 9 May 2016. ‘Strategic Europe: Poland’s Polarizing Poli-
tics’, Carnegie Europe, accessed 13 July 2016, at <http://carnegieeurope.eu/
strategiceurope/?fa=63529>.
Djankov, Simeon. September 2015. ‘Russia’s Economy under Putin: From
Crony Capitalism to State Capitalism’, Peterson Institute for International
Economics Policy Brief, No. PB15–18.
Dranitsyna, Yekaterina. 11 November 2005. ‘Tax Reforms Leave Business
Unsatisfied’, St. Petersburg Times, in JRL, No. 9293, 13 November 2005.
Dubrovsky, Vladimir. 30 June 2015. ‘The Ukrainian Tax System: Why and
How It Should Be Reformed, Part I’, Vox Ukraine, accessed 25 August
2016 at <http://voxukraine.org/2015/06/30/the-ukrainian-tax-system-why-
and-how-it-should-be-reformed/>.
Dunlap, John B. 1993. The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Easter, Gerald M. December 2002. ‘Politics of Revenue Extraction in Post-
communist States: Poland and Russia Compared’, Politics & Society, Vol. 30,
No. 4, pp. 599–627.
September 2009. ‘International Leverage vs. Institutional Mimicry: Explain-
ing Tax Reform in Eastern Europe’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada.
2012. Capital, Coercion, and Post-communist States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press).
December 2013. ‘Response to Aaron Schneider’s Review of Capital, Coercion
and Postcommunist States’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 1148–
1149.
Ebrill, Liam; and Oleh Havrylyshyn. 1999. Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and
Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union (Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund).
Economist. 1 October 2005. ‘Special Report Poland: Can the Eagle Soar?’ p. 25.
Bibliography 331
20 October 2005. ‘Blood Money’, Economist, Print Edition, accessed through
<www.economist.com>.
16 April 2016. ‘Ukraine’s Struggle Against Corruption: Clean-Up Crew’,
pp. 29–30.
30 April 2016. ‘Poland’s Rightest Revolution: Red and White Cavalry’, pp. 35–
36.
Ekiert, Grzegorz. 1996. The State against Society: Political Crises and Their After-
math in East Central Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Elsner, Alan. 26 September 1999. ‘Gore Blames Communism for Russian Cor-
ruption’, Reuters.
Elster, John, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss. 1998. Institutional Design in Post-
communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press).
Ernst & Young. 2010. 2010 Russia Tax Survey, Moscow.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 13 December
2012. Diversifying Russia: Harnessing Regional Diversity, London.
Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press).
Evans, Peter, and James E. Rauch. October 1999. ‘Bureaucracy and Growth: A
Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on
Economic Growth’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 64, No. 5, pp. 748–
765.
Fak, Alex. 5 July 2005. ‘Lack of Trust Carries Heavy Toll’, Moscow Times, p. 1,
online edition.
Faulconbridge, Guy. 10 February 2005. ‘Kudrin Sets Out His Plans for Tax
Service’, Moscow Times, p. 2.
Fish, M. Steven. 1995. Democracy from Scratch (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press).
Winter 1999. ‘Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratiza-
tion in East Europe and Eurasia’, Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, pp. 794–823.
2005. Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics (New York:
Cambridge University Press).
Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie (Public Opinion Foundation, or FOM). 2011.
‘The Practice of Public Service Delivery in Russia’ (Moscow).
Fortin, Jessica. August 2010. ‘A Tool to Evaluate State Capacity in Post-
communist Countries, 1989–2006’, European Journal of Political Research,
Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 654–686.
Franklin, Jennifer L. 1997. ‘Tax Avoidance by Citizens of the Russian Federa-
tion: Will the Draft Tax Code Provide a Solution?’ Duke Journal of Compar-
ative and International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 135–174.
Fritz, Verena. 2007. State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania,
Belarus, and Russia (Budapest: Central European University Press).
Frunkin, Konstantin. 2 November 2005. ‘Government Determined to Pursue
Administrative Reform’, Izvestia, in JRL, No. 9286 (3 November 2005).
Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to
the French Revolution (London, UK: Profile Books).
332 Bibliography
July 2013. ‘Commentary: What is Governance?’ in Governance: An Inter-
national Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 26, No. 3,
pp. 347–368.
Gaddy, Clifford G., and Barry W. Ickes. September/October 1998. ‘Russia’s Vir-
tual Economy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, pp. 53–67.
2002. Russia’s Virtual Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press).
Galligan, Denis J., and Daniel M. Smilov. 1999. Administrative Law in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe 1996–1998 (Budapest: Central European University
Press).
Gaman-Golutvina, Oxana. 2009. ‘The Changing Role of the State and State
Bureaucracy in the Context of Public Administration Reforms: Russian
and Foreign Experience’, in Anton Olenik, ed., Reforming the State With-
out Changing the Model of Power? On Administrative Reform in Post-Socialist
Countries (Abingdon, UK: Routledge), pp. 38–54.
Ganev, Venelin I. 2011. ‘The Annulled Tax State: Schumpeterian Prolegom-
ena to the Study of Postcommunist Fiscal Sociology’, Communist and Post-
communist Studies, Vol. 44, pp. 245–255.
Gehlbach, Scott. 2008. Representation through Taxation: Revenue, Politics and
Development in Postcommunist States (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press).
Germanova, Olga. 5 August 2011. ‘Re-branding the Image of the Tax Service’,
Vestnik, No. 29, accessed 24 August 2015 at <www.visnuk.com.ua/ru/pubs/
fromarchive/1/id/1923>.
Gerth, H.H, and C. Wright Mills. 1958. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(New York: Oxford University Press).
GfK Ukraine. 25 May 2009. ‘STS Modernisation Project KPIS 2008: Presenta-
tion of Research Results’.
Ghindar, Angelica. 2009. ‘Why Go Democratic? Civil Service Reform in Central
and Eastern Europe’, Ph.D. Dissertation in Political Science in the Gradu-
ate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign.
Gimpelson, V.E. 2002. ‘Chislennost’ i sostav rossiı̆skoı̆ biurokratii: mezhdu
sovetskoı̆ nomenklaturoı̆ i gossluzhboı̆ grazhdanskogo obshchestva’ [Num-
ber and composition of Russian bureaucracy: Between Soviet Nomenkatura
and State Service of Civic Society], Preprint (Moscow: Moscow State
University Higher School of Economics). Accessed <www.hse.ru/science/
preprint/WP3_2002_05.htm>.
Gintova, M.A. 29 June 2009. Mekhanizmy gosudarstvennogo stimulirovaniya
institutsional’nykh reform na regional’nom urovne [Mechanisms of State
Incentives Institutional Reforms at the Regional Level], Candidate of Eco-
nomic Sciences Dissertation, Moscow State University.
Glazunov, Mikhail. 2016. Corporate Strategy in Post-communist Russia (Abingdon,
UK: Routledge).
Goble, Paul. 25 November 2005. ‘Window on Eurasia: Putin’s “Power Vertical”
Taking Federalism out of the Federation’, in JRL, No. 9304 (26 November
2005).
Bibliography 333
Goetz, Klaus H. December 2001. ‘Making Sense of Post-communist Central
Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or Latinization?’ Journal
of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6, pp. 1032–1051.
Goetz, Klaus H. and Helmut Wollmann. 2001. ‘Governmentalizing Central
Executives in Post-communist Europe: A Four-Country Comparison’ Jour-
nal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 6, pp. 864–887.
Gorchinskaya, Katya. 19 May 2015. ‘Ukraine Gets New State Property
Chief’, RFE/RL, accessed 8 January 2016 at <www.rferl.org/content/bilous-
named-ukraines-property-chief-despite-poor-report/27025358.html>.
18 July 2015. ‘Avoiding Lustration in Ukraine: Senior Prosecutor Evades
Sweep of Yanukovych-Era Officials’, RFE/RL, accessed at <www.rferl.org/
content/ukraine-lustration-prosecutor-valendyuk/27135678.html>.
Graham, Thomas. 30 September 1999. Testimony on Corruption in Russia and
Future U.S. Policy Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in
JRL, No. 3565 (16 October 1999).
Greene, Samuel A. 2014. Moscow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s
Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
Grigorieva, Ekaterina, and Frumkin, Konstantin. 26 May 2005. ‘Government
in Instalments: President Putin Delivers His Budget Address’, Izvestiya, in
JRL, No. 9160 (26 May 2005).
Grindle, Merilee S. 1996. Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin
America and Africa (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
Hale, Henry. July 2010. ‘Ukraine: The Uses of Divided Power’, Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 84–98.
Hamilton, Christopher. and Wojciech Roszkowski. 1991. ‘Bureaucratic Poland:
Organized Life inside the Maverick Society’, in Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz and
Christopher Hamilton, eds., Public Bureaucracies Between Reform and Resis-
tance: Legacies, Trends and Effects in China, the USSR, Poland, and Yugoslavia
(New York: St. Martin’s Press), pp. 131–178.
Hardin, Russell. 1998. ‘Trust in Government’, in Valerie Braithwaite and Mar-
garet Levi, eds., Trust and Governance (New York: Russell Sage Foundation).
2002. Trust and Trustworthiness (New York: Russell Sage Foundation).
Hellman, Joel. January 1998. ‘Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform
in Postcommunist Transitions’, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 203–234.
Herbst, John E. 20 June 2016. ‘Why the West Was Wrong about Ukraine’s
New Government’, Atlantic Council, accessed 13 July 2016 at <www
.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-west-was-wrong-about-
ukraine-s-new-government>.
Highfield, Richard, and Katherine Baer. 2000. ‘Tax Administration for
Russia’ (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs
Department).
Hilderbrand, Mary E., and Merilee S. Grindle. 1997. ‘Building Sustainable
Capacity in the Public Sector: What Can Be Done?’ in Merilee S. Grindle,
ed., Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of
Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 31–
62.
334 Bibliography
Himes, Susan, and Martine Milliet-Einbinder. January 1999. ‘Russia’s Tax
Reform’, in OECD Observer, No. 215, pp. 26–29, accessed 1 February 2001
at <www.oecd.org/publications/observer/215/e-himes.htm>.
Hosking, Geoffrey. 2014. Trust: A History (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press).
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press).
Huskey, Eugene. 2001. ‘Political Leadership and the Centre–Periphery Strug-
gle: Putin’s Administrative Reforms’, in Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova,
eds., Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 113–
142.
Huskey, Eugene, and Alexander Obolonsky. July/August 2003. ‘The Struggle
to Reform Russia’s Bureaucracy’, Problems of Post-communism, pp. 24–
33.
Iakovlev, Andrej A. March 2000. ‘The Causes of Barter, Nonpayments, and Tax
Evasion in the Russian Economy’, Problems of Economic Transition, Vol. 42,
No. 11, pp. 80–96.
Ickes, Barry W., and Joel Slemrod. 1992. ‘Tax Implementation Issues in the
Transition from a Planned Economy’, in Pierre Pestieau, ed., Public
Finance in a World of Transition: Proceedings of the 47th Congress of the
International Institute of Public Finance/Institut International de Finances
Publiques, St. Petersburg 1991, A Supplement to Public Finance/Finances
Publiques, Vol. 47, pp. 384–399.
INDEM Foundation. 2001. ‘Russia Anti-Corruption Diagnostics: Sociological
Analysis’, Moscow.
Instytut Praw Publicznych (Institute of Public Affairs). 5 March 2012. National
Integrity System Assessment: Poland, p. 2, accessed 1 January 2016, at <www
.transparency.org/whatwedo/nisarticle/poland_2012>.
Interfax (Moscow). 25 July 2006. ‘NGO Leaders Says Tax Claims Are Attempt
to Pressure Civil Society’, in JRL, No. 169 (26 July 2006).
Interfax-Ukraine. 21 June 2016. ‘Groysman Hopes Tax Reform in Ukraine to Be
Drawn Up in September’, Kyiv Post, accessed 29 August 2016 at <www
.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/groysman-hopes-tax-reform-
in-ukraine-to-be-drawn-up-in-september-416780.html>.
International Finance Corporation (IFC). 2004. ‘Business Environment in
Ukraine’ (Kyiv and Washington, DC).
2005. ‘Business Environment in Ukraine’ (Kyiv and Washington, DC).
International Monetary Fund (IMF). May 1999. ‘Ukraine: Recent Economic
Developments’, IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/42.
April 2002. ‘Russian Federation: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix’,
IMF Country Report No. 02/75.
November 2005. ‘Ukraine, Statistical Appendix’, IMF Country Report
No. 05/417.
January 2016. ‘Ukraine: Technical Assistance Report – Reducing Social Secu-
rity Contributions and Improving the Corporate and Small Business Tax
System’, IMF Country Report No. 16/25.
Bibliography 335
1 September 2016. ‘Ukraine: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic
and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding’,
accessed 7 October 2016 at <www.imf.org/External/NP/LOI/2016/UKR/
090116.pdf>.
International Tax and Investment Centre (ITIC). 5 January 2005. ITIC Bulletin,
Special Edition.
IPR Strategic Information Database. 28 November 2002. ‘Putin Signs Decree on
Reforming the Civil Service’, accessed through Factiva.
ITAR-TASS. 19 February 1998. ‘Overall Debt to All Budgets in Russia Totals
555 Bln Rbls’, accessed through the Dow Jones Interactive Electronic
Search Engine.
23 November 2005. ‘“Under-the-Table” Salaries in Russia Make Up 30% of
Total Payroll Fund’, in JRL, No. 9303 (25 November 2005).
Itrich-Drabarek, Jolanta. 2012. ‘Chapter I: The Legal Foundations and the
Quality and Ethical Standards of the Polish Civil Service’, in Jolanta Itrich-
Drabarek, Kamil Mroczka, and Łukasz Świetlikowski, Civil Service in Poland
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po raschetam ėkonomistov, nalog soburaiut na 50–62%’ [VAT Isn’t Paid:
According to Economists, the Tax is Collected at 50 to 62 Percent], Vedo-
mosti, p. A3. Translated from the Russian by the author.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Indus-
trial Policy, 1925–1975 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press).
Johnson, David. 1996–present. Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), E-mail newsletter.
A project of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at
George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
Johnson, Simon, and Daniel Kaufmann. 1997. ‘The Unofficial Economy in
Transition’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1997, No. 2.
Jones Luong, Pauline, and Erika Weinthal. 2010. Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership
Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press).
K., L. 16 May 2001. ‘Wojciechowski chce pojedynku’, Rzeczpospolita. Archive
section of Rzeczpospolita online <www.rzeczpospolita.pl>.
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na 31 grudnia 2002 r.’ [Information on the implementation of tax liabilities
as of 31 December 2002], Warsaw.
May 2004a. ‘Informacja w sprawie realizacji zobowiązań podatkowych według
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July 1993. ‘Analiza wykonania budżetu państwa w 1992 roku’ [Analysis of the
implementation of the state budge in 1992], Warsaw.
July 1994. ‘Analiza wykonania budżetu państwa w 1993 roku’ [Analysis of the
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Kwaśniewski, Aleksander, 17, 208
Kyiv Post, 260
Lane, David, 74
language and tax compliance, 250–252
Latin America, 45, 118
Latvia, 132
Law and Justice (PiS) (Poland), 17, 18,
37, 57, 70
Law of the Urals Division, the Russian
Academy of Sciences’, 83
Lebedev, Alexander, 171
Ledeneva, Alena, 43
Ledyaev, Valeri G., 139, 140
legacies. See historical legacies
legitimacy, 13, 40
and trust, 40, 42
measuring, 220
of the transition, 259
Polish People’s Republic, 63
Soviet, 35, 76
state’s, 27, 44, 220, 227, 259
tax authority’s, 43
Lenin, Vladimir, 75
Levi, Margaret, 43–44, 53, 203–205, 218
Levitsky, Steven, 21
Lewin, Moshe, 74, 75
Lieberman, Evan, 97, 98, 110
Linz, Juan, 25, 29, 30, 244, 245
Lithuania, 76, 132
loans for shares (Russia), 27
Logunov, A.B., 81
Lough, John, 226




Main Audit Administration of the
President (Russia), 190
Main Division of Tax Investigations
(Russia), 149
managed democracy, 28
Mann, Michael, 6, 36, 139
Marcinkiewicz, Kazimierz, 70
Martin, Isaac William, 50




McNab, Robert M., 117, 151




Migdal, Joel, 6, 13, 14, 23, 24
Milanov, Valentin B., 134
Mill, John Stuart, 5
Millar, James R., 29
MIMIC method, 123
mineral extraction tax (MET), 101
Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade (Russia), 81, 82, 116, 148
Ministry of Economy (Ukraine), 125
Ministry of Finance (Poland), 48, 64, 113,
130, 141, 144, 161, 162, 180,
181–182, 185, 186, 190
Ministry of Finance (Russia), 79, 81, 116,
117, 144, 146, 169
Ministry of Finance (Ukraine), 106, 154,
155–157
Ministry of Finance (USSR), 99, 144
Ministry of Interior (Russia), 151, 153
Ministry of Interior (Ukraine), 159
Ministry of Revenues and Dues (Ukraine),
158
Ministry of Taxes and Dues (Russia), 48,
79, 144, 145, 146, 150, 182, 187
Ministry of the Treasury (Poland), 141
model transference, 10, 32, 38, 54, 56, 72,
94–95, 139, 259
Monitoring Administration (Russia), 83
Movchan, Andrei, 193
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Najwyższy Trybunał Administracyjny
Supreme Audit Chamber. See
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Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (Poland’s
social security system or ZUS), 100,
124, 142, 283
Zhurzhiy, Andrei V., 106
Zyuganov, Gennadiy, 19, 58

